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PREFACE
the essays compiled in this volume are about agency and change in the 
Muslim Middle East, the societies in which religion seems to occupy a 
prominent position. More specifi cally, they focus on the confi guration of 
sociopo liti cal transformation brought about by internal social forces, by 
collectives and individuals.  Here I focus on the diverse ways in which the 
ordinary people, the subaltern— the urban dispossessed, Muslim women, 
the globalizing youth, and other urban grass roots— strive to aff ect the con-
tours of change in their societies, by refusing to exit from the social and 
po liti cal stage controlled by authoritarian states, moral authority, and neo-
liberal economies, discovering and generating new spaces within which 
they can voice their dissent and assert their presence in pursuit of bettering 
their lives. The vehicles through which ordinary people change their societ-
ies are not simply audible mass protests or revolutions, even though they 
represent an aspect of pop u lar mobilization; rather, people resort more 
widely to what I will elaborate as “nonmovements”— the collective endeav-
ors of millions of noncollective actors, carried out in the main squares, back 
streets, court houses, or communities. This book, then, is about the “art of 
presence,” the story of agency in times of constraints. The essays constitute 
the core of my refl ections for the past de cade or so on the social movements 
and nonmovements that are seen through the prism of historical specifi city 
of the Muslim Middle East, yet ones that insist on both critical and con-
structive engagement with the prevailing social theory. By so doing my 
hope has been not only to produce rigorous empirical knowledge about so-
cial change in this complex region, but in the meantime to engage with and 
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contribute to social theory in general. My wish is that this book might off er 
a Middle Eastern contribution, however modest, to scholarly debates on so-
cial movements and social change.
544-41003_ch00_4P.indd   x 9/1/09   1:58 PM
xi
—-1
—0
—+1
AC KNOW LEDG MENTS
a volume that has taken about a de cade of research and refl ections must have 
been written with the assistance and support, whether intellectual or practi-
cal, of many people— scholars, students, and colleagues, in the Middle East, 
the United States, and Eu rope. Understandably, it is diffi  cult to pinpoint them 
in order to record my sincere appreciation. But I do wish to register my deep-
est gratitude to them all. Most of the pieces in this volume  were produced or 
fi nalized during my work as the Academic Director of the Dutch- based Inter-
national Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), a unique 
scholarly enterprise that combined rigorous scholarship with constructive 
social engagement. I am grateful to the colleagues at ISIM, especially staff  
members and the internationally diverse fellows who enriched the institute by 
their enthusiasm and their valuable and varied experiences. Some of the ideas 
in this book developed out of my short contributions to the ISIM Review, and 
some others from preparing numerous lectures, which I delivered in diff erent 
parts of the world in the course of these years. I am grateful for the individu-
als and organizations who welcomed cooperation. As always, my greatest debt 
is to my family, Linda, Shiva, and Tara, without whose unfailing love and sup-
port none of these endeavors would have materialized in the way they have.
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 1 INTRODUCTION
The Art of Presence
there is no shortage of views, whether regional or international, suggesting 
that the Middle East has fallen into disarray. We continue to read how the 
personal income of Arabs is among the lowest in the world, despite their mas-
sive oil revenues. With declining productivity, poor scientifi c research, de-
creasing school enrollment, and high illiteracy, and with health conditions 
lagging behind comparable nations, Arab countries seem to be “richer than 
they are developed.”1 The unfortunate state of social development in the re-
gion is coupled with poor po liti cal governance. Authoritarian regimes rang-
ing from Iran, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco to the sheikhdoms of the 
Persian Gulf, and chiefl y Saudi Arabia (incidentally, most with close ties to 
the West), continue to frustrate demands for democracy and the rule of law, 
prompting (religious) opposition movements that espouse equally undemo-
cratic, exclusive, and oft en violent mea sures. Not surprisingly, the current 
conditions have caused much fear in the West about the international destabi-
lizing ramifi cations of this seeming social and po liti cal stagnation.
Thus, never before has the region witnessed such a cry for change. The 
idea that “everywhere the world has changed except for the Middle East” has 
assumed a renewed prominence, with diff erent domestic and international 
constituencies expressing diff erent expectations as to how to instigate change 
in this region. Some circles hope for a revolutionary transformation through a 
sudden upsurge of pop u lar energy to overturn the unjust structures of power 
and usher in development and democracy. If the Ira ni an Revolution, not so 
long ago, could sweep aside a long- standing monarchy in less than two years, 
why  couldn’t such movement be forged in the region today? This is a diffi  cult 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
position to sustain. It is doubtful that revolutions can ever be planned.2 Even 
though revolutionaries do engage in plotting and preparing, revolutions do 
not necessarily result from prior schemes. Rather, they oft en follow their own 
intriguing logic, subject to a highly complex mix of structural, international, 
coincidental, and psychological factors. We oft en analyze revolutions in retro-
spect, rarely engaging in ones that are expected or desired, for revolutions are 
never predictable.3 On the other hand, most people do not particularly wish 
to be involved in violent revolutionary movements. People oft en express doubt 
about engaging in revolution, whose outcome they cannot foresee. They oft en 
prefer to remain “free riders,” wanting others to carry out revolutions on their 
behalf. Furthermore, are revolutions necessarily desirable? Those who have 
experienced them usually identify violent revolutions with massive disrup-
tion, destruction, and uncertainty. Aft er all, nothing guarantees that a just 
social order will result from a revolutionary change. Finally, even assuming 
that revolutions are desirable and can be planned, what are people under au-
thoritarian rule to do in the meantime?
Given these constraints, an alternative view postulates that instead of 
waiting for an uncertain revolution, change should be instigated by commit-
ting states to undertaking sustained social and po liti cal reforms. Such a non-
violent strategy of reform requires powerful social forces— social movements 
(of workers, the poor, women, youth, students, and broader democracy move-
ments) or genuine po liti cal parties— to challenge po liti cal authorities and he-
gemonize their claims. Indeed, many activists and NGOs in the Middle East 
are already engaged in forging movements to alter the current state of aff airs. 
However, while this may serve as a genuinely endogenous strategy for change, 
eff ective movements need po liti cal opportunities to grow and operate. How 
are social and po liti cal movements to keep up when authoritarian regimes 
exhibit a great intolerance toward or ga nized activism, when the repression of 
civil- society organizations has been a hallmark of most Middle Eastern states?
It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that growing segments of peo-
ple, frustrated by the po liti cal stalemate, lament that although most people in 
the Middle East suff er under the status quo, they remain repressed, atomized, 
and passive. Pop u lar activism, if any, goes little beyond occasional, albeit 
angry, protests, with most of them directed by Islamists against the West and 
Israel, and less against their own repressive states to commit to a demo cratic 
order. Since there is slight or no agency to challenge the ossifi ed status quo, 
the argument goes, change should come from outside, by way of economic, 
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THE ART OF PRESENCE 3
po liti cal, and even military pressure. Even the Arab Human Development Re-
port, arguably the most signifi cant manifesto for change in the Arab Middle 
East, is inclined to seek a “realistic solution” of a “western- supported project 
of gradual and moderate reform aiming at liberalization.”4 Still, the percep-
tion that the Middle East remains “unchangeable” has far greater resonance 
outside the region, notably in the West and among policy circles, the main-
stream media, and many think tanks. Indeed, a strong “exceptionalist” out-
look informs the  whole edifi ce of the “democracy promotion industry” in the 
West, which pushes for instigating change through outside powers, one which 
does not exclude the use of force.5
The idea of Middle Eastern exceptionalism is not new. Indeed, for a long 
time now, change in Middle Eastern societies has been approached with a 
largely western Orientalist outlook whose history goes back to the eigh teenth 
century, if not earlier.6 Mainstream Orientalism tends to depict the Muslim 
Middle East as a monolithic, fundamentally static, and thus “peculiar” entity. 
By focusing on a narrow notion of (a rather static) culture— one that is virtu-
ally equated with the religion of Islam— Middle Eastern societies are charac-
terized more in terms of historical continuity than in terms of change. In this 
perspective, change, albeit uncommon, may indeed occur, but primarily via 
individual elites, military men, or wars and external powers. The George W. 
Bush administration’s doctrine of “regime change,” exemplifi ed in, for instance, 
the occupation of Iraq and the inclination to wage a war against Iran, repre-
sents how, in such a perspective, “reform” is to be realized in the region. Con-
sequently, internal sources of po liti cal transformation, such as group inter-
ests, social movements, and po liti cal economies, are largely overlooked.
But in fact the Middle East has been home to many insurrectionary epi-
sodes, nationwide revolutions, and social movements (such as Islamism), and 
great strides for change. Beyond these, certain distinct and unconventional forms 
of agency and activism have emerged in the region that do not get adequate at-
tention, because they do not fi t into our prevailing categories and conceptual 
imaginations. By elaborating on and highlighting these latter forms, or what I 
call “social nonmovements,” I wish also to raise a number of theoretical and 
methodological questions as to how to look at the notions of agency and change 
in the Muslim Middle East today. Indeed, conditioned by the exceptionalist 
outlook, many observers tend to exclude the study of the Middle East from the 
prevailing social science perspectives. For instance, many narratives of Is-
lamism treat it simply in terms of religious revivalism, or as an expression of 
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primordial loyalties, or irrational group actions, or something peculiar and 
unique, a phenomenon that cannot be analyzed by the conventional social sci-
ence categories. In fact, Islamism had been largely excluded from the mode of 
inquiry developed by social movement theorists in the West until recently, 
when a handful of scholars have attempted to bring Islamic activism into the 
realm of “social movement theory.”7 This is certainly a welcome development. 
However, these scholars tend largely to “borrow” from, rather than critically 
and productively engage with and thus contribute to, social movement theories. 
Indeed, it remains a question how far the prevailing social movement theory is 
able to account for the complexities of socioreligious movements in contempo-
rary Muslim societies, in par tic u lar when these perspectives are rooted in par-
tic u lar genealogies, in the highly diff erentiated and po liti cally open Western 
societies, where social movements oft en develop into highly structured and 
largely homogeneous entities— possibilities that are limited in the non- Western 
world. Charles Tilly is correct in alerting us to be mindful of the historical 
specifi city of “social movements”— political per for mances that emerged in West-
ern Eu rope and North America aft er 1750. In this historical experience, what 
came to be known as “social movements” combined three elements: an or ga-
nized and sustained claim making on target authorities; a repertoire of per for-
mances, including associations, public meetings, media statements, and street 
marches; and fi nally, “public repre sen ta tions of the cause’s worthiness, unity, 
numbers, and commitment.”8 Deployed separately, these elements would not 
make “social movements,” but some diff erent po liti cal actions. Given that the 
dominant social movement theories draw on western experience, to what extent 
can they help us understand the pro cess of solidarity building or the collectivi-
ties of disjointed yet parallel practices of noncollective actors in the non- western 
po liti cally closed and technologically limited settings?9
In contrast to the “exceptionalist” tendency, there are those oft en “local” 
scholars in the Middle East who tend uncritically to deploy conventional 
models and concepts to the social realities of their societies, without acknowl-
edging suffi  ciently that these models hold diff erent historical genealogies, and 
may thus off er little help to explain the intricate texture and dynamics of 
change and re sis tance in this part of the world. For instance, considering “slums” 
in light of the conventional perspectives of urban sociology, the informal 
communities in the Middle East (i.e., ashwaiyyat) are erroneously taken to be 
the breeding ground for violence, crime, anomie, extremism, and, consequently, 
radical Islam. There is little in such narratives that sees these communities as 
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THE ART OF PRESENCE 5
a signifi cant locus of struggle for (urban) citizenship and transformation in 
urban confi guration. Scant attention is given to how the urban disenfran-
chised, through their quiet and unassuming daily struggles, refi gure new life 
and communities for themselves and diff erent urban realities on the ground 
in Middle Eastern cities. The prevailing scholarship ignores the fact that these 
urban subaltern redefi ne the meaning of urban management and de facto 
participate in determining its destiny; and they do so not through formal in-
stitutional channels, from which they are largely excluded, but through direct 
actions in the very zones of exclusion. To give a diff erent example, in early 2000 
Ira ni an analysts looking uncritically at Muslim women’s activism through 
the prism of social movement theory— developed primarily in the United 
States— concluded that there was no such a thing as a women’s movement in 
Iran, because certain features of Ira ni an women’s activities did not resemble 
the principal “model.” It is perhaps in this spirit that Olivier Roy warns against 
the kind of comparison that takes “one of the elements of comparison as 
norm” while never questioning the “original confi guration.”10 A fruitful ap-
proach would demand an analytical innovation that not only rejects both 
Middle Eastern “exceptionalism” and uncritical application of conventional 
social science concepts but also thinks and introduces fresh perspectives to 
observe, a novel vocabulary to speak, and new analytical tools to make sense 
of specifi c regional realities. It is in this frame of mind that I examine both 
contentious politics and social “nonmovements” as key vehicles to produce 
meaningful change in the Middle East.
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE
A number of remarkable social and po liti cal transformations in the region 
have resulted from or ga nized contentious endeavors of various forms, rang-
ing from endemic protest actions, to durable social movements, to major rev-
olutionary mobilizations. The constitutional revolution of 1905– 6 heralded 
the end of Qajar despotism and the beginning of the era of constitutionalism 
in Iran. The Egyptian Revolution of 1952, led by free offi  cers, and the Iraqi 
Revolution of 1958 terminated long- standing monarchies and British colonial 
rule, augmenting republicanism and socialistic economies. In a major social 
and po liti cal upheaval, the Algerians overthrew French colonial rule in 1962 
and established a republic.
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 galvanized millions of Ira ni ans in a move-
ment that toppled the monarchy and ushered in a new era, not only in Iran, 
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6 INTRODUCTION 
but in many nations of the Muslim world. Some twenty- fi ve years earlier, a 
nationalist and secular demo cratic movement led by Prime Minister Muham-
mad Mossadegh had established constitutionalism, until it was crushed by a 
coup engineered by the CIA and the British secret ser vice in 1953, which re-
instated the dictatorship of the Shah. In 1985 in Sudan, a nonviolent uprising 
by a co ali tion of students, workers, and professional  unions (National Alliance 
for National Salvation) forced President Jaafar Numeiri’s authoritarian pop-
ulist regime (born of a military coup) to step down in favor of a national 
transitional government, paving the way for free elections and demo cratic 
governance. The fi rst Palestinian intifada (1987– 93) was one of the most 
grassroots- based mobilizations in the Middle East of the past century. Trig-
gered by a fatal accident caused by an Israeli truck driver, and against the 
backdrop of years of occupation, the uprising included almost the entire Pal-
estinian population, in par tic u lar women and children, who resorted to non-
violent methods of re sis tance to the occupation, such as civil disobedience, 
strikes, demonstrations, withholding taxes, and product boycotts. Led mainly 
by the local (versus exiled) leaders, the movement built on pop u lar commit-
tees (e.g., women’s, voluntary work, and medical relief ) to sustain itself, while 
serving as an embryonic institution of a future in de pen dent Palestinian state.11 
More recently, the “Cedar Revolution,” a grassroots movement of some 1.5 mil-
lion Lebanese from all walks of life demanding meaningful sovereignty, de-
mocracy, and an end to foreign meddling, resulted in the withdrawal of Syrian 
forces from Lebanon in 2005. This movement came to symbolize a model of 
peaceful mobilization from below that could cause momentous change in the 
region. At almost the same time, a nascent democracy movement in Egypt, with 
Kifaya at its core, mobilized thousands of middle- class professionals, stu-
dents, teachers, judges, and journalists who called for a release of po liti cal 
prisoners and an end to emergency law, torture, and Husni Mubarak’s presi-
dency. In a fresh perspective, this movement chose to work with “pop u lar 
forces,” rather than with traditional opposition parties, bringing the campaign 
into the streets instead of broadcasting it from headquarters, and focused on 
domestic issues rather than international demands. As a postnational and pos-
tideological movement, Kifaya embraced activists from diverse ideological ori-
entations and gender, religious, and social groups. This novel mobilization 
managed, aft er years of Islamist hegemony, nationalism, and authoritarian rule, 
to break the taboo of unlawful street marches, and to augment a new postna-
tionalist, secular, and nonsectarian (demo cratic) politics in Egypt. It galvanized 
international support and compelled the Egyptian government to amend the 
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THE ART OF PRESENCE 7
constitution to allow for competitive presidential elections. More spectacularly, 
the nonviolent Green Wave mobilized millions of Iranians against the Ahma-
dinejad’s hardline government (accused of fraud in the presidential elections of 
June 12, 2009) pushing for democratic reform.
Movements like Green Wave, Kifaya, and the Cedar Revolution emerged 
against the background of, and indeed as alternatives to, the more formidable 
Islamist trends in the Muslim Middle East, which have grown on the ruins of 
secular Arab socialism— a mix of Pan- Arabism and (non- Marxist) socialism, 
which wielded notable impact on po liti cal ideas and social developmental 
arenas in the 1950s and 1960s but declined aft er the Arab defeat in the Six Day 
War with Israel. Islamist movements have posed perhaps the most serious 
challenge to secular authoritarian regimes in the region, even though their 
vision of po li ti cal order remained largely exclusivist and authoritarian. They 
expressed the voice of the mainly middle- class high achievers— products of 
Arab socialist programs— who in the 1980s felt marginalized by the dominant 
economic and po liti cal pro cesses in their societies, and who saw no recourse 
in the fading socialist project and growing neoliberal modernity, thus chart-
ing their dream of justice and power in religious politics. The infl uence of 
Middle Eastern Islamism has gone beyond the home countries; by forging 
transnational networks, it has impacted global politics on an unpre ce dented 
scale. Yet the failure of Islamism to herald a demo cratic and inclusive order 
has given rise to far- reaching nascent movements, what I have called “post- 
Islamism,” that can reshape the po liti cal map of the region if they succeed. 
Neither anti- Islamic nor secular, but spearheaded by pious Muslims, post- 
Islamism attempts to undo Islamism as a po liti cal project by fusing faith and 
freedom, a secular demo cratic state and a religious society. It wants to marry 
Islam with individual choice and liberties, with democracy and modernity, to 
generate what some have called an “alternative modernity.” Emerging fi rst in 
the Islamist Iran of the late 1990s (and expressed in Mohammad Khatami’s 
reform government of 1997– 2004), post- Islamism has gained expression in a 
number of po liti cal movements and parties in the Muslim world, including 
Egypt’s Al- Wasat, the current Lebanese Hizbullah, the Moroccan Justice and 
Development Party, and the ruling Turkish Justice and Development Party 
(AK Party). This trend is likely to continue to grow as an alternative to undemo-
cratic Islamist movements.
Parallel to the current post- Islamist turn, Islam continues to serve as a 
crucial mobilizing ideology and social movement frame. But as this book dem-
onstrates, Islam is not only a subject of po liti cal contention, but also its object. 
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8 INTRODUCTION 
In other words, while religious militants continue to deploy Islam as an ideo-
logical frame to push for exclusive moral and sociopo liti cal order, secular 
Muslims, human rights activists, and, especially, middle- class women have 
campaigned against a reading of Islam that underwrites patriarchy and justi-
fi es their subjugation. Indeed, the history of women’s struggle in the Middle 
East has been intimately tied to a battle against conservative readings of 
 Islam. Throughout the twentieth century, segments of Middle Eastern women 
 were mobilized against conservative moral and po liti cal authorities, to push 
for gender equality in marriage, family, and the economy, and to assert their 
social role and ability to act as public players.12 While the earlier forms of wom-
en’s activism, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, focused 
primarily on charity work, the 1940s saw women collectively engaged in anti-
colonial struggles, while protesting against polygamy and advocating female 
education. Women’s campaigns  were galvanized in associational activism, 
which in this period fl ourished in Egypt, Tunis, Morocco, Lebanon, Sudan, 
and Iraq.13 In the meantime, the nationalist and left ist po liti cal parties and 
movements wished to strengthen women’s rights; yet issues relating to gender 
equality took a backseat to po liti cal priorities, in par tic u lar the broader ob-
jective of national liberation. It was largely in the postcolonial era, when 
women’s presence in education, public life, politics, and the economy had 
been considerably enhanced, that women’s organizations dedicated their at-
tention primarily to gender rights. Yet the tide of conservative Islamism and 
Salafi  trends since the 1980s has posed a new challenge to eff orts to decrease 
the gender gap in Middle Eastern societies.14 Many women are now in the 
throes of a battle that aims to retain what the earlier generations had gained 
over years of struggle. The desire to play an active part in society and the 
economy and to assert a degree of individuality remains a signifi cant women’s 
claim.
If historically women used charity associations to assert their public role 
and other gender claims, currently the professional middle classes (teachers, 
lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, and doctors) deploy their fairly in de pen dent 
syndicates both to defend their professional claims and to carry out po liti cal 
work, since traditional party politics remain in general corrupt and in eff ec-
tive. Thus, it is not uncommon to fi nd professional syndicates to serve nation-
alist or Islamist politics— a phenomenon quite distinct from labor  unions. 
Unlike the professional syndicates, the conventional trade  unions remain en-
gaged chiefl y with economic and social concerns. Despite corporatism and 
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governmental pressures, trade  unions in the Middle East have spearheaded 
defending workers’ rights and their traditional social contract. While Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey have enjoyed more or less pluralist and rela-
tively in de pen dent  unions, in the ex- populist countries of the region, such as 
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria,  unions remain in the grip of corporat-
ism. But even such corporatist  unions have been used by the public- sector 
workers to fi ght against redundancies, price increases, and traditional bene-
fi ts. Clearly,  unionism covers only a small percentage of working people, or ga-
nized in the formal and public sectors. Where trade  unions have failed to 
serve the interests of the majority of working poor, workers have oft en re-
sorted to illegal strikes or mass street protests.15 Thus, the Economic Reform 
and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) has, since the 1980s, coincided 
with a number of cost- of- living protests in many cities of the region, protests 
with little or no religious coloring. Indeed, the 2006, 2007, and March– April 
2008 spate of mass workers’ strikes in Egypt’s public and private sectors, in 
par tic u lar among the textile workers of Mahalla al- Kubra, was described as the 
most eff ective or ga nized activism in the nation’s history since World War II, 
with almost no Islamist infl uence.16
It is clear that contentious collective action has played a key role in the po-
liti cal trajectories of the Middle Eastern nations. These collectives represent 
fairly or ga nized, self- conscious, and relatively sustained mobilizations with 
identifi able leadership and oft en a par tic u lar (nationalist or socialist) ideology 
or discourse. However, this type of or ga nized activism does not develop just 
anywhere and anytime. It requires a po liti cal opportunity— when the po liti cal 
authorities and the mechanisms of control are undermined by, for instance, a 
po liti cal or an economic crisis, international pressure, or infi ghting within 
the ruling elites. For example, the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon resulted from 
the slaying of Prime Minister Hariri, which off ered a po liti cal and psychologi-
cal opportunity to forge a broad anti- Syrian movement. Alternatively, an op-
portunity may arise when a sympathetic government or a faction within the 
government comes to power (e.g., as a result of an election), which then di-
minishes risk of repression and facilitates collective and or ga nized mobiliza-
tion; this was the case during the reform government under President Khat-
ami in Iran (1997– 2004). Otherwise, in ordinary conditions, the authoritarian 
regimes in the region have expressed little tolerance toward sustained collec-
tive dissent. The Freedom  House reported in 2003 that while only fi ve states 
in the Middle East and North Africa region allowed some limited po liti cal 
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rights and civil liberties, the remaining twelve states allowed none.17 In Iran 
in 2007 alone, thousands of activists— journalists, teachers, students, women, 
and members of labor, civil, and cultural organizations— were arrested and 
faced court charges or  were dismissed from their positions.18 Dozens of dai-
lies and weeklies, and hundreds of NGOs,  were shut down. An Amnesty In-
ternational report on Egypt cites police violence against peaceful protestors 
calling for po liti cal reform, the arrest of hundreds of Muslim Brothers mem-
bers, and the detention, without trial, of thousands of others suspected of 
supporting banned Islamic groups. Torture and ill- treatment in detention 
continued to be systematic.19 Restriction of po liti cal expression has been, by 
far, worse in Saudi Arabia and Tunis. The following report about a group of 
young Egyptians launching a peaceful campaign gives a taste of the severe 
restrictions against collective actions:
July 23, 2008. Under the scorching sun on a beach in Alexandria, Egypt, a few 
dozen po liti cal activists snap digital pictures and chatter ner vous ly. Many of 
them wear matching white T-shirts emblazoned with the image of a fi st raised 
in solidarity and the words “April 6 Youth” splashed across the back. A few of 
them get to work constructing a giant kite out of bamboo poles and a sheet of 
plastic painted to look like the Egyptian fl ag. Most are in their twenties, some 
younger; one teenage girl wears a teddy bear backpack. Before the group can 
get the kite aloft , and well before they have a chance to distribute their pro- 
democracy leafl ets, state security agents swarm across the sand. The cops shout 
threats to break up what is, by Western standards, a tiny demonstration. The 
activists disperse from the beach, feeling hot and frustrated; they didn’t even 
get a chance to fl y their kite. Joining up with other friends, they walk together 
toward the neighborhood of Loran, singing patriotic songs. Then, as they turn 
down another street, a group of security agents jump out of nowhere. It’s a 
coordinated assault that explodes into a frenzy of punches and shoves. There 
are screams and grunts as about a dozen kids fall or are knocked to the 
ground. The other 30 or so scatter, sprinting for blocks in all directions before 
slowing enough to send each other hurried text messages: Where are you? 
What happened? Those who didn’t get away are hustled into a van and two 
cars. The security men are shouting at them: “Where is [the leader] Ahmed 
Maher ?”20
In the absence of free activities, the po liti cal class is forced either to exit 
the po liti cal scene at least temporarily, or to go underground. All of the re-
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gion’s guerilla movements, whether the Marxist Fedaian of prerevolutionary 
Iran, the nationalist Algerian re sis tance against the French colonialism, or the 
more recent Islamist al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya of Egypt and the Islamic Salva-
tion Front (FIS) of Algeria, resorted to subversive revolutionism largely be-
cause open and legal po liti cal work was limited. The sad truth is that the dis-
sident movements of this sort are likely to spearhead undemo cratic practices. 
Surveillance and secrecy disrupt free communication and open debate within 
a movement, leading either to fragmentation of aims and expectations— a 
recipe for discord and sedition— or to outright authoritarian tendencies and a 
cult of leadership. Still, while only a handful of revolutionary activists would 
venture into such perilous subversive operations, others would fi nd recourse 
in street politics, expressing grievance in public space and engaging in civic 
campaigns, or resort to the type of “social nonmovements” that interlock ac-
tivism with the practice of everyday life.
STREET POLITICS AND PO LITI CAL STREET
The contentious politics I have outlined so far are produced and expressed 
primarily in urban settings. Indeed, urban public space continues to serve as 
the key theater of contentions. When people are deprived of the electoral 
power to change things, they are likely to resort to their own institutional clout 
(as students or workers going on strike) to bring collective pressure to bear on 
authorities to undertake change. But for those urban subjects (such as the 
unemployed,  house wives, and the “informal people”) who structurally lack 
intuitional power of disruption (such as going on strike), the “street” becomes 
the ultimate arena to communicate discontent. This kind of street politics de-
scribes a set of confl icts, and the attendant implications, between an individ-
ual or a collective populace and the authorities, which are shaped and ex-
pressed in the physical and social space of the streets, from the back alleyways 
to the more visible streets and squares.21  Here confl ict originates from the ac-
tive use of public space by subjects who, in the modern states, are allowed to 
use it only passively— through walking, driving, watching— or in other ways 
that the state dictates. Any active or participative use infuriates offi  cials, who 
see themselves as the sole authority to establish and control public order. 
Thus, the street vendors who proactively spread their businesses in the main 
alleyways; squatters who take over public parks, lands, or sidewalks; youth 
who control the street- corner spaces, street children who establish street com-
munities; poor  house wives who extend their daily  house hold activities into 
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the alleyways; or protestors who march in the streets, all challenge the state 
prerogatives and thus may encounter reprisal.
Street politics assumes more relevance, particularly in the neoliberal cit-
ies, those shaped by the logic of the market. Strolling through the streets of 
Cairo, Tehran, Dakar, or Jakarta in the midst of a working day, one is aston-
ished by the presence of so many people operating in the streets— working, 
running around, standing, sitting, negotiating, driving, or riding on buses 
and trams. These represent the relatively new subaltern of the neoliberal city. 
For the neoliberal city is the “city inside- out,” where a massive number of in-
habitants become compelled by the poverty and dispossession to operate, sub-
sist, socialize, and simply live a life in the public spaces.  Here the outdoor spaces 
(back alleys, public parks, squares, and the main streets) serve as indispensi-
ble assets in the economic livelihood and social/cultural reproduction of a 
vast segment of the urban population, and, consequently, as fertile ground for 
the expression of street politics.22
But “street politics” has another dimension, in that it is more than just 
about confl ict between authorities and deinstitutionalized or informal groups 
over the control of public space and order. Streets, as spaces of fl ow and move-
ment, are not only where people express grievances, but also where they forge 
identities, enlarge solidarities, and extend their protest beyond their immedi-
ate circles to include the unknown, the strangers.  Here streets serve as a me-
dium through which strangers or casual passersby are able to establish latent 
communication with one another by recognizing their mutual interests and 
shared sentiments. This is how a small demonstration may grow into a mas-
sive exhibition of solidarity; and that is why almost every contentious politics, 
major revolution, and protest movement fi nds expression in the urban streets. 
It is this epidemic potential of street politics that provokes authorities’ severe 
surveillance and widespread repression. While a state may be able to shut down 
colleges or to abolish po liti cal parties, it cannot easily stop the normal fl ow of 
life in streets, unless it resorts to normalizing violence, erecting walls and 
checkpoints, as a strategic element of everyday life.
Thus, not only does city space serve as the center stage of sociopo liti cal 
contentions, it at the same time conditions the dynamics and shapes the pat-
terns of confl icts and their resolution. Cities inescapably leave their spatial 
imprints on the nature of social struggles and agency; they provoke par tic u lar 
kinds of politics, of both micro and macro nature. For instance, revolutions in 
the sense of “insurrections” not only result from certain historical trajecto-
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ries, but are also shaped by certain geographies and are facilitated by certain 
spatial infl uences. Thus, beyond asking why and when a given revolution oc-
curred, we should also be asking where it was unleashed and why it happened 
where it did. As sites of the concentration of wealth, power, and privilege, cit-
ies are as much the source of epidemic confl icts, social struggles, and mass 
insurgencies as the source of cooperation, sharing, and what I like to call “every-
day cosmopolitanism”— a place where various members of ethnic, racial, and 
religious groupings are conditioned to mix, mingle, undertake everyday en-
counters, and experience trust with one another. Cosmopolitan experiences 
in cities, in turn, may act as a spatial catalyst to ward off  and contain sectarian 
strife and violence. In this book, I examine how, for instance, Muslims and 
Coptic Christians in Cairo experience an intertwined culture, shared lives, 
and inseparable histories— a social intercourse that subverts the language of 
clash, one that has dominated the current “interreligious” relations around 
the globe. And yet, along with providing the possibility for mixing and min-
gling of diverse ethnic and religious members, modern cities— due to density, 
advanced media, high literacy, and communication technologies— can also 
facilitate swift  and extensive forging of sectarian, albeit “distanciated,” com-
munities along ethnic or religious lines. Such collective feelings, grievances, 
and belonging have no better place for expression than urban streets. In other 
words, urban streets not only serve as a physical space where confl icts are 
shaped and expressed, where collectives are formed, solidarities are extended, 
and “street politics” are displayed. They also signify a crucial symbolic utter-
ance, one that goes beyond the physicality of streets to convey collective senti-
ments of a nation or a community. This I call po liti cal street, as exemplifi ed in 
such terms as “Arab street” or “Muslim street.” Po liti cal street, then, denotes 
the collective sentiments, shared feelings, and public opinions of ordinary 
people in their day- to- day utterances and practices that are expressed broadly 
in public spaces— in taxis, buses, and shops, on street sidewalks, or in mass 
street demonstrations.
The types of struggles that characterize the societies of the Middle East 
are neither unique to this region nor novel in their emergence. Similar pro-
cesses are well under way in other parts of the world. The integration of the 
Middle East into the global economic system has created socio- political struc-
tures and pro cesses in this region that fi nd resemblance in other societies of 
the global South. Yet the continuing authoritarian rule, the region’s strategic 
location (in relation to oil and Israel), and the predominance of Islam give the 
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politics of dissent in the Muslim Middle East par tic u lar characteristics. Not-
withstanding its characterization as “passive and dead” or “rowdy and danger-
ous,” the “Arab street” exhibited a fundamental vitality and vigor in the aft er-
math of 9/11 events and the occupation of Iraq, despite the Middle East’s 
regimes’ continuous surveillance of po liti cal dissent. However, much mobili-
zational energy is spent on nationalistic and anti- imperialist concerns at the 
expense of the struggle for democracy at home. Even though street politics in 
the Arab world has assumed some innovations in strategy, methods, and con-
stituencies, it remains overwhelmed by the surge of religio- nationalist poli-
tics. Yet it is naive to conclude a priori that the future belongs to Islamist poli-
tics. The fact is that Islamism itself is undergoing a dramatic shift  in its 
underlying ideals and strategies. Thus, while Islam continues to play a major 
mobilizational role, the conditions for the emergence of Iranian- type Islamic 
revolutions seem to have been exhausted. I suggest that the evolving domestic 
and global conditions, namely, the tendency toward legalism and reformist 
politics, individualization of piety, and transnationalization (both the objec-
tives and the actors) among radical trends, tend to favor not Islamic revolu-
tions, but some of kind of “post- Islamist refolutions”— a type of indigenous 
po liti cal reform marked by a blend of demo cratic ideals and, possibly, reli-
gious sensibilities. Given the continuous authoritarian rule that curbs or ga-
nized and legal opposition movements, the social nonmovements of frag-
mented and inaudible collectives may play a crucial role in instigating such a 
transformation.
SOCIAL NONMOVEMENTS
What are the “social nonmovements”? In general, nonmovements refers to the 
collective actions of noncollective actors; they embody shared practices of 
large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented but similar activities trig-
ger much social change, even though these practices are rarely guided by an 
ideology or recognizable leaderships and organizations. The term movement 
implies that social nonmovements enjoy signifi cant, consequential elements 
of social movements; yet they constitute distinct entities.
In the Middle East, the nonmovements have come to represent the mobili-
zation of millions of the subaltern, chiefl y the urban poor, Muslim women, 
and youth. The nonmovement of the urban dispossessed, which I have termed 
the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary,” encapsulates the discreet and pro-
longed ways in which the poor struggle to survive and to better their lives by 
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quietly impinging on the propertied and powerful, and on society at large. It 
embodies the protracted mobilization of millions of detached and dispersed 
individuals and families who strive to enhance their lives in a lifelong collec-
tive eff ort that bears few elements of pivotal leadership, ideology, or struc-
tured or ga ni za tion. More specifi cally, I am referring to the mass movement 
of rural migrants who, in a quest for a better life- chance, embark on a steady 
and strenuous campaign that involves unlawful acquisition of lands and shel-
ters, followed by such urban amenities as electricity, running water, phone 
lines, paved roads, and the like. To secure paid work, these migrants take over 
street sidewalks and other desirable public spaces to spread their vending 
businesses, infringing on and appropriating pop u lar labels to promote their 
merchandise. Scores of people subsist on turning the public streets into park-
ing spaces for private gains, or use sidewalks as sites for outdoor workshops and 
other businesses. These masses of largely atomized individuals, by such parallel 
practices of everyday encroachments, have virtually transformed the large cities 
of the Middle East and by extension many developing countries, generating a 
substantial outdoor economy, new communities, and arenas of self- development 
in the urban landscapes; they inscribe their active presence in the confi guration 
and governance of urban life, asserting their “right to city.”
This kind of spread- out and encroachment refl ects in some way the non- 
movements of the international illegal migrants. There exist now a massive 
border check, barriers, fences, walls, and police patrol. And yet they keep 
fl ooding— through the air, sea, road, hidden in back of trucks, trains, or sim-
ply on foot. They spread, expand, and grow in the cities of the global North; 
they settle, fi nd jobs, acquire homes, form families, and struggle to get legal 
protection. They build communities, church or mosque groups, cultural col-
lectives, and visibly fl ood the public spaces. As they feel safe and secure, they 
assert their physical, social and cultural presence in the host societies. Indeed, 
the anxiety that these both national and international migrants have caused 
among the elites are remarkably similar. Cairo elite lament about the ‘inva-
sion of fallahin’ (peasants) from the dispersed Upper Egyptian countryside, 
and Istanbul elite warn of the encroachment of the ‘black Turks,’ meaning poor 
rural migrants from Anatolia, who, they say, have altogether ruralized and 
transformed the social confi guration of “our modern cities.” In a strikingly 
similar tone, white Eu ro pe an elites express profound anxiety about the ‘inva-
sion of foreigners’— Africans, Asians, and in par tic u lar Muslims— who they 
see as having overwhelmed Eu rope’s social habitat, distorting the Eu ro pe an 
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way of life by their physical presence and cultural modes— their hijab, mosques 
and minarets. Truth is, rhetoric notwithstanding, the encroachment is real 
and is likely to continue. The struggles of such migrant poor in the Middle 
East or those of the international migrants constitute neither an or ga nized 
and self- conscious social movement nor a coping mechanism, since people’s 
survival is not at the cost of themselves but of other groups or classes. These 
practices also move beyond simple acts of everyday re sis tance, for they engage 
in surreptitious and incremental encroachments to further their claims. 
Rather, they exemplify a poor people’s nonmovement.
It is oft en claimed that radical Islamism in the Middle East voices the in-
terests of the poor as the victim of the urban ecol ogy of overcrowded slums, 
where poverty, anomie, and lawlessness nurture extremism and violence, of 
which militant Islamism is a variant. But this view fi nds less plausibility when 
it is tested against the general reluctance of the urban poor to lend ideological 
support to this or that po liti cal movement. A pragmatic politics of the poor, 
one that ensures tackling concrete and immediate concerns, means that po-
liti cal Islam plays little part in the habitus of the urban disenfranchised. The 
underlying politics of the poor is expressed not in po liti cal Islam, but in a 
poor people’s “nonmovement”— the type of fl uid, fl exible, and self- producing 
strategy that is adopted not only by the urban poor, but also by other subal-
tern groups, including middle- class women.
Under the authoritarian patriarchal states, whether secular or religious, 
women’s activism for gender equality is likely to take on the form of non-
movement. Authoritarian regimes and conservative men impose severe restric-
tions on women making gender claims in a sustained fashion— establishing 
in de pen dent organizations and publications, lobbying, managing public pro-
tests, mobilizing ordinary women, acquiring funding and resources, or estab-
lishing links with international solidarity groups. In the Iran of early 2007, for 
instance, women activists who initiated a “million- signature campaign”— to 
involve ordinary women nationally against misogynous laws— encountered 
constant harassment, repression, and detention. Many young activists  were 
beaten up, not only by morals police, but in some cases by their own male 
guardians. Recognizing such constraints on or ga nized campaigns, women 
have tended to pursue a diff erent strategy, one that involves intimately the 
mundane practices of everyday life, such as pursuing education, sports, arts, 
music, or working outside the home. These women did not refrain from per-
forming the usually male work of civil servants, professionals, and public ac-
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tors, from carry ing out chores such as banking, taking cars to mechanics, or 
negotiating with builders. They did not stop jugging in public parks, climbing 
Mount Everest, or contesting (and winning) in male- dominated car racing, 
despite unsuitable dress codes. So, women established themselves as public 
actors, subverting the conventional public– private gender divide. Those who 
did not wish to wear veils defi ed the forced hijab (headscarf ) in public for 
more than two de cades in a “war of attrition” with the public morals police 
until they virtually normalized what the authorities had lamented as 
“bad- hijabi”—showing a few inches of hair beneath the headscarves. In their 
legal battles, women challenged court houses and judges’ decisions on child 
custody, ending marriages, and other personal status provisions.
These mundane doings had perhaps little resemblance to extraordinary 
acts of defi ance, but rather  were closely tied to the ordinary practices of every-
day life. Yet they  were bound to lead to signifi cant social, ideological, and legal 
imperatives. Not only did such practices challenge the prevailing assumptions 
about women’s roles, but they  were followed by far- reaching structural legal 
imperatives. Every claim they made became a stepping- stone for a further 
claim, generating a cycle of opportunities for demands to enhance gender 
rights. Thus, women’s quest for literacy and a college education enabled them 
to live alone, away from the control of their guardians, or led to a career that 
might demand traveling alone, supervising men, or defying male dominance. 
The intended or unintended consequences of these disparate but widespread 
individual practices  were bound to question the fundamentals of legal and 
moral codes, facilitating claims for gender equality. They at times subverted 
the eff ective governmentality of the state machinery and ideology, pushing it 
towards pragmatism, compromise, and discord. Women activists (as well as 
the authorities)  were keenly aware of the incremental consequences of such 
structural encroachment and tried to take full advantage of the possibilities it 
off ered both to practical struggles and to conceptual/discursive articulations.
What about the nonmovement of youth? Indeed, similar pro cesses charac-
terize Muslim youth activism. Very oft en “youth movements” are erroneously 
confl ated with and mistaken for “student movements” or “youth chapters” of 
this or that po liti cal party or po liti cal movement, so that, for instance, the 
youth chapter of the Ba῾ th party is described as the “youth movement” in the 
Iraq of Saddam Hussein. I suggest that these categories should conceptually be 
kept separate, for they speak to diff erent realities. Broadly speaking, a youth 
movement is about reclaiming youthfulness. It embodies a collective challenge 
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whose central goal consists of defending and extending youth habitus— 
defending and extending the conditions that allow the young to assert their 
individuality, creativity, and lightness and free them from anxiety over the 
prospect of their future. Curbing and controlling youthfulness is likely to 
trigger youth dissent. But the diff erent ways in which youth dissent is ex-
pressed and claims are made determine whether the young are engaged in a 
fully fl edged youth movement or a nonmovement.
A cursory look at the Muslim Middle East would reveal that the claims of 
youthfulness remain at the core of youth discontent. But the intensity of youths’ 
activism depends, fi rst, on the degree of social control imposed on them by the 
moral and po liti cal authorities and, second, on the degree of social cohesion 
among the young. Thus, in postrevolutionary Iran the young people forged a 
remarkable nonmovement to reclaim their youth habitus— in being treated 
as full citizens, in what to wear, what to listen to, and how to appear in public, 
and in the general choice of their lifestyle and pursuit of youthful fun. Indeed, 
the globalizing youth more than others have been the target of, and thus have 
battled against, puritanical regimes and moral sensibilities that tend to stifl e 
the ethics of fun and joy that lie at the core of the expression of youthfulness. 
“Fun”— a meta phor for the expression of individuality, spontaneity, and 
lightness— therefore became a site of a protracted po liti cal contestation be-
tween the doctrinal regimes and the Muslim youth, and a fundamental ele-
ment in youth dissent, especially in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This remark-
able dissent emanated partly from the contradictory positionality of youth. 
On one side, the young  were highly valorized for their role in the revolution 
and the war (with Iraq), and, on the other, they remained under a strong so-
cial control and moral discipline by the Islamic regime. This occurred in a 
time and place in which the young people enjoyed an enormous constituency, 
with two- thirds of the total population being under thirty years of age. But 
this dissent was not a structured movement with extensive networks of com-
munication, or ga ni za tion, and collective protest actions. As in many parts of 
the Middle East, the young in general remained dispersed, atomized, and di-
vided, with their or ga nized activism limited to a number of youth NGOs and 
publications. Youths instead forged collective identities in schools, colleges, 
urban public spaces, parks, cafés, and sports centers; or they connected with 
one another through the virtual world of various media. Thus, theirs was not 
a deliberate network of solidarity where they could meet, interact, articulate 
their concerns, or express collective dissent. Rather, they linked to one an-
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other passively and spontaneously— through “passive networks”— by sensing 
their commonalities through such methods as recognizing similar hairstyles, 
blue jeans, hang- out places, food, fashions, and the pursuit of public fun. In 
sum, just as with women and the poor, theirs was not a politics of protest, but 
of practice, a politics of redress through direct action.
While the battle over “fun” brings the globalizing urban youth to the 
center stage of po liti cal struggle against fundamentalist movements and re-
gimes, youth nonmovements as such— those whose major preoccupation re-
volves around reclaiming youth habitus— should not necessarily be seen as 
the harbinger of demo cratic transformation, as it is oft en hoped. Youth may 
become agents of demo cratic change only when they act and think po liti-
cally; otherwise, their preoccupation with their own narrow youthful claims 
may bear little impetus for engaging in broader societal concerns. In other 
words, the transforming or, in par tic u lar, demo cratizing eff ects of youth 
nonmovements depend partly on the capacity of adversarial regimes or states 
to accommodate youthful claims. Youth nonmovements, just like women’s 
nonmovements, follow a strong demo cratizing eff ect primarily when they 
challenge the narrow doctrinal foundations of the exclusivist fundamentalist 
regimes.
LOGIC OF PRACTICE IN NONMOVEMENTS
How do we explain the logic of practice in nonmovements? Social movements, 
especially those operating in the po liti cally open and technologically ad-
vanced western societies, are defi ned as the “or ga nized, sustained, self- 
conscious challenge to existing authorities.”23 Very oft en, they are embedded 
in par tic u lar organizations and guided by certain ideologies; they pursue cer-
tain frames, follow specifi c leaderships, and adopt par tic u lar repertoires or 
means and methods of claim making.24 What, then, diff erentiates the type of 
nonmovements that I have discussed  here so far? What are the distinct fea-
tures of nonmovements in general?
First, nonmovements, or the collective actions of noncollective actors, 
tend to be action- oriented, rather than ideologically driven; they are over-
whelmingly quiet, rather than audible, since the claims are made largely indi-
vidually rather than by united groups. Second, whereas in social movements 
leaders usually mobilize the constituencies to put pressure on authorities to 
meet their demands, in nonmovements actors directly practice what they 
claim, despite government sanctions. Thus, theirs is not a politics of protest, 
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but of practice, of redress through direct and disparate actions. Third, un-
like social movements, where actors are involved usually in extraordinary 
deeds of mobilization and protestation that go beyond the routine of daily 
life (e.g., attending meetings, petitioning, lobbying, demonstrating, and so 
on), the nonmovements are made up of practices that are merged into, in-
deed are part and parcel of, the ordinary practices of everyday life. Thus, the 
poor people building homes, getting piped water or phone lines, or spread-
ing their merchandise out in the urban sidewalks; the international mi-
grants crossing borders to fi nd new livelihoods; the women striving to go 
to  college, playing sports, working in public, conducting “men’s work,” or 
choosing their own marriage partners; and the young appearing how they 
like, listening to what they wish, and hanging out where they prefer— all 
represent some core practices of nonmovements in the Middle East and 
similar world areas. The critical and fourth point is that these practices are 
not carried out by small groups of people acting on the po liti cal margins; 
rather, they are common practices of everyday life carried out by millions of 
people who albeit remain fragmented. In other words, the power of nonmove-
ments does not lie in the unity of actors, which may then threaten disruption, 
uncertainty, and pressure on the adversaries. The power of nonmovements 
rests on the power of big numbers, that is, the consequential eff ect on norms 
and rules in society of many people simultaneously doing similar, though 
contentious, things.
What eff ect do “big numbers” have? To begin with, a large number of 
people acting in common has the eff ect of normalizing and legitimizing those 
acts that are otherwise deemed illegitimate. The practices of big numbers are 
likely to capture and appropriate spaces of power in society within which the 
subaltern can cultivate, consolidate, and reproduce their counterpower. Thus, 
the larger the number of women who assert their presence in the public 
space, the more patriarchal bastions they undermine. And the greater the 
number of the poor consolidating their self- made urban communities, the more 
limited the elite control of urban governance becomes. Second, even though 
these subjects act individually and separately, the eff ects of their actions do 
not of necessity fade away in seclusion. They can join up, generating a more 
powerful dynamic than their individual sum total. Whereas each act, like 
single drops of rain, singularly makes only individual impact, such acts pro-
duce larger spaces of alternative practices and norms when they transpire in 
big numbers— just as the individual wetting eff ects of billions of raindrops 
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join up to generate creeks, rivers, and even fl oods and waves (Figure 1.1). Thus, 
what ultimately defi nes the power of nonmovements relates to the (intended 
and unintended) consequences of the similar practices that a “big number” of 
subjects simultaneously perform.
By thinking about nonmovements in this fashion, are we not in a sense 
conjuring up Hardt and Negri’s concept of multitude, which they defi ne as “sin-
gularities of social subjects that act in common”? At fi rst glance, the enor-
mous magnitude as well as the fragmentation of social subjects associated 
with multitude reminds one of nonmovements and the “power of big num-
bers.” But the resemblance stops there. Unlike the categories of working class, 
people, or mass, which are marked by sameness and shared identities, multi-
tude is made up of “singularities,” or dissimilar or nonidentical social sub-
jects, a mix of diff erent social groups, gender clusters, or sexual orientations 
that are ontologically diff erent (Figure 1.2). Their apparent similarity, in 
Hardt and Negri’s view, lies in their producing “immaterial labor” and standing 
opposed to the “empire.”25 Thus, whereas multitude is assumed to bring to-
gether singular and ontologically diff erent social subjects (men, women, black, 
white, various ethnicities,  etc.), nonmovements galvanize members of the same, 
even though internally fragmented, groups (e.g., globalizing youth, Muslim 
women, illegal migrants, or urban poor), who act in common, albeit oft en in-
dividually. While in nonmovements, collective action is a function of shared 
interests and identities within a single group, especially when confronted 
by a common threat, in a multitude, it is not clear precisely how the singular 
components are to come and act together, and how these diff erent groups 
(e.g., men and women, native working class and migrant workers, or dominant 
a a a
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Figure 1.1.  Power of big numbers: Exponential outcome of 
merging individual acts. 
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and subordinate ethnicities) avoid confl icts of interests between them, let alone 
act in common.
If, unlike in a multitude, common identities are essential for agents of non-
movements to act collectively, how are these identities forged among frag-
mented and atomized subjects in the fi rst place? And why do they act in com-
mon if they are not deliberately mobilized by organizations or leaders? 
Collective identities are built not simply in open and legal institutions or soli-
darity networks, of which they are in general deprived due to surveillance. 
Solidarities are forged primarily in public spaces— in neighborhoods, on 
street corners, in mosques, in workplaces, at bus stops, or in rationing lines, or 
in detention centers, migrant camps, public parks, colleges, and athletic 
stadiums— through what I have called “passive networks.” The passive net-
works represent a key feature in the formation of nonmovements. They refer to 
instantaneous communications between atomized individuals, which are es-
tablished by tacit recognition of their commonalities directly in public spaces 
or indirectly through mass media.26 Thus, the poor street vendors would rec-
ognize their common predicaments by noticing one another on street corners 
on a daily basis, even though they may never know or speak to one another. 
Female strangers neglecting dress codes in public spaces would internalize 
their shared identities in the streets by simply observing one another; those 
confronting men and judges in court houses would readily feel their com-
monly held inferior status. On street corners, at shopping malls, or in colleges, 
the young identify their collective position by spontaneously recognizing 
similar fashions, hairstyles, and social tastes. For these groups, space clearly 
provides the possibility of mutual recognition (Figure 1.5)— a factor that dis-
tinguishes them from such fragmented groups as illegal immigrants, who 
may lack the medium of space to facilitate solidarity formation unless they 
come together in the same workplaces, detention centers, or residential com-
pounds. These latter groups rely oft en on mass media, rumors, or distanciated 
networks— that is, knowing someone who knows someone who knows some-
one in a similar position— a pro cess that facilitates building “imagined soli-
darities” (Figure 1.3).27
The new information technology, in par tic u lar the current social net-
working sites such as Facebook, can bypass the medium of physical space by 
connecting atomized individuals in the world of the Web, and in so doing cre-
ate a tremendous opportunity for building both passive and active networks. 
The Egyptian April 7 Youth Movement built on such media to connect some 
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70,000 people, most of them young, who then called for the support of textile 
workers’ strikes in April 2008 and protested against the Israeli aggression in 
Gaza in 2008– 9.28 But this venue is limited largely to young, literate, and well- 
to- do groups, whose mobilization of this kind can descend into a sort of “chic 
politics” of ad hoc and short- lived interventions. More importantly, this chan-
nel is too exposed and contained, and thus vulnerable to police surveillance, 
when compared to the fl uidity and resiliency of “passive networks.” In the war 
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Figure 1.2.  No network: Atomized individuals 
without a common position. Source: Asef Bayat, 
Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements in 
Iran. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997, p. 18.
Figure 1.3.  No network: Atomized individuals 
with a common position. Source: Asef Bayat, Street 
Politics: Poor People’s Movements in Iran. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997, p. 18.
Figure 1.4.  Active network: Individuals with 
similar positions brought together deliberately— 
association with an active network. Source: Asef 
Bayat, Street Politics: Poor People’s Movements 
in Iran. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997, p. 18.
Figure 1.5.  Passive network: Atomized individuals 
with similar positions brought together through 
space. Source: Asef Bayat, Street Politics: Poor 
People’s Movements in Iran. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1997, p. 18.
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of un- equals, the weak will certainly loose if it follows the same rules of the 
game as those of the powerful. To win an unequal battle, the underdog has no 
choice but to creatively play diff erent, more fl exible and constantly changing 
games.
At any rate, what mediates between passive networks and possible collec-
tive action is a common threat. In other words, while making gains in non-
movements takes place individually through direct practices, the defense of 
gains oft en takes place collectively, when a common threat turns the subjects’ 
passive network into active communication and or ga nized re sis tance. Thus, 
women who individually defy authorities by disregarding dress codes are 
likely to come together when they encounter morals police in the streets. The 
urban poor who usually carry on building illegal homes quietly and individu-
ally oft en resist a government’s de mo li tion eff orts collectively. The massive 
public demonstration of illegal migrants in Los Angeles on March 26, 2006 to 
demand a legislation to protect them represents perhaps a more striking po-
tential of episodic collection protest of the otherwise atomized agents of non- 
movements. Of course it is always possible that the subjects may, instead of 
engaging in immediate confrontation, rationally choose to resort to the “war of 
attrition”— a temporary compliance in times of constraint while carry ing on 
with encroachments when the right time arrives. Unlike women, the young, or 
the poor, illegal immigrants cannot resist state action unless they begin to delib-
erately or ga nize themselves, since the markers through which they can readily 
recognize their shared predicaments in public are limited (see Figure 1.4). But 
people with limited visible markers may still connect through shared sound 
(e.g. chants of “Allah Akbar” on rooft ops or youngsters setting off  fi recrackers 
at night time) and symbols (like identical colors, handbands, or t-shirts).
These dynamics already point to the questions of how and when non-
movements may turn into contentious politics and social movements. Indeed, 
actual (even though quiet and individualized) defi ance by a large number of 
people implies that a massive societal mobilization is already under way. This 
may develop into contentious politics when opportunity for or ga nized, sus-
tained, and institutional activism becomes available— for instance, when states/
regimes gripped in infi ghting, crisis, international pressure, or wars become 
weaker; or when a more tolerant government ascends to power. But the trans-
formative eff ect of nonmovements should not be judged merely by their even-
tual elevation into or ga nized social movements. Nonmovements, on their 
own, can have signifi cant transformative impact if they continue to operate in 
society. They can diminish or impair a state’s governmentality. For states rule 
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not as external to society through mere surveillance but weave their logic into 
the fabric of society, into norms, rules, institutions, and relations of power. The 
operation of nonmovements challenges that logic of power. The states may 
conceivably attempt to off set nonmovements’ subversive practices by, for in-
stance, submerging them into their logic of power. But this may not be so easy, 
for the incremental disposition of claim making in nonmovements is likely to 
diminish states’ ability to neutralize their eff ects. Should a state ultimately ac-
commodate the claims of nonmovements, it would in eff ect be a notable re-
form of the state itself.29
Why are nonmovements the prevalent form of activism in par tic u lar so-
cial and po liti cal settings, such as in the Muslim Middle East? The fi rst factor 
relates to the fact that authoritarian states do not tolerate any in de pen dent 
and or ga nized dissent. So, they tend either to fragment the subaltern, espe-
cially the po liti cal class, or to subsume them under their own populist institu-
tions. But the fact is that subaltern classes themselves are also experiencing 
new dispositions. The growing fragmentation of labor, informalization, the 
shrinking of public sectors, and “NGOization”— all associated with the neo-
liberal restructuring— further curtail the pop u lar capacity for or ga nized ac-
tivism in the form of, say, traditional trade  union organizations. Yet such a 
subaltern is confronted by states that are remarkably incapable of or unwill-
ing to fulfi ll their social and material needs and expectations— ones that are 
swelled up by the escalating urbanization, educational growth, media expan-
sion, and citizen awareness— thus pushing the populace to take matters into 
their own hands. When the states cannot provide adequate housing or jobs for 
the poor (and when the possible conventional legal channels, like lobbying, to 
achieve these goals are not trusted or get frustrated by state bureaucracy), the 
poor resort to direct squatting on land or shelters, or illegally spreading their 
street businesses. When the authorities fail to recognize gender rights or 
youth demands, women and youths may defy the offi  cial authority by directly 
executing their claims in the areas or institutions with least surveillance or 
otherwise appropriating and overturning those that enjoy offi  cial sanction. 
Such encroachments become possible— and this is the third point— because 
the authoritarian regimes, despite their omnipresent image, preside over the 
states—“soft  states”— that lack the capacity, consistency, and machinery to 
impose full control, even though they may wish to. Consequently, there exist 
many escapes, spaces, and uncontrolled holes— zones of relative freedom— 
that can be fi lled and appropriated by ordinary actors. The genius of subaltern 
subjects— nonmovements—lies precisely in discovering or generating such 
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escapes. In other words, I am speaking of the agency and perseverance of mil-
lions of women, young people, and the dispossessed who, notwithstanding 
their diff erences, understand the constraints yet recognize and discover op-
portunities, and take advantage of the spaces that are available to enhance 
their life- chances. The case of a physically small Ira ni an woman driver— her 
determination to take part, and to win, in male- dominated car racing— is 
only one example of how women fi nd spaces where they can decisively subvert 
the dominant ideology that regards them as second- class citizens. This ex-
ample illustrates what I have called the “art of presence”— the courage and 
creativity to assert collective will in spite of all odds, to circumvent con-
straints, utilizing what is available and discovering new spaces within which 
to make oneself heard, seen, felt, and realized. The art of presence is the fun-
damental moment in the life of nonmovements, in life as politics.
The story of nonmovements is the story of agency in the times of con-
straints. The concept is both descriptive and prescriptive. On the one hand, by 
bypassing the rigid dichotomies of ‘active’/‘passive,’ ‘individual’/‘collective,’ 
or ‘civil’/ ‘po liti cal’ re sis tance which have limited our conceptual horizons, it 
opens up wholly new possibilities to explore unnoticed social practices that 
may in fact be harbinger of signifi cant social changes. It helps uncover the 
logic of practice among dispersed and distant collectives under the conditions 
of authoritarian rule when free association and active communication are sup-
pressed. It tells us how people manage, resist, and subvert domination through 
widespread collective (if fragmented) practices. On the other hand, the con-
cept is prescriptive, in that it challenges the ideas and excuses that justify exit 
and inaction under conditions of surveillance. It help us to recognize, indeed 
gives us hope, that despite authoritarian rule, there are always ways in which 
people resist, express agency, and instigate change, rather than waiting for a 
savior or resorting to violence.
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Dissecting a Manifesto
in the first de cade of the new millennium, the Middle East seems to have 
plunged into a deadlock, the way out of which few would say they know for 
sure. Despite its massive oil revenue, personal income of Arabs was among 
the lowest in the world. Productivity declined, scientifi c research was in a 
poor state, school enrollment decreased, and illiteracy remained consider-
able despite high spending. Arab countries had a lower information/media -
to- population ratio than the world average— less than 53 newspapers per 1,000 
citizens, compared to 285 per 1,000 people in the industrialized world. Trans-
lation of books remained negligible— only 4.4 translated books per million 
 were published every year (compared to 519 in Hungary and 920 in Spain). The 
Arab world’s developmental indexes in health and education lagged far be-
hind comparable nations in the World Bank’s income tables. In short “Arab 
countries [ were] richer than they [ were] developed.”1 At the same time, the 
region’s authoritarian regimes, ranging from Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco to 
the sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf (chiefl y Saudi Arabia), and all with close 
ties to the West, have continued to defy per sis tent calls for demo cratization 
and accountability. Precisely such a historical trajectory has engendered op-
position movements, which have been overwhelmingly articulated by religious 
(Islamist) po liti cal groups, and which have espoused equally undemo cratic, 
exclusive, and oft en violent mea sures.
Adapted from Asef Bayat, “Transforming the Arab World: The Arab Human Develop-
ment Report and the Politics of Change,” Development and Change 36, no. 6, 2005, 
1225– 37.
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The combination of such social and po liti cal conditions has more than 
ever reinforced, in the mainstream media and academic circles in the West, 
the already prevalent idea of “Middle Eastern exceptionalism”— that reifying 
kernel of the Orientalist paradigm. Thus, in comparison with its counterparts 
in the developing world, the Middle East— in par tic u lar the Arab world— has 
oft en been viewed as something very diff erent, a “unique” cultural entity that 
does not fi t into conventional frames of analysis. Policy personnel in the West, 
notably the United States, called for an urgent change in the region and yet be-
lieved that change would not come from within, but from without, and by force. 
This juncture encouraged the neoconservative ideologues in the George W. 
Bush administration to put into practice their Leo Straussian philosophy of 
force, illiberal elitism in politics, and the idea of uniting po liti cal order by 
means of creating external threat. Muslim countries in the region have been 
told to alter textbooks, abolish religious schools, and instruct religious preach-
ers to refrain from anti- U.S. sermons. The United States toppled the Taliban 
regime in Af ghan i stan and dismantled Saddam Hussein’s regime by occupa-
tion of Iraq, while threatening Iran in a quest to generate a “greater Middle 
East,” to cultivate “democracy and development.”
Few Arabs and Muslims in the region consider “change by force” as a via-
ble and dignifi ed strategy, not least because it is essentially immoral, infl icts 
widespread violence and destruction, and impinges on people’s dignity. Hav-
ing lived and worked in the Middle East for close to two de cades, I feel that a 
call for po liti cal change from within has continued ceaselessly even though 
the “external” confl icts, notably Israel’s continuing occupation of Palestinian 
lands and the aggressive U.S. foreign policy in the region, have seriously dis-
torted internal struggles for social and po liti cal transformation. The stubborn 
resiliency of the authoritarian states against change, coupled with the threat 
of imperialist domination from outside, have brought the region to a depress-
ing impasse. Perhaps never before has the quest for an endogenous vision for 
change in the Arab world been so urgent as today.
The signifi cance of the Arab Human Development Report lay precisely in 
its publication at this debilitating regional and global juncture, notably aft er 
the crucial post- 9/11 turning point. But even more than this, the Report, total-
ing four volumes—Creating Opportunities for Future Generations (2002), Build-
ing a Knowledge Society (2003), Towards Freedom in the Arab World (2004), 
and Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World (2005)— came to represent 
the most signifi cant “manifesto of change” “produced by the Arabs for the 
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Arab world.” It aimed to show a way out of this profound malaise by calling 
for a “radical transformation” of the region.
To serve the strategic objective of “radical transformation,” the authors 
adopt a broad understanding of development, in terms of a “pro cess of ex-
panding people’s choices.” Perceived as a mixture of Dudley Seers’s notion of 
development as a pro cess that allows the realization of human potential and 
Amartya Sen’s “freedom as development,” the Report views human develop-
ment as a pro cess in which people enlarge their choices, infl uence the pro-
cesses that shape their lives, and enjoy full human rights.2 Such a conceptual-
ization clearly transcends the traditional perceptions of “development” in 
terms of the mere growth of GNP, rise of personal income, industrialization, 
technological advance, and social modernization, even though the latter may 
contribute to “development as freedom.” Thus, in a comprehensive survey of 
development status ranging from education, health, and knowledge to culture 
and politics, the Report identifi es three major “defi cits”— in knowledge, in free-
dom/democracy, and in women’s empowerment— which are at the core of 
Arab developmental decline. It describes how some sixty- fi ve million adult 
Arabs, two- thirds of them women, have remained illiterate. The quality of 
education is in decline, and mechanisms for intellectual- capital development 
are lacking. College graduates do not fi nd jobs in suitable occupations; the use 
of information communications technology (ICT) is remarkably limited, and, 
consequently, highly educated people are in short supply.
Disparity in the distribution of knowledge manifests only one aspect of 
gender in e qual ity in the Arab countries. It is true that women’s education and 
literacy have certainly improved, but the prevailing social attitudes and norms 
continue to focus on women’s reproductive role and their unpaid tasks. Con-
sequently, 50 percent of women remain illiterate, while their mortality rate is 
double that of Latin America.3 In addition, women are treated unfairly before 
the law, and in pay, personal status, structures of opportunity, and occupa-
tional hierarchy. With the continuing discrimination against women, society 
undermines a major segment of its productive capacity.
As feminist theory has taught us, gender in e qual ity refl ects a defi cit in 
demo cratic theory and practice in general. And in the Arab region in par tic u-
lar, this defi cit is far more profound. According to the Report, the region in 
these respects lags far behind Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Eu rope. While 
the Arab states in general “talk the talk” of democracy, they have in practice 
exhibited highly authoritarian tendencies. Dominated by powerful executives 
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and lifelong presidencies, the states curtail freedom of expression and associa-
tion, while human rights have fallen victim to secretive and coercive institu-
tions, unaccountable to anyone. Suppression of freedoms and human rights is 
the enemy of human development, the Report concludes. To remedy these 
debilitating conditions and to achieve meaningful development, the Arab 
Human Development Report calls for empowering women, building a knowl-
edge society, and achieving freedom and good governance.
How plausible are these advocacies, and to what extent can such a mani-
festo of change bring the Middle East, its subaltern, out of its current dead-
lock? A careful appraisal of the Report, of what it calls for, the very mode of its 
production, and the politics surrounding it, tells us a great deal about the con-
tradictions and complexities of po liti cal pro cesses in the Middle East and its 
relationship to the Western world. It reveals how the fundamental ideals and 
expectations— freedom, development, democracy, women’s emancipation— on 
the one hand refl ect the genuine desire for autonomy and emancipation, and 
at the same time serve as discursive tools for imperialistic domination. The 
Report, which refl ects the contradictions of the very region it wants to liber-
ate, falls in the end to an elitist neoliberal vision in which the “emancipatory 
outcries” get sidelined.
POLITICS SURROUNDING THE DOCUMENT
No comparable Arab document in recent memory has been as much debated, 
commended, and contested as the Arab Human Development Report. Prepared 
by a team of over a hundred Arab intellectuals and professionals at a cost of 
some U.S. $700,000 as of 2005,4 the Report has provoked unpre ce dented dis-
cussion in the West as well as in the Arab world about the predicament of the 
region— aired on tele vi sion talk shows, in parliaments, and in print media. 
The fi rst two volumes of the Report  were received with great jubilation and 
enthusiasm in the West. The editorials of the major U.S. and Eu ro pe an dailies 
praised the authors for their professionalism and honesty in disclosing the sad 
truths of their nations. “With uncommon candor and a battery of statistics,” 
the Middle East Quarterly reacted, “the Report tells a sorry story of two de-
cades of failed planning and developmental decline.”5 More than one million 
copies of the fi rst issue of the Report  were downloaded within the fi rst year of 
its publication, while the website of the Report received some two million 
hits.6 The U.S. State Department described the 2002 Report as “a groundbreak-
ing document,”7 and Time magazine deemed it the most important publica-
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tion of 2002. The prestigious Dutch Prince Claus Award in 2003 went to this 
publication; and the G8 in 2004 endorsed the U.S. plan for a “greater Middle 
East” on the basis of the recommendations of this remarkable document. The 
deplorable state of development in the Arab world, it was thought, lay at the 
heart of the rising terrorism in the Middle East, which the G8 considered as 
jeopardizing these nations’ interests.
The western overenthusiasm for the Report had largely to do with the per-
ceived ac know ledg ment by the Arab elites of their own defi ciencies in practic-
ing freedom, democracy, and development— and this through a document 
that had been sanctioned by the credible United Nations Development Pro-
gram. It refl ected a confi rmation of the western “expert” anxieties, claims, 
and strategies, raised particularly in the crucial conjuncture of post- 9/11 about 
the Arab Middle East. The expert community would hear through the pages 
of the Report how the Arab world, now considered as the nest of global terror-
ism, acknowledged its own indictment, while proclaiming its desire to launch 
a po liti cal and economic reform.
Largely for the very same reasons (and the fact) that western offi  cials and 
commentators exalted the Report, many Arab intellectuals slammed the pub-
lication at home. They lashed out at the Report for vilifying and degrading, as 
they saw it, the Arab peoples before Israel and the United States at a time 
when the Arabs  were being besieged globally. They feared that the Report 
could be used to justify the American expansionist policy and Israeli domina-
tion in the region. They charged the Report’s exclusive emphasis on internal 
sources of decline as one- sided, totally ignoring the role of colonialism and 
“imperialist intervention” in causing the developmental malaise of the Arab 
peoples.8 For them, the Report signifi ed the defensiveness and dependence of 
its authors and their deference before western sensibilities. The fact that the 
document was originally written in En glish and only then translated into Ara-
bic was seen as a further confi rmation of the intended (western) audience of 
the publication. In addition, the Arab critics slammed the Report for adopting 
a concept of “human development” that drew on the Alternative Human De-
velopment Index (AHDI), which emphasizes individual freedom and gender— 
the major focus of western policymakers. What should be prioritized, they 
argued, should include tackling the problems of poverty, education, health, 
and equity, rather than simply demo cratization, not least because there is no 
necessary relationship between democracy and development (understood as 
income and Human Development Index indicators), in par tic u lar when the 
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Report adopts an American formula of democracy, “underlying free market 
with little attention paid to human entitlements and social ser vices.”9
Neither the overenthusiasm of the western commentators nor the dispar-
aging tone of Arab counterparts does justice to the Report. Both tend to politi-
cize the document, praising and blaming it for largely the wrong reasons. The 
Arab intelligentsia’s suspicion of western enthusiasm about the Report is justi-
fi ed, given the destructive and debilitating eff ects of the western, especially 
the U.S. foreign policy over the region’s development and democracy. In the 
name of fi ghting against communism, to maintain their geopo liti cal domi-
nance and secure the fl ow of cheap oil, many western governments have in-
variably helped the region’s authoritarian states to crush nationalist, socialist, 
and pop u lar struggles (as in Iran, Oman,  etc.). The U.S. support for Israel’s 
continuing occupation of Palestinian lands, undermining re sis tance move-
ments against the occupation, and its own illegal occupation of Iraq represent 
enough reasons for the Arab population to suspect western intents to “demo-
cratize” the region.
The Arab critics of the Report are correct when they suggest that the cause 
of the deplorable condition of knowledge is not just internal despotism, but 
also foreign interventions. The Israeli army’s looting of the Palestinian univer-
sities, research centers, and archives in early 2000 surely did not further the 
growth of a knowledge society in Palestine. Indeed, volumes 2 and 3 of the Re-
port, notwithstanding its UN offi  cial status, do take issue, even though briefl y, 
with the destructive consequences for Arab human development of Israeli oc-
cupation and the Anglo- American invasion of Iraq. The killing by the Israeli 
army of 768 and the injuring of over 4,000 Palestinians between May 2003 and 
June 2004; the de mo li tion of some 12,000 homes within only three years, not to 
mention the even more destructive Israeli bombardments of Lebanon in 2006 
and Gaza in early 2009; and parcelizing the West Bank, with attendant eco-
nomic and psychological damages, have led to devastating developmental conse-
quences. In a similar vein, the occupation of Iraq, with its massive loss of lives, 
destruction of infrastructure, dismantling of the state institutions, and human 
rights violations, without doubt have impeded the development of the region.10
Yet speaking of foreign dominance as the cause of underdevelopment is 
nothing new among Arab intellectuals. The widespread view in the Middle 
East has long been infused by a strong nationalist discourse, oft en at the cost 
of externalizing internal problems and losing a balanced sense of self. By ex-
clusive attention to the evils of colonialism and external intrigues, the pre-
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vailing de pen den cy paradigm in the Arab region has for de cades contributed 
to a debilitating nationalist and populist politics in which a critique of self, of 
patriarchy, and of authoritarian polity, as well as reaching out to the world, 
have been lost to defensiveness, po liti cal self- indulgence, and conspiracy the-
ory. This outlook, still prevalent among the po liti cal classes in the Arab world, 
has distorted class politics, deviated from the struggle for democracy, cur-
tailed transnational solidarity (with movements located in the West, for in-
stance), and largely played into the hands of the authoritarian Arab regimes, 
which also play nationalist/nativist cards.
The Report’s major breakthrough lies precisely in its attempt and out-
look to transcend such nationalist discourse, by highlighting the internal 
sources of developmental problems. Comprehensive, full of crucial data and 
insights, it covers major areas of developmental interests, including growth, 
distribution, poverty, education, health, demography, and infant mortality, as 
well as gender, knowledge, governance, culture, and politics. The Report self- 
consciously displays a major postnational and postde pen den cy narrative of the 
Arab world. Signifi cantly, it wants to show a way out of the malaise, hoping to 
establish a pro cess within which Arab people can enhance their choices.
Yet this remarkable document displays a rather peculiar text, a schizo-
phrenic transcript, wherein incongruity in language, format, audience, vi-
sions, and strategies perplexes the critical reader. On the one hand, the Report 
is a statement of fundamental importance, a “vision of an Arab re nais sance,” 
a guide to social and po liti cal transformation of the Arab world; and yet it is 
couched and squeezed in the administrative and soulless language of the World 
Bank. At times, radical tones are merged into neoliberal imagery of economy, 
polity, elites, and change. The reader is bewildered as to what to interpret the 
text as: a treatise on po liti cal transformation or a conventional UN report 
with its “executive summary” and countless sections and subsections, oft en 
embracing diverse views and perspectives so that logical consistency gets lost 
amid some kind of “repre sen ta tion of all of views.” For instance, no possible 
explanation is left  off  the list of probable reasons for the undemo cratic dispo-
sition of Arab states (authoritarian family, clannishness, a social structure 
antithetical to freedom, “oriental despotism,” colonial domination, repressive 
legal structure, and rentier character of the Arab states), even though they 
may contradict one another. Several pages are devoted to the social, po liti cal, 
and cultural environment as “un- hospitable to freedom,” and yet we read else-
where how pop u lar culture is replete with “longing for freedom” or how the 
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Arab bedouin culture is imbued with free- spirited legacies.11 It is as if there 
has been an urge to practice a “democracy of explanations” among these 
many solicited authors of the Report, even though at the cost of incongruity 
and analytical inconsistency. But these analytical anomalies should not deter 
us from paying attention to the Report chiefl y as a document of strategy, and 
it is  here that its strengths as well as its major drawbacks lie.
STRATEGY OF CHANGE
Given the major defi cits in knowledge, freedom/democracy, and woman em-
powerment in the region, the Report regards as the ultimate strategic objec-
tives to build a “knowledge society,” to establish freedom and democracy, and 
to empower women. These represent crucial strategic goals. But the challenge 
is to explore how the Arab nations are to fulfi ll such aspirations, and what 
social forces are to be deployed for their realization. Let us begin with the 
“knowledge society.” The idea of a knowledge society, one that has lingered 
since the 1970s, is rooted in Daniel Bell’s The Coming of Post- Industrial Society 
as a distinct stage in the development of capitalism. Since then this notion has 
submerged and resurfaced once again in the works of such social theorists as 
Alvin Gouldner, Jean- François Lyotard, Francis Fukuyama, and more recently 
Manuel Castells.12 The World Bank followed suit and began to advocate the 
idea. In so cio log i cal and political- economy literature, “knowledge society” 
signifi es a tendency in the “postindustrial” and post- Fordist phase of late 
capitalism, where science and technology are to play an increasingly impor-
tant role in societies’ governance and economic production; it presupposes an 
economy in which knowledge and skill become more signifi cant for the ac-
cumulation of capital, or investment and profi tability, than income or physi-
cal capital. This is due to the highly mobile and fl exible disposition of knowl-
edge, which is well in tune with the highly dynamic movement of capital in 
the age of globalization. Some observers view the “knowledge society” as rep-
resenting a phase in late modernity in which knowledge seems to play the 
same role as labor in the classical economy.13
What ever its dynamics— and some have expressed doubt about its 
usefulness14— knowledge society is an outcome not of planning but of highly 
developed market forces in postindustrial economies. The fi rst question, then, 
is how realistic it is to envision and extend such a scenario to the socioeco-
nomic reality of the Middle East, which still holds an inadequate industrial 
basis, and where property and income still play a far more important role in 
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individuals’ life- chances than does knowledge. Although higher education 
has contributed considerably, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, to upward 
mobility of many lower- class individuals, the growing “intellectual unem-
ployment” in the region points to the fact that knowledge by itself does not 
necessarily bring material well- being for many people. What it certainly does 
is generate expectations, change status, and, in the absence of real purchase, 
cause a deep- rooted po liti cal resentment. Indeed, the rise of po liti cal Islam in 
the Arab world has partly to do with the failure of knowledge (university edu-
cation) to secure reasonable life- chances, which the impoverished educated 
middle classes expected it to do. As some Arab economists suggest, the Re-
port, following the current World Bank trend, tends to exaggerate the “poten-
tial role of information and communication in Arab development,” simply 
because the Arab region still lacks a strong economic and technical infra-
structure.15 Perhaps one should search for those types of knowledge that are 
of urgent relevance to these po liti cal economies. Alternatively, perhaps we 
should imagine a diff erent understanding of “knowledge society” than what is 
currently perceived.
Regardless of the relevance of the idea of “knowledge society” with respect 
to the future of the Arab region, the question of how to realize this aim of a 
knowledge society remains paramount. The Report proposes fi ve precondi-
tions necessary to build a knowledge society. They include developing a high- 
quality education for all, integrating science and information technology in 
all societal activities, shift ing toward knowledge- based economic production, 
and reestablishing an Arab knowledge model based on rationality, the strength 
of the Arabic language, and cultural diversity. However, the most important 
element is considered to be achieving freedoms of opinion, expression, and 
assembly. I will not delve into the relationship between individual freedom/
democracy and attaining knowledge; some have argued that there are few 
necessary relationships between the two. For instance, as Galal Amin sug-
gests, Arabs could expand their knowledge during the despotic Abbasid Khila-
fat of Harun al- Rashid, when art, music, and science prospered; and Oxford 
and Cambridge certainly did not fl ourish in En gland’s demo cratic era;16 and 
the authoritarian regimes in such countries as Iran or Tunisia have not pre-
vented a notable expansion of both general literacy and higher education. 
Nonetheless, a demo cratic society and polity clearly allow for wider oppor-
tunity for knowledge acquisition, even though unequal distribution of 
knowledge and information feature the intrinsic characteristics of capitalist 
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democracies (for instance, given the unequal access to the mainstream media 
in the United States, it is diffi  cult to develop an alternative narrative to the 
offi  cial version of the events of 9/11). Thus, my concern relates not to the rela-
tionship between knowledge acquisition and freedom, but rather to the modali-
ties of bringing those freedoms (of expression and assembly) to fruition. And 
this is a point closely tied to the Report’s second major requirement to realiz-
ing Arab human development in general, that is, establishing freedom.
But what is “freedom”? The concept embraces “democracy” but is not lim-
ited to it. In fact, democracy, we are told, “can be used to legislate restrictions 
on freedom.”17 Freedom is defi ned as “liberation of the individual from all 
factors that are inconsistent with human dignity, such as hunger, disease, 
ignorance, poverty and fear.”18 Embedded in the concept are also civil and 
po liti cal rights. It is a credit to the authors of the Report to envisage such a 
comprehensive vision of freedom for the Arab peoples. However, a number 
of questions are raised. First, when “freedom” is perceived in such an all- 
inclusive fashion, then what is the need to bring in and discuss two more 
prerequisites for human development (i.e., knowledge and women’s empower-
ment)? Because in this broad sense “freedom is synonymous with human de-
velopment.”19 In addition, while the link between knowledge and develop-
ment or democracy and development is fairly well discussed, there is no serious 
justifi cation as to why women’s empowerment is particularly crucial for hu-
man development. Certainly, empowering women accounts for an end in it-
self, to which the Report, to its credit, off ers prominent attention. There is no 
doubt that women in the Arab world (as elsewhere, though in various degrees) 
suff er from gender discrimination, and this needs to be addressed. But dis-
crimination targets also children, the el der ly, the handicapped, and immi-
grants or refugees. What makes women in par tic u lar, as an analytical cate-
gory, important for human development? Failing to delve into this question is 
likely to give credence to those critics who, even unjustifi ably, may suggest 
that the “trendy” notion of “women’s empowerment” serves primarily to sat-
isfy the sensibilities of a “western audience.”
Third, implicit in the Report’s understanding of freedom is also “eco-
nomic freedom,” the free market. Does this not clash with the objective of 
equity— a concern to which the Report makes only a passing reference? In the 
spirit of neoliberal orthodoxy, the Report implicitly celebrates the advent of 
the free market in the Middle East, because of its potential to free the econ-
omy from the domination of corrupt and ineffi  cient states. It is true that state 
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bureaucracy and corruption do hinder economic per for mance and discour-
age investment; and a mea sured deregulation is undoubtedly necessary. How-
ever, an unfettered economic freedom, as Sylvia Chan and others have shown, 
not only can undercut equity and civil and po liti cal freedoms,20 but may also 
stand against the very spirit of “human development.” Evidence suggests that 
the implementation of Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment, spread 
throughout the Middle East, has caused a signifi cant shift  in social policies, 
with adverse impacts on the very foundation of human development, in the 
areas of health, education, housing, and the supply of adequate food.21 Market 
forces have drastically undermined the principle of equity, that is, equal access 
to life- chances. The result has been the development of a two- tier system of 
social provisions where high- quality private but expensive social ser vices (in 
schooling, hospitals, food supply, air quality, entertainment, living environ-
ment) stand against the deteriorating state provisions. The expanded NGO 
sector in the region partially fi lls the vacuum of the shrunken involvement of 
the state in off ering social ser vices to the needy. Yet not only do NGOs frag-
ment their benefi ciaries, they may also reinforce communal cleavages. For un-
like the state, which dispenses welfare provisions to all citizens irrespective of 
their communal affi  liations, NGOs can function on ethnic lines, extending 
ser vices to a par tic u lar community while excluding others (see Chapter 4).
Finally and most importantly, attaining “fundamental freedoms,” in the 
sense of “civil and po liti cal rights,” “good governance,” and democracy, clearly 
represents an end in itself, no matter what other purposes it may serve. And 
these are objectives with which the po liti cal classes in the Middle East have 
continuously been preoccupied, but which have thus far failed to materialize. 
The key question, however, is how to bring about a “society of freedom and 
good governance.” What kinds of human agency, social forces, are apt to carry 
out such a historic transformation? Can it be achieved by off ering good advice 
to the incumbent governments, by rational dialogue between the states and 
opposition groups? Does the solution lie in “democracy by conquest,” as in 
Af ghan i stan and Iraq, or is there a need to launch social and po liti cal move-
ments to push for demo cratization from within?
It is possible to imagine, as the authors do, that the current status quo 
might lead to despair, violence, or even unpredictable revolutions. This, we are 
told, is not a solution. The ideal scenario would be to “pursue an historic, 
peaceful and deep pro cess of negotiated po liti cal alteration” from above.22 But 
because the elites (intellectuals and national po liti cal actors), as the agents of 
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this strategy, are not as yet ready to face the challenge, then the  whole strategy 
of po liti cal transformation, in the end, collapses into the “realistic solution” of 
a “western- supported project of gradual and moderate reform aiming at liber-
alization in Arab countries.”23 How far this strategy diff ers from the U.S.- 
driven idea of a “greater Middle East” remains unclear.
It would be naive to underestimate the enormous challenge facing those 
who wish to transform the region, and the authors of the Report seem to un-
derstand this. Yet Arabs are likely to question the wisdom behind this “realis-
tic solution.” Why should they expect the West to step in demo cratizing their 
region, other than for pursuing its own selfi sh interests? Why should the United 
States pursue changing the authoritarian Arab regimes (e.g., Saudi Arabia) if 
that would further escalate opposition to its vital economic and strategic in-
terests in the region? Would such a “foreign- driven” initiative not be dis-
missed by the Arab states on the grounds that it interferes in their internal 
aff airs? Of course, this is not to dismiss, a priori, any possible international 
solidarity and support (whether from foreign states or civil society organiza-
tions) for a project of po liti cal change. The point, rather, is to explore how to 
manage foreign support. Foreign support may be legitimately utilized if it is 
initiated in association with endogenous democracy movements in the Arab 
countries. Even a negotiated po liti cal change “from above” is not far- fetched if 
there exist social movements that would compel the power elites to negotiate 
toward what is currently termed “demo cratization by pact,” as in Mexico, 
Chile, and elsewhere.24 The fact that President Mubarak of Egypt accepted in 
February 2005 to allow rival candidates to run against him in the presidential 
elections had less to do with western pressure than with a nascent but vocal 
Kifaya (“enough is enough”) movement, which instigated international mo-
mentum to bear on the Egyptian regime. Likewise, the Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon in 2005 resulted not directly from the western push, but pri-
marily from a Lebanese pop u lar movement, which in turn galvanized foreign 
support and pressure.
Yet despite their crucial role, the Report shows little interest in the ideas of 
social movements or grassroots mobilization for po liti cal transformation. For 
instance, to raise the status of Arab women, the Report not only advocates a 
series of legislative, institutional, religious/discursive, and economic (poverty 
reduction) reforms, but also envisages a “societal movement” at the national 
and regional levels, taking health care and education for girls as its prime fo-
cus, and establishing partnership with the governments, NGOs, the UN, and 
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other international organizations. But this notion of “societal movement” con-
sisting, presumably, of collective eff orts and networks remains exceedingly 
broad and unmistakably depoliticized, rendering it distinct from a “social 
movement” as we understand it in po liti cal sociology. It appears, then, that 
speaking of pop u lar movements or mobilization— and this displays one fur-
ther instance of the schizo phre nia of the Report— may imply radicalism and 
disorder, thus dismaying Arab offi  cialdom or standing contrary to the “neu-
tral” discursive package of the UN or the World Bank. Politics from below, 
therefore, has to be avoided.
This “elitist” approach in the Report not only derives from a distrust of 
“politics from below”; it has also related to the authors’ liberal imagination of 
the “state” as the neutral apparatus representing the public interests, a notion 
deeply embedded in the conceptual paradigms that inform the general visions 
of the UNDP and World Bank.  Here, the authoritarianism of the Arab states 
becomes simply a pathological matter— the states are either “benign but irratio-
nal” or “rational but ignorant” entities, which in either case can be put on the 
right path by proper counsel, sound legislation, or pressure from outside. This 
understanding, in par tic u lar the authors’ overemphasis on legalities, clearly 
overlooks the vested interests behind those who cling to the status quo. Even a 
few women driving in the streets of Riyadh cause havoc within the Saudi re-
gime, let alone ac cep tance of democracy, which can lead to the end of the mon-
archy. I do not wish to preclude the possibility of enhancing social development, 
demo cratic governance, rule of law, and fundamental freedoms in the region. 
On the contrary, I wish to stress that achieving these objectives is highly com-
plex, closely tied to the structures of power, vested interests, and, above all, so-
cial struggles— themes that we will explore in the following chapters.25
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 3 THE QUIET ENCROACHMENT OF THE ORDINARY
notwithstanding some overestimated claims of the globalization thesis (such 
as the waning role of nation- states, the breakdown of borders, the homogeneity 
of lifestyles, cultures, po liti cal systems, and so on),1 it is generally agreed that 
the economics of globalization, comprised of a global market “discipline,” fl ex-
ible accumulation, and “fi nancial deepening,” has had a profound impact on 
postcolonial societies.2 One major consequence of the new global restructur-
ing in the developing countries has been a double pro cess of, on the one hand, 
integration and, on the other, social exclusion and informalization.
The historic shift  in the periphery from socialist and populist regimes into 
liberal economic policies, through the Economic Reform and Structural Ad-
justment Program, has led to the erosion of much of the social contract, col-
lective responsibility, and welfare state structures. Thus, millions of people in 
the global South who depended on state provisions must now rely on them-
selves to survive. Deregulation of prices on housing, rent, and utilities jeopar-
dizes many poor people’s security of tenure, subjecting them to the risk of 
homelessness. Reduction of spending on social programs means shrinking 
access to decent education, health care, urban development, and government 
housing. Gradual removals of subsidies on bread, bus fares, and petrol have 
aff ected radically the living standard of millions of vulnerable groups. In the 
meantime, in a drive for privatization, public sectors have either been sold out 
or “reformed,” which in either case has caused massive layoff s without a clear 
Adapted from “From ‘Dangerous Classes’ to ‘Quiet Rebels’: Politics of the Urban Sub-
altern in the Global South,” International Sociology 15, no. 3 (2000), pp. 533– 57.
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prospect of boosting the economy and creating viable jobs. According to the 
World Bank, in the early 1990s, during the transition to market economies in 
postsocialist, adjusting Latin American and Middle Eastern countries, formal 
employment fell by 5 percent to 15 percent.3 In Africa the number of un-
employed grew by 10 percent each year throughout the 1980s, while labor 
absorption in the formal wage sector kept declining.4 By the late 1990s, a stag-
gering one billion workers representing one- third of the world’s labor force, 
most of them in the South,  were either unemployed or underemployed.5 A 
large number of once educated, well- to- do middle classes (professionals, gov-
ernment employees, and students) and public- sector workers, as well as seg-
ments of the peasantry, have been pushed into the ranks of the urban poor in 
labor and housing markets.
Thus, accompanied by the development of highly affl  uent groups, the new 
structuring has given rise to the growth of a marginalized and deinstitution-
alized subaltern in Third World cities. There is now an increasing number of 
unemployed, partially employed, and casual labor, street- subsistence workers, 
street children, and members of the underworld— groups that have been in-
terchangeably referred to as “urban marginals,” “urban disenfranchised,” and 
“urban poor.” Such socially excluded and informal groups are by no means 
new historical phenomena. However, the recent global restructuring seems to 
have intensifi ed and extended their operation. In the 1998 fi nancial crisis at 
least two million people lost their jobs in South Korea, as did three million in 
Thailand, and a staggering ten million in Indonesia.6 What is novel about this 
era is the marginalization of a large segment of middle classes. Slum dwell-
ing, casual work, under- the- table payment, and street hawking are no longer 
just the characteristics of the traditional poor but also are spread among the 
educated young people with higher status, aspirations, and social skills— 
government employees, teachers, and professionals.
How does this growing urban grass roots in the Third World respond to 
the larger social and economic pro cesses that aff ect their lives, if and when it 
does? Those who promote globalization suggest that the trickle- down of an 
eventual national economic growth will in the long run compensate for the in-
evitable sacrifi ces that the poor make in the transitional phase. In the mean-
time, social funds, NGOs and emergency aid are encouraged to create jobs and 
assist in social programs to alleviate the hardships and avert possible social un-
rest. Indeed, some view the upsurge of the NGOs in the South since the 1980s as 
a manifestation of or ga nized activism and grassroots institutions for social 
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development. However, granting that the development NGOs vary consider-
ably, their potential for in de pen dent and demo cratic or ga ni za tion of develop-
ment for the poor has generally been overestimated. As Neil Webster, reporting 
on India, has noted, advocates simply tend to expect too much from the devel-
opment NGOs,7 and by doing so underestimate their structural constraints 
(e.g., or gan i za tion al rationale, unaccountability, and professional middle- class 
leadership) for a meaningful development strategy. My own work on Middle 
Eastern development NGOs supports this conclusion. The professionalization 
of the NGOs tends to diminish the mobilizational feature of grassroots activ-
ism while it establishes new form of clientelism (see Chapter 4).
Many on the Left  point to a number of “reactive movements” (identity 
politics) that, they say, challenge globalization by appropriating technologies 
that it off ers. While Alberto Melluci’s “new social movements” focuses exclu-
sively on the “highly diff erentiated” western societies, others who, like Man-
uel Castells and Ankie Hoogvelt, take a southern perspective suggest religious, 
ethnic, and feminist movements as well as the Latin American postdevelop-
ment ideas as the backbone of antiglobalization forces. Identity movements 
do take up some of the challenges of globalization in postcolonial societies. 
However, they refl ect more the sentiments of the middle- class intellectuals 
than the actual everyday practices of the ordinary people. What do the grass 
roots think or do? What form of politics, if any, do the urban marginalized 
groups espouse?
Critically navigating through the prevailing models, including culture of 
poverty, survival strategy, urban social movements, and everyday re sis tance, 
I would suggest that the new global restructuring is reproducing subjectivities 
(marginalized and deinstitutionalized groups such as the impoverished mid-
dle classes, the unemployed, casual labor, street- subsistence workers and 
street children), social space, and thus terrain of po liti cal struggles that cur-
rent theoretical perspectives cannot on their own account for. I propose an 
alternative outlook—“quiet encroachment”— that I think might be more per-
tinent to examining the activism of the marginalized groups in the cities of 
the postcolonial societies. Quiet encroachment refers to noncollective but pro-
longed direct actions of dispersed individuals and families to acquire the 
basic necessities of their lives (land for shelter, urban collective consumption 
or urban ser vices, informal work, business opportunities, and public space) in 
a quiet and unassuming illegal fashion. This perspective has emerged out of 
my observation of urban pro cesses in the Muslim Middle East with its specifi c 
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social and po liti cal structures; nevertheless, it might have relevance to other 
Third World cities.
PREVAILING PERSPECTIVES
The so cio log i cal examination of urban “marginality” dates back to nineteenth- 
century Eu rope. Problems associated with urbanization (crime, inner- city con-
ditions, unemployment, migration, cultural duality, and so on) acquired scien-
tifi c treatment from the social science community. Georg Simmel’s “the stranger” 
dealt with sociopsychological traits of new urban settlers, and Durkheim was 
particularly keen on their “anomie.” Such a conceptualization later informed 
the work of the Chicago School of Sociology and Urban Study in the United 
States during the 1920s and 1930s, when Chicago served as the laboratory for 
examining the social behavior of its many ethnic immigrants. For Everett 
Stonequist and Robert Park, many immigrants  were “marginals”— a trait that 
was embedded in their social structure. Marginal personality was a manifesta-
tion of cultural hybridity, living on the margins of two cultures without being a 
full member of either.
Unlike the Chicago School functionalists, the mainstream Marxists, how-
ever, did not take the issue seriously. Relative to the centrality of the working 
class as the agent of the social transformation, Marxist theory either ignored 
the urban poor or described them as “lumpenproletariat,” the “non- proletarian” 
urban groups, a term used by Marx himself; but, as Hal Draper notes, it gave 
rise to “endless misunderstanding and mistranslation.” 8 For Marx, the 
lumpenproletariat was a po liti cal economy category. It referred to propertyless 
people who did not produce—“non- working proletariat,” obsolete social ele-
ments such as beggars, thieves, thugs, and criminals who  were in general poor 
but lived on the labor of other working people. Due to their economic exis-
tence, they  were said to follow a politics of noncommitment, which in the end 
may work against the interests of the producing classes.9 It is this uncertain 
politics that renders the lumpenproletariat, for both Marx and Engels, the “so-
cial scum,” “refuse of all classes,” the “dangerous classes.” Although Marx theo-
rized them later in terms of the “reserve army of labor,” and thus a segment of 
the working class, controversy nevertheless continued as to the relevance of 
this concept in the current capitalist structuring, as it does not leave much 
chance for these people to be reemployed. Some suggested that far from 
being on “reserve,” the urban disenfranchised  were integrated into the capital-
ist relations.10 Even with Frantz Fanon’s passionate defense of lumpenprole-
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tariat as the revolutionary force in the colonies,11 the Communist parties in the 
Third World did not go beyond looking at the urban marginals as the “toiling 
masses” who might have the potential for alliance with the working class.
However, the continuous prominence of the “informals” (which in many de-
veloping economies clearly outweighed the industrial working class) and their 
assumed threat to po liti cal stability in the developing countries returned them to 
academic analysis. Against the descriptive term of “informals” and the deroga-
tory one of “lumpenproletariat,” T. G. McGee and Robin Cohen opted for the 
notion of “proto- proletariat,” and Peter Worsley “urban poor”— concepts that 
recognized some degree of agency.
More serious studies of the social conditions and the politics of the urban 
subaltern in the Third World emerged among U.S. social scientists during the 
1960s. Modernization and urban migration in the developing countries had 
caused a dramatic expansion of impoverished urban settlements, and the 
growing urban “underclass” was thought to provide a breeding ground for the 
spread of radical guerrilla movements, which, in the midst of the cold war, 
 were perceived to jeopardize the po liti cal interests of the United States and 
those of local elites. Po liti cal observers took the Chinese Revolution of 1949, 
the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the growing guerrilla movements in parts 
of the Third World as convincing evidence. Latin America, however, acted as 
a laboratory for much- debated theories about the social and po liti cal behav-
iors of the urban underclass. Studies by Samuel Huntington and Joan Nelson, 
among others, refl ected the concerns of the time.12  Here, prevailing scholar-
ship focused on the poor’s “po liti cal threat” to the existing order. Scholars, 
mostly po liti cal scientists,  were preoccupied with the question of whether the 
migrant poor constituted a destabilizing force. Joan Nelson argued that there 
was “no evidence that the new migrants are either radical or violence- prone.”13 
Such preoccupations overlooked the dynamics of the poor’s everyday life. 
Many viewed the politics of the poor in the binary terms of a revolutionary/
passive dichotomy, consequently limiting how to look at the matter. Essential-
ism informed both sides of the controversy. The ensuing debates  were galva-
nized in four identifi able perspectives: the “passive poor,” “survival strategy,” 
“urban territorial movement,” and “everyday re sis tance” models.
The Passive Poor
While some observers working in the functionalist paradigm still viewed 
the urban poor as essentially disruptive and imbued with the sentiments of 
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anomie, many considered the poor as a po liti cally passive group struggling 
simply to make ends meet. Oscar Lewis’s theory of a “culture of poverty,” 
based upon ethnographies among the urban poor in Puerto Rico and Mex-
ico, off ered scientifi c legitimacy to such notion.14 Highlighting certain cul-
tural/psychological essentials as components of a culture of poverty— fatalism, 
traditionalism, rootlessness, unadaptability, criminality, lack of ambition, 
hopelessness, and so on— Lewis unintentionally extended the notion of the 
“passive poor.” With an underlying emphasis on identifying the “marginal 
man” as cultural type, the “culture of poverty” remained a dominant per-
spective for many years, informing much of antipoverty discourse and poli-
cies in the United States as well as the Third World elites’ perception of the 
poor.
The conceptual weaknesses of “culture of poverty,” despite Lewis’s empa-
thy for the poor, became clear before long. Simply, Lewis essentialized the 
culture of the poor, since his “culture of poverty” was only one type of culture 
among many.15 Lewis’s generalization disregarded the varying ways in which 
the poor in diff erent cultures handle poverty. Critiques such as Worsley’s 
charged that Lewis was a middle- class scholar who blamed the poor for their 
poverty and passivity.16 Interestingly, Lewis’s conceptualization shared many 
traits with those of the Chicago School urban sociologists such as Stonequist 
and Robert Park and even the thinkers of an earlier generation like Simmel. 
Janice Perlman’s powerful critique of the “myth of marginality” in 1976, to-
gether with Manuel Castells’s critical contributions, undermined this outlook 
in academia, if not in offi  cialdom. They demonstrated that the myth of mar-
ginality was an instrument of social control of the poor, and that the margin-
alized poor  were a product of capitalist social structure.17
The Surviving Poor
As such, the “survival strategy” does not directly deal with the politics of the 
poor, but a relevant, implicit conceptual assumption underlies this perspective. 
The survival strategy model goes one step toward implying that although the 
poor are powerless, they do not sit around waiting for fate to determine their 
lives. Rather, they are active in their own way to ensure their survival. Thus, to 
counter unemployment or price increases, they oft en resort to theft , begging, 
prostitution, or the re orientation of their consumption pattern; to respond to 
famine and war, they choose to leave their homes even if emigration is dis-
couraged by the authorities. In this thinking, the poor are seen to survive; 
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however, their survival is at the cost of themselves or their fellow humans.18 
While resorting to coping mechanisms in real life seems quite widespread 
among the poor in many cultures, an overemphasis on the language of sur-
vival strategy, as Escobar notes, may contribute to maintaining the image of 
the poor as victims, denying them any agency.19 The fact is that poor people 
may also resist and make advances in their lives when the opportunity arises. 
Beyond that, evidence in many parts of the world does indicate that many of 
them also create opportunities for advancement— they or ga nize and get in-
volved in contentious politics. John Friedmann’s notion of “empowerment” is 
indicative of just such an opportunity- creating tendency of the poor. It de-
scribes poor people’s self- organization for collective survival through the 
institution of the  house hold as the central element for the production of liveli-
hood, the principle of moral economy (trust, reciprocity, voluntarism), and 
the utilization of their “social power” (free time, social skills, networking, as-
sociations, and instruments of production).20
The Po liti cal Poor
Critiques of “passive poor” and “culture of poverty” models opened the way 
for the development of an outlook in which the urban subaltern emerged as 
po liti cal actors— the “urban territorial movement” standpoint. Perlman, Cas-
tells, and some other scholars of Latin America insisted that the poor  were not 
marginal, but integrated into the urban society. Rather, they argued, the poor 
 were “marginalized”— economically exploited, po liti cally repressed, socially 
stigmatized, and culturally excluded from a closed social system.21 Not only 
did the poor participate in party politics, elections, and mainstream eco-
nomic activities, more importantly, they establish their own territorial social 
movements. Thus, community associations, barrios, consumer organizations, 
soup kitchens, squatter support groups, church activities, and the like  were 
understood as manifesting or ga nized and territorially based movements of 
the poor who strive for “social transformation” (according to Castells), “eman-
cipation” (according to Schuurmann and van Naerssen), or an alternative to 
the tyranny of modernity, in the words of John Friedmann.22 In their imme-
diate day- to- day activities, the poor struggle for a share in urban ser vices, or 
“collective consumption.”
The territorial character of these movements results from the mode of ex-
istence of the agents— the urban grass roots. Although quite diff erentiated (in 
terms of income, status, occupation, and production relations), the urban 
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grass roots nevertheless are thought to share a common place of residence, 
community. Shared space and the needs associated with common property, 
then, off er these people the possibility of “spatial solidarity.”23 The attempts to 
highlight contentious politics as well as noncontentious cooperation among 
the urban poor undercut drastically both the “culture of poverty” and “sur-
vivalist” arguments, granting a signifi cant agency to the urban subaltern. 
However, the “urban movement perspective” appears largely a Latin Ameri-
can model rooted in the sociopo liti cal conditions of this region. Not surpris-
ingly, it is a perspective that has been off ered primarily by scholars working in 
Latin America.24 Local soup kitchens, neighborhood associations, church 
groups, or street trade  unionism are hardly common phenomena in, say, the 
Middle East, Asia, or Africa (with the exception of countries like India and 
South Africa). In the Middle East, for instance, the prevalence of authoritar-
ian states (of despotic, populist, or dictatorial kinds), which are wary of civil 
associations, together with the strength of family and kinship relations, ren-
der primary solidarities more pertinent than secondary associations and so-
cial movements. While collective entities such as the charity organizations 
and mosque associations do exist, they rarely lead to po liti cal mobilization of 
the pop u lar classes. Although associations based upon neighborly relations, 
common origin and ethnic affi  liation, or traditional credit systems are quite 
common, social networks that extend beyond kinship and ethnicity remain 
largely casual, unstructured, and paternalistic (see Chapter 4).
Some scholars tend to present the Islamist movements in the region as the 
Middle Eastern model of urban social movements. A few functional resem-
blances notwithstanding, the fact remains that the identity of Islamism does 
not derive from its par tic u lar concern for the urban disenfranchised. Is-
lamism in general has broader aims and objectives. Unlike the Catholic 
Church, in par tic u lar the liberation theology movement, the Islamist move-
ments tend oft en to mobilize not the poor, but largely the educated middle 
classes, which they view as the main agents of po liti cal change.25 So it is mainly 
in exceptional circumstances (e.g., crises and revolutionary situations) that 
some degree of mobilization and contentious politics is encouraged, as in 
revolutionary Iran and the crisis- stricken Algeria. It is true that the Islamist 
Rifah Party in Turkey mobilized slum dwellers; this was so primarily because 
Turkey’s free electoral system had granted the urban grass roots voting power, 
and thus a bargaining leverage that the Islamists as a legitimate po liti cal party 
could utilize.
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Still, one must realize that the prevalence of urban movements in Latin 
America varies considerably. As Leeds and Leeds have shown, due to the mul-
tiplicity of competing interest groups (government, private interests, and oth-
ers) the grass roots have had more opportunity for collective action in Peru 
than in Brazil, where the extremity of constraints forced the poor to “seek 
their betterment through the paternalistic, individualistic channels of favors 
and exchange of interests.”26 In Chile, in episodes of po liti cal openness and 
radical groupings, the poor have been or ga nized more extensively.
The Resisting Poor
The dearth of conventional collective action— in par tic u lar, contentious pro-
tests among the subaltern groups (the poor, peasants, and women) in the devel-
oping countries, together with a disillusionment with dominant socialist par-
ties, pushed many radical observers to “discover” and highlight diff erent types 
of activism, however small- scale, local, or even individualistic. Such a quest, 
meanwhile, both contributed to and benefi ted from the upsurge of theoretical 
perspectives, during the 1980s, associated with poststructuralism that made 
micropolitics and “everyday re sis tance” a pop u lar idea. James Scott’s depar-
ture, during the 1980s, from a structuralist position in studying the behavior of 
the peasantry in Asia to a more ethnographic method of focusing on individ-
ual reactions of peasants contributed considerably to this paradigm shift .27 In 
the meantime, Foucault’s “decentered” notion of power, together with a revival 
of neo- Gramscian politics of culture (hegemony), served as a key theoretical 
backing for micropolitics, and thus the “re sis tance” perspective.
The notion of “re sis tance” came to stress that power and counterpower 
 were not in binary opposition, but in a decoupled, complex, ambivalent, and 
perpetual “dance of control.”28 It based itself on the Foucauldian idea that “wher-
ever there is power there is re sis tance,” although the latter consisted largely of 
small- scale, everyday, tiny activities that the agents could aff ord to articulate 
given their po liti cal constraints. Such a perception of re sis tance penetrated 
not only peasant studies, but a variety of fi elds, including labor studies, iden-
tity politics, ethnicity, women’s studies, education, and studies of the urban 
subaltern. Thus, multiple researchers discussed how relating stories about 
miracles “gives voice to pop u lar re sis tance”29; how disenfranchised women 
resisted patriarchy by relating folktales and songs or by pretending to be pos-
sessed or crazy;30 how reviving extended family among the urban pop u lar 
classes represented an “avenue of po liti cal participation.”31 The relationships 
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between the Filipino bar girls and western men  were discussed not simply in 
terms of total domination, but in a complex and contingent fashion;32 and the 
veiling of the Muslim working woman has been represented not in simple 
terms of submission, but in ambivalent terms of protest and co- optation—
hence, an “accommodating protest.”33 Indeed, on occasions, both veiling and 
unveiling  were simultaneously considered as a symbol of re sis tance.
Undoubtedly, such an attempt to grant agency to the subjects that until 
then  were depicted as “passive poor,” “submissive women,” “apo liti cal peas-
ant,” and “oppressed worker” was a positive development. The re sis tance 
paradigm helps to uncover the complexity of power relations in society in 
general, and the politics of the subaltern in par tic u lar. It tells us that we may 
not expect a universalized form of struggle; that totalizing pictures oft en 
distort variations in people’s perceptions about change; that local should be 
recognized as a signifi cant site of struggle as well as a unit of analysis; that 
or ga nized collective action may not be possible everywhere, and thus alter-
native forms of struggles must be discovered and acknowledged; that or ga-
nized protest as such may not necessarily be privileged in the situations 
where suppression rules. The value of a more fl exible, small- scale, and un-
bureaucratic activism should, therefore, be acknowledged.34 These are some 
of the issues that critiques of poststructuralist advocates of “re sis tance” 
ignore.35
Yet a number of conceptual and po liti cal problems also emerge from this 
paradigm. The immediate trouble is how to conceptualize re sis tance, and its 
relation to power, domination, and submission. James Scott seems to be clear 
about what he means by the term:
Class re sis tance includes any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is 
or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, pres-
tige) made on that class by superordinate classes (for example, landlords, 
large farmers, the state) or to advance its own claims (for example, work, land, 
charity, respect) vis-à- vis these superordinate classes.36 [emphasis added]
However, the phrase “any act” blocks delineating between qualitatively 
diverse forms of activities that Scott lists. Are we not to distinguish between 
large- scale collective action and individual acts, say, of tax dodging? Do recit-
ing poetry in private, however subversive- sounding, and engaging in armed 
struggle have identical value? Should we not expect unequal aff ectivity and 
implications from such diff erent acts? Scott was aware of this, and so agreed 
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with those who had made distinctions between diff erent types of resistance— 
for example, “real re sis tance” refers to “or ga nized, systematic, pre- planned or 
selfl ess practices with revolutionary consequences,” and “token re sis tance” 
points to unor ga nized incidental acts without any revolutionary consequences, 
and which are accommodated in the power structure.37 Yet he insisted that 
the “token re sis tance” is no less real than the “real re sis tance.” Scott’s follow-
ers, however, continued to make further distinctions. Nathan Brown, in 
studying peasant politics in Egypt, for instance, identifi es three forms of 
politics: atomistic (politics of individuals and small groups with obscure 
content), communal (a group eff ort to disrupt the system, by slowing down 
production and the like), and revolt ( just short of revolution to negate the 
system).38
Beyond this, many re sis tance writers tend to confuse an awareness about 
oppression with acts of re sis tance against it. The fact that poor women sing 
songs about their plight or ridicule men in their private gatherings indicates 
their understanding of gender dynamics. This does not mean, however, that 
they are involved in acts of re sis tance; neither are the miracle stories of the 
poor urbanites who imagine the saints to come and punish the strong. Such 
an understanding of “re sis tance” fails to capture the extremely complex inter-
play of confl ict and consent, and ideas and action, operating within systems of 
power. Indeed, the link between consciousness and action remains a major 
so cio log i cal dilemma.39
Scott makes it clear that re sis tance is an intentional act. In Weberian tra-
dition, he takes the meaning of action as a crucial element. This intentional-
ity, while signifi cant in itself, obviously leaves out many types of individual 
and collective practices whose intended and unintended consequences do not 
correspond. In Cairo or Tehran, for example, many poor families illegally tap 
into electricity and running water from the municipality despite their aware-
ness of their behavior’s illegality. Yet they do not steal urban ser vices in order 
to express their defi ance vis-à- vis the authorities. Rather, they do it because 
they feel the necessity of those ser vices for a decent life, because they fi nd no 
other way to acquire them. But these very mundane acts when continued lead 
to signifi cant changes in the urban structure, in social policy, and in the ac-
tors’ own lives. Hence, the signifi cance of the unintended consequences of 
agents’ daily activities. In fact, many authors in the re sis tance paradigm have 
simply abandoned intent and meaning, focusing instead eclectically on both 
intended and unintended practices as manifestations of “re sis tance.”
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There is still a further question. Does re sis tance mean defending an al-
ready achieved gain (in Scott’s terms, denying claims made by dominant 
groups over the subordinate ones) or making fresh demands (to “advance its 
own claims”), what I like to call “encroachment”? In much of the re sis tance 
literature, this distinction is missing. Although one might imagine moments 
of overlap, the two strategies, however, lead to diff erent po liti cal consequences; 
this is so in par tic u lar when we view them in relation to the strategies of 
dominant power. The issue was so crucial that Lenin devoted his entire What 
Is to Be Done? to discussing the implications of these two strategies, albeit in 
diff erent terms of “economism/trade  unionism” vs. “social demo cratic/party 
politics.”
What ever one may think about a Leninist/vanguardist paradigm, it was 
one that corresponded to a par tic u lar theory of the state and power (a capital-
ist state to be seized by a mass movement led by the working- class party); in 
addition, it was clear where this strategy wanted to take the working class (to 
establish a socialist state). Now, what is the perception of the state in the “re-
sis tance” paradigm? What is the strategic aim in this perspective? Where does 
the re sis tance paradigm want to take its agents/subjects, beyond “prevent[ing] 
the worst and promis[ing] something better”?40
Much of the literature of re sis tance is based upon a notion of power that 
Foucault has articulated, that power is everywhere, that it “circulates” and is 
never “localized  here and there, never in anybody’s hands.” 41 Such a formula-
tion is surely instructive in transcending the myth of the powerlessness of the 
ordinary and in recognizing their agency. Yet this “decentered” notion of power, 
shared by many poststructuralist “re sis tance” writers, underestimates state 
power, notably its class dimension, since it fails to see that although power 
circulates, it does so unevenly— in some places it is far weightier, more con-
centrated, and “thicker,” so to speak, than in others. In other words, like it or 
not, the state does matter, and one needs to take that into account when dis-
cussing the potential of urban subaltern activism. Although Foucault insists 
that re sis tance is real when it occurs outside of and in de pen dent of the sys-
tems of power, the perception of power that informs the “re sis tance” literature 
leaves little room for an analysis of the state as a system of power. It is, there-
fore, not accidental that a theory of the state and, therefore, an analysis of the 
possibility of co- optation, are absent in almost all accounts of “re sis tance.” 
Consequently, the cherished acts of re sis tance fl oat around aimlessly in an 
unknown, uncertain, and ambivalent universe of power relations, with the 
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   54 9/1/09   1:59 PM
—-1
—0
—+1
THE QUIET ENCROACHMENT OF THE ORDINARY 55
end result an unsettled, tense accommodation with the existing power 
arrangement.
Lack of a clear concept of re sis tance, moreover, oft en leads writers in this 
genre to overestimate and read too much into the acts of the agents. The result 
is that almost any act of the subjects potentially becomes one of “re sis tance.” 
Determined to discover the “inevitable” acts of re sis tance, many poststruc-
turalist writers oft en come to “replace their subject.”42 While they attempt to 
challenge the essentialism of such perspectives as “passive poor,” “submissive 
Muslim women,” and “inactive masses,” they tend, however, to fall into the 
trap of essentialism in reverse— by reading too much into ordinary behaviors, 
interpreting them as necessarily conscious or contentious acts of defi ance. 
This is so because they overlook the crucial fact that these practices occur 
mostly within the prevailing systems of power.
For example, some of the lower class’s activities in the Middle East that 
some authors read as “re sis tance,” “intimate politics” of defi ance, or “avenues 
of participation” may actually contribute to the stability and legitimacy of the 
state.43 The fact that people are able to help themselves and extend their net-
works surely shows their daily activism and struggles. However, by doing so 
the actors may hardly win any space from the state (or other sources of power, 
like capital and patriarchy)— they are not necessarily challenging domina-
tion. In fact, governments oft en encourage self- help and local initiatives so long 
as they do not turn oppositional. They do so in order to shift  some of their 
burdens of social welfare provision and responsibilities onto the individual 
citizens. The proliferation of many NGOs in the global South is a good indica-
tor of this. In short, much of the re sis tance literature confuses what one might 
consider coping strategies (when the survival of the agents is secured at the 
cost of themselves or that of fellow humans) and eff ective participation or 
subversion of domination.
There is a last question. If the poor are always able to resist in many ways 
(by discourse or actions, individual or collective, overt or covert) the systems 
of domination, then what is the need to assist them? If they are already po liti-
cally able citizens, why should we expect the state or any other agency to em-
power them? Misreading the behavior of the poor may, in fact, frustrate our 
moral responsibility toward the vulnerable. As Michael Brown rightly notes, 
when you “elevate the small injuries of childhood to the same moral status as 
suff ering of truly oppressed,” you are committing “a savage leveling that di-
minishes rather than intensifi es our sensitivities to injustice.” 44
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Given the shortcomings of the prevailing perspectives— that is, the essential-
ism of the “passive poor,” the reductionism of “survival strategy,” the Latino- 
centrism of the “urban social movement model,” and the conceptual perplex-
ity of “re sis tance literature”— I like to assess the politics of the urban marginals 
in the developing world from a diff erent angle, in terms of “the quiet en-
croachment of the ordinary.” I believe that this notion might be able to over-
come some of those inadequacies and better capture the important aspect of 
urban subaltern politics in conditions of globalization.45
The notion of “quiet encroachment” describes the silent, protracted, but 
pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied, powerful, or 
the public, in order to survive and improve their lives. They are marked by 
quiet, largely atomized and prolonged mobilization with episodic collective 
action— open and fl eeting struggles without clear leadership, ideology, or 
structured or ga ni za tion. While quiet encroachment cannot be considered a 
“social movement” as such, it is also distinct from survival strategies or “every-
day re sis tance” in that, fi rst, the struggles and gains of the agents are not at the 
cost of fellow poor or themselves (as is the case in survival strategies), but of 
the state, the rich, and the powerful. Thus, in order to illuminate their shel-
ters, the urban poor tap electricity, not from their neighbors, but from the 
municipal power poles; to raise their living standard, they would not prevent 
their children from attending school in order to work, but rather squeeze the 
timing of their formal job, in order to carry on their secondary work in the 
informal sector.
In addition, these struggles are seen not necessarily as defensive merely in 
the realm of re sis tance, but cumulatively encroaching, meaning that the actors 
tend to expand their space by winning new positions to move on. This type of 
quiet and gradual grassroots activism tends to contest many fundamental as-
pects of the state prerogatives, including the meaning of order, control of pub-
lic space, of public and private goods, and the relevance of modernity.
I am referring to the lifelong struggles of the fl oating social clusters— the 
migrants, refugees, unemployed, underemployed, squatters, street vendors, 
street children, and other marginalized groups, whose growth has been ac-
celerated by the pro cess of economic globalization. I have in mind the pro-
tracted pro cesses in which millions of men and women embark on long mi-
gratory journeys, scattering in remote and oft en alien environs, acquiring 
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work, shelter, land, and living amenities. The refugees and international mi-
grants encroach on host states and their provisions, the rural migrants on the 
cities and their collective consumption, the squatters on public and private 
lands or ready- made homes, and the unemployed, as street- subsistence work-
ers, on the pubic space and business opportunity created by shop keep ers. Thus, 
millions of rural migrants, the urban poor, and the impoverished middle class 
quietly claim state/public lands on the outskirts of the cities or take over cem-
eteries, rooft ops, and other urban spaces creating vibrant spontaneous com-
munities and informal life. Once settled, encroachments continue in many 
directions. Counter to formal terms and conditions, the residents add rooms, 
balconies, and extra space in and on buildings. Those who have formally been 
given housing in public projects built by the state illegally redesign and rear-
range their space to suit their needs by erecting partitions, and by adding and 
inventing new space.46 Oft en,  whole communities emerge as a result of intense 
struggles and negotiations between the poor and the authorities and elites in 
their daily lives.47
Within such communities, the encroachers tend to compel the authorities 
to extend urban ser vices to their neighborhoods by otherwise tapping them 
illegally, using them free of charge. However, once utilities are installed, many 
simply refuse to pay for their use. Some 40 percent of poor residents of Hayy 
el- Sellom, a south Beirut informal community, for instance, refused to pay 
their electric bills in the late 1990s. Similar stories are reported in urban Chile 
and South Africa, where the poor have periodically refused to pay for urban 
public ser vices aft er struggling to acquire them, oft en against the authorities’ 
will. Millions of street vendors in the cities of the global South have occupied 
the streets in the main commercial centers, infringing on favorable business 
opportunities the shop keep ers have generated. Large numbers of inhabitants 
in these cities subsist on tips from parking cars in streets that they control and 
or ga nize in such elaborate ways as to create maximum parking space. Finally, 
as in many Third World cities, such as those in South Korea, the encroach-
ment of the street vendors on copyrights of labels and trademarks has invari-
ably caused protests by multinational companies.48
As state employees and professionals, the previously privileged segments 
of the workforce, feel the crunch of neoliberal policies, they too resort to their 
own repertoires of quiet encroachment. Thus, to compensate for their meager 
monthly salary, the schoolteachers in Egypt, for instance, turn to private paid 
tutoring of their own pupils. By doing so, they have created a massive sector of 
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illegal private teaching that generated in early 2000 some EL12 billion ($3 bil-
lion) a year, and at least 25 percent of the annual earning of Egyptian fami-
lies.”49 Similarly, “street lawyers” or “unregistered practitioners” may encroach 
on the legal profession. These street lawyers do not hold law degrees but have 
acquired some legal knowledge by working as employees in law offi  ces. They 
then share their legal experience with new law graduates (who cannot aff ord 
the high cost of establishing law offi  ces) to off er competitive ser vices.50
These actors carry out their activities not as deliberate po liti cal acts; 
rather, they are driven by the force of necessity— the necessity to survive and 
improve life. Necessity is the notion that justifi es their oft en unlawful acts as 
moral and even “natural” ways to maintain a life with dignity. Yet these very 
simple and seemingly mundane practices tend to shift  them into the realm of 
contentious politics. The contenders become engaged in collective action and 
see their actions and themselves as po liti cal chiefl y when they are confronted 
by those who threaten their gains. Hence, a key attribute of quiet encroach-
ment is that while advances are made quietly, individually, and gradually, the 
defense of their gains is oft en, although not always, collective and audible.
Driven by the force of necessity (eff ects of economic restructuring, agricul-
tural failure, physical hardship, war, and displacement), these actors set out on 
their ventures rather individually, oft en or ga nized around kinship and friend-
ship ties, and without much clamor. They even deliberately avoid collective ef-
fort, large- scale operation, commotion, and publicity. At times the squatters, 
for instance, prevent others from joining them in specifi c areas; and vendors 
discourage their counterparts from settling in the same vicinity. Many even 
hesitate to share with similar groups information about their strategies of ac-
quiring urban ser vices. Yet as these seemingly disparate individuals and fami-
lies pursue similar paths, their sheer cumulative numbers turn them into an 
eventual social force. This is another feature of quiet encroachment.
But why individual and quiet direct action, instead of collective demand 
making? Unlike the factory workers, students, or professionals, these people 
represent groups in fl ux and structurally operate largely outside institutional 
mechanisms through which they can express grievances and enforce demands. 
They lack an or gan i za tion al power of disruption— the possibility of going on 
strike, for example. They may participate in street demonstrations or riots as 
part of a general expression of pop u lar discontent, but only when these meth-
ods enjoy a reasonable currency and legitimacy (as in the immediate postrevo-
lutionary Iran, Beirut during the civil war, or aft er the fall of Suharto in Indo-
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nesia in 1998), and when they are mobilized by outside leaders. Thus, urban 
land takeovers may be led by left - wing activists; and the unemployed and street 
vendors may be invited to form  unions (as in Iran aft er the revolution, in Lima, 
or in India). This, however, represents an uncommon phenomenon, since 
more oft en than not, mobilization for collective demand making is prevented 
by po liti cal repression in many developing countries, where these struggles 
oft en take place. Consequently, in place of protest or publicity, these groups 
move directly to fulfi ll their needs by themselves, albeit individually and dis-
creetly. In short, theirs is not a politics of protest, but of redress, struggle for an 
immediate outcome through individual direct action.
What do these men and women aim for? They seem to pursue two major 
goals. The fi rst is the redistribution of social goods and opportunities in the 
form of the (unlawful and direct) acquisition of collective consumption (land, 
shelter, piped water, electricity, roads), public space (street pavements, inter-
sections, street parking places), opportunities (favorable business conditions, 
locations, labels, licenses), and other life- chances essential for survival and 
acceptable standards of living.
The other goal is attaining autonomy, both cultural and po liti cal, from the 
regulations, institutions, and discipline imposed by the state and modern in-
stitutions. In a quest for an informal life, the marginals tend to function as 
much as possible outside the boundaries of the state and modern bureaucratic 
institutions, basing their relationships on reciprocity, trust, and negotiation 
rather than on the modern notions of individual self- interest, fi xed rules, and 
contracts. Thus, they may opt for jobs in self- employed activities rather than 
working under the discipline of the modern workplace; resort to informal 
dispute resolution than reporting to police; get married through local infor-
mal procedures (in the Muslim Middle East under local sheikhs) rather than 
by governmental offi  ces; borrow money from informal credit associations 
rather than modern banks. This is so not because these people are essentially 
non- or antimodern, but because the conditions of their existence compel 
them to seek an informal mode of life. Because modernity is a costly exis-
tence, not everyone can aff ord to be modern. It requires the capacity to con-
form to the types of behavior and mode of life (adherence to strict discipline 
of time, space, contracts, and so on) that most vulnerable people simply can-
not aff ord. So while the disenfranchised wish to watch color TV, enjoy clean 
tap water, and possess the security of tenure, they are weary of paying taxes 
and bills or reporting to work at specifi ed times (see Chapter 9).
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But how far can the urban subaltern exercise autonomy in the conditions 
of globalization, amid expanding integration? The fact is that not only do the 
poor seek autonomy, they also need security, that is, freedom from the state’s 
surveillance, because an informal life in the conditions of modernity is also 
an insecure life. To illustrate, street vendors may feel free from the discipline 
of modern working institutions, but they suff er from police harassment for 
lacking business permits. The struggle of the poor to consolidate their com-
munities, to have schools, clinics, or sewerage would inevitably integrate them 
into the prevailing systems of power (i.e., the state and modern bureaucratic 
institutions) that they wish to avoid. In their quest for security, the urban poor 
are in constant negotiation and vacillation between autonomy and integra-
tion. Yet they continue to pursue autonomy in any possible space available 
within the integrating structures and pro cesses.
BECOMING PO LITI CAL
If encroachment begins with little po liti cal meaning attached to it, if illegal 
acts are oft en justifi ed on moral grounds, then how does it turn into a collec-
tive/po liti cal struggle? So long as the actors carry on with their everyday 
advances without being confronted seriously by any authority, they are likely 
to treat their advances as ordinary, everyday exercises. However, once their 
gains are threatened, they tend to become conscious of their doings and the 
value of their gains, defending them in oft en collective and audible fashion. 
Examples may be found in the mobilization of the squatters in Tehran in 1976, 
and of the street vendors in the 1980s, and street riots by the squatters in sev-
eral cities in the early 1990s. Alternatively, the actors may retain their gains 
through quiet noncompliance, without necessarily engaging in collective re-
sis tance. Instead of collectively standing by their businesses, the mobile street 
vendors in Cairo or Istanbul simply retreat into the backstreets once the mu-
nicipal police arrive, and they immediately resume their work when the police 
are gone. At any rate, the struggles of the actors against the authorities are not 
about gaining, but primarily about defending and furthering already- won 
gains. But they almost invariably involve state power.
The state’s position vis-à- vis this type of activism is aff ected, fi rst, by the 
extent of their capacity to exercise surveillance and, second, by the dual na-
ture of quiet encroachment (infringing on property, power, and privilege and, 
at the same time, being a self- help activity). Third World states seem to be more 
tolerant of quiet encroachment than are those in the industrialized countries 
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such as the United States, where similar activities, albeit very limited, also 
take place. The industrial states are by far better equipped with ideological, 
technological, and institutional apparatuses to conduct surveillance of their 
populations. In other words, people have more room for autonomy under the 
vulnerable and “soft  states” of the global South than in the advanced industri-
alized countries, where tax evasion, infringement of private property, and en-
croachment on the state domains are considered serious off enses.
On the other hand, quiet encroachment, although it is an infringement 
on the public, property, and power, may in many ways benefi t Third World 
governments, for it is a mechanism through which the poor come to help 
themselves. It is no surprise, then, that these governments oft en express con-
tradictory reactions toward these kinds of activities. The “soft ” and vulnerable 
states, especially at times of crisis, tend in practice to allow the encroachments 
when the latter still appear limited. On their part, the encroachers attempt 
constantly to appear limited and tolerable while in fact expanding so much that 
re sis tance against them becomes formidable. They do so by resorting to tacti-
cal retreats, going invisible, bribing the offi  cials, or concentrating on par tic u lar 
and less strategic spaces (for instance, squatting in remote areas or vending in 
less visible locations).
However, once their real expansion and impact are revealed, when the 
cumulative growth of the actors and their doings passes beyond a tolerable 
point, the state crackdown becomes expectable. Yet in most cases the crack-
downs fail to yield much, since they are usually launched too late, when the 
encroachers have already spread, becoming visible and past the point of no 
return. Indeed, the description by the offi  cials of these pro cesses as “cancer-
ous” brings home the dynamics of such nonmovements.
The sources of confl ict between the actors and the state are not diffi  cult to 
determine. First, the oft en “informal” and free- of- charge distribution of pub-
lic goods exerts a heavy pressure on the resources that the state controls. Be-
sides, the rich— the real estate own ers, merchants, and shopkeepers— also lose 
properties, brands, and business opportunities. The alliance of the state and 
the propertied groups adds a class dimension to the confl ict. On the other 
hand, the actors’ drive for autonomy in everyday life creates a serious void in 
the domination of the modern state. Autonomous life renders the modern 
states, in par tic u lar the populist versions, rather irrelevant. Moreover, auton-
omy and informality (of agents, activities, and spaces) deprive the states of the 
knowledge necessary to exert surveillance. Unregulated jobs, unregistered 
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peoples and places, nameless streets and alleyways, and policeless neighbor-
hoods mean that these entities remain hidden from the government’s books. 
To be able to control them, the states need to make them transparent. Indeed, 
programs of squatter upgrading may be seen in terms of this strategy of open-
ing up the unknown in order to be able to control it. Confl ict between these 
encroachers and the state, therefore, is inevitable.
Nowhere is this confl ict more evident than in the “streets,” this public 
space par excellence. Since the “streets” serve as the only locus of collective 
expression for, but by no means limited to, those who generally lack an insti-
tutional setting to express discontent, including squatters, the unemployed, 
street- subsistence workers, street children, members of the underworld, and 
 house wives. Whereas factory workers or college students, for instance, may 
cause disruption by going on strike, the unemployed or street vendors can 
voice grievances only in the public spaces, the streets. Indeed, for many of 
these disenfranchised, the streets are the main, perhaps the only, place where 
they can perform their daily functions— to assemble, make friends, earn a 
living, spend their leisure time, and express discontent. In addition, streets 
are also the public places where the state has the most evident presence, which 
is expressed in police patrol, traffi  c regulations, and spatial divisions— in 
short, in public order. The dynamics of the power relationship between the 
encroachers and the authorities are what I have termed “street politics.” By 
“street politics,” I mean a set of confl icts and the attendant implications 
between a collective populace and the authorities, which are shaped and 
expressed episodically in the physical and social space of the “streets,” 
from alleyways to the more visible street sidewalks, public parks, and pub-
lic sport facilities. It describes the articulation of discontent by people who 
operate usually outside the modern institutions (like the unemployed, or 
casual workers or  house wives); or by those groups who may enjoy the insti-
tutional settings (such as factory workers or students), but wish to gain 
support and solidarity beyond the confi nes of their institutions among the 
general public.51
Two key factors render the streets an arena of politics. First is the use of 
public space as a site of contestation between the actors and the authorities. In 
this sense, what makes the streets a po liti cal site is the active or participative 
(as opposed to passive) use of public space. This is so because these sites (side-
walks, public parks, intersections,  etc.) are increasingly becoming the domain 
of the state power, which regulates their use, making them “orderly.” It ex-
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pects the users to operate them passively. An active use challenges the author-
ity of the state and those social groups that benefi t from such order.
The second element shaping street politics is the operation of what I have 
called the “passive network” among the people who use and operate in the pub-
lic space. By “passive network” I mean an instantaneous communication 
among atomized individuals that is established by a tacit recognition of their 
common identity, and which is mediated through real and virtual space. When 
a woman enters a party full of male guests, she instantaneously notices another 
woman at that party. Vendors on a street are most likely to recognize one an-
other even if they never meet or talk. Now when a threat occurs to the women 
in the party or the vendors in the street, they are likely to get together even if 
they do not know each other or have not planned to do so in advance. The sig-
nifi cance of this concept lies in the possibility of imagining mobilization of at-
omized individuals, such as the quiet encroachers, who are largely deprived of 
organizations and deliberate networking. “Passive network” implies that indi-
viduals may be mobilized to act collectively without active or deliberately con-
structed networks. Street as a public space has this intrinsic feature that makes 
it possible for people to become mobilized through establishing passive net-
works. Once the individual actors, the encroachers, are confronted by a threat, 
their passive network is likely to turn into an active communication and coop-
eration. That is how an eviction threat or a police raid may immediately bring 
together squatters or street vendors who did not even know one another. Of 
course, the shift  from passive network to collective re sis tance is never a given. 
Actors might feel that tactical retreat would yield far better result than con-
frontation, a tendency common in today’s Cairo’s streets, but uncommon in the 
revolutionary Iran, where on- the- spot collective re sis tance prevailed.52
I suggested at the outset that a major consequence of the new global re-
structuring has been a double pro cess of integration, on the one hand, and 
social exclusion and informalization, on the other. Both pro cesses tend to gen-
erate discontent on the part of many urban grass roots in the global South. 
First, there are many among the urban grass roots who fi nd it diffi  cult to func-
tion, live, and work, within the modernizing economic and cultural systems 
characterized by market discipline, contract, exchange value, speed, and bu-
reaucracy, including the state organizations. These people attempt to exit 
from such social and economic arrangements, seeking alternative and more 
familiar, or informal, institutions and relations. Second, globalization has 
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also a tendency to informalize through programs of structural adjustment, 
rendering many people unemployed or pushing them to seek refuge in infor-
mal production, trade, housing, and transportation. Transnational street ven-
dors (circulating, for instance, between the new Central Asian republics and 
Istanbul, or between Jamaica and Miami) are the latest product of this age. In 
short, the new global restructuring tends to intensify the growth of subjectivi-
ties, social space, and terrain of po liti cal struggles that are coming to charac-
terize the cities of the developing world.
Although the prevailing perspectives (survival strategy, urban social move-
ments, and everyday re sis tance) provide useful angles to view the activism of 
the urban subaltern, they do, however, suff er from major drawbacks, as dis-
cussed earlier. I suggested that the “quiet encroachment” perspective might 
off er a way out of those conceptual problems. From this vantage point, the 
poor not only struggle for survival, but strive in a lifelong pro cess to improve 
their lot through oft en individualistic and quiet encroachment on the public 
goods and on the power and property of the elite groups. In this pro cess, the 
grass roots do not directly challenge the eff ect of globalization. Rather, in 
their quest for security, they get involved in constant negotiations with global-
ization to maintain or seek autonomy in any space remaining unaff ected. At 
the same time, in this pro cess, the unintended consequences of their daily en-
croachments and negotiations beget signifi cant social changes in urban struc-
ture and pro cesses, in demography, and in public policy. We saw earlier how 
crucial such a strategy is in the lives of the urban grass roots. Yet the question 
remains as to how far this quiet encroachment can take these actors.
Given their existential constraints (poor skills and education or meager 
income, connection, and or ga ni za tion), quiet encroachment serves as a viable 
enabling strategy for the marginalized groups to survive and better their lot. 
However, this nonmovement neither is able to cause broader po liti cal transfor-
mation nor aims to. The larger national movements have the capacity for such 
a transformation. Yet, compared to global/national mobilization, these local-
ized struggles are both meaningful and manageable for the actors– meaningful 
in that they can make sense of the purpose and have an idea of the conse-
quences of these actions; and manageable in that they, rather than some remote 
national leaders, set the agenda, project the aims, and control the outcome. In 
this sense for the poor, the local is privileged over the global/national.
It is true that the disenfranchised succeed relatively in extending their life- 
chances, oft en through lifetime struggles; nevertheless, crucial social spaces 
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remain out of their control. The poor may be able to take over a plot of land to 
build shelters, may tap running water or electricity illegally from the main 
street or neighbors; they may secure a job on the street corner by selling things 
and may be able to bribe or dodge the municipal police every now and then. 
But how can they get schools, health ser vices, public parks, paved roads, and 
security— the social goods that are tied to larger structures and pro cesses, the 
national states, and the global economy? In other words, the largely atomistic 
and localist strategies of the disenfranchised, despite their own advantages, 
render a search for social justice in the broader, national sense poorly served. 
The urban grass roots are unlikely to become a more eff ective player in a 
larger sense unless they become mobilized on a collective basis, their strug-
gles linked to broader social movements and civil- society organizations.53 Yet 
it is crucial to stress that until this is realized and its result is tested, quiet en-
croachment remains a most viable enabling strategy, which the urban disen-
franchised pursue to cause change in their own lives, and in the domains of 
social policy, urban governance, and public order.
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 4 THE POOR AND THE PERPETUAL PURSUIT 
OF LIFE CHANCES
how do the Middle Eastern poor manage to live in the current new- liberal 
times, and what does their life struggle mean to urban politics in the region? 
Prior to the advent of the political- economic restructuring of the 1980s, most 
Middle Eastern countries  were largely dominated by either nationalist- populist 
regimes (such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Turkey) or pro- western 
rentier states (Iran, the Arab Gulf states). Financed by oil or remittances, these 
largely authoritarian states pursued state- led development strategies, attain-
ing remarkable (21 percent average annual) growth rates.1 Income from oil 
off ered the rentier states the possibility of providing social ser vices to many 
of their citizens, and the ideologically driven populist states dispensed signi-
fi cant benefi ts in education, health, employment, housing, and the like.2 For 
these postcolonial regimes, such provision of social welfare was necessary to 
build popularity among the peasants, workers, and middle strata at a time 
that these states  were struggling against both the colonial powers and old 
internal ruling classes. The state acted as the moving force of economic and 
social development on behalf of the populace.
The authoritarian nature of these states restricted meaningful po liti cal 
participation and the development of eff ective civil- society organizations. 
The regimes’ etatist ideology and patrimonial tendencies rendered the states 
the main, if not the sole, provider of livelihoods for many citizens, in ex-
Adapted from Asef Bayat, “Activism and Social Development in the Middle East,” Inter-
national Journal of Middle East Studies 34, no. 1 (February 2002), pp. 1– 28. Copyright 
© 2002 Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission.
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change for their loyalty. In etatist models, the state controls the bulk of the 
economic, po liti cal, and social domains, leaving little space for society to de-
velop itself and for interest groups to surface, compete, and act autonomously. 
In the Middle East, such ideology oft en led to the demobilization— or, at best, 
controlled mobilization— of certain segments of the population, as exempli-
fi ed by the corporatist  unions under Gamal Abdel Nasser and currently in 
Syria; the state- run syndicates under the Shah of Iran; the Islamic Associa-
tions under Ayatollah Khomeini; and the People’s Councils in Libya.3
The advent of “liberalization” and marketization through the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund– sponsored Economic Reform and Structural Adjust-
ment programs (ERSA) has, since the early 1990s, provoked important socio-
economic changes. Free- market economies have made consumer commodities 
vastly more accessible and have enriched the upper socioeconomic strata 
while also increasing income disparities and causing critical changes in labor 
markets. Informal and marginalized groups, such as the unemployed, casual 
workers, and street- subsistence laborers, have expanded. A large number of 
public- sector workers and rural laborers, as well as educated, once well- to- do 
members of the middle class (government employees and college students), 
have been pushed into the ranks of the urban poor in labor and housing 
markets.
In the meantime, states have gradually been retreating from the social re-
sponsibilities that characterized their early populist development. Many so-
cial provisions have been withdrawn, and the low- income groups largely have 
to rely on themselves to survive. For instance, in Egypt, state subsidies on cer-
tain basic foodstuff s such as rice, sugar, and cooking oil have been removed, 
and subsidies on items such as fuel, power, and transportation have been re-
duced. Rent control is being reconsidered; a new land law has ended tenant 
farmers’ control over land; and pubic- sector reform and privatization con-
tinue, all with signifi cant social costs. As early as 1993, a United States Agency 
for International Development report warned of the “deteriorating social 
conditions in Egypt.” 4 Although certain social indicators such as life expec-
tancy and infant mortality have improved, unemployment, poverty, and in-
come gaps reportedly increased in the 1990s.5 Similar changes are taking 
place in Jordan, resulting from a series of events such as the second Gulf War, 
which deepened the crisis there.6 In Iran, the government has been vacillating 
between etatism and free- market policies since 1990. Compared with that in 
other countries in the region, the direction of economic liberalization in Iran 
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has been slow, due partly to labor re sis tance and partly to the struggle among 
po liti cal factions. Although the Syrian economy remains predominantly un-
der state control, the private sector is being allowed to expand gradually.7
Concurrent with these political- economic developments has been the glo-
balization of the ideas of human rights and po liti cal participation, which have 
placed economic rights and citizen participation on the po liti cal agenda and 
subsequently helped to open new spaces for social mobilization. The inability 
of populist states to incorporate or suppress the new social forces (such as 
lower- middle and middle classes) that they have helped to generate has led to 
the growth of civil- society institutions. When states are unable to meet the 
needs of these classes, they resort to (and encourage the establishment of) civil 
associations to fulfi ll them.8 Surveys on civil society in the Middle East sug-
gest that, despite the authoritarian nature of many states, human rights activ-
ists, artists, writers, religious fi gures, and professional groups have brought 
pressure to bear on the governments for accountability and openness.9
These overall economic and social changes— notably, the deteriorating 
social conditions of the poor, on the one hand, and the expansion of the public 
sphere and civil institutions, on the other— raise some crucial questions. How 
do the grass roots in the Middle East react to their changing social and eco-
nomic realities? And if they indeed confront their changing circumstance, what 
is the logic behind the shift  in the nature of demands, sites of protests, and 
patterns of struggles in the region? To what extent is “pressure from below” 
required for meaningful policy change and institutional reform conducive to 
social development for defending people’s livelihoods and rights? By address-
ing such questions, this chapter explores the ways in which the urban disen-
franchised strive to defend their livelihoods and assert their right to the city. 
While past mass urban protests and labor  unionism have failed to improve 
the living conditions of a large number of people, community activism has 
been feeble, and social Islam and NGOs address only some of the problems. 
Middle Eastern societies thus seem to foster quiet encroachment as a prevalent 
strategy that gives the urban grass roots some power over their own lives and 
infl uence over state policy.
URBAN MASS PROTESTS
The urban riots of the 1980s  were an early expression of discontent with some 
aspects of neoliberal policies in the Middle East, as various countries tried to 
reduce their defi cits through austerity policies, such as cuts in consumer sub-
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sidies. These reductions violated the social contract between the states and 
the masses, triggering anger and discontent. Although it is diffi  cult to deter-
mine the precise profi le of the participants, the urban middle and lower classes 
 were among the main actors. In August 1983, the Moroccan government re-
duced consumer subsidies by 20 percent. Even though public- sector salaries 
 were raised by an equal amount, riots broke out in northern Morocco and 
other regions. Similar riots occurred in Tunis in 1984 (89 killed) and in Khar-
toum in 1982 and 1985 (number of dead unknown). In the summer of 1987, 
Lebanese involved in the civil war got together to stage a massive demonstra-
tion in Beirut against the drop in the value of the Lebanese pound. Algeria 
was struck by cost- of- living riots in the fall of 1988, and Jordan experienced 
similar violence in 1989.10 This list excludes many po liti cal protests that raised 
issues concerning individual freedoms, regional autonomy, and professional 
matters (e.g., at Egypt’s Military Academy in 1986 and in the Ira ni an cities of 
Tabriz and Qazvin and, later, among students in 1999).
Despite the acceleration of neoliberal policies, urban mass protests ebbed 
noticeably during the 1990s. Several factors played a part. Alarmed by the 
earlier unrest, governments imposed tighter controls while delaying or imple-
menting unpop u lar policies only gradually. Aside from internationally spon-
sored safety nets, such as the Social Fund for Development in Egypt and Jor-
dan, additional outlets  were off ered by the growth of welfare NGOs and social 
Islam.
The experience of the Islamic Revolution and the war with Iraq distin-
guished Iran from its regional counterparts. While many regimes in the Mid-
dle East  were shedding their pop u lism during the 1980s and 1990s, Iran began 
to experience that only aft er the revolution. The Islamic regime’s rhetoric in 
favor of the “downtrodden” contributed to the mobilization of the grass roots. 
The war suppressed internal dissent; once it ended, a new opportunity for col-
lective activities, such as urban mass protests, arose. Thus, unlike the relatively 
quiet 1980s, six major protests took place in Tehran and other Ira ni an cities in 
the early 1990s. Riots in Tehran in August 1991 and in Shiraz and Arak in 1992 
 were carried out by squatters because of de mo li tion of their shelters or forced 
evictions. Even more dramatic unrest took place in the city of Mashad in 1992 
and Tehran’s Islamshahr community in 1995. In Mashad, the protests  were 
triggered by the municipality’s rejection of demands by city squatters to legal-
ize their communities. This massive unrest, on which the army failed to 
clamp down, left  more than one hundred buildings and stores destroyed, 
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three hundred people arrested, and more than a dozen people dead. The 
three- day riots in Islamshahr, a large informal community in South Tehran, 
in April 1995, had to do with the postwar economic austerity— notably, in-
creases in bus fare and the price of fuel— under President Hashemi 
Rafsanjani.
Urban protests in the Middle East have had mixed results. Following im-
mediate repression, governments in many cases have had to revoke unpop u lar 
mea sures (as in Egypt in 1977, Tunisia and Morocco in 1984, Sudan in 1985, 
Algeria in 1988, Jordan in 1989, and Iran on many occasions). At times, they 
have made tactical concessions, such as increasing wages; this, however, af-
fects only wage earners, at the expense of the self- employed poor and the 
unemployed.11 Where the protests are local or small- scale, the governments 
usually have managed to end them by force. In the early 1980s, workers in 
Kafr al- Dawwar in Egypt managed to fulfi ll only part of their demands. The 
Egyptian farmers’ protests in 1998 across isolated villages failed to modify the 
new policy that ended tenant farmers’ long- term control over land. However, 
when social protests have gained national support by embracing diverse is-
sues and actors (such as students and the middle classes making economic as 
well as po liti cal claims), they oft en provoke signifi cant changes, including po-
liti cal reform (as in Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey in the late 1980s).
Despite their drama and, at times, their remarkable impact, urban mass 
protests are usually spontaneous, ad hoc, and consequently uncommon; they 
oft en involve violence and a risk of repression. Urban riots are a response to 
the absence of eff ective institutionalized mechanisms of confl ict resolution. 
The social groups without institutionally based power to disrupt (such as the 
unemployed, who cannot strike) and those who enjoy such power but fi nd it 
inadequate (workers, students) are likely to follow leaders in initiating mass 
protests. This is not to say, as some have claimed, that Middle Eastern masses 
essentially lack a “truly collective life,” resorting instead to “mob action.”12 
For in favorable conditions, they also engage in modern forms of collective 
action, notably, trade  unionism.
TRADE  UNIONISM
Trade  unionism represents an older and sustained institution through which 
working people have defended their rights or exerted pressure on economic 
elites and governments to bring about social change. Trade  unions have the 
potential to respond rapidly and systematically to unjust labor practices, dis-
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tributive issues, and po liti cal matters. At the same time, they are most 
 aff ected by the current neoliberal economic policies, including new labor dis-
cipline and lay- off s which in the end undermine the power of the  unions.
Originally, trade  unions in the Middle East emerged in the context of 
Eu ro pe an colonial domination. Their struggles, therefore, involved both class 
and nationalist dimensions— usually a tense strategic position. At in de pen-
dence, most trade- union organizations  were integrated into the state struc-
ture or the ruling parties, resulting in the current situation, in which unitary, 
compulsory  unions make up the majority of labor organizations. This type of 
 union, in which public- sector workers constitute the core members, operates 
in countries with populist pasts (such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria) 
as well as in Kuwait and Yemen. The Arab Gulf states, using mostly foreign 
workers, impose tough discipline and disallow labor organizations in exchange 
for relatively high pay. Surveillance, however, has not prevented occasional 
outbreaks of labor unrest, such as the Palestinian workers’ strike in the Saudi 
oil industry in the 1980s and the riots of Egyptian workers in Kuwait against 
discrimination in October 1999.13 Only Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey 
have pluralist  unions that are relatively in de pen dent from the state or ruling 
parties.
 Union structure aff ects workers’ ability to maintain their gains or to ad-
vance them. In de pen dent  unions, more than corporatist ones, are likely to 
defend workers’ rights. However, in the experience of the region, workers tend 
to use the existing corporatist organizations to further their own interests, as 
shown in the state- controlled workers syndicates before the Ira ni an Revolu-
tion and workers’ shuras and the  Union of Unemployed Workers aft er.14 This 
applies also to the corporatist trade  unions in Egypt established by Nasser fol-
lowing the liberal era (1928– 52), when labor  unions enjoyed a period of relative 
in de pen dence.15
Currently, or ga nized public- sector workers, more than any other group, 
feel the immediate consequences of economic adjustment. Thus, trade  unions 
are concerned with and oft en struggle against cuts in consumer subsidies, price 
rises, reductions in wages and allowances, layoff s, and government interfer-
ence in  union aff airs. A human- rights or ga ni za tion reported seventy strikes 
against large companies in Egypt during 1998, most of which involved state 
security forces. The main cause of the industrial actions was “government re-
form policy.”16 The Egyptian press, citing offi  cial statements, reported in early 
1999 the occurrence of more than fi ve strikes and sit- ins per week. These 
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actions resulted largely from reductions in allowances and perquisites and the 
introduction of fi nes.17 In Iran, the 1990s saw a rapid increase in worker strikes. 
During the fi rst half of 1991, some two thousand strikes  were reported.18 
According to one account, strikes by workers trying to catch up with infl ation 
 were so common that the authorities hardly noticed them.19 New labor laws, 
redraft ed to accord with the neoliberal era and economic realities, have been 
hotly contested, because they oft en strip workers of several traditional rights, 
notably, job security. In Egypt, the labor  unions compelled government and 
business to accept in 1994 an exchange of “the right to strike for the right to 
fi re.”20 In Iran, labor law remained a matter of dispute between the ruling 
clergy and pro- labor forces for more than a de cade.
Some observers tend to underestimate the capacity of or ga nized labor in 
the Middle East to aff ect social and po liti cal developments on the grounds 
that strikes, the workers’ major weapon, are illegal and oft en involve the risk 
of arrest and imprisonment. In addition, they argue, states usually co- opt 
the leaderships of these largely corporatist labor  unions, thus rendering 
 union activism practically in eff ec tive.21 It is true that strikes are illegal, and 
labor leaders may be bought off , with many of them becoming part of the 
ruling parties and the state bureaucracy. However, as Posusney rightly ar-
gues, “labor has been able to pursue economic demands and wring conces-
sions from the state, in spite of corporatist controls,” and its ability to do so 
“is contingent on the specifi c issue at hand and how policy around that issue 
is made.”22 The fact is that even the corporatist leadership must be somehow 
responsive to the views and concerns of its rank and fi le. Not only do labor 
leaders oft en express opposition to certain government policies (e.g., removal 
of subsidies, privatization, aspects of labor law), but the rank and fi le tend to 
wage unoffi  cial industrial action when the leadership fails to take the initia-
tive. In Egypt, for instance, opposition by or ga nized labor has been the main 
cause of delays in the implementation or renegotiation of terms of adjust-
ment with the International Monetary Fund both currently and under pre-
vious governments.23
Notwithstanding its social and po liti cal impact, or ga nized labor in the 
Middle East has continued to comprise only a small portion of the total work-
force. The vast majority have been self- employed, with a large fraction of wage 
earners working in small workshops in which paternalistic labor relations 
prevail. Although tension between bosses and employees is not uncommon in 
these establishments, laborers are more likely to remain loyal to their bosses 
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than to ally with their colleagues in the shop next door. On the  whole, be-
tween one- third and one- half of the workforce in the cities (Egypt, 43; Iran, 
35; Turkey, 36; Yemen Arab Republic, 70) are active in the informal sector 
and thus remain unor ga nized and beyond the provisions of labor law.24 The 
economic restructuring of the 1980s has further undermined or ga nized labor, 
as the public sector, the core of trade  unionism, is shrinking because of clo-
sures, downsizing, and early retirements. Numerous reports point to the de-
clining capacity of the region’s labor movements to mobilize. Or ga nized labor 
in Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iran is described as “disjointed,” 
“defensive,” “decapitated and de- proletarianized.”25 Sporadic unrest notwith-
standing, labor is becoming more informal and fragmented, with less or no 
protection, and dispersed across vast arrays of activities and spaces among the 
unemployed, casual workers, and domestic labor, in the small workshops, and 
on street corners.26
COMMUNITY ACTIVISM
For the urban grass roots, then, urban community or neighborhood may off er 
a sense of common identity and a ground for collective action in the stead of 
the workplace. For in the neighborhoods, most face the same diffi  culties in 
ensuring secure housing, paying rent, and acquiring access to urban ameni-
ties, schools, clinics, cultural centers, and the like. Community- based collec-
tive struggles for such “collective consumption” through institutional settings 
are what in a sense characterize the urban social movements. This kind of 
community activism, oft en contentious, should be distinguished from the no-
tion of “community development.” The latter has had a double eff ect of both 
maintaining the status quo and engendering social change. Indeed, the pro-
gram of community development in the West was originally aimed at counter-
insurgency against communism (in the colonies), containment of discontent 
among the black underclass (in the United States), and management of the 
poor by providing community solutions (in the United Kingdom).27 Yet com-
munity development may also open space to cultivate re sis tance against the 
elites and foster social change. This is oft en the case when the grass roots initi-
ate development on their own or are mobilized by local leaders, NGOs, reli-
gious groups, or politicians (as in Brazilian barrios or in the Self- Employed 
Women’s Association in India).  Here mobilization may not necessarily be 
contentious; it could express cooperative community engagement whereby 
people work together to improve their lives and communities with a degree of 
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   73 9/1/09   1:59 PM
-1—
0—
+1—
74 SOCIAL NONMOVEMENTS
control over decisions and their outcome. How do the Middle Eastern cities 
fare in terms of such community activism?
In recent times, a number of community mobilizations that took place in 
Middle Eastern cities bore some resemblance to urban social movements. 
Take, for instance, the campaign of the people of Ezbet Mekawy, a low- income 
community in Cairo, against industrial pollution in the area, where smelters 
had caused major health and environmental problems.28 They used tradi-
tional strategies of communication within the community, as well as modern 
tactics such as engaging the media, lobbying politicians, and resorting to the 
court system as a means of registering opposition. In a diff erent example, mem-
bers of the Shubra al- Khaima community in Egypt rapidly responded to a 
governorate’s plan in August 1994 to demolish an unauthorized section of a 
community complex (a mosque, a clinic, and a pharmacy) that had taken in-
habitants ten years to build with their own money.29
At certain periods— notably, when states become more vulnerable— even 
more enduring and large- scale mobilization develops. The collapse of the 
state during the Lebanese civil war caused quiet encroachment and commu-
nity mobilization in the Muslim south, where its institutions continue to this 
day. Thousands from the south moved to the southern suburb of Beirut, build-
ing illegal settlements that currently make up 40 percent of the homes in the 
area. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, networks of vol-
unteer and associational groups played a vital role not only in supporting civil 
disobedience, but also in fi lling the vacuum created by loss of municipal ser-
vices.30 The Palestinian Pop u lar Organizations acted as the main organs of 
social provisioning and development in the occupied territories, both during 
the intifada and aft er.31 Immediately aft er the Ira ni an Revolution of 1979, many 
poor families took over hundreds of vacant homes and half- fi nished apart-
ment blocks, refurbishing them as their own properties and establishing 
apartment councils to manage them collectively. In the meantime, land take-
overs and illegal construction accelerated. With the help of local and outside 
mobilizers, squatters got together and demanded electricity and running wa-
ter; when they  were refused or encountered delays, they acquired them ille-
gally. They established roads, opened clinics and stores, constructed mosques 
and libraries, and or ga nized refuse collection. They further set up associa-
tions and community networks and participated in local consumer coopera-
tives. A new and a more autonomous way of living, functioning, and or ga niz-
ing community was in the making.
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However, when compared with movements in some Latin American coun-
tries, these experiences, as exemplary of urban social movements, seem acutely 
uncommon. They tend to happen in extraordinary social and po liti cal cir-
cumstances— in revolutionary conditions or in times of crisis and war, when 
the state is undermined or totally absent, as in Palestine. Thus, few such activi-
ties become a pattern for sustained social mobilization and institutionalization 
in normal situations. Once the exceptional conditions come to an end, the ex-
periments begin to wither away or become distorted. In Iran, community ac-
tivism did not get a chance to consolidate itself. Lack of experience, rivalry of 
outside mobilizers and po liti cal groups, and especially the hostility of the 
government seriously undermined the experiment. Instead, mosque associa-
tions not only  were established to off er the locals assistance in distributing 
basic necessities such as food during the war with Iraq, but served also to con-
trol po liti cal discontent in the neighborhoods. They resembled the three 
thousand Community Development Associations (CDAs) that currently op-
erate throughout Egypt.32 Although CDAs contribute to the poor’s social 
well- being, their mobilizing impact is minimal. As a fi eld researcher working 
in a pop u lar quarter of Cairo stated: “Even in the highly politicized Sayyeda 
Zeinab, or ga nized social action that involves the area’s inhabitants seems 
minimal. The residents’ role is usually limited to that of benefi ciaries of what-
ever ser vices . . .  are available.”33
Needless to say, urban communities are not blank spots devoid of social 
interaction. Surely, they are more than small villages subject to individualism, 
anonymity, and competition. Nevertheless, they contain numerous forms of 
networks and institutions. In the modern city of Tehran, neighborly relations 
still prevail; members participate in assisting one another, pay visits, consult, 
and take part in weddings and funerals.34 In Egyptian cities, migrant associa-
tions have institutionalized some of these functions; funeral activities and 
maintaining cemeteries for the people from “home villages” are their main 
activity.35 Infl uential individuals may take advantage of the state- controlled 
neighborhood councils. But the informal credit systems serve as perhaps the 
most important form of community network in urban centers. Social networks 
that extend beyond kinship and ethnicity remain largely casual, unstructured, 
and paternalistic. The weakness of civic or nonkinship cooperation at the 
community level only reinforces traditional hierarchical and paternalistic re-
lations with people depending on local leaders (kibar, shaykhs, Friday prayer 
leaders), problem solvers, and even local bullies, rather than on broad- based 
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social activism. In such social conditions, the modern institutions such as po-
liti cal party branches, local NGOs, or police are susceptible to clientelism. 
Thus, while the Egyptian lower classes, for instance, are aware of environ-
mental problems, they undertake little in the way of collective action, either 
through communal engagement to upgrade the community itself or through 
protest actions to demand that offi  cials do this for them.36
Why is community activism, a social action for collective consumption, 
relatively uncommon in the Middle East? Why is the region a “blank space” in 
the global map of community action, as some observers have put it?37 One 
reason has to do with the legacy of pop u lism, which continues to infl uence the 
po liti cal behavior of the ordinary people in most Middle Eastern countries. 
Populist regimes established a social contract between the lower and middle 
classes and the state, whereby the state agreed to provide the basic necessities 
in exchange for their support, social peace, and consequent demobilization, 
or just a controlled mobilization. This was not an agreement between the state 
and in de pen dent classes. Rather, it was an agreement between the state and 
a shapeless mass, an aggregate of individuals and corporate institutions in 
which in de pen dent collective identity and action  were seriously undermined. 
Although distributive pop u lism is currently waning and market forces are 
escalating, many people still tend to look at the states as the main source of 
protection as well as misfortune. In countries where authoritarian pop u lism 
still predominates (such as Iran in the 1980s, Libya, and Syria), the statesman’s 
dread of the public sphere has given a structure to the regimes that in some 
ways incarcerate the entire population.
This legacy has also contributed to the tendency among many ordinary 
people to seek individualistic solutions to their problems.38 More oft en than 
not, families of diff erent social strata tend to compete when resources are 
scarce. This occurs even more oft en in the new and heterogeneous communi-
ties (such as Dar el- Salam, Madinat al- Nahda, and Kafr el- Seif in Cairo, and 
Islamshahr and Khak Sefi d in Tehran) than in the old city quarters, where the 
relative homogeneity of inhabitants and the longevity of residence have pro-
duced a spatial identity. The coexistence of identifi able strata in a community— 
such as old- timers and newcomers, those with and without security of tenure, 
and diff erent ethnic groups— oft en sharpens the existing competition, leading 
to confl icts.39 Consequently, with solidarity intangible among the people, re-
course to the mighty state— this provider and punisher— becomes an alterna-
tive way to achieve their goals. Many of them know, however, that the bureau-
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cracy is unable or unwilling to respond formally to the growing demands of 
the urban poor, and they tend to seek informal, individualistic, and even op-
portunistic ways to cultivate connection or bribe the offi  cials. “The best way 
to get what ever you want done,” said a resident of the Sayyeda Zeinab district 
of Cairo, “is to pay a bribe to any of the assistants of any of the area’s big politi-
cians and they will do for you what ever you want.” 40
A key contributor to such social response is the lack of a structure of op-
portunity for mobilization. The advent of neoliberal economies in the Middle 
East has not accompanied a suffi  ciently demo cratic polity.41 Put simply, most 
governments in the region are still apprehensive of and tend to restrict in de-
pen dent collective mobilization for fear of losing po liti cal space. In many states, 
public demonstrations and gatherings are largely illegal. As a street vendor in 
Cairo’s Madinat al- Nahda invoking Egypt’s emergency law said: “If I call my 
neighboring street vendor to get together and do something collectively, this 
would be called mobilization, and I could be taken in for that.” 42 A human 
rights agency’s account of farmers’ protests in twenty- fi ve villages against 
the new land law in Egypt in the course of eight months reported fi ft een 
deaths, 218 injuries, and 822 arrests.43
Alternatively, the governments may allow pop u lar initiative in order to 
control it. Where it succeeds in doing so, the pop u lar classes tend to lose inter-
est, with the result that their activism fails to sustain itself. Because the sup-
porting environment is lacking, they fail to experiment and learn new ways of 
doing things. Thus, most of the genuine pop u lar institutions transform into 
the extension of the states.
Po liti cal democracy is instrumental in another way. In a truly competitive 
polity, po liti cal forces are compelled to bargain with and thus mobilize the 
grass roots to win their electoral support. This is how the urban poor in Iran 
became the subject of an intense competition between the ruling clergy and 
various oppositional groups in the early 1980s. Similarly, a sustained competi-
tive system in Turkey allowed the Islamist Rifah Party to mobilize the urban 
masses in the twenty- six municipalities it controlled, thereby giving the elec-
torate strong bargaining power. Manipulative electoral practices in Egypt, 
however, tend to limit the oppositional parties to restricted local campaigns, 
as in Ezbet Mekawy described earlier.
Finally, collective patronage may also lead unintentionally to social and 
po liti cal mobilization when patrons bargain with their poor clients’ leaders in 
their quest for personal and po liti cal power. Mobilization of street vendors in 
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   77 9/1/09   1:59 PM
-1—
0—
+1—
78 SOCIAL NONMOVEMENTS
Mexico City through negotiation between the vendors’  union leaders and 
politicians is partly the result of this type of po liti cal patronage.44 In much of 
the Middle East (except in Lebanon and in the case of Istanbul’s street car 
parkers’ “mafi a”), however, patronage seems to work more through individ-
ual channels and rarely leads to group activities. Favors are granted more to 
individuals or families (in getting the security of tenure or jobs, for instance) 
than groups who then can bargain with their patron in exchange for his 
support.
In brief, community activism in the form of urban social movements 
seems to be largely a Latin American model rooted in sociopo liti cal condi-
tions of that region (although it can be found in South Africa and, to a lesser 
extent, in India). The likes of local soup kitchens, neighborhood associations, 
church groups, and street trade  unionism are hardly common features in the 
Middle East. The prevalence of authoritarian states and the legacy of pop u-
lism, together with the strength of family and kinship ties in this region, 
render primary solidarities more pertinent than secondary associations and 
social movements.
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Some observers view the current Islamist movements in the region as the 
Middle Eastern model of urban social movements. In this vision, Islamism— in 
par tic u lar, “social Islam”— articulates the concerns and struggles of the un-
derprivileged urban Middle Easterners. For many, the seemingly disadvan-
taged background of the radical Islamists is indicative of the nature of the 
movements. Others look at the locations of their activities, in poor areas, to 
arrive at similar conclusion.45
No doubt, Islamist movements— notably, “social Islam”— represent a sig-
nifi cant means through which some disadvantaged groups survive hardship 
or better their lives. The Islamist movements contribute to social welfare fi rst 
by directly providing ser vices such as health care, education, and fi nancial 
aid; at the same time, they off er involvement in community development and 
a social network, most of which are carried out through local, nongovern-
mental, mosques. Second, the Islamist movements tend to foster social com-
petition wherein other religious and secular organizations are compelled to 
become involved in community work. Finally, the governments, in order to 
outmaneuver the Islamists and regain legitimacy, are oft en forced to imple-
ment social policies in favor of the poor.
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Although Islamic social welfare has a long history in the Middle East, it 
has multiplied and taken on new forms in recent de cades. During the 1980s 
growth of Islamism in Turkey, “mosques and their attendant religious associ-
ations represented direct channels of neighborhood or ga ni za tion and recruit-
ment.” 46 The Islamist Rifah Party continued in the 1990s to focus on grass-
roots community issues—“garbage, potholes and mud.” Many Rifah Party 
mayoral candidates even distributed in- kind incentives to secure support. This 
grassroots strategy led to the party’s massive victory in the 1994 elections, cap-
turing 327 municipalities throughout Turkey, including Ankara and Istanbul. 
Mayors have boasted about successfully addressing the problems of congested 
transportation, water and fuel shortage, inadequate housing, pollution, corrup-
tion, and the like.47 Similarly, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a co ali tion of 
diff erent Islamist parties in Algeria, prevailed in municipal elections in June 
1990 in a very similar fashion. When the National Liberation Front allowed a 
multiparty system in 1989, FIS activists began to work within the existing 
Charity Associations (mosque- centered networks) that had been established 
in the 1980s by religious activists. Supported by the Charity Associations, the 
FIS took its po liti cal ideas into the neighborhoods.48
In a quite diff erent context, Hizbullah fi lled the vacuum created by the 
absence of the state in southern Lebanon to construct the infrastructure for 
social development. During the 1980s, Hizbullah began gradually to address 
social problems faced by the Shi῾i community. It developed plans to off er 
medical care, hospital treatment, electricity, and water trucking. It also paved 
roads, built housing, managed sewage systems, set up gas stations, and oper-
ated schools, nurseries, hospitals, and sports centers.49 It provided 130,000 
scholarships, aid for 135,000 needy families, and interest- free loans. Repairing 
war- damaged  houses and attending to daily needs of the population in areas 
of Shi῾i concentration  were priority areas of intervention.50
Egypt’s social Islam has become perhaps the most pervasive phenomenon 
in the region. The Islamic associations, oft en centered in nonstate mosques, 
grew extensively in part because the government’s development programs had 
fallen into crisis in the past two de cades. They accounted for one- third of all 
Egyptian private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in the late 1980s, and at least 
50 percent of all welfare associations (or 6,327) in the late 1990s,51 off ering 
charity and health ser vices to millions. More than four thousand zakat (reli-
gious tax) committees or ga nized in mosques mediate between the donors and 
the needy. Some estimates put the number of benefi ciaries of the Islamic welfare 
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(health) ser vices at 15 million people (in 1992), as opposed to 4.5 million in 
1980.52 Indeed, the mosques came to provide alternative support ser vices to 
low- income groups to compensate for the government’s withdrawal of sup-
port aft er adopting more liberal economic policies. One typical association, 
the Ansar al- Muhammadiya Association in the poor community of Imbaba, 
built a mosque and two schools and provided day care, medical treatment, 
and an elaborate welfare program.53 Others off ered video clubs, computer 
training centers, and similar ser vices to cater to the needs of such groups as 
the high- school graduates who are the potential recruits of the radical po liti-
cal Islamists. Contrary to the common perception, radical Islamists such as 
al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya and al- Jihad  were far less involved in urban commu-
nity work. As rural and urban guerrillas, their strategy centered on armed 
attacks, targeting the state offi  cials, police, and tourism. Nevertheless, where 
possible, they combined their po liti cal agitation with some welfare activities, 
as they did in such poor quarters of Cairo as Ain Shams and Imbaba.54
What makes all of these activities “Islamic” is the combination of an alter-
native to both the state and the private sector, the religious conviction of many 
of their activists, Islamic- based funding and, fi nally, the provision of aff ord-
able social ser vices. It is widely agreed that such Islamic community activities 
oft en outdo their secular counterparts. The availability of funding in the form 
of zakat (2.5 of income) from Muslim businesses and activists, various dona-
tions (saadaqat), khums (a fi ft h) levied on the savings of Shi῾i Muslims, and 
external aid (e.g., from Iran to Hizbullah and from Saudi Arabia to the FIS) 
renders these associations comparatively advantageous. In the early 1990s, the 
Nasser Bank, which supervises the zakat committees in Egypt, reported a $10 
million zakat fund.55 The additional advantages include the spirit of volun-
tarism, as well as legal favor. That is, unlike secular NGOs, which have to 
surmount many bureaucratic hurdles to raise funds, the religious PVOs tend 
to get around the law by obtaining donations and other contributions from 
Muslim believers in places of worship.56
The grassroots activities of the Islamists, in the meantime, compelled 
other social forces to enter into the competition, hoping to share this po liti cal 
space. The Turkish religious orders (tariqas) emulated one another in com-
munity activities through mosques and their attendant associations.57 Al- Azhar, 
the pillar of establishment Islam in Egypt, began to off er similar social ser-
vices to the needy in competition with the Muslim Brotherhood and al- 
Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya. Similarly, secular groups— notably, secular NGOs— seem 
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to work hard to off er their own piecemeal alternatives. An estimated fi ve mil-
lion poor benefi ted from the health, educational, fi nancial, and community 
ser vices of Egyptian PVOs in 1990.58 In addition, the governments  were af-
fected, as they feared losing the po liti cal initiative to the Islamists. The Egyp-
tian government’s mea sures to upgrade slums and squatter areas in the early 
1990s clearly refl ected the infl uence of Imbaba, the slum community in Cairo 
in which by 1992 militant Islamists had created, according to foreign media, 
“a state within the state.”59
Given these activities, to what extent does Islamism represent a Middle 
Eastern model of urban social movements? To what degree does Islamism 
embody grassroots activism in communities or work collectives? How far do 
the Islamists encourage the grass roots to participate in their own aff airs, to 
defend and extend their social rights? I suggest that although Islamism, not-
withstanding its variations, may be considered a form of social movement, it 
does not express an urban social movement. The identity of Islamism does 
not derive from its par tic u lar concern for the urban disfranchised. It has 
never articulated a vision of an alternative urban order around which to mo-
bilize the community members, whom the Islamists see as deserving welfare 
recipients to be guided by leaders. The members are rarely expected to partici-
pate actively in making their communities.
The Islamist movements have more extensive aims than simply focusing 
on the disfranchised, although many activists work through the poor com-
munities to pursue broader objectives. Not all, however, operate even in this 
fashion. For example, in Iran before the revolution, neither the clergy nor 
nonclerical Islamists, such as Ali Shariati,  were particularly interested in mo-
bilizing the poor; nor did the poor take an active part in the Islamic Revolu-
tion. The mobilization of the urban grass roots by the ruling clergy in Iran 
began mainly aft er the revolution. The clergy lent its support to the poor 
through the rhetoric of the downtrodden (mustaz῾ afin), fi rst, to off set the 
stands in favor of the lower class taken by the left  and the Mujahedin- e Khalq, 
and second, to win over the poor as their social basis in their struggles against 
the Left , liberals, and the remnants of the ancien régime. The honeymoon 
between the poor and the ruling clergy was over when the poor  were polar-
ized. A segment was integrated into the state structure as members of the 
revolutionary institutions, such as the Revolutionary Guards, Construction 
Crusade, and the like; others remained outside, and their struggles for devel-
opment brought them into confrontation with the regime.
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The Lebanese Hizbullah, with its law enforcement apparatus, fell some-
where between a social movement and a quasi- state. Among other things, 
Hizbullah constructed an infrastructure of social development, but few of 
these ser vices  were free.60 As of early 2000, the Hizbullah and Amal move-
ments controlled the poor suburban municipalities of South Beirut. Although 
they use the United Nations Development Program discourse of participation 
and mobilization, their attitudes toward the local people remain paternalistic. 
They oft en select (not elect) people for municipality councils and cooperate 
with those NGOs that are closer to them.61 However, alongside their mobili-
zation of the grass roots, Turkey’s Rifah Party and Algeria’s FIS adopted ex-
clusivist and divisive mea sures. The Rifah- dominated municipalities prac-
ticed nepotism and patronage, laid off  secular employees in favor of religious 
ones, favored contractors who donated money to the party, and overlooked il-
legal real- estate construction in exchange for donations. The Rifah Party’s 
policy of “cultural purifi cation” tended to divide communities.62 Taking 
a similarly exclusionary stand, Egypt’s al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya in Imbaba forced 
women to veil themselves, burned video shops and hairdressing salons, and 
beat men who drank alcohol. The Christian residents turned fearful and inse-
cure. While or ga nized labor generally has remained out of the Islamists’ reach, 
the relationship between the Islamists and the urban poor has been complex. 
For instance, contrary to common perception, Islamic social- welfare organiza-
tions in Egypt are not sites of Islamist po liti cal activity. They simply act as ser-
vice organizations. The vast majority have no link to po liti cal Islam as such. 
Only a few  were affi  liated with the Muslim Brotherhood, and a mere handful 
with the radical Islamists, notably al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya. The rest operate on 
the basis of humanitarian commitment or simple business rationale in a coun-
try where the market for “Islamic” commodities (Islamic fashion, books, edu-
cation, and entertainment) has been thriving. The explicit po liti cal stance 
emerged in the welfare associations not in the poor areas, but in the middle- 
class neighborhoods and among professional associations of doctors, engi-
neers, and lawyers who  were allied with the Muslim Brotherhood.63 However, 
the spread of Islamic ser vices and commodities is not restricted to the poor 
neighborhoods or exclusively to Muslims. It extends to middle- class and af-
fl uent districts and to the Christian community. The Islamic schools are not 
free of charge but are private institutions that virtually exclude the poor. In 
the Imbaba slum, for instance, only a fraction  were admitted for free.64 The 
Islamic schools are geared largely toward the well- to- do, urban middle classes.
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Although it has links to diverse classes, Islamism in the Middle East is 
primarily a movement not of the disfranchised, but of the marginalized 
middle classes. Middle- class agitators in turn tend to activate the youth and 
the educated unemployed, as well as the socially well- to- do and po liti cally 
marginalized groups. It is these groups that are considered the main agents 
of social change. Activities among the poor are largely limited to the provi-
sion of social ser vices, oft en charity, and mobilization during elections in 
which free balloting takes place. In exchange, the Muslim poor in the cities 
approach the Islamists in pragmatic terms. Many of those who have no direct 
interaction with the Islamists remain confused as to their intentions. Others 
who benefi t from their activities appear both appreciative and apprehensive. 
There is no evidence suggesting that the urban poor as a  whole have off ered 
an ideological allegiance to the Islamists or to the governments that have 
fought against the Islamists. Islamist movements, therefore, are distinct from 
Latin American liberation theology. The strategic objective of the liberation 
theology has been the “liberation of the poor”; the interpretation of gospel 
follows from this point of departure.65 The Islamist movements, however, 
generally have broader social and po liti cal objectives (e.g., an Islamic state, 
law, and morality) than simply helping the downtrodden, and secular issues 
such as social justice for the poor follow only from the establishment of Is-
lamic order— the most noble objective.66 In addition, what most Islamists 
share is a par tic u lar moral vision of society, which is repressive in terms of 
gender relations and intolerant of religious minorities and modern– secular 
forces with a stake in building a nonreligious demo cratic polity. Ideological 
monopolies disrupt the pro cess of pluralist demo cratization and frustrate 
the truly participatory framework that is essential for a sustained social de-
velopment. But does the vision behind nonreligious NGOs off er a more via-
ble alternative for the poor?
THE POLITICS OF THE NGOs
The remarkable expansion of the Islamic welfare associations in the 1980s 
and 1990s is as much a refl ection of the trend toward Islamization as of the ex-
plosive growth of NGOs in the Middle East in general. The notable gathering 
in Cairo in May 1997 of some seven hundred NGO delegates from almost all 
of the Arab countries to follow up their discussions during the 1994 Inter-
national Conference on Population and Development marks the growing sig-
nifi cance attached to this sector.
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Associational life is not new in the Middle East. Many countries in the re-
gion have a long history of philanthropic activities. Early- nineteenth- century 
associations  were religious, drawing either on the Islamic notions of com-
passion and good deeds (as in paying zakat and sadaqiat) or on the Christian 
value of charity. They  were followed in the early twentieth century by largely 
secular welfare and charitable associations, some of which  were also used to 
cover anticolonial campaigns. Many of the welfare associations  were run 
mainly by women of aristocratic families, who through work in such associa-
tions aimed to play a role in the public sphere, a domain occupied almost 
exclusively by men. Although the legacy of such associational culture has con-
tinued to the present, the recent NGOs are of a diff erent breed and follow a 
diff erent logic.
In the late 1990s there  were some fi ft een thousand registered NGOs in 
Egypt, double the number that existed in 1977. By comparison, Tunisia devel-
oped fi ve thousand NGOs, of which 10 percent are charity- based. Lebanon’s 
NGOs grew from 1,586 in 1990 to more than 3,500 by 1996, in a population of 
three million; Jordan’s NGOs have increased from 112 in 1980 to over 800 to-
day. The Palestinian Indigenous (Ahli) Organizations (IAOs) increased from 
1,000 (including 800 in the occupied territories and some 200 in Israel) in the 
early 1990s to 1,800 today. (A number of them  were registered with either Is-
raeli or Jordanian authorities. But perhaps the more important ones, known 
as “mass- based organizations,”  were largely unregistered.) With regard to Iran, 
some accounts put the number of NGOs as high as fi ft een thousand. However, 
this is likely to be an exaggerated fi gure. During the 1980s, in the course of the 
war with Iraq, many informal people’s associations  were set up. Yet because of 
the predominance of pop u lism and Iran’s “closed door” policy, the country’s 
record of development NGOs is insignifi cant when compared with those of 
other Middle Eastern countries. Many relief and welfare activities in Iran are 
carried out by governmental or governmental– nongovernmental organizations— 
notably, the Imam’s Relief Committee, the Foundation of Martyrs, the Con-
struction Crusade, the Housing Foundation, and the Volunteer Women’s Com-
munity Health Workers’ Or ga ni za tion. However, since the late 1990s, a new 
trend has arisen toward setting up professional, women’s health, and environ-
mental NGOs. The Network of Women’s NGOs included between fi ft y- eight 
and one hundred organizations, for instance. The new thinking, since the 
era of President Mohammad Khatami, has been that the local councils should 
be turned into the locus of pop u lar participation, while the NGOs, currently 
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   84 9/1/09   1:59 PM
—-1
—0
—+1
THE POOR AND THE PERPETUAL PURSUIT OF LIFE CHANCES 85
numbering about 2,500, should be in charge of delivering ser vices and 
charity.67
NGOs in the region fall into four general types in terms of their rationale 
or the impetus behind their activities. The religiously motivated associations 
are or ga nized by mosques and Islamic fi gures or by churches and Christian 
institutions. They are inspired by religious obligations or religious– political 
factors. Classical welfare associations, run mostly by upper- class families, 
have now incorporated some developmental functions, such as income gen-
eration, training, and community upgrading. Professional NGOs are managed 
largely by upper- middle- class professionals and, at times, by development 
experts who are driven by their training and humanistic urge or simply by 
material self- interest. And, fi nally, there are a host of state- sponsored “NGOs,” 
such as the Egyptian Community Development Associations and the Ira ni an 
Foundation of the Dispossessed. These groups remain, in eff ect, an extension of 
the state. Put together, these NGOs are active in diverse fi elds of human rights, 
women’s issues, welfare, culture, business, and development.  Here I will focus 
on welfare and development NGOs that target disadvantaged groups.
Several factors have contributed to the spectacular growth of the NGOs. 
First, as elsewhere, there was a need in the region’s poorer countries (such as 
Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia) to fi ll the gap left  by the states’ inability and un-
willingness to face the challenge of social development following the imple-
mentation of neoliberal policies. Population growth and urban migration had 
already placed great pressure on urban social ser vices. Where a state was ab-
sent or defunct, as in Lebanon and Palestine, or ga nized self- help fi lled the 
vacuum. The second factor is the fl ow of foreign funding resulting from new 
donor policies that extend aid largely to NGOs rather than to individual 
states. External funding not only encouraged the establishment of NGOs but 
oft en infl uenced their activities. When there was money for human- rights ac-
tivities, for example, human- rights organizations  were established. Third, 
there seemed to be a unique consensus along the po liti cal spectrum— among 
neoliberals, the World Bank, governments, and liberal and left ist opposition 
groups— in support of the NGOs. The conservatives wanted to shift  the bur-
den of social provisions from the state to individuals. For them, NGOs acted 
as a safety net to off set the possibility of social unrest caused by the repercus-
sions of neoliberal policies. In the view of Prince Talal Abdel- Aziz al- Saud of 
Saudi Arabia, “NGOs are the central component of development.” According 
to a prominent Arab NGO advocate, “NGOs have replaced class struggle and 
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socialism.” 68 Middle Eastern liberals and the Left  also supported the NGOs 
for their perceived role as agents of social change from below, contributing 
ultimately to development and democracy. Thus, for a Palestinian activist, 
“the most important role of NGOs in a future Palestinian self- authority is to 
accelerate the speed of change, to mobilize the rural population and to demo-
cratize the society.” 69 Because of their small size, effi  ciency, and commitment 
to the cause of the poor, NGOs are seen as true vehicles for grassroots partici-
pation in development. Consequently, they serve as a bulwark against the 
creeping spread of Islamic fundamentalism by off ering an alternative outlet to 
the Islamist agendas.
How eff ective are the development and welfare NGOs in facing the chal-
lenge of social development in the Middle East? Most studies confi rm that the 
sector is “a vital component of the nations’ social safety net and important 
provider of valued social ser vices.”70 In Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Sudan, 
where the states have been absent, defunct, or in deep crisis, NGOs played a 
vital role in survival, emergency aid, and relief. According to the World Bank, 
Palestinian NGOs in 1994 accounted for 60 percent of primary health- care 
ser vices and 50 percent of all secondary and tertiary health- care ser vices; 100 
percent of the programs for the disabled and preschool children; and a sizable 
portion of agricultural, housing, small business credit, and welfare ser vices.71 
In addition, given the growing privatization and high costs of health care and 
education, the poorest segments of society would hardly be able to aff ord their 
increasing costs without these associations. In a sense, NGOs assist the de-
clining public sector on which millions of citizens still rely. In my research in 
Cairo, for example, NGO premises oft en served a community function and 
could be used free of charge or for a nominal fee as day- care centers; medical 
clinics; family- planning ser vices; recreational and vocational training classes 
in sewing, doll making, electrical appliance repair; and the like. One associa-
tion that provided microcredit loans to single mothers had made it possible 
for hundreds of women to set up vending enterprises in their localities and 
thereby become functionally self- suffi  cient. NGO headquarters oft en served a 
social function, as well, allowing local poor families, mostly women, to gather 
in public and learn social skills, such as how to talk in public or behave “prop-
erly.” An estimated 5 million poor people benefi t from such associations.72 
The 3,000 Egyptian CDAs alone serve some 300,000 people by implementing 
programs in health care, food production, women’s projects, family planning, 
income generation, and child and youth development.73
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Social development, however, is more than mere survival, relief, and safety 
net, with total dependence on charity or precarious foreign aid.74 In addition, 
in the current development discourse, social development does not only mean 
fulfi lling basic needs; it also involves achieving social and economic rights 
and being self- sustaining. This requires, in Anisur Rahman’s words, “creating 
a condition where people can think, use their abilities, and act, that is, to par-
ticipate.”75 Ideally, an “NGO should work so as to make itself progressively 
redundant to any group or set of groups with which it has been working in-
tensively.” In short, they should mobilize the grass roots. How well do the 
Middle Eastern development NGOs meet this goal of mobilization? Many 
NGO advocates have complained about the absence of a spirit of participation 
in the NGOs. Despite a recent tendency to establish professional and advo-
cacy associations, Jordanian NGOs remain largely “charity- driven.”76 Activ-
ists hope that they will adopt an “enabling approach.”77 Lebanese NGOs con-
tinued to carry the legacy of war and have been active largely in the fi elds of 
relief and emergency; like their Palestinian counterparts, they depended heav-
ily on external humanitarian assistance.78 Only recently has there been a clear 
shift  from relief and humanitarian assistance to the developmental and advo-
cacy associations (human rights, women, and democracy).79 The charitable 
societies in Palestine have managed to alleviate (in the areas of relief, health, 
education, and culture) the pressure generated by daily needs. They play a 
“preventive role at best, by maintaining basic social care, but they do not 
perform a developmental role in the full sense of the term.”8 0 Accordingly, 
NGOs’ overwhelming focus on ser vices at the cost of ignoring productive ac-
tivities has pushed the Palestinians toward further dependence on the Israeli 
economy.
Several accounts of NGOs— notably, the likes of the traditional welfare as-
sociations in Egypt— point to their largely paternalistic attitudes and struc-
ture.81 Paternalism is refl ected both in local NGOs’ top- down internal or ga ni-
za tion and in their relationship with the benefi ciaries. The main decisions in 
NGOs are made by one or two people, with rare participation of staff , includ-
ing the extension workers. In turn, staff  are motivated not by altruistic incen-
tives but by monetary motives. With the dearth of voluntarism, NGO work 
for status- conscious but low- paid employees appears to be no more than a dull 
job experience.
Paternalistic NGOs perceive their benefi ciaries more as recipients of assis-
tance than as participants in development. For their “favors” and benevolence, 
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NGOs oft en expect loyalty, support, and ser vice. It is not the place of benefi -
ciaries to question the adequacy and quality of ser vices or the accountability 
of the NGOs, for this would be interpreted as interfering in the NGOs’ aff airs. 
It is not the target groups but the NGO leaders and donors who defi ne the needs 
and priorities of a given NGO. A common problem among Middle Eastern 
NGOs is project duplication, which results not only from inadequate coordi-
nation, but also from ignoring the specifi c concerns of the benefi ciaries. Com-
petition and factionalism among NGOs, and the variations in donors’ (oft en 
intermediary NGOs) policies, prevent coordination of development strategies 
and add up to the problem of duplication. Indeed, local associations are oft en 
subjected to clientelistic relations with the intermediary NGOs, who extend 
funds to the former.
The professional NGOs, which have grown exponentially since the 1990s, 
seem to have overcome some of the administrative and attitudinal short-
comings of the more traditional welfare associations. They attempt to prac-
tice participatory methods both internally and in relation to their clients, 
placing the emphasis on professionalism, education, and effi  ciency. A number 
of women’s, human- rights, and advocacy NGOs refl ect this trend today.82 
However, certain features of professional organizations— hierarchy of author-
ity, fi xed procedures, rigidity, and the division of labor— tend to diminish the 
spirit of participation. Rema Hammami has shown in the case of Palestine 
that local activism and mass organizations before the peace pro cess  were 
mostly mobilizational— that is, the activities  were initiated, decided on, and 
carried out with the involvement of the grass roots. Aft er the Palestinian Na-
tional Authority (PNA) was set up, however, the conditions of foreign funding 
turned these groups into organizations of the professional elite, with par tic u-
lar discourses of effi  ciency and expertise. This new arrangement tends to cre-
ate distance between NGOs and the grass roots.83 Thus, what NGO activism 
means in reality is the activism of NGO leaders, not that of the millions of 
targeted people. These NGOs serve more their employees than the potential 
benefi ciaries.
In addition to the internal problems (paternalism and administrative in-
adequacy), government surveillance poses a real obstacle to autonomous and 
healthy operation of NGOs. In general, as with the grassroots associations, 
states in the region express a contradictory position toward NGOs: they lend 
them support as long as the NGOs reduce the burden of social- service provi-
sion and poverty alleviation. In the late 1990s, recognition was growing among 
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Middle Eastern states of the contributions made by the voluntary sector in 
social development, as refl ected in new and more favorable NGO laws and the 
public expression of support for the organizations (as in Egypt, Iran, and Jor-
dan). Yet the governments also fear losing po liti cal space, because there is the 
possibility of NGOs turning oppositional. Professional associations (in Egypt, 
Jordan, Palestine, and Iran) are oft en drawn into politics, compensating for 
the absence or inadequacy of po liti cal parties. Consequently, governments, 
while allowing associational life, impose strict legal control by screening ini-
tiators; they also check fund- raising and unilaterally outlaw nonconformist 
NGOs. This contradictory position is partly related to the states’ economic 
and po liti cal capacities. Thus, while economic weakness in a country may 
generate space for people’s self- activity as in NGOs, the states’ po liti cal weak-
ness usually restrains it. To illustrate, the Ira ni an government, lacking fi nan-
cial resources to curb population growth in the early 1990s, mobilized more 
than 20,000 female volunteers, who managed educational work to achieve 
successful family- planning and primary health- care programs in cities, con-
tributing to bring the growth rate down from a high of 3.4 percent in 1987 to 
1.4 percent by 1996. Yet the government fi ercely rejected these women’s de-
mand to set up an association, because it feared in de pen dent or ga ni za tion.84 
In a way, this implies that in practice the state favors certain NGOs (depend-
ing on what they do) and is leery of others. For instance, associations that 
belong to well- connected high offi  cials are treated better than are critical 
human- rights and women’s rights organizations.85 It is therefore crucial not 
to approach the NGO sector as a homogeneous entity. Just as with the concept 
of “civil society,” class and connection intervene to stratify the private volun-
tary sector.
These handicaps are partially cultural and attitudinal (e.g., the paternalis-
tic approach to development and status orientation) and partly structural. 
Unlike those of trade  unions and cooperatives, the benefi ciaries of an NGO 
are not its members and therefore cannot hold it accountable for inadequacy. 
The same relationship, in turn, persists between local NGOs and donor agen-
cies; as a result, the NGOs are accountable not to their benefi ciaries but to their 
donors.86 Mahmood Mamdani is perhaps correct in saying that the NGOs 
do undermine the existing clientelism, yet they simultaneously create a new 
type.87 The question, then, is whether the present NGOs are structurally able 
to foster grassroots participation for meaningful development. Perhaps we 
simply expect too much from NGOs, as Neil Webster, writing on India, has 
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noted. Maybe we attribute to these NGOs “development qualities and abilities 
that they do not in fact possess.”88 What ever our expectations, the fact re-
mains that self- activity—collective or individual mobilization— remains a cru-
cial factor in poor people’s elevation to a point at which they can meaningfully 
manage their own lives. In the Middle East, the existing forms of activism in 
the communities— or through labor  unions, social Islam, and the NGOs— do 
contribute to the well- being of the underprivileged groups. However, they fall 
short of activating and directing a great number of people in sustained mobili-
zation for social development. The sociopo liti cal characteristics of the Middle 
East instead tend to generate a par tic u lar form of activism— a grassroots non-
movement that, I think, has far- reaching implications for social change. I am 
referring to the “quiet encroachment of the ordinary.”
THE QUIET ENCROACHMENT OF THE ORDINARY
In the previous chapter, I described the quiet encroachment as the silent, pro-
tracted, and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and 
powerful in a quest for survival and improvement of their lives.89 They are 
characterized by quiet, largely atomized, and prolonged mobilization with 
episodic collective action— open and fl eeting struggles without clear leader-
ship, ideology, or structured or ga ni za tion. Although the quiet encroachment 
is basically a nonmovement, it is diff erent from survival strategies or “every-
day re sis tance” in that, fi rst, the struggles and gains of the grass roots are at 
the cost not of fellow poor people or themselves (as in survival strategies), but 
of the state, the rich, and the general public. In addition, these struggles 
should be seen not as necessarily defensive merely in the realm of re sis tance, 
but as cumulatively encroaching, meaning that the actors tend to expand 
their space by winning new positions to move on. This kind of quiet activism 
challenges many fundamental state prerogatives, including the meaning of 
“order,” control of public space, and the meaning of “urban.” But the most im-
mediate consequence is the redistribution of social goods in the form of the 
(unlawful and direct) acquisition of collective consumption (land, shelter, 
piped water, electricity), public space (street pavements, intersections, street 
parking places), and opportunities (favorable business conditions, locations, 
and labels).
Postrevolution Iran experienced an unpre ce dented colonization, mostly 
by the poor, of public and private land, apartments, hotels, street sidewalks, 
and public utilities. Between 1980 and 1992, despite the government’s opposi-
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tion, the land area of Tehran expanded from 200 square kilometers to 600 
square kilometers; well over one hundred mostly informal communities  were 
created in and around Greater Tehran. The actors of the massive informal 
economy extended beyond the typical marginal poor to include the new mid-
dle classes, the educated salary earners whose public- sector positions rapidly 
declined during the 1980s. In a more dramatic fashion, millions of rural mi-
grants and the urban poor in Egypt have quietly claimed cemeteries, rooft ops, 
and state and public lands on the outskirts of the city, creating largely autono-
mous communities. Greater Cairo contains over 111 spontaneous settlements 
(ashwaiyyat) housing more than six million people who have subdivided agri-
cultural lands and put up shelters unlawfully. Throughout the country, 344 
square kilometers of land has come under occupation or illegal construction, 
mainly by low- income groups. Some 84 percent of all housing units from 1970 
and 1981  were informally built. To these informal units one should add “verti-
cal encroachments”— the addition of rooms, balconies, and extra space on top 
of buildings. The capital for construction comes mainly from the informal 
credit associations (gama῾ iyyat) located in neighborhoods. Many rent the 
homes unlawfully to other poor families. The prospective tenant provides the 
“key money,” which he borrows from a credit association, to a plot holder, who 
then uses it to build but rents it to the provider of the key money. The plot 
holder becomes a homeowner, and the tenant fi nds a place to live. Both break 
the law that allows only one year’s advance on rent.90
Once settled, the poor tend to force the authorities to extend living ame-
nities, or collective consumption, to their neighborhoods by otherwise tap-
ping them illegally. Many poor in Tehran, Cairo, Istanbul, Tunisia, and other 
cities illegally use electricity and running water by connecting their homes to 
electricity poles, extending water pipes to their domiciles, or sharing or ma-
nipulating utility meters. For instance, in the late 1990s, illegal use of piped 
water in the city of Alexandria alone cost, on average, some $3 million a year. 
A cursory look at Cairo- based communities such as Dar al- Salam, Ezbet Sa-
dat, Ezbet Khairallah, Ezbet Nasr, and Basaatin shows evidence of this wide-
spread phenomenon. In late April 1996, the municipality reported that it had 
cut off  eight hundred illegal electricity lines in the Dar a-Salam and Basaatin 
communities in a single raid.
This informal and oft en uncharged use of collective ser vices leaves gov-
ernments little choice but selectively to integrate the informal settlements, 
hoping to commit the residents to pay for ser vices they have thus far used 
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illegally. Securing property and community tax is another consideration. Al-
though the poor welcome the extension of provisions, they oft en cannot af-
ford to pay the bills. Therefore, it is not uncommon to see reinformalization 
springing up from the fringes of the new formalized communities. In the do-
main of work, “street- subsistence workers” quietly take over public thorough-
fares to conduct their business in the vast parallel economy. The streets in the 
commercial districts of Middle Eastern cities are colonized by street vendors 
who encroach on favorable business opportunities that shop keep ers have cre-
ated. Cairo reportedly has 600,000 street vendors, and Tehran, until recently, 
had some 150,000. Informality means not only that the actors generally escape 
the costs of formality (tax regulation, for instance), but that they also benefi t 
from the theft  of imported goods, brands, and intellectual property. With 
capital of $6, a Cairene vendor could make up to $55 a month.91
Thousands of poor people (in Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran, for instance) 
subsist on tips from parking cars in the streets that they control and or ga nize 
in such a way as to create maximum parking space. They have turned many 
streets into virtual parking lots, which they control by creating working gangs 
with elaborate internal or ga ni za tion. Establishing alternative transportation 
systems is another way to make a living. Ezbet Khairallah in Cairo typifi es 
thousands of similar neighborhoods in the region, where vans carry passen-
gers without even registration plates. A newspaper described this community 
as one in which “no offi  cial has ever entered since its establishment” in the 
early 1980s.92 The logic behind these types of encroachment is refl ected in the 
words of a Cairene street vendor, who said, “When dealing with the govern-
ment, you have to take the proverb, ‘What you can win with, play with.’ ” 93
Governments usually send mixed signals about quiet encroachment. On 
the one hand, they see the people helping themselves by building their own 
shelters, getting their own ser vices, creating their own jobs. On the other hand, 
they realize that these activities are carried out largely at the cost of the state, 
the propertied, and the public. Equally important, the poor tend to outadmin-
ister the authorities by establishing a diff erent public order, acting in de pen-
dently and oft en tarnishing the image of modernity the nation seeks to por-
tray. “We are not against the vendors making a living,” says the chief of Cairo’s 
security department, “but not at the expense of Egypt’s reputation. They spoil 
the picture of Cairo, they block the streets, they crowd the pavements.” 94
Yet encroachment is tolerated in practice as long as it appears limited. 
Once it goes too far, governments oft en react. Postrevolutionary Iran, for 
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instance, saw many bloody confrontations between the security forces and 
encroachers. Daily police harassment is a common practice in many Middle 
Eastern cities. Nevertheless, the frequent off ensives against squatters and street 
vendors oft en fail to bring a result. The actors either resort to on- the- spot re-
sis tance (as in Iran) or, more commonly, resume their activities quietly fol-
lowing each tactical retreat (as in Egypt). For instance, while the municipal 
police drive around to remove street vendors— in which case the vendors sud-
denly disappear— the vendors normally return to their work once the police 
are gone. “Everything we are doing is useless,” says an Egyptian offi  cial.95 The 
Ira ni an authorities became even more frustrated when “anti- vending squads” 
failed to clear public spaces. Confronting quiet encroachment is particularly 
diffi  cult for vulnerable governments. The municipalities, using stick- and- 
carrot tactics, may indeed manage to demolish communities, drive vendors 
away from the main streets, or track down unregistered transportation. Nev-
ertheless, they have to yield to the actors’ demands by off ering alternative 
solutions. Where removals or de mo li tions have actually been carried out, the 
dispossessed have been off ered alternative street markets, housing, or regu-
lated taxi ser vice. Only thirteen of a total eighty- one squatter settlements in 
Cairo (excluding Guiza)  were in 1998 identifi ed for de mo li tion (for safety rea-
sons); the rest  were planned to be upgraded.96
Quiet encroachment, therefore, is not a politics of collective demand mak-
ing, a politics of protest. Rather, it is a mix of individual and collective direct 
action. It is accentuated under the sociopo liti cal circumstance characterized 
by authoritarian states, populist ideology, and strong family ties. The authori-
tarian bureaucratic states make collective demand making both risky (because 
of repression) and less than eff ective (owing to bureaucratic ineffi  ciency); pop-
u lism tends to obstruct the public sphere and autonomous collectivities, ren-
dering primary loyalties the more functional mechanism of survival and 
struggle. Yet, in the long run, the encroachment strategy generates a reality on 
the ground with which states oft en fi nd no option but to come to terms. In the 
end, the poor manage to bring about signifi cant changes in their own lives, the 
urban structure, and social policy. It is precisely this centrality of the agency, 
of the urban grass roots, that distinguishes quiet encroachment from any in-
cremental social change that may result from urbanization in general. Al-
though this kind of activism represents a lifelong, sustained, and self- 
generating advance, it is largely unlawful and constantly involves risk of harass-
ment, insecurity, and repression. As a fl uid and unstructured form of activism, 
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encroachment has the advantage of fl exibility and versatility, but it falls short 
of developing legal, fi nancial, or gan i za tion al, and even moral support. The 
challenge is to encourage convergence of the mobilizational element of quiet 
encroachment, the institutional capacity of NGOs, and the consent of the 
authorities.
Early reaction by the urban grass roots to aspects of structural adjustment 
policies during the 1980s included developing coping strategies and mounting 
urban riots. These strategies, however, seem to have given way to more insti-
tutionalized methods of dealing with austerity. The safety nets provided by 
social Islam and NGOs (coupled with state repression) contributed to this 
shift  in method. With po liti cal Islam undermined (institutionalized, co- 
opted, or curbed) by the end of the 1990s, social Islam, “NGOization,” and 
quiet encroachment, despite their fl aws, appear to have become the dominant 
forms of activism that now contribute to improving some aspects of people’s 
lives in Middle Eastern countries. Although quiet encroachment has a longer 
history, the spread of Islamism and NGOs gained new momentum in the 
1980s and especially in the 1990s, the period in which neoliberal economic 
policies began to be implemented. The growth of these types of activism 
(along with the new social movements associated with women and human 
rights) coincides with the relative decline in traditional class- based 
movements— peasant organizations, cooperative movements, and trade 
 unionism. The transformation of the rural social structure, “de- 
peasantization,” and growing urbanization are eroding the social bases of 
peasant and cooperative movements. The weakening of economic pop u lism, 
closely linked to the new economic restructuring, has resulted in a decline of 
public- sector employment, which constituted the core of the corporatist trade 
 unionism; at the same time, it has led to a growing fragmentation of the work-
force, expressed in the expansion of the informal urban economy. State bu-
reaucracy (as a segment of the public sector) continues to remain weighty; 
however, its employees, unlike workers in industry or ser vices, largely have 
been unor ga nized. A large segment of low- paid state employees survive on 
incomes deriving from second or third jobs in the informal sector.
In the meantime, the increasing informality of economies and expanded 
urbanization in the Middle East tend to cause a shift  in pop u lar needs and 
demands. The growth of informality means that struggles for wages and con-
ditions, the typical focus of traditional trade  unionism, are losing ground in 
favor of broader concerns for jobs, informal work conditions, and aff ordable 
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cost of living. Rapid urbanization, however, increases the demand for urban 
collective consumption— shelter, decent housing, electricity, piped water, trans-
portation, health care, and education. This desire for citizenship, expressed in 
community membership and developmental rights, is one that traditional 
trade  unionism is unable to address. The task instead falls on community 
movements that remain feeble in the Middle East. At the same time, the scope 
of social Islam and NGOs, despite their contributions to social welfare, is also 
unable to realize fully the goal of social development. Even though by the close 
of the 1990s, some Middle Eastern governments (in Jordan, Iran, the Palestin-
ian Territories)  were cautiously recognizing the activities of some civil- society 
organizations, especially the social- development NGOs, they fell short of em-
powering civil- society organizations from above and encouraging social devel-
opment from below. It is, therefore, mainly to the strategy of quiet encroach-
ment that the urban disenfranchised in the Middle East resort in order to fulfi ll 
their growing needs. Through quiet encroachment, the subaltern create realities 
on the ground with which the authorities sooner or later must come to terms.97 
Joan Nelson’s contention that, because the poor are never or ga nized well 
enough, they fail to exert infl uence on national policies is true.98 Yet the cu-
mulative consequence of poor people’s individual direct actions may, in the 
end, result in some improvements from below and policy changes from above. 
Given the gradual retreat of states from their responsibilities in off ering social 
welfare, the poor in the Middle East would have been in a far worse condition 
had grassroots actions been totally absent. Yet grassroots activities do have 
limitations in terms of their own internal constraints, in their capacity to win 
concessions adequately, and in relation to the constraints directed from the 
states. It is a mistake to leave the entire task of social development to initia-
tives from below; a bigger mistake is to give up on the states— in par tic u lar, on 
their crucial role in large- scale distribution. Yet imagining policy change and 
the concrete improvement of people’s lives without their pressure or direct 
action seems no more than an unwarranted illusion.
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feminists have long argued that probably all modern states possess, albeit 
in diff erent degrees, patriarchal tendencies. But patriarchy fi gures especially 
prominently in those authoritarian regimes and movements that exhibit con-
servative religious (Islamic, Christian, Jewish, or Hindu) dispositions. Indeed, 
patriarchy is entrenched in religious authoritarian polity.1 In many authori-
tarian Muslim states, such as Egypt, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, or the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, where conservative Islamic laws are in place, women have 
become second- class citizens in many domains of public life. Consequently, a 
central question for women’s rights activists is how to achieve gender equality 
under such circumstances. A commonly proposed strategy consists of or ga-
niz ing strong women’s movements to fi ght for equal rights. Movements are 
usually perceived in terms of collective and sustained activities of a large 
number of women or ga nized under strong leaderships, with an eff ective net-
work of solidarities, procedures of membership, mechanisms of framing, com-
munication, and publicity— the types of social movements that are associated 
with images of marches, banners, organizations, lobbying, and the like.
It is a credit to women in most western and demo cratic countries for creat-
ing sustainable movements that have achieved remarkable outcomes since the 
1960s. While it may be that many women in Muslim (and non- Muslim) au-
thoritarian states do wish and indeed strive to build similar social movements, 
Adapted from “A Women’s Non- Movement: What It Means to Be a Woman Activist 
in an Islamic State,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 27, 
no. 1 (2007), pp. 160– 72.
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   96 9/1/09   1:59 PM
—-1
—0
—+1
FEMINISM OF EVERYDAY LIFE 97
their struggles are oft en thwarted by the repressive mea sures of authoritarian/
patriarchal states as well as the unsympathetic attitudes of many ordinary 
men. Consequently, the type of collective actions practiced mostly in demo-
cratic settings, which have come to dominate our conceptual universe as the 
women’s movements, may not deliver under nondemo cratic conditions, if 
they are ever allowed to emerge. The conventional social movement is con-
cerned chiefl y with politics of protest, contentious politics where collective 
actors exert pressure (by threat, disruption, or causing uncertainty) on ad-
versaries to meet their demands. How do we account for a women’s activism 
that may rarely deploy or ga ni za tion and networking, mobilizing strategies, 
street marches, picketing, strikes, or disruption, and yet is able to extend 
their choices?
In the aft ermath of a revolution in which they had participated massively, 
Ira ni an women faced an authoritarian Islamic regime that imposed forced 
veiling, gender segregation, and widespread surveillance, and revoked the pre-
revolutionary laws that favored women. Women resisted these policies, not 
much by deliberate or ga nized campaigns, but largely through mundane daily 
practices in public domains, such as working, playing sports, studying, show-
ing interest in art and music, or running for po liti cal offi  ces. Imposing them-
selves as public players, women managed to make a signifi cant shift  in gender 
dynamics, empowering themselves in education, employment, and family law, 
while raising their self- esteem. They reinstated equal education with men, 
curtailed polygamy, restricted men’s right to divorce, demonized religiously 
sanctioned temporary marriage (mut῾ a), reformed the marriage contract, im-
proved the employment status of women, brought back women as judges, de-
bated child custody, and to some degree changed gender attitudes in the fam-
ily and in society. Women’s seemingly peculiar, dispersed, and daily struggles 
in the public domain not only changed aspects of their lives; they also ad-
vanced a more inclusive, egalitarian, and woman- centered interpretation of 
Islam.
Not only the Islamic republic, but many other Muslim societies have also 
experienced similar dispersed activities, albeit with varying eff ect, depending 
on the degree of misogyny of the states and the mobilizational effi  cacy of 
women. Nevertheless, because of their largely mundane and everyday nature, 
such women’s practices are hardly considered a par tic u lar type of activism 
that can lead to some far- reaching consequences. How do we characterize 
such activities? How do we explain the logic of their operation? Drawing on 
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the experience of women under the Islamic Republic of Iran, my purpose in 
this essay is to suggest that there are perhaps diff erent ways in which Muslim 
women under authoritarian regimes may, consciously or without being aware, 
defy, resist, negotiate, or even circumvent gender discrimination— not neces-
sarily by resorting to extraordinary and overarching “movements” identifi ed 
by deliberate collective protest and informed by mobilization theory and 
strategy, but by involving ordinary daily practices of life— by working, play-
ing sports, jogging, singing, or running for public offi  ces. This involves de-
ploying the power of presence, the assertion of collective will in spite of all odds, 
refusing to exit, circumventing constraints, and discovering new spaces of free-
dom to make oneself heard, seen, felt, and realized. The eff ective power of these 
practices lies precisely in their ordinariness, since as irrepressible actions they 
encroach incrementally to capture trenches from the power base of patriar-
chal structure, while erecting springboards to move on. Conventional social 
movements with identifi able leaderships may be more readily prone to repres-
sion than such dispersed but common practices by a large number of actors 
whose activism is deeply intertwined with the practices of daily life. Their end 
result can amount to a considerable modifi cation in gender hierarchy and 
discrimination. This par tic u lar strategy of Ira ni an women to achieve equal 
rights may give us an opportunity to perhaps rethink about what it means to 
be a woman activist, or what may constitute a woman’s “nonmovement,” un-
der authoritarian regimes in contemporary Muslim societies.
WOMEN AND THE ISLAMIC STATE
The Ira ni an Revolution of 1979 was a nationwide pop u lar movement where 
diverse groups and classes— modern and traditional, religious and secular, 
middle- class and poor, male and female— massively participated.2 Apart from 
a few obvious cases (such as the clergy and royalist upper classes) as winners 
and losers, debate still continues as to which social groups, and in what 
respects, really benefi ted from it.3 In general, women are regarded to be on the 
losing side. Perhaps no social group felt so immediately and pervasively the 
brunt of the Islamic Revolution as the middle class, especially secular women. 
Only months into the life of the Islamic regime, new, misogynous policies 
angered women who only recently had marched against the Shah. The new 
regime overturned the less male- biased Family Protection Laws of 1967; over-
night, women lost their right to be judges, to initiate divorce, to assume child 
custody, and to travel abroad without permission from a male guardian. 
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Polygamy was reintroduced and all women, irrespective of faith,  were forced 
to wear the veil in public.4 In the early years, social control and discrimina-
tory quotas against women in education and employment compelled many 
women to stay at home, seek early retirement, or go into informal and family 
business.5
The initial reaction to these drastic policies came from secular women. 
Thousands demonstrated in Tehran on March 8, 1979, vilifying Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s imposition of the hijab, or veiling. Even though Khomeini re-
treated temporarily, the decree was gradually enforced. Shocked by the on-
slaught on their liberty, secular women or ga nized dozens of albeit- desperate 
organizations mostly affi  liated with sectarian left ist trends for whom the gen-
der question was subordinated to the class emancipatory project.6 All these 
groups  were put down by the Islamic regime once the war with Iraq began in 
1980. Then followed a de cade of repression, demoralization, and fl ight. While 
secular women in exile continued with feminist education and activism, those 
in Iran began to emerge from their tormenting abeyance into the world of 
arts, literature, journalism, and scholarship only at war’s end.
Although traditionalist clerics favored keeping women at home, away from 
“moral dangers,” others, however, compelled by the remarkable presence of 
women in the revolution, adopted a discourse that exalted Muslim women as 
both guardians of the family and active public agents. This broad discursive 
framework guided a spectrum of “Muslim women activists.” Inspired by the 
writings of Ali Shariati and Morteza Motahhari, they set out to off er an en-
dogenous, though abstract, “model of Muslim women,”7 in the image of the 
Prophet’s daughter Fatima and his granddaughter Zeinab, who  were simulta-
neously “true” homemakers and public persons.8 Out of dozens of Islamic 
groups and organizations, the Women’s Association of the Islamic Revolution 
(WAIR) gathered prominent Islamist women, including Azam Taleqani, Fe-
reshte Hashemi, Shahin Tabatabaii, Zahra Rahnavard, and Gawhar Dast-
gheib. Most  were members of prominent clerical families and held that the 
(socialist) East treated the woman as a mere “working machine,” and the 
(capitalist) West as a “sex object,” while only Islam regarded women as “true 
humans.”9 Instead of equality, these activists advocated the complementary 
nature of men and women. Some justifi ed polygamy on the grounds that it 
protected widows and orphans. Although some objected to forced veiling and 
the abrogation of the Family Law, they stopped short of any concrete protest 
but contended that wearing the veil should be enforced through education, 
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not by coercion. Most refused to acknowledge, let alone communicate with, 
secular western feminists, whom they saw as “provoking women against men” 
and questioning religious principles and the sanctity of shari῾a.10 Indeed, 
alarmed by the danger of gender debates, Shahla Habibi (President Rafsan-
jani’s advisor on women’s issues) committed herself “against overstating 
women’s oppression” and identity politics. Instead, she placed emphasis on 
the “family [as] the heart of the society, and women the heart of family.” 11 
Thus, daycare centers became “harmful for children,” 12 even though their 
closure would throw many women out of work. Muslim women activists ac-
cepted “tradition” (Qur a᾽n, hadith, fi qh, and ijtihad) as an adequate guide to 
ensure women’s dignity and well- being.13 “In an Islamic state led by the rule of 
a supreme jurist (velayat- i faqih) there would be no need for special organiza-
tions to defend women’s rights,” argued Maryam Behroozi, a woman and 
member of Parliament.14 While the moderates agreed with “women’s freedom 
to study, to choose suitable jobs, and have access to various social and admin-
istrative fi elds,” 15 the more conservative Islamists (such as the parliamentari-
ans Marzieh Dabbagh, Rejaii, Dastgheib, and Behroozi) viewed gender divi-
sion in occupations, tasks, and activities as a divine order.16 In their paradigm, 
women, as Muslims, had more obligations than rights.
With the onset of the war with Iraq (1980– 88) debate about women’s status 
was suppressed. The authorities continued to project women as mothers and 
wives, who  were to produce manpower for the war, for the glory of Islam and 
the nation. But by the late 1980s dissent simmered in women’s “politics of 
nagging.” Women complained in public daily, in taxis, buses, bakery queues, 
grocery shops, and in government offi  ces, about repression, the war economy, 
the war itself. In so doing, they formed a court of irrepressible public opinion 
that could not be ignored. A certain iconic moment shattered the illusion of the 
“model of Muslim women,” when on national radio a young woman expressed 
her preference for Osheen, a character in a Japa nese tele vi sion series, over Fatima, 
the Prophet’s daughter. Only then did authorities realize how out of touch 
they had become regarding women’s lives in Ira ni an society. Some ten years 
into the Islamic republic, Azam Taleqani admitted bitterly that “poverty and 
polygamy are the only things that poor women have obtained from the 
revolution.” 17
War and repression had surely muted women’s voices but had not altered 
their conviction to assert themselves through the practices of everyday life, 
by resisting forced Islamization, pursuing education, seeking employment, 
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yearning for arts and music, practicing sports, and socializing their children 
according to these pursuits. Mobilization for the war eff ort had already placed 
them in the public arena as “model Muslim women,” making them conscious 
of their power. Beyond illusions imposed by men, there  were also facts. In a 
mere twenty years, women’s unpre ce dented interest in education had more 
than doubled their literacy rate: in 1997 it stood at 74 percent.18 By 1998, more 
girls than boys  were entering universities, a fact that worried some offi  cials, 
who feared that educated women might not be able to fi nd men with higher or 
equal status to marry. But for young women college off ered not only educa-
tion, but a place to socialize, gain status, and have a better chance for jobs and 
more desirable partners.
While for some the sheer fi nancial necessity left  no choice but to seek em-
ployment in the cash economy,19 most middle- class and well- to- do women 
chose working outside the home in order to be present in the public realm. 
Aft er an overall decline in female employment, largely in industry, of 40 per-
cent between 1976 and 1986, the share of women at work in cities  rose from 
8.8 percent in 1976 to 11.3 percent in 1996. This excluded those who worked 
in informal occupations, family businesses, or part- time jobs.20 By the mid- 
1990s, half of the positions in the government sector and over 40 percent in 
education  were held by women. Professional women, notably writers and art-
ists, reemerged from domestic exile; at the fi rst Book Fair of Women Publish-
ers in Tehran, in 1997, some forty- six publishers displayed seven hundred ti-
tles by women authors. Over a dozen female fi lmmakers  were regularly 
engaged in their highly competitive fi eld, and more women than men won 
awards at the 1995 Ira ni an Film Festival.21 But few of their internationally ac-
claimed productions helped elevate the underdog image of Ira ni an Muslim 
women in the world.
The economic conditions of families made  house wives more publicly vis-
ible than ever before. Growing economic hardship since the late 1980s forced 
middle- class men to take multiple jobs and work longer hours, so that “they 
 were never home.” Consequently, all domestic and outside chores (taking 
children to school, dealing with the civil ser vice, banking, shopping, or fi xing 
the car) that had previously been shared by husbands and wives shift ed exclu-
sively to women.22 A study confi rmed that women in Tehran, notably  house wives, 
spent on average two hours per day in public places, at times until ten at night, 
traveling by taxi, bus, and metro.23 This public presence gave women self- 
confi dence, new social skills, and city knowledge and encouraged many to 
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return to school or to volunteer for NGOs or charities. One impressive exam-
ple of voluntarism was the Ministry of Health’s mobilization of some 25,000 
women in Tehran in the early 1990s to educate urban lower- class families 
about hygiene and birth control; mounting population growth (3.9 percent 
between 1980 and 1985 and 3.4 percent between 1985 and 1990) had caused the 
regime great po liti cal anxiety,24 and these women contributed to decreasing 
the rate to a low of 1.7 percent between 1990 and 1995.25
Women did not give up on sports, even if a woman’s body, and sports 
along with it, had been at the center of the regime’s moral crusade. The hard-
ship of sweating under a long dress and veil did not deter many women from 
jogging, cycling, or target shooting, or from playing tennis, basketball, or even 
climbing Mount Everest. Nor did women avoid participating in national and 
international— albeit exclusively female or Muslim— tournaments.26 They 
also defi ed the state policy banning women from attending male competi-
tions; some disguised themselves in male attire,27 while the more assertive 
simply forced their way in. In 1998 hundreds of women stormed into a mas-
sive stadium full of jubilant young men celebrating a national soccer team 
victory. From then on women  were assigned to special sections in the stadium 
to attend events. Their demand to play soccer in public bore fruit in 2000 when 
the fi rst women’s soccer team was formally recognized.28 Faezeh Rafsanjani, 
the president’s daughter, played a crucial role in promoting and institutional-
izing women’s sports. The fi rst College of Women’s Physical Education had 
already been established in 1994 to train school sports staff .
While the new moral order and imposition of the veil had a repressive ef-
fect on secular and non- Muslim women, it brought some degree of mobility to 
their socially conservative counterparts: traditional men felt at ease allowing 
their daughters or wives to attend schools or appear at public events.29 More-
over, the regime’s mobilization of lower classes for the war eff ort, street rallies, 
and Friday prayer sermons dramatically increased the public presence of women 
who would have otherwise remained in the confi nes of their unyielding dwell-
ings. Meanwhile, the women who felt stifl ed by the coercive moralizing of the 
government resisted patiently and fi ercely. Offi  cials invariably complained 
about bad- hijabi, or young women neglecting to properly wear the head- 
cover. With the jail penalty (between ten days and two months) for improper 
hijab, showing inches of hair sparked daily street battles between defi ant 
women and the agents of multiple offi  cial and semi- offi  cial morals- enforcing 
organizations such as Sarallah, Amre beh Ma᾽ ruf, Nahye as Monker, and 
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Edareh Amaken. During a four- month period of 1990 in Tehran, 607 women 
 were arrested, 6,589  were forced to submit written affi  davits, and 46,000 re-
ceived warnings.30 Nevertheless, by the late 1990s, the bad- hijabi became an 
established practice.
Women’s daily routines and re sis tance to the Islamic government did not 
mean their departure from religiosity. Indeed, most displayed religious devo-
tion, and many  were willing to wear light head- covers in the absence of force.31 
Yet they insisted on exerting individual choice and entitlement, which chal-
lenged both the egalitarian claims of the Islamic state and the premises of 
orthodox Islam. Women wanted to play sports, work in desirable jobs, study, 
listen to or play music, marry whom they wished, and reject the grave gender 
in e qual ity. “Why are we to be acknowledged only with reference to men?” 
wrote one woman in a magazine. “Why do we have to get permission from 
Edareh Amaken [morals police] to get a hotel room, whereas men do not need 
such authorization?”32 These seemingly mundane desires and demands, how-
ever,  were deemed to redefi ne the status of women under the Islamic republic, 
because each step forward would encourage demands to remove more re-
strictions. The eff ect could snowball. How could this general dilemma be 
resolved?
The women’s magazines Zan- e Ruz, Payam- e Hajar, and Payam- e Zan 
 were the fi rst to refl ect upon such dilemmas. At the state level, the Social and 
Cultural Council of Women and the Bureau of Women’s Aff airs  were estab-
lished in 1988 and 1992, respectively, to address such issues and to devise con-
crete policies. Even Islamists, such as Ms. Rejaii, wife of a former prime min-
ister, expressed reservations about the “model of Muslim women,” attacking 
“narrow- minded” anti- female ideas and obsession with the veil.33 Interestingly, 
many of these women worked in public offi  ce, including Parliament, and had 
been given a taste of discrimination by their traditionalist male colleagues. 
The Women’s Association of the Islamic Revolution was shut down and its 
views attacked; the Islamic Republic Party incorporated the magazines Zan- e 
Ruz and Rah- e Zeinab; and once her parliamentary term ended, the promi-
nent female Islamist Azam Taleqani fell out of the government’s graces. In the 
end, the rather abstract philosophical approach of Islamist women proved 
insuffi  cient to accommodate women’s desire for individual choice within an 
Islamist framework. Post- Islamist feminists, however, emerged to take up the 
challenge.
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A POST- ISLAMIST FEMINISM?
In a departure from the Islamist women activists, post- Islamist feminism ar-
ticulated a blend of piety and choice, religiosity and rights. It set out a strategy 
for change through discussion, education, and mobilization in a discursive 
frame that combined religious and secular idioms. With a clear feminist agenda, 
the post- Islamist strategy derived not from an abstract model but from the 
reality of women’s daily lives. Activists held Islam in its totality as a system 
that could accommodate women’s rights only if it was seen through the femi-
nist lens. These feminists valued women’s autonomy and choice, emphasizing 
gender equality in all domains. For them, feminism, irrespective of its origin 
(secular, religious, or western) dealt with women’s subordination in general. 
The West was no longer a monolithic entity imbued with immorality and de-
cadence (a view held by secular revolutionary and Islamist women); it was also 
home to democracy and science, to feminists and exiled Ira ni an women with 
whom they wished to establish dialogue. This position transcended the di-
chotomy of “Islamic” versus “secular” women. Post- Islamist feminists  were 
diff erent from such Islamist women activists as the Egyptian Heba Rauf, who 
 were primarily Islamist but happened to be women and raised women’s is-
sues. Post- Islamist feminists  were feminists fi rst and foremost, who utilized 
Islamic discourse to push for gender equality within the constraints of the 
Islamic republic. They did not limit their intellectual sources only to Islam 
but also benefi ted from secular feminism.34 The women’s magazines Far-
zaneh, Zan, and Zanan spearheaded this trend by running articles on, for 
instance, how to improve one’s sex life, cooking, women’s arts in feminist 
critical discourse, deconstruction of patriarchal Persian literature, and legal 
religious discussions, written by Muslim, secular, Ira ni an and western au-
thors, including Virginia Woolf, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Simone de Beau-
voir, and Susan Faludi.35 Zanan appealed in par tic u lar to educated young 
urban women.36
The major challenge to post- Islamist feminism was to demonstrate that 
the claims for women’s rights  were not necessarily alien to Ira ni an culture or 
Islam.37 But, as secular feminists wondered, would operating within the 
Islamic discourse not constrain endeavors for gender equality when “all 
Muslims, from the very orthodox to the most radical reformers, accept the 
Qur a᾽n as the literal word of Allah, unchanging and unchangeable”?38 Post- 
Islamist feminists responded by undertaking women- centered interpreta-
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tions of the sacred texts in a fashion similar to that of early Eu ro pe an femi-
nists such as Hildegard of Bingen (1098– 1179), Christine de Pizan (1365– 1430), 
Isotta Nogarola (1418– 66), or Anna Maria von Schurman (1607– 78), to name 
only a few, who deconstructed the Bible- driven perceptions about the “sin-
ful” and “inferior” disposition of Eve/women.39 Zanan set out to deconstruct 
the “patriarchal readings” of the scriptures, off ering gender- sensitive percep-
tions that would allow women to be equal with men, to take on social and 
po liti cal positions as judges, presidents, religious sources of emulation 
(marja᾽ ), or Islamic jurists ( faqih). “There are no defi ciencies in Islam [with 
regard to women]. Problems lie in po liti cal and patriarchal perceptions,” 
they contended.40 Within this emerging “feminist theology,” interpreters 
questioned misogynist legislation and the literal reading of Qur a᾽nic verse; 
they emphasized instead the “general spirit” of Islam, which, they argued, 
was in favor of women. If in his twenty- three years of struggle the Prophet of 
Islam changed many antiwomen practices of his time, post- Islamist femi-
nists  were to extend this tradition of emancipation to modern times. Meth-
odologically grounded on hermeneutics, philology, and historicism, women 
interpreters transcended literal meanings in favor of interpretive and his-
torical deductions. To refute the “innate superiority of men” that orthodox 
readings deduced from Qur a᾽nic verses (such as Surah 4:34 Nisa, where men 
are favored over women), Zanan writers shift ed the basis of hierarchy from 
sex to piety by invoking the gender- free verse: “The noblest among you in the 
sight of God is the most God- fearing of you” (S. 49:13). Accordingly, child 
custody was not automatically the right of men (as the shari῾a seems to au-
thorize) but was determined by the well- being of children, which Islam 
stresses highly.41 Against a 1998 parliamentary bill that called for the separa-
tion of men and women in medical treatment, Zanan argued not only that 
the Qur a᾽n ruled against any forced guidance in general (because people are 
responsible for their choices, good or evil), but also that in Islamic theology 
religion exists to serve humans rather than the other way around. Instead of 
obligation, it concluded, the bill should recognize the patient’s choice over 
his medical treatment.42
Building on linguistic analyses, post- Islamist feminists deconstructed the 
verse “al- rejal qawwamoun ala- nisa” (Nisa, 4:34), on which many of the mi-
sogynist deductions are based. Feminist theologians attributed the word qa-
wam not to the Arabic root “qym,” meaning “guardianship over other,” but to 
“qwm,” signifying “rising up,” “fulfi lling needs,” or “protecting.” 43 Thus, 
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rather than meaning “men exert guardianship over women,” the verse could 
imply “men protect or fulfi ll the needs of women.” In the same fashion, they 
stated the verb darb in the Qur᾽ an should be understood not simply as “to 
beat,” but also “to put an end to” or “to go along with.” 44 Consequently, the 
Qur a᾽n did not authorize the right to divorce to men alone or deny such a right 
to a woman.45 Indeed, the gender- neutrality of the Persian language, as re-
fl ected in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, off ered much discursive 
opportunity for women to campaign for equal rights.46 For instance, eligibility 
conditions for the country’s presidency, such as “rejal- e mazhabi” (religious 
personalities) or “faqih- e adel” ( just jurist), can apply to both men and women. 
While in Arabic the word rajol was generally accepted as meaning “a man,” in 
Persian, they contended, it referred to (po liti cal) “personality” in general, thus 
arguing women  were also eligible to run for president.47 The major novelty of 
these gender- sensitive theological debates was that, beyond a few enlightened 
clerics,48 women themselves  were waging them, and they  were doing so in the 
pages of the pop u lar daily press.
The new women’s activism alarmed the clerical establishment, ordinary 
men, and conservative women. A male pathologist commented with dismay 
how “the freedom of women in Iran has been misconceived. . . .  In the past 
few years some women who apparently became protagonists in the struggle 
for equal right have gone astray. They talked so much about men’s domina-
tion that people became enemies, and this was a blow to our society.” 49 Aya-
tollah Fazel Lankarani of the Qom Seminary warned the activists “not to 
question Islam’s principles by your intellectualism. . . .  Who says there is no 
diff erence between men and women?” he challenged. “Who are you to express 
opinions [ . . .  ] before God and his prophet?” 50 The Friday prayer leader in 
Rasht denounced women who “questioned religious authorities on hijab and 
shari῾a,” warning them “not to cross the red line, not to dismiss the Qur a᾽n 
and Islam.” 51 Others, like Ayatollah Mazaheri,  were outraged by the activists’ 
demand that the Ira ni an government endorse the UN charter against dis-
crimination against women, because this would entail the western domina-
tion of the nation.52 Islamist women in Majlis (Monireh Nobakht and Marz-
ieh Vahid Dastjerdi) proposed to curtail feminist debates in the press and 
public, because they “create confl ict between women and men” and under-
mine shari῾a and fundamentals of the religion.53 Such attacks became intel-
lectual justifi cations for hard- line mob and media to harass bad- hijab women 
on the streets, denounce women’s sports and recreation, and fi ght against the 
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return of “de cadence, fashion, and individual taste.” 54 Zanan was taken to 
court in 1998 on charges of inciting women against men and “spreading ho-
mosexuality.” 55 The cleric Mohsen Saidzadeh, whose women- centered essays 
on theology and Islamic law had dismayed the conservative clerics, was jailed 
in June 1998.56
Despite all this pressure, the “nonmovement” made considerable inroads, 
empowering women through education, employment, and family law, and 
raised self- esteem. The opportunity of equal education with men made a 
comeback following the offi  cial restrictive quotas that favored men. Polygamy 
was seriously curtailed, men’s right to divorce restricted, and religiously- 
sanctioned mut a᾽, or temporary marriage, was demonized. At its height in 
2002 (1381), only 271, or one out of 1,000 marriages,  were “temporary.” 57 In 
cases where husbands initiated divorce proceedings, women won a fi nancial 
reward equal to the value of their involuntary  house work during marriage, 
even though applying such rulings proved to be diffi  cult. New laws authorized 
fi nancial rewards to widowed working women, increased maternity leave to 
four months, reestablished nurseries for the children of working women, and 
decreased women’s working hours to 75 percent of the time required of men. 
New legislation also made bride price payable in the current value, allowed 
early retirement aft er twenty years of work, off ered fi nancial protection for 
women and children deprived of male support, obliged the government to 
provide women’s sport facilities, and authorized single women over twenty- 
eight years old to study abroad without a male guardian.58 In 1998, a pi lot 
project to prevent wife abuse was launched.59 Child custody was intensely de-
bated, while the struggle for women to be judges led to their appointment as 
judicial counselors in lower courts and co- judges in high courts. In 1997, fi f-
teen female deputies sat in the Women’s Aff airs Commission of Parliament.60
These struggles, meanwhile, led to changes in power relations between 
women and men within the family and society. Female suicide and the rising 
divorce rate (27 percent in 2002, 80 percent of which  were divorces initiated by 
women)  were seen as what an Ira ni an sociologist called the “painful modern-
ization of our society.”61 Meanwhile, opinion polls on women’s public role showed 
that 80 percent of respondents (men and women)  were in favor of female gov-
ernment ministers, while 62 percent did not oppose a female president.62 The 
prevailing perception of Ira ni an women as helpless subjects trapped in the 
solitude of domesticity and hidden under the long black chador proved to be 
an oversimplifi cation.
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A NONMOVEMENT?
This is not to overstate the status of Ira ni an women in the Islamic republic. 
Indeed, as late as 1998, feminist lawyer Mehrangiz Kar warned against read-
ing too much into what women had achieved. She listed a dozen areas in Ira-
ni an law where fl agrant gender inequalities persisted,63 as they did in most 
po liti cal, legal, and family institutions imbued with patriarchal relations. In-
equalities remained in men’s right to divorce, child custody, polygamy, and 
sexual submission, and the amount of a man’s blood money was still twice 
that of woman’s. Yet it is also true that the daily struggles of women in the 
public domain not only changed aspects of their lives, but also advanced a 
more demo cratic interpretation of Islam. Women’s most signifi cant achieve-
ment was subverting the conventional gender divide of public men and pri-
vate women. Against much re sis tance, Ira ni an women imposed themselves as 
public players.
The paradoxical status of women under the Islamic republic perplexed 
many observers, and activists themselves, trying to grasp the nature of wom-
en’s activism. Had Ira ni an women forged a “social movement” of their own? 
Many commented in the negative, on the grounds that women activists  were 
few, dispersed, and unclear about a strategy for change, and did not engage in 
the0retical work.64 Moreover, this nonmovement lacked known leaders identi-
fi ed as “feminists” to mobilize the mass of ordinary women.65 For these com-
mentators, women’s sporadic activism represented the existence of not a so-
cial movement but a “social problem.” 66 In contrast, activists unequivocally 
characterized women’s struggles in terms of a social movement,67 even though 
some uttered the language of “movement” in qualifi ed terms,68 phrasing it as 
a “silent,” “decentralized,” or “leaderless movement.” 69 They charged those 
denying the “movement” character of the women’s activities with trying to 
subordinate gender issues to the larger reformist, demo cratic, or class politics. 
Even if an or ga nized movement might seem far- fetched, they suggested, 
women did express a shared feeling, “hamdeli,” about their inferior position 
in society and wished to do something about it.70
Clearly, the hegemony of a westo- centric model of “social movements” 
confi ned these conceptual imaginations to two opposing positions— either 
there was a women’s movement or there was not— as if alternative forms of 
struggles beyond the conventional contentious politics  were unthinkable. Af-
saneh Najmabadi’s argument that the very question (of whether there existed 
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such a thing as a women’s social movement) was irrelevant and even harmful, 
because it privileged one form of struggle over others, carried much weight. 
Yet the objection did not resolve the question of what it really was. How do we 
characterize such activisms; how to determine the logic of their operation? If 
Ira ni an women failed to develop a movement of their own, then how did the 
fragmented yet collective and nondeliberate practices lead to some tangible 
outcome?
Ira ni an women’s activism readily conjures up what James Scott has fa-
mously phrased “everyday forms of re sis tance,” by which he describes the 
struggles of the Javanese poor peasants to withstand the encroachment of the 
superordinate classes by such discreet, illicit, and individualistic actions as 
foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, slander, or sabotage.71 Looked 
at from this perspective, Ira ni an women could be said to subvert or resist, in 
their everyday practices, the state policies that tend to undermine women’s 
rights. There was certainly a strong element of “re sis tance” in both discourse 
and actions of women protagonists. Yet Ira ni an women’s struggles  were nei-
ther merely “defensive,” hidden, silent, nor illegal and merely individualistic. 
Rather, they  were also collective and progressively encroaching, in the sense 
that actors would capture trenches from the patriarchal legal structure, public 
institutions, and family to move forward, so that each gain would act as 
a stepping- stone for a further claim. Protagonists, in addition,  were involved 
in some degree of ideological elaboration and discursive campaign. Indeed, 
women’s involvement in hundreds of NGOs, solidarity networks, and dis-
courses by the late 1990s pointed to some degree of or ga nized activism. Women’s 
groups held rallies, participated in international women’s meetings, lobbied 
politicians and clerical leaders, and campaigned in the Majlis. Women’s 
Weeks, book fairs, fi lm festivals, and sporting events  were sites of their mobi-
lization. In 1995 in de pen dent activists, together with moderate offi  cials such 
as Shahla Habibi, coordinated a Women’s Week Festival during which they 
held sixty- two seminars, three thousand celebrations, 230 exhibits, and 161 
contests.72 Over two dozen women’s magazines (such as Zanan, Farzaneh, 
Hoquq- e Zan, Zan- e Rouz, Neda, Rayhaneh, Payam- e Hajar, Mahtab, Kitab- e 
Zan, and Jens- e Dovvom73) and an increasing number of websites (such as 
bad- jens and zanan- e iran) communicated ideas, advertised events, and estab-
lished solidarity networks. Between 1990 and 2002, thirty- six new women’s 
journals  were published. Feminist ideas permeated universities, with female 
student groups publishing newsletters on gender issues, and by the late 1990s 
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four Ira ni an universities had established women’s studies programs, though 
their operation left  much to be desired.74
Can this kind of activism then be characterized in terms of the “new social 
movements,” which are suggested to focus on reclaiming individuals’ identity 
from the colonization of the lifeworld by the state and the market in post-
industrial societies? It is true, Iran’s women’s activities do seem to resonate 
with a “new social movement” in the sense of fragmented activisms devoid of 
structured or ga ni za tion, coherent ideology, and clear- cut leadership, but which 
galvanizes collective sentiments and identities. Yet this perspective, or what 
Alberto Melucci phrases as “collective action without collective actors,” helps 
us little to account for the par tic u lar ways in which women’s identities  were 
forged, actions taken, and advances made. The new social movements, even 
with dispersed activities, multiclass actors, and unclear leadership, still rely 
on overt, deliberate, and collective mobilization— lobbying, street protests, po-
liti cal contention, and discursive campaigns— something that did not feature 
prominently among the Ira ni an women. The dynamics of claim making 
among them followed a diff erent logic and course.
Iran’s women’s activism signifi ed largely a “nonmovement,” embodying 
an aggregate of dispersed collective sentiments, claim making, and everyday 
practices involved in diverse gender issues, chiefl y, assertion of women’s indi-
vidualities. Collective identities  were formed less in women’s distinct insti-
tutions than in (albeit controlled) public spaces: workplaces, universities, bus 
stops, rationing lines, shopping markets, neighborhoods, informal gatherings, 
and mosques. Beyond some conscious network building, “passive networks” 
served as the most important medium for the construction of collective iden-
tities. Passive networks signifi ed instantaneous and unspoken communica-
tion between atomized individuals established through gaze in public space 
by tacit recognition of commonalities expressed in style, behavior, or con-
cerns.75 Thus, for instance, nonconformist women with similar “improper” 
outfi ts, who might not even know or meet one another, would spontaneously 
feel empathy and affi  nity; they would share a common threat from the morals 
police and solidarity with one another.
Occasions of intense po liti cal tension, threat, or opportunity would oft en 
turn women’s passive networks into communicative actions. For instance, the 
 house wives or mothers of war victims, since they lacked institutional settings 
to express discontent, would oft en take their grievances into the streets while 
standing in long rationing lines at bakeries or butcher shops, or at bus stops, 
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where they perfected the irrepressible practice of “public nagging.” They de-
liberately deployed the one gender- based comparative advantage, maternal 
impunity, or their power as mothers and homemakers, to protest and yet re-
main immune from backlash. While the protests of men and the young  were 
oft en suppressed, women’s maternal status off ered them protection. The wives 
of war victims compounded this “maternal impunity” with their po liti cal 
capital as the family of martyrs, to launch successful campaigns against the 
patriarchal interpretation of shari῾a that granted the custody of their now- 
fatherless children to their grandfathers.
Yet public protestation of this kind constituted only an insignifi cant as-
pect of women’s general activities. Most women, apart from activist groups, 
rarely articulated shared demands about women’s rights and gender equality; 
at best, they did so individually and usually aft er they had encountered legal 
or institutional obstacles. For the most part, they went ahead on their own to 
claim them directly in the domains that they could: in educational institutions, 
workplaces, sport centers, or courts. Theirs, then, was not, at least until early 
2000, a conventional social movement so oft en associated with solid or ga ni-
za tion, strategizing, nonroutine collective action with banners and marches. 
Rather, Iran’s women’s activism represented a movement by consequence, or 
a  “nonmovement”— that is, dispersed collective endeavors embodied in the 
mundane practices of everyday life, but ones that would lead to progressive 
eff ects beyond their immediate intent. This nonmovement operated through 
an incremental and structural pro cess of claim making— similar to “quiet en-
croachment,” but intimately attached to the imperative of women’s per sis tent 
public presence. In this structural encroachment every claim justifi ed the 
next, creating a cycle of opportunities for further claims, ultimately leading to 
more gender equality and individual entitlements. Thus, the eff ective power 
of women’s activism fi rst lay in its being based on ordinary, everyday, and so 
irrepressible, practices; and second, it benefi ted from an incremental encroach-
ment onto the power base of patriarchal structures.76
Against Islamist gender bias, the mere public presence of women was an 
achievement, but it also acted as a springboard for women to encroach on or 
negotiate with patriarchal power. Women got involved in the war eff ort and in 
voluntary work, and they sought paid jobs; they pursued education and sports, 
jogged and cycled, and participated in world championships; they worked as 
professionals, novelists, fi lmmakers, and bus or taxi drivers, and ran for high 
public offi  ce. And these very public roles beset the social and legal imperatives 
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that had to be addressed— restrictive laws and customs needed to be altered to 
accommodate the requisites of public women within the prevailing patriar-
chal system. College education, for example, oft en required young women to 
live in de pen dent from their families, something that would otherwise be 
deemed inappropriate. Women’s public activity raised the issue of their hijab 
(of its compatibility with the nature of a woman’s work), association with 
men, sexual tensions,77 and equality with men in society. Why should women 
not be elected president or supreme leader? If women could act as high offi  -
cials, would they still need to obtain their husbands’ permission to attend a 
foreign conference? Women’s public presence would in addition challenge 
male superiority in personal status laws, entitling women to demand equal 
rights in divorce, inheritance, blood money, and child custody. When more 
women than men enter and graduate from universities, women are likely 
(though not necessarily) to occupy positions supervising men who would have 
to accept if not internalize their authority. These pro cesses contributed to tilt-
ing gender- power relations in public and in  house holds.78
In their day- to- day struggles, the fragmented actors pushed for their 
claims, not as deliberate acts of defi ance, but as logical and natural venues to 
express individuality and to better their life chances. Women did not get in-
volved in car racing or mountain climbing because they wished to defy the 
patriarchal attitudes or religious state; they did so because they found fulfi ll-
ment in such activities even though in the context of the Islamic republic they 
appeared defi ant. The crucial point is that despite much constraint and pres-
sure, women did not give up but kept on pursuing those interests, which in turn 
led to serious normative and legal consequences. For they compelled patriarchal 
and po liti cal authority to acknowledge women’s role in society, and thus their 
rights. In sum, what underlined Iran’s women’s activism was not collective pro-
test, but collective presence. The women’s nonmovement drew its power not 
from the threat of disruption and uncertainty— as in the case of contentious 
politics; rather, it subsisted on the power of presence— the ability to assert col-
lective will in spite of all odds, by circumventing constraints, utilizing what 
exists, and discovering new spaces of freedom to make oneself heard, seen, 
felt, and realized. In this nonmovement, women did not usually take extraor-
dinary mea sures to compel authorities to make concessions; in a sense, the 
very ordinary practices that they strived for (e.g., studying, working, jogging, 
initiating divorce, or running for po liti cal offi  ce) accounted for the actual 
gains. Not only did the element of ordinariness make the movement virtually 
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irrepressible, it also allowed women to gain ground incrementally without 
seeming to constitute a threat.
Adversaries did oft en recognize the “danger,” even though they could do 
little to stop the momentum. Indeed, it was the “danger” of “incremental en-
croachment” that alarmed the conservative clergy, who had some thirty- fi ve 
years earlier expressed opposition to the Shah’s granting voting rights to 
women in local elections. “Voting rights for women, in addition to its own 
troubles, would lead to their participation in the parliamentary elections; then 
this would lead to equality of men and women in divorce, in being judges, and 
the like. . . .  No doubt these practices would stand against our religious 
principles.”79
The women’s nonmovement could not fully operate only at a practical 
level. It was bound to move into the realm of intellectual and ideological strug-
gles. Women’s incremental practices needed to be backed up by careful argu-
mentation and discursive campaign. Women activists had to address the legal 
and theological contradictions that their actual encroachment had exposed. 
To this end activists deployed sophisticated legal, theological, and theoretical 
articulations to take advantage of the opportunity that their public presence 
off ered them. Specialized publications and women lobbyists in the Majlis 
played a crucial role in such discursive campaigns, the ammunition for which 
they drew from alternative legal and theological interpretations.
How was it that women became visible despite surveillance? Women’s 
drive for a public presence was fueled by the memory of their prerevolution 
status, economic necessity, and the globalization of women’s struggles. But 
the more immediate factor was the discursive opportunity that women’s own 
struggles had already generated. Their massive participation in the revolution 
of 1979 had compelled many religious leaders, chiefl y Ayatollah Khomeini, to 
publicly acknowledge women’s social and po liti cal agency. Khomeini’s appeal 
to women voters during the fi rst referendum of the Islamic republic estab-
lished their public power. “Women do more for the [revolutionary] movement 
than men; their participation doubles that of men,” he admitted.80 He con-
tinued, “That Muslim women are to be locked up in their homes is an utterly 
false idea that some attribute to Islam. Even during early Islam, women  were 
active in the armies and war fronts.” 81 Later, Muslim feminists would invoke 
Khomeini’s statements to defy conservative clerics who wished to drive them 
back into the private realm. In the end, women’s pervasive publicness, their 
power of presence, was bound to challenge many of patriarchal structures of 
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the Islamic state and gender relations, establishing for them a new autono-
mous identity. This in turn framed women’s demands for equality and their 
insubordination to many “traditional” roles.82
Speaking of such nonmovements, the collective action of the noncollective 
actors, in this manner is not meant to downplay the signifi cance of or ga nized 
and sustained women’s social movements; nor is it at the same time to devalue 
the strategy of nonmovements in comparison to the conventional social move-
ments. My intention, rather, has been to highlight the mode of operation of 
a par tic u lar mobilization under social and po liti cal constraints. At any rate, 
nonmovements may well evolve into contentious collective challenge in op-
portune times; and the Ira ni an women activists have oft en tried to utilize such 
strategy by or ga niz ing social protests, rallies, and more impressively, the cam-
paign of one million signatures. In fact, by the middle of the fi rst de cade of 
this century, Iran’s women’s nonmovement seemed to develop into a nascent 
social movement, when activists pushed for more intense self- refl ection, 
greater networking and or ga ni za tion, and wider deliberate mobilization. This 
movement played a remarkable part in mobilizing scores of women in the presi-
dential elections of June 2009 and in the subsequent street protests that came to 
galvanize Iran’s Green Movement for civil and political rights. These tendencies, 
notably activists’ attempts to articulate, think about, discuss, and conceptualize 
their activism, distinguished it from nonmovements of the urban poor or glo-
balizing youth. Yet so long as such or ga nized, sustained, and easily identifi able 
social movements face state repression, nonmovements— these elusive, fl exible, 
dispersed, and yet encroaching collective endeavors— remain a critical option.
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there seems to be a great deal of both alarm and expectation about the po liti-
cal weight of Muslim youth in the Middle East. While many express anxiety 
over the seeming desire of the young in the Arab world to act as foot soldiers 
of radical Islam, others tend to expect youth (as in Iran or Saudi Arabia) to 
push for demo cratic transformation in the region.1 Thus, youths are projected 
to act as po liti cal agents, social transformers, whether for or against Islamism. 
Indeed, the recent history of the region is witness to the po liti cal mobilization 
of the young, as scores of Muslim youth have been involved in radical Islamist 
movements, from Saudi Arabia to Egypt to Morocco, or have defi ed the moral 
and po liti cal authority of the doctrinal regimes in the region, such as in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. What do these events and involvements tell us about 
youth politics in general and “youth movements” in par tic u lar? Do they point 
to the necessarily transformative role of the young? Are youth movements 
revolutionary or ultimately demo cratizing in orientation? How can the preva-
lent “social movement theory” help us understand the nature of youth politics 
broadly, and that of the Muslim Middle East specifi cally?
While studies on youth- related themes such as AIDS, exclusion, vio-
lence, or religious radicalism have fl ourished in recent years, “youth” as an 
analytical category appears in them for the most part incidentally. Thus, 
many studies on “youth religious radicalism,” for example, are primarily 
about religious radicalism per se, where the young people (like others) only 
Adapted from Asef Bayat, Making Islam Demo cratic: Social Movements and the Post- 
Islamist Turn (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 59– 65, 161– 64.
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happen to be involved. This is diff erent from an approach that takes “youth” 
as the point of departure, as the central category, to examine religious radi-
calism. On the other hand, youth as a social category has curiously been 
absent from the prevalent social movement debates. In general, scholarly at-
tempts to conceptualize the meanings and modalities of youth movements 
remain rare. At best, it is assumed that such conceptual tools as ideology, or-
ga ni za tion, mobilization, framing, and the like would be adequate to assess 
youth as a collective body. Consequently, youth activisms, those which do not 
fall into the frame of classical social movements, have fallen into the realm, 
and are viewed largely from the prism, of “social problems” or subcultures. 
Whereas historical studies and journalistic accounts do talk about such col-
lectives as youth movements (referring, for instance, to po liti cal protests of 
the 1960s or the subcultures of hippies or punks), they presume a priori that 
youth movements are those in which young people play the central role. Thus, 
student activism, antiwar mobilization, and counterculture trends of the 
1960s in Eu rope and the United States, or the youth chapters of certain po liti-
cal parties and movements such as Communist youth, are taken to manifest 
diff erent forms of youth movements.2 My approach diff ers from these.
I would like to suggest that a discussion of the experience of youth in the 
Muslim Middle East, where moral and po liti cal authority impose a high de-
gree of social control over the young, can off er valuable insight into conceptu-
alizing youth and youth movements. By comparing youth activisms in the 
Muslim Middle East, I suggest we can productively construct “youth” as a use-
ful analytical category, which can then open the way to understanding the 
meaning of a youth movement. I propose that rather than being defi ned in 
terms of the centrality of the young, youth movements are ultimately about 
claiming or reclaiming youthfulness. And “youthfulness” signifi es par tic u lar 
habitus or behavioral and cognitive dispositions that are associated with the 
fact of being “young”— that is, a distinct social location between childhood 
and adulthood, where the youngster in a relative autonomy is neither totally 
dependent (on adults) nor in de pen dent, and is free from being responsible for 
others. Understood as such, the po liti cal agency of youth movements, their 
transformative and demo cratizing potential, depends on the capacity of the 
adversaries, the moral and po liti cal authorities, to accommodate and contain 
youthful claims. Otherwise, youth may remain as conservative as any other 
social groups. Yet, given the prevalence of the doctrinal religious regimes in 
the Middle East whose legitimizing ideologies are unable to accommodate the 
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youth habitus, youth movements possess a great transformative and demo-
cratizing promise.
YOUNG PEOPLE, YOUTH, AND 
YOUTH MOVEMENTS
The idea of youths as a revolutionary class is not new. The widespread mobili-
zation of young people in Eu rope and the United States during the capitalist 
boom of the 1960s convinced many observers that youths (then active in uni-
versities, in antiwar movements, and in producing alternative lifestyles)  were 
the new revolutionary force of social transformation in western societies. For 
Herbert Marcuse in the United States, and Andre Gorz in France, youths and 
students had taken the place of the proletariat as the major agent of po liti cal 
change.3 In this vein, youth movements have oft en been equated and used in-
terchangeably either with student movements or with youth chapters or branches 
of this or that po liti cal party or movement.4 Thus, the youth section of the 
Fascist Party in Germany is described as the German youth movement. Or 
the youth or ga ni za tion of the Iraqi Ba᾽ th Party is assumed to be the youth 
movement in Iraq.5
I would suggest that a youth movement is neither the same as student activ-
ism nor an appendage of po liti cal movements; nor is it necessarily a revolution-
ary agent. First, movements are defi ned not simply by the identity of their actors 
(even though this factor aff ects very much the character of a movement), but 
primarily by the nature of their claims and grievances. Although in reality stu-
dents are usually young, and young people are oft en students, they represent 
two diff erent categories. “Student movements” embody the collective struggles 
of a student body to defend or extend “student rights”— decent education, fair 
exams, aff ordable fees, or accountable educational management.6 On the other 
hand, activism of young people in po liti cal organizations does not necessarily 
make them agents of a youth movement. Rather, it indicates youth support for, 
and their mobilization by, a par tic u lar po liti cal objective (e.g., democracy, 
Ba᾽ thism, or fascism). Of course, some youth concerns may be expressed in 
and merge into certain po liti cal movements, as in German Fascism, which 
represented aspects of a German youth movement, or in the current pietism of 
Muslims in France, which partially refl ects the individuality (e.g., through 
putting on headscarves) of Muslim girls. However, this possibility should not 
be confused with the situation where young people happen to support a given 
po liti cal or ga ni za tion or movement.
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But is the po liti cal ideal of the young necessarily revolutionary? By no 
means. Indeed, the po liti cal conservatism of many young people in the West 
aft er the 1960s, which compelled Marcuse to retreat from his earlier position, 
shattered the myth of youths as a revolutionary class. If anything, the po liti-
cal or transformative potential of youth movements is relative to the degree 
of social control their adversaries impose on them. For instance, a po liti cal 
regime, such as that in present- day Iran or Saudi Arabia, that makes it its 
business to scrutinize individual behavior and lifestyle is likely to face youth 
dissent. Otherwise, youth movements per se may pose little challenge to au-
thoritarian states unless they think and act po liti cally. Because a youth move-
ment is essentially about claiming youthfulness, it embodies the collective chal-
lenge whose central goal consists of defending and extending the youth habitus, 
by which I mean a series of dispositions, ways of being, feeling, and carry ing 
oneself (e.g., a greater tendency for experimentation, adventurism, idealism, 
autonomy, mobility, and change) that are associated with the so cio log i cal fact 
of “being young.” Countering or curtailing this habitus, youthfulness, is likely 
to generate collective dissent.
But, as the experience of today’s Saudi Arabia shows, the mere presence of 
the young people subject to moral and po liti cal discipline does not necessarily 
render them carriers of a youth movement, because young persons (as age 
category) are unable to forge a collective challenge to the moral and po liti cal 
authority without fi rst turning into youth as a social category, that is, turning 
into social actors. When I was growing up in a small village in central Iran 
during the 1960s, I of course had my friends and peers, with whom I talked, 
played, cooperated, and fought. However, at that point we  were not “youth,” 
strictly speaking; we  were simply young persons, just members of an age cohort. 
In the village, most young people actually had little opportunity to experience 
“youthfulness,” as they rapidly moved from childhood, a period of vulnera-
bility and dependence, to adulthood, the world of work, parenting, and re-
sponsibility. Many youngsters never went to school. There was little “relative 
autonomy,” especially for most young girls, who  were rapidly transferred from 
their father’s authority to that of the husband and  were eff ectively trained into 
their roles as  house wives long before puberty (that boys  were usually exempted 
from such responsibility indicates how gender intervenes in the formation of 
youth).
It is partially in this light that Bourdieu has famously contended that youth 
is “nothing but a word,” suggesting that talking about youth as a social unit 
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is itself a manipulation of the young.7 How can we imagine youth as a single 
category, he argues, when the youngsters of diff erent classes (rich and the 
poor) have little in common? Indeed, I must add, the diff erences in the life-
worlds of male and female youngsters have been even more remarkable. Yet 
Bourdieu’s contention pertains primarily to the pre- schooling situation, 
when young persons experience radically diff erent lifeworlds. But as he 
himself acknowledges, in modern times mass schooling has changed all 
this. It has produced youthfulness on a massive national, as well as global, 
scale.
Youth as a social category, as collective agents, are an essentially modern, 
indeed urban, phenomenon. It is in modern cities that “young persons” turn 
into “youth,” by experiencing and developing a par tic u lar consciousness about 
being young, about youthfulness. Schooling, prevalent in urban areas, serves 
as a key factor in producing and prolonging the period of youth, while it cul-
tivates status, expectations, and, possibly, critical awareness. Cities, as loci of 
diversity, creativity, and anonymity, present opportunities for young people 
to explore alternative role models and choices, and they off er venues to ex-
press individuality. Mass media, urban spaces, public parks, youth centers, 
shopping malls, cultural complexes, and local street corners provide arenas 
for the formation and expression of collective identities. The fragmented mass 
of young individuals might share common attributes in expressing common 
anxieties, in demanding individual liberty, and in constructing and assert-
ing subverting identities. Individuals may bond and construct identities 
through such deliberate associations and networks as schools, street corners, 
peer groups, and youth magazines. However, identities are formed mostly 
through “passive networks,” the nondeliberate and instantaneous communica-
tions among atomized individuals that are established by the tacit recognition 
of their commonalities and that are mediated directly through the gaze in pub-
lic space, or indirectly through the mass media.8 As present agents in the pub-
lic space, the young recognize shared identity by noticing (seeing) collective 
symbols inscribed, for instance, in styles (T-shirts, blue jeans, hairstyle), types 
of activities (attending par tic u lar concerts and music stores, and hanging 
around shopping malls), and places (stadiums, hiking trails, street corners). 
When young persons develop a par tic u lar consciousness about themselves as 
youth and begin to defend or extend their youth habitus, their youthfulness in a 
collective fashion, a youth movement can be said to have developed. Where po-
litical repression curtails organized activism, youth may form nonmovements.
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Unlike student movements, which require a good degree of or ga ni za tion 
and strategy building, youth “nonmovements” may augment change by their 
very public presence. With their central preoccupation with “cultural produc-
tion” or lifestyles, the young may fashion new social norms, religious prac-
tices, cultural codes, and values, without needing structured or ga ni za tion, 
leadership, or ideologies. This is because youth nonmovements are, I would 
suggest, characterized less by what the young do (networking, or ga niz ing, de-
ploying resources, mobilizing) than by how they are (in behaviors, outfi ts, 
ways of speaking and walking, in private and public spaces). The identity of a 
youth nonmovement is based not as much on collective doing as on collective 
being; and the forms of their expression are less collective protest than col-
lective presence. The power of Muslim youth in the Middle East lies precisely 
in the ability of their atomized agents to challenge the po liti cal and moral 
authorities by the per sis tence of their merely alternative presence. Even 
though youth (non)movements are by defi nition concerned with the claims of 
youthfulness, nevertheless they can and do act as a harbinger of social change 
and demo cratic transformation under those doctrinal regimes whose legiti-
mizing ideologies are too narrow to accommodate youthful claims of the Mus-
lim youth.
In Iran, where moral and po liti cal authority converged, draconian social 
control gave rise to a unique youth identity and collective defi ance. Young 
people both became central to and  were further mobilized by the post- Islamist 
reform movement. The assertion of youthful aspirations, the defense of their 
habitus, lay at the heart of their confl ict with moral and po liti cal authority. 
With the state being the target of their struggles, Ira ni an youths engendered 
one of the most remarkable youth nonmovements in the Muslim world. The 
struggle to reclaim youthfulness melded with the struggle to attain demo cratic 
ideals. In contrast, Egyptian youth, operating under the constraints of “passive 
revolution,” opted for the strategy of “accommodating innovation,” attempting 
to adjust their youthful claims within existing po liti cal, economic, and moral 
norms. In the pro cess, they redefi ned dominant norms and institutions, blended 
divine and diversion, and engendered more inclusive religious mores. Yet this 
subculture took shape within, and neither against nor outside, the existing re-
gime of moral and po liti cal power. Egyptian youth remained distant from 
both being a movement and involvement in po liti cal activism until the late 
2000s, when a new Web- based opportunity seemed to off er some venues for a 
collective mobilization.
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IRAN’S “THIRD GENERATION”
The spectacular activism of young people in the Islamic Revolution,9 the war 
with Iraq, and in the new revolutionary institutions earned them a new, ex-
alted position, altering their image from “young troublemakers” to “heroes 
and martyrs.” This was the image of the “spectacular male youth” drawn so cio-
log i cally from lower- and middle- class families. At the same time, the young 
 were seen as highly vulnerable to corrupting ideas and therefore needing pro-
tection and surveillance. To reproduce an ideal “Muslim man,” the Islamic 
regime launched in 1980 the “cultural revolution” program to Islamize educa-
tional culture and curricula. Universities  were shut down for two years, Is-
lamic associations  were set up in schools, and all public places came under the 
watchful gaze of morals police and proregime vigilantes.
What sustained this regime of surveillance for a de cade  were revolution-
ary fervor, preoccupation with war, and the repression of dissent. Young men 
 were either on the war front or fl eeing the country, preferring the humiliation 
of exile to “heroic martyrdom” in a “meaningless” battle. Although adoles-
cents sought refuge in schools, oft en by deliberately failing exams to postpone 
graduation, they lived in anxiety, gloom, and depression. One out of every 
three high school students suff ered from a behavioral disorder. Girls in par-
tic u lar  were more susceptible to stress, fear, and depression.10 The poetic re-
fl ections of a young girl talking to herself capture the depth of her inner 
gloom as she witnesses the gradual erosion of her youth:
My father never recognizes me on the street.
He says “all of you look like mourners.”
Yes, we dress in black, head to toe in black.
Sometimes, I get scared by the thought of my father not recognizing me in this 
dark colorlessness . . .  
I stare at the mirror,
And I see an old woman.
Am I still sleepy?
Oh . . .  I feel aged and unhappy.
Why should I be so diff erent from other 20- year- olds?
They liken my joy to sin,
They close my eyes to happiness,
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They stop me from taking my own steps . . .  
Oh . . .  I feel like an old woman. . . .  
No, no, I want to be young,
Want to love,
To dress in white, be joyful, have fun,
 And move to fulfi ll my dreams. . . .  
I look at myself in the mirror.
I look so worn out and aged . . . 11
Few offi  cials noticed this inner despair in youngsters’ lives. Blinded by 
their own constructed image and by their doctrinal animosity toward joy, Is-
lamist leaders failed to read the inner minds and hearts of this rapidly grow-
ing segment of the population. The shocking truth emerged only in the post-
war years when some offi  cials noticed “strange behavior” among the young. 
With the war over and postwar reconstruction under way, the young began to 
publicly express their selfh ood, both individually and collectively. The media 
carried stories about the “degenerate behavior” of Ira ni an youth. Boys  were 
discovered disguised as women walking on the streets in a southern city. 
Tomboy girls wore male attire to escape harassment of morals police. College 
students refused to take religious studies courses,12 and “authorities in an Ira-
ni an holy Muslim city launched a crackdown on pop music, arresting dozens 
of youths for playing loud music on their car stereos.” 13 Other reports spoke 
of groups of young males dancing in the streets next to self- fl agellation cere-
monies on the highly charged mourning day of ‘Ashura.’ Young drivers had 
fun by crashing their cars into each other, or by playing a form of the game of 
“chicken”: racing while handcuff ed to the steering wheel and trying to escape 
before fl ying off  a cliff .14 Drug addiction soared among schoolchildren. The 
average age of prostitutes declined from twenty- seven to twenty, expanding 
the industry by 635 percent in 1998.15
Yet alongside individual rebellion, the young took every opportunity to 
assert open and clandestine subcultures, defying the moral and po liti cal 
authority. The severe restriction of music did not deter them. When the re-
formist mayor of Tehran, Gholam Hussein Karbaschi, established numerous 
cultural centers in South Tehran, young people comprised 75 percent of those 
who rushed to fi ll classical- music classes and concert halls. Smuggled audio 
and video recordings of exiled Ira ni an singers fi lled big- city main streets, 
while MTV- type music videos found widespread popularity. The young blared 
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loud music from speedy cars, to the dismay of Islamists, while across the capi-
tal, underground pop and rock bands thrived at covert late- night parties. 
Teenagers enjoyed not only the music but its subculture and fashion— tight or 
baggy pants, vulgar En glish slang, tattoos— acquired through smuggled vid-
eos.16 Rap and heavy metal music in par tic u lar became pop u lar. By 1999, mu-
sic subcultures had become so widespread that the reformist Ministry of 
Culture was compelled to recognize and even or ga nize the fi rst concert of 
“pop music” in the Islamic republic. Some teens ran away from home to join 
rock bands, attracted by a sense of belonging, though many  were incarcerated 
by the morals police.
Indeed, runaway teenagers became a major social problem. In 2000, 
Tehran was reportedly faced with an “escalating crisis of runaway girls fre-
quently becoming victims of prostitution rings and human traffi  cking.” Be-
tween 1997 and 1998 the number of reported runaway teenagers tripled. In 
Tehran alone nine hundred girls ran away in 2000, and four thousand in 
2002,17 when the nationwide number was reportedly sixty thousand.18 Asser-
tion of individuality— freedom to have a male partner (42 percent) and free-
dom from family surveillance— seemed to be the main cause.19 “I want to leave 
Iran,” lamented a young female who had been arrested for leaving home. “I 
don’t like Iran at all. I feel I am in prison  here even when I am sitting in the 
park.”
Although dating openly had become a prime casualty of Islamic moral 
code, the young devised ways to resist. Well- to- do young boys and girls made 
contacts not only at private parties and underground music concerts, but also 
in public parks, shopping malls, and restaurants, oft en discreetly arranged by 
cell phone. In such “distanciated dating,” girls and boys stood apart but eyed 
each other from a distance, chatted, fl irted, and expressed love through elec-
tronic waves. To seek privacy and yet appear legitimate, young couples hired 
taxis to drive them around the city in anonymity, while they sat back for 
hours to romance or take delight in their companionship. The popularity of 
Valentine’s Day revealed an abundance of “forbidden love” and relationships 
in which sex, it seemed, was not excluded. In fact, scattered evidence indicated 
widespread premarital sex among Iran’s Muslim youths, despite the high risk 
of harsh penalties. An academic claimed that one out of three unmarried girls, 
and 60 percent in North Tehran, had had sexual relations. Out of 130 cases of 
AIDS cases reported in hospitals, 90  were unmarried women.20 An offi  cial of 
Tehran municipality reported “each month at least 10 or 12 aborted fetuses are 
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found in the garbage.”21 Although public information did not exist, research-
ers and medical professionals  were alarmed by the extent of unwanted preg-
nancies. Doctors unoffi  cially spoke of the fact that “not one week passes by 
without at least two or three young girls coming in for abortion.”22 Report-
edly, some 60 percent of patients requesting abortions  were unmarried young 
girls.23 The United Nations Population Fund offi  cials in Tehran referred to a 
survey on “morality” (meaning sexuality) among young people, but the re-
sults  were so “terrible” that they had to be destroyed.24 Attention to self, physi-
cal appearance, clothing, fashion, and plastic surgery became widespread 
trends among young females.
Clearly, sexuality among the young posed a major challenge to the Islamic 
state, testing the capacity of Islamism to integrate youths, whose sensibilities 
 were inherently subversive to it. In the early 1990s, President Rafsanjani came 
up with the idea of “temporary marriage” as an “Islamic” solution to the cri-
sis. It meant controlling sexual encounters through fi xed short- term (as short 
as a few hours) relationships called “marriage.” Ayatollah Ha᾽ eri Shirazi pro-
posed “legitimate courtship” (without sex), an openly recognized relationship 
approved by parents or relatives.25 Others called for some kind of offi  cial docu-
ment confi rming the legitimacy of such relationships, meaning something 
like temporary marriage in which the couple would not live together.26 And in 
2000, conservative Islamists put forward the idea of a Chastity  House, where 
men seeking sex  were to “temporarily marry” prostitutes to “legitimize” their 
encounters.
The desperate cultural politics of young people shattered Islamists’ image 
of them as self- sacrifi cing individuals devoted to martyrdom and moral codes. 
By challenging the regime’s moral and po liti cal authority, the young subverted 
the production of “Muslim youth.” Anxiety over the increasing bad- hijabi 
(laxity in veil wearing) among school and university girls haunted offi  cials. 
“We are encountering a serious cultural onslaught. What is to be done?” they 
lamented.27 Over 85 percent of young people in 1995 spent their leisure time 
watching tele vi sion, but only 6 percent of them watched religious programs; 
of the 58 percent who read books, less then 8 percent  were interested in reli-
gious literature.28 A staggering 80 percent of the nation’s youth  were indiff er-
ent or opposed to the clergy, religious obligations, and religious leadership,29 
while 86 percent of students refrained from saying their daily prayers.30 Offi  -
cial surveys confi rmed the deep mistrust separating the young from the state 
and what ever it stood for. The vast majority (80 percent) lacked confi dence in 
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politicians,31 and most (over 70 percent) saw the government as being respon-
sible for their problems.
Yet this distrust of the Islamist authorities did not mean that the young 
abandoned religion. Indeed, they expressed a “high religiosity” in terms of 
fundamental religious “beliefs” and “feelings,”32 with some 90 percent believ-
ing in God and the idea of religion, according to a study.33 But youth remained 
largely indiff erent to religious practices; religious belief and knowledge seemed 
to have little impact on their daily lives. God existed but did not prevent them 
from drinking alcohol or dating the opposite sex. To them, religion was a more 
philosophical and cultural reality than it was moral and doctrinal. While most 
refused to attend mosque ceremonies, they fl ocked to public and private lec-
tures given by the “religious intellectuals,” which spread during the mid- 1990s. 
Like their Egyptian counterparts, the globalized Ira ni an youth reinvented 
their religiosity, blending the transcendental with the secular, faith with free-
dom, divine with diversion.
In an ingenious subversive accommodation, many youngsters utilized the 
prevailing norms and institutions, especially religious rituals, to accommo-
date their youthful claims, but in doing so they creatively redefi ned and sub-
verted the constraints of those codes and norms. This strategy was best 
expressed in the way the North Tehrani youths treated the highly charged 
ritual of Muharram, which commemorates the death of Imam Hussein, the 
grandson of Prophet Muhammad. By inventing “Hussein parties,” the young 
turned this highly austere occasion of mourning into an eve ning of glamour, 
fun, and sociability. Boys and girls dressed in their best, strolled through the 
streets, joined parades of mourners, and used the occasion to stay out until 
dawn to socialize, fl irt, exchange phone numbers, and secretly arrange dates.34 
In a similar spirit, they reinvented the “sham- e ghariban” (the eleventh night 
of the month of Muharram), the most dreary and sorrowful Shi῾i ritual in Is-
lamic Iran, as a blissful night of sociability and diversion. Groups of fi ft y to 
sixty girls and boys carried candles through the streets to large squares, where 
they sat on the ground in circles, oft en leaning on one another in the romantic 
aura of dim candlelight, and listened to the melancholic nowhe (sad religious 
songs) while chatting, meditating, romancing, or talking politics in hushed 
tones until dawn.35
These rituals of re sis tance did not go unpunished by violent vigilante 
baseejies, or bands of “fundamentalist” youth who attacked the participants 
and disrupted their assemblies and in so doing turned their “subversive 
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 accommodation” into po liti cal defi ance. The cultural became overtly po liti cal. 
In January 1995, a hundred thousand young spectators of a Tehran soccer 
match went on a rampage following a disagreement on the result of the compe-
tition. Riots destroyed part of the stadium and led to a mass protest of youths 
chanting: “Death to this barbaric regime”; “Death to the Pasdaran.”36 In 2004, 
over fi ve thousand youths battled with violent vigilante groups in North Teh-
ran; and much earlier, the city of Tabriz had witnessed thousands of young 
spectators raging against basiji bands for objecting to the “improper behavior” 
of a few individuals in the crowd. Even more than collective grief and violence, 
collective joy became a medium of subversion. For the mass expression of 
“happiness” not only defi ed puritan principles of grief and gloom but circum-
vented its aura of repression. The success of Iran’s national soccer team in 
Australia in November 1997 and at the World Cup in Paris against the United 
States in June 1998 sent hordes of young boys and girls into the streets in every 
major city to cheer, dance, and sound their car horns. For fi ve hours security 
forces lost control, stood aside, and watched the crowd in its blissful ecstasy.37 
In the city of Karadj, the crowd overwhelmed the basijies by chanting, “Basiji 
must dance!” But even defeat was a pretext to show collective defi ance. Hours 
aft er Iran’s team lost to Bahrain in 2001, hundreds of thousands took to the 
streets, expressing deep- felt anger at the Islamist authorities. In fi ft y- four dif-
ferent areas of Tehran, young people marched, shouted po liti cal slogans, threw 
rocks and handmade explosives at police, vandalized police cars, broke traffi  c 
lights, and lit candles in a sign of mourning for the defeat. Other cities, Karadj, 
Qom, Shiraz, Kashan, Isfahan, and Islamabad, also witnessed similar protests. 
Only aft er eight hundred arrests did protestors go home.38 But perhaps noth-
ing was more symbolic about the young’s defi ance than setting off  fi reworks to 
celebrate Nowruz, the coming of the Ira ni an New Year. The Islamic state had 
outlawed this ancient Persian tradition. But by setting off  millions of fi recrack-
ers, youngsters turned urban neighborhoods into explosive battle zones, scorn-
ing the offi  cial ban on the ritual and the collective joy that went with it.39 The 
“mystery of fi recrackers,” as one daily put it, symbolized outrage against offi  -
cialdom that the young saw as having forbidden joy and jolliness.40
The younger generation’s defi ance deepened the confl ict between reform-
ists and conservatives in government. Reformists blamed the youth unrest on 
the conservatives’ overbearing moral pressure and the “suppression of joy.” 
Launching a public debate on the necessity of leisure, the reformists called for 
tolerance and understanding.41 In so doing, the reformists supplied the young 
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with a platform, po liti cal support, and moral courage. Backed by reformist 
friends at the top, the young further pushed for their claims, not only through 
defi ance, but also by engagement in civic activism. In 2001, some fi ft y youth 
NGOs  were registered in Tehran, and four hundred in the country.42 Within 
two years they reached 1,100, of which 850 participated in the fi rst national 
congress of youth NGOs in 2003.43 Still thousands more fl ourished informally 
throughout the country, working in cultural, artistic, charity, developmental, 
and intellectual domains. They or ga nized lectures and concerts, did charity 
work, and coordinated bazaars, at times with remarkable innovation. On one 
occasion, a group of youths presented President Khatami with a plan for al-
ternative young cabinet members to form a “government of youths.” But re-
claiming public space to assert their youthful sensibilities remained the major 
concern of those whose globalized subcultures (expressed in sexuality, gender 
roles, and lifestyle)  were distancing them even from post- Islamists’ commit-
ment to largely traditional moral conventions.44 Youth’s behavior infuriated 
conservative puritans, who clamored against what they considered a “cultural 
invasion,” “hooliganism,” and “anti- Islamic sentiments,” blaming them on 
Khatami’s “failure to ameliorate unemployment, poverty and corruption.” 45 
Thus, they launched new crackdowns on events, gatherings, places, and behav-
iors that  were seen to cause “immorality, “depravity,” and “indecency”; they 
dispatched special units with groups of uniformed men who carried machine 
guns and hand grenades to reassert the republic’s moral order.46
This simultaneous condition of both suppression (of youthfulness by the 
politico- moral authority) and opportunity (valorization and encouragement 
of the young) off ered these youth a spectacular sense of self and the possibility 
to act collectively, a status their Egyptian or Saudi counterparts largely lacked. 
But there was more to the emergence of a national Ira ni an youth movement 
than politics. Sweeping social change since the early 1980s had helped form 
“youth” as a social category. Demographically, by 1996 Iran had experienced 
a dramatic rise in its number of young people, with two- thirds under the age 
of thirty. Of these, a staggering twenty million, one- third of the population, 
 were students (an increase of 266 percent since 1976). Most lived in cities, ex-
posed to diverse lifestyles with spaces for relative autonomy, extrakinship 
identities, and social interactions on a broad scale. In the meantime, as urban-
ity was permeating the countryside, an “urbanized” generation of rural youth 
was in the making. The spread of Open University branches throughout the 
country, for instance, meant that on average every village had two university 
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graduates, a very rare phenomenon in the 1970s. Rural youth began to acquire 
legitimacy based on competence and merit and became major decision mak-
ers, which the dominance of se niority had previously made unthinkable. 
With sweeping social changes in the countryside and expanding communica-
tion technologies that facilitated the fl ow of young people, ideas, and life-
styles, social barriers separating rural and urban youth began to crumble, giv-
ing the country’s young a broader, national constituency. Meanwhile, the 
weakening of parental authority over the young (resulting from the state’s 
valorization of youth) and the reinforcement of child- centeredness in the fam-
ily (an outcome of rising literacy among women and mothers) contributed to 
the individuation of the young and their militancy.47
By the mid- 1990s, Iran’s postrevolutionary young had become “youth,” a 
social agent. But theirs was not a conventional social movement, an or ga nized 
and sustained collective challenge with articulated ideology or a recognizable 
leadership. Rather, theirs was a nonmovement, the “collective conscience” of the 
noncollective actors, whose principal expression lay in the politics of presence, 
tied closely to the young’s everyday cultural struggles and normative subver-
sion. This fragmented mass of individuals and subgroups shared common at-
tributes in expressing common anxieties, in demanding individual liberty, and 
in constructing and asserting their collective identities. The individual young-
sters  were tied together not only within dispersed subgroups (youth magazines, 
NGOs, peer groups, and street- corner associations), but more commonly through 
“passive networks”: those nondeliberate communications formed by the young-
sters tacitly recognizing their commonalities through sight and sound in public 
spaces, by identifying shared symbols displayed in styles (T-shirts, blue jeans, 
hair), types of activities (attending par tic u lar concerts and music stores), and 
places (sport stadiums, shopping malls, hiking tracks), and by the sound of their 
music or fi recrackers. Thus, the birth of youth as a social category of national 
scale, operating in uniquely simultaneous conditions of both repression and op-
portunity, drove the Ira ni an youths to reclaim their youthfulness in a battle in 
which the state became the target. Reclaiming youth habitus from state control 
and moral authority defi ned Iran’s youth nonmovement.
POLITICS OF EGYPTIAN YOUTHS: 
“ACCOMMODATING INNOVATION”
“Youth” as a social category also developed in Egypt. Quite similar to Iran, in 
1996 about half of Egypt’s sixty million people  were under twenty, and 64 per-
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cent under thirty.48 Although the total student population in 1996 (11.6 million) 
was only just over half of Iran’s, Egypt had the same number of college stu-
dents (1.1 million).49 Similarly, the peculiarity of the Egyptian countryside 
(with comparatively large villages concentrated along the Nile Valley and Delta 
and in close proximity to each other and large cities) contributed to their grow-
ing urbanity during the 1980s and 1990s. The abundance of electricity; new 
means of communication; commercialization; the fl ow of people, goods, and 
information; and increasing occupational specialization marked the shift ing 
social structure of post- open- door rural settings.50 The spread of mass school-
ing provided the raw materials to produce educated youth. And urban institu-
tions such as college campuses, coff ee shops, shopping malls, concert venues, 
festivals of saints, and street corners provided spaces for social interaction, ac-
tive and passive networks, and the construction of youth identities. In brief, the 
young as social actors had emerged in both Iran and Egypt in a more or less 
similar pattern.
But the simultaneous pro cesses of urbanization, Islamization, and global-
ization had fragmented the young generation in Egypt. Alongside actively 
pious and provincial adolescents had emerged new generations of globalized 
youths who had been increasingly exposed to the global cultural fl ows. Clearly, 
diff erent class and gender experiences had given rise to multiple youth identi-
ties. Whereas harsher social control in the Islamic republic had pushed male 
and female youth to develop similar aspirations, gender distinction in Egypt 
remained more enunciated. For example, the diff erence in social aspirations 
between adolescent boys and girls in Egypt was so pronounced that observers 
spoke of “more separate male and female cultures than a single youth culture.” 
Especially crucial  were male perceptions of women, which seriously threat-
ened their identity as youths’ shared habitus. Rarely would men (in Egypt 
only 4 percent) marry a woman who had premarital sex.51 “No one goes out 
with a girl and marries her. Ninety- nine percent of men would not marry a 
girl they ever touched,” stated a university student in Egypt. And the girls felt 
this bitter truth. “This is what we hate about the boys; they rarely marry the 
girl they go out with.”52
But in both Iran and Egypt, the mainstream young attempted to assert their 
habitus, to exert their individuality, aspired for change, and created youth 
subculture. They did so by recognizing the existing moral and po liti cal con-
straints and trying to make the best out of the existing institutions. However, 
compared to their Ira ni an counterparts, Egyptian youth remained demobilized 
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in the po liti cal and civic domains. While they showed interest in participating 
po liti cally, they lacked the means to do so. Unlike in Iran, where ageism was 
breaking down and youth was remarkably valorized, the elders and po liti cal 
elites in Egypt did not trust the young in the po liti cal arena. Egyptian politics, 
both governmental and oppositional, continued to remain in the grip of very 
old men, with an average age of seventy- seven in 2002.53 Meanwhile, the 
young distrusted party politics, which happened to be the only legitimate 
channel for activism.54 A survey by the Ahram Center for Po liti cal and Strate-
gic Studies revealed that 67 percent of young people  were not registered to 
vote.55
Lack of trust in electoral games pushed the young further away from poli-
tics, and restrictions on campus activism put a damper on youth po liti cal mo-
bilization. The mobilization of middle- and lower- middle- class youth in the 
Islamist movement during the 1980s did not repeat itself in other po liti cal fi elds. 
In the late 1990s po liti cal activity on campuses was paltry, as state security in-
tervened to prevent Islamist, left ist, and Nasserist candidates from running 
for student  unions. Only Israel’s reoccupation of the Palestinian Territories in 
early 2000 galvanized social and po liti cal mobilization.56 The remarkable in-
volvement of Egyptian youths in collecting food and medicine for Palestin-
ians was indeed a watershed in youth voluntarism, but it was the result of the 
unique po liti cal and moral aura of the siege of Palestinians by Likud’s repres-
sive incursions. Otherwise, the young showed slight interest in public ser vice 
or voluntarism. Even the youths of elite families, whose social and fi nancial 
resources oft en make them the prime source of donations, remained indiff er-
ent. Of twenty hand- picked students of Egyptian universities, only one had 
engaged in any volunteer activities.57 Genuine youth initiatives such as Fathi 
Kheir NGO  were exceptions. The prevailing notion was that the state, not 
citizens, was to take charge of social provisions.
Clearly, the young  were bearing the brunt of Egypt’s “passive revolution,” 
in which the “seculareligious” state had appropriated the initiative for change 
through a remarkable blend of concession and control. Egyptian youth  were 
not under the same moral and po liti cal control as their counterparts in Iran 
or Saudi Arabia. Depending on their social and economic capacities, they 
 were able to listen to their music, follow their fashions, pursue dating games, 
have aff ordable fun, and be part of global trends so long as they recognized 
their limits, beyond which their activities would collide with the moral au-
thority and the state. Youths  were to be integrated and guided by the state.
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To do so, the state would provide the young with “scientifi c advance-
ment” or technical education to catch up and compete in the world, and at 
the same time guide them into religious piety in order to withstand both for-
eign cultural infl uences and home- grown po liti cal Islam.58 Indeed, the 1999 
presidential decree to rename the Supreme Council of Youths (established in 
1965) the Ministry of Youths and Sports displayed offi  cial anxiety over the 
“youth problem.”59 Their protection from po liti cal and moral ills had be-
come a matter of “national security.” The Ministry of Youth with its control 
of four thousand Youth Centers was to help materialize these objectives. 
Government loans  were to enable the young to settle down and marry by 
purchasing fl ats,60 to provide access to ICT, and to acquire technical training 
through NGOs.61 Meanwhile, the Youth Centers, some kind of state- controlled 
NGOs, would or ga nize summer camps, debates, entertainment, training pro-
grams, religious education caravans, and sporting events. But the deplorable 
state of most of these centers, their poor amenities, garbage- infested athletic 
fi elds, poor libraries, and the state’s control rendered them inadequate to 
carry out this enormous task. Oft en, only lower- class youngsters, almost all of 
them male, attended the centers. Many remained “youth centers without 
youths,” as an offi  cial weekly put.62 If the televised annual “dialogue” of the 
president with “Egyptian youths” was any indication, a deep distrust sepa-
rated youths from the state.63 The young took solace in nonstate spaces that 
infringed only marginally on po liti cal and moral authorities. They resorted 
to the cultural politics of everyday life, where they could reassert their youth-
ful claims.
For over a de cade, young Egyptians  were seen in the image of Islamist 
militants waging guerrilla war, penetrating college campuses, or memorizing 
the Qur᾽ an in the backstreet mosques of sprawling slums. Moral authorities, 
parents, and foreign observers expected them to be characteristically pious, 
strict, and dedicated to the moral discipline of Islam. Yet in their daily lives, the 
mainstream young defi ed their constructed image, oft en shocking moral au-
thorities by expressing defi ance openly and directly. “The youth of this coun-
try are rebelling against the old traditions,” stated a twenty- year- old female 
student in Cairo. “We are breaking away from your chains; we are not willing 
to live the lives of the older generations. Women smoking shisha is the least 
shocking form of rebellion going on. Face the changes and embrace our gen-
eration; do not treat us as if we are children. Our generation is more exposed 
than yours, and this is a simple fact.” 64
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Reports of “satanic youth” in January 1997 demonstrated not only pre-
vailing moral panic over the alleged vulnerability of youths to global culture, 
but those youths’ emerging self- assertion. Every Thursday night hundreds of 
well- to- do youngsters gathered in an abandoned building to socialize, have 
fun, and, above all, dance to heavy metal music. Six weeks of sensational me-
dia coverage and the arrest of dozens accused of “satanism” (later released for 
lack of evidence) proved the existence of underground subcultures that few 
adults had noticed. The music subculture, however, did not die out aft er the 
satanist myth. It reappeared in the form of raving. Egyptian raves began with 
small bands and small crowds, but aft er 1998 professional or ga ni za tion and 
commercialization helped them grow rapidly. They encompassed music genres 
from around the world, including Egyptian pop, and catered to young elites of 
“glamour, high fashion and lifestyle.” 65 For many, the rave became “a com-
munity which you have grown to know, at least recognize, centered around a 
common interest in the music.” 66 The Egyptian rave was largely sex- free, but 
it did involve alcohol and (unoffi  cially) drugs (in the form of Ecstasy). Indeed, 
studies indicated that experimentation with alcohol went beyond the well- 
to- do young. One out of every three students in the cities had drunk alcohol, 
mainly beer.67 Although only somewhat more than 5 percent admitted experi-
menting with drugs (85 percent of whom  were cannabis users), the problem 
became more severe in the early 1990s. Law enforcement professionals warned 
that the use of Ecstasy in par tic u lar was on the rise.68
While in general a “culture of silence” prevailed regarding sexuality,69 
premarital sex seemed to be widespread among Muslim youth, despite nor-
mative and religious prohibition. In an approximate but indicative survey of 
one hundred high school and college girls in various Cairo districts, 8 percent 
said they had had sexual intercourse, 37 percent had experienced sex without 
intercourse, 23 percent had kissed, and 20 percent had only held hands. In a 
survey of 100 school and college male students in Cairo, 73 percent said they 
would not mind having premarital sex as long as they would not marry their 
partners.70 A more comprehensive study found “substantial rates of premari-
tal sex among university students.”71 In AIDS education classes, students posed 
questions about specifi c sexual practices that surprised health educators.72 
Although comprehensive surveys did not exist, the use of pornography by 
males appeared to be quite widespread.73 Ninety out of one hundred respon-
dents said they masturbated regularly, and 70 percent of those ninety thought 
they  were doing something religiously and physically wrong.74 Beyond infl u-
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ences from satellite dishes, illicit videos, and later the Internet, the changing 
structure of  house holds seemed to facilitate youth sexual practices. The father 
fi gure, once so important, was changing even in villages. One out of three fami-
lies was fatherless, resulting from divorce, abandonment, and mostly (20 to 25 
percent) fathers working abroad; children might use the home for romance 
when their mothers went out.75 Otherwise, lower- class Cairo couples found 
romantic solace on the benches of inconspicuous metro stations, where they 
sat and talked or romanced while pretending to wait for trains.76
Most of these young people  were religious. They oft en prayed, fasted, and 
expressed fear of God. A few heavy metal “satanists” whom I interviewed con-
sidered themselves devout Muslims but also enjoyed rock music, drinking al-
cohol, and romance. The mainstream young combined prayer, partying, and 
pornography, faith and fun. Notice how, for instance, a lower- class young 
man working in Dahab, a tourist resort where many foreign women visit, 
blended God, women, and police in pursuit of his mundane and spiritual 
needs: “I used to pray before I came to Dahab. My relationship to God was 
very strong and very spiritual. Now, my relationship to God is very strange. 
I always ask him to provide me with a woman, and when I have a partner, I ask 
him to protect me from the police.”77
This might sound like a contradiction, but it expresses more a consolation 
and an accommodation. The young enjoyed dancing, raving, having illicit 
relationships, and fun but found solace and comfort in their prayers and faith. 
“I do both good and bad things, not just bad things. The good things erase the 
bad things,” said a law student in Cairo.78 A twenty- fi ve- year- old religious 
man who drank alcohol and “tried everything” also smoked “pot in a group 
sometimes to prove [their] manhood.” He prayed regularly, hoping that God 
forgave his ongoing misdeeds. Such a state of liminality, this “creative inbe-
tweeness,” illustrates how the young attempted to redefi ne and reimagine 
their Islam in order to accommodate their youthful desires for individuality, 
change, fun, and “sin” within the existing moral order. Not only did they rede-
fi ne their religion, they also reinvented notions of youthfulness. “During ado-
lescence,” a nineteen- year- old student said, “all young men do the same; there is 
no halal or haram [right or wrong] at that age.”79 Similarly, many young girls 
saw themselves as committed Muslims but still uncovered their hair or wore 
the veil only during Ramadan or only during fasting hours. Many of those 
who enjoyed showing their hair found consolation in deciding to cover it aft er 
marriage, when their youthful stage was over.
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To assert their habitus under the prevailing moral and po liti cal con-
straints, Egyptian youths resorted to accommodating innovation, a strategy 
that redefi ned and reinvented prevailing norms and traditional means to ac-
commodate their youthful claims. Yet the young did not depart radically 
from the dominant system but made it work for their interests.80 The rela-
tively widespread practice of urfi  (informal) marriage since the late 1990s 
exemplifi ed this strategy. Urfi  marriage is a religiously accepted but unoffi  -
cial oral contract that requires two witnesses and is carried out in secret. The 
minister of social aff airs spoke of 17 percent of university female students 
going through urfi  marriage, causing a public uproar over this “danger” to 
“national security.” 81 Offi  cials cited declining social authority, absence of 
fathers, and the employment of mothers as the cause of this “frightening 
phenomenon.” 82 Experts pointed to the lack of housing and especially the 
absence of a “religious supervision” over youth.83 But in essence, the young 
utilized this traditional institution to pursue romance within, but not out-
side or against, the moral and economic order, to get around the moral con-
straints on dating and the economic constraints on formal marriage.84 With 
the same logic, lower- class youth resorted to, but also modifi ed the meaning 
of, such religious occasions as Ramadan (the time of fasting), Eid al- Adha 
(the festival of sacrifi ce), and the birthdays of saints as occasions of intense 
sociability and diversion.
Indeed the phenomenon of Amr Khaled, Egypt’s most pop u lar young lay 
preacher, who since the late 1990s spoke about piety and the moralities of 
everyday life, should be seen in a similar sense of a reinvention of a new reli-
gious style by Egypt’s globalizing youth.85 In a sense, Egyptian cosmopolitan 
youths fostered a new religious subculture— one that was expressed in a dis-
tinctly novel style, taste, language, and message. It resonated in the aversion 
of these young from patronizing pedagogy and moral authority. These glo-
balizing youth displayed many seemingly contradictory orientations; they 
 were religious believers but distrusted po liti cal Islam if they knew anything 
about it; they swung back and forth from (the pop star) Amr Diab to Amr 
Khaled, from partying to prayers, and yet they felt the burden of a strong 
social control by their elders, teachers, and neighbors. As young Egyptians 
 were socialized in a cultural condition and educational tradition that oft en 
restrained individuality and novelty, they  were compelled to assert them in a 
“social way,” through “fashion.” Thus, through the prism of youth, this reli-
gious subculture galvanized around the “phenomenon of Amr Khaled” was 
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   134 9/1/09   1:59 PM
—-1
—0
—+1
RECLAIMING YOUTHFULNESS 135
partly an expression of “fashion” in a Simmelian sense— in the sense of an 
outlet that accommodates contradictory human tendencies: change and ad-
aptation, diff erence and similarity, individuality and social norms. Resorting 
to this type of piety permitted the elite young to assert their individuality, 
undertake change, and yet remain committed to collective norms and social 
equalization.86
Although innovative, these strategies conformed to the prevailing regime 
of power, meaning that Egyptian youth stood largely demobilized within so-
cial and po liti cal constraints. Egypt’s “passive revolution” had ensured this 
demobilization by off ering room to exercise a limited degree of innovation, 
but only within the po liti cal discipline of the “seculareligious” state. It was 
only toward the end of the fi rst de cade of the twenty- fi rst century that Egyp-
tian youth managed to collectively break through the rigid case of the state to 
mobilize— not in the streets, but on the screens of computers. With the new 
technological opportunities, e-mail, weblogs, and especially Facebook, some 
seventy thousand educated youths linked up to produce what came to be known 
as the April 6 Youth Movement. Utilizing such a venue to campaign against 
po liti cal repression, economic stagnation, and nepotism, the young activists 
augmented a new way of doing politics, a step further than what Kifaya move-
ment had begun earlier on.87 For now, we may not be able to judge the po liti-
cal effi  cacy of such postmodern nonmovements, but they attest to the fact that 
the subaltern utilize any opportunities to outmaneuver state surveillance and 
push for change. Yet the point is not to wait for opportunities, but to con-
stantly generate them.
What, then, of youths as a po liti cal force in the Muslim Middle East? Do 
youth non/movements possess the capacity to cause po liti cal and demo cratic 
transformation? If indeed the youth movements, as I have suggested, are ulti-
mately about claiming and reclaiming youthfulness, then their transforma-
tive and demo cratizing potential would depend on the capacity of the moral 
and po liti cal authorities to accommodate youthful claims. If their youthful 
claims are accommodated, youth movements would by defi nition cease to 
exist, and young people may remain as conservative po liti cally as any other 
social groups. To act as democratizing agents, the young will need to think 
and act po liti cally, as the Egyptian April 6 Youth Movement in 2008 illustrates. 
Yet, because the current doctrinal religious regimes in the Middle East possess 
limited capacity to contain the increasingly global youth habitus, youth move-
ments retain a considerable transformative and demo cratizing promise. Thus, 
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Muslim youth, perhaps similar to their non- Muslim counterparts, remain in 
constant struggle to assert, claim, and reclaim their youthfulness, by taking 
advantage of available venues, including resorting to religion or subverting it. 
Negotiating between their youthfulness and Muslimness, mediated through 
political and economic conditions, marks a central feature of Muslim youth 
habitus.
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in december 2002, on a plane from Aleppo, Syria, I happened to be sitting next 
to a twenty- year- old Syrian cleric on his way to Cairo to spend some time in 
Al- Azhar, the seat of Egypt’s offi  cial Islam. He asked if he could borrow my Syr-
ian newspaper, which he quickly skimmed through until he reached the sports 
pages. Only aft er the young cleric had thoroughly observed the entire section 
did I start a conversation with him. He said he loved soccer and prayed that his 
favorite teams, Bayern Munich and Barcelona, would win their national tour-
naments. Music was his other interest, not only that of Um Kulthoum and 
Fairouz, but also that of the Egyptian pop star Amr Diab. Young mullahs also 
need to have fun, it occurred to me. Observing this man of religion taking 
such plea sure in temporal diversions, I could not help wondering why puritan 
Islamists express such hostility toward fun and joy.
One of the ironies of “fundamentalist” Islamism is that it has tenaciously 
withstood waves of po liti cal challenges but has felt powerless before simple dis-
plays of spontaneity and joy and the pursuit of everyday pleasures. It seems as 
though every occasion of mundane festivity, private parties, and gatherings at 
bustling street corners, tea houses, shopping malls, and secular celebrations 
becomes a matter of profound doctrinal anxiety and delegitimation. It is as 
if these ordinary pursuits would enfeeble the Islamist moral paradigm, just 
as the erotic taste of chocolate perturbed the tranquillité of the French vil-
lage in Joanne Harris’s novel Chocolat. So, why are Islamists so distinctly 
Adapted from Asef Bayat, “Islamism and the Politics of Fun,” Public Culture, 19, no. 3 
(October 2007), pp. 433– 59.
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apprehensive of the expression of “fun”— a preoccupation most people in the 
world seem to take for granted?
By fun, I mean an array of ad hoc, nonroutine, and joyful pursuits— 
ranging from playing games, joking, dancing, and social drinking, to involve-
ment in playful art, music, sex, and sport, to par tic u lar ways of speaking, 
laughing, appearing, or carry ing oneself— where individuals break free tem-
porarily from the disciplined constraints of daily life, normative obligations, 
and or ga nized power. Fun is a meta phor for the expression of individuality, 
spontaneity, and lightness, in which joy is the central element. While joy is 
neither an equivalent nor a defi nition of fun, it remains a key component of it. 
Not everything joyful is fun, such as routine ways of having meals, even though 
one can make food fun by injecting joyful creativity in preparing or consum-
ing it. Thus, fun oft en points to usually improvised, spontaneous, free- form, 
changeable, and thus unpredictable expressions and practices. There is a strong 
tendency in modern times to structure and institutionalize fun in the form of, 
for instance, participating in or ga nized leisure activities: going to bars, discos, 
concerts, and the like. However, the inevitable drive for spontaneity and in-
vention renders or ga nized fun a tenuous entity.
Fun may be expressed by individuals or collectives, in private or public, 
and take traditional or commoditized forms. Fashion, for instance, represents 
a collective, commoditized, and systematic expression of fun, yet one that is 
constantly in fl ux because it responds to the carefree and shift ing spirit of fun. 
Fun appeals to almost all social groups (the rich and poor, old and young, 
modern and traditional, men and women), yet youths are the prime practi-
tioners of fun, embodying a greater tendency toward experimentation, adven-
turism, idealism, and a drive for autonomy, mobility, and change— and thus 
the main target of anti- fun politics. Perhaps that is why fun is oft en confl ated 
with and identifi ed by “youth culture.” However, fun in fact constitutes only 
one, albeit signifi cant, component of youth culture, in the same way that 
lower- class festivities, such as the activities celebrating the birthdays of saints 
(mulids) in Egypt, are but one aspect of folk culture, and the creations of avant- 
garde artists one element of a counterculture. But the diff erential habitus of 
these social groups tends to orient them to diff erent fun practices and therefore 
to subject them to diff erent degrees of prohibitions and regulations that can be 
subsumed under the rhetoric of “anti- fun.” For instance, whereas the el der ly 
poor can aff ord simple, traditional, and contained diversions, the globalized 
and affl  uent youth tend to embrace more spontaneous, erotically charged, and 
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commodifi ed pleasures. This might help explain why globalizing youngsters 
more than others cause fear and fury among Islamist anti- fun adversaries, 
especially when much of what these youths practice is informed by western 
technologies of fun and is framed in terms of “western cultural import.”
The fear of fun is not restricted to Islamists and Islam but extends to most 
religions. It is not even a merely religious concern; secularists, whether revo-
lutionary or conservative, have also expressed apprehension of and animosity 
toward fun. Rather than simply a doctrinal question, “anti- fun- damentalism” 
is a historical matter, one that has to do signifi cantly with the preservation of 
power. In other words, at stake is not necessarily the disruption of the moral 
order, as is oft en claimed, but rather the undermining of the hegemony, the 
regime of power on which certain strands of moral and po liti cal authority 
rest. By “moral- political authority,” I refer not only to state or governmental 
power, but also to the authority of individuals (for instance, shaykhs or cult 
leaders) and sociopo liti cal movements— those whose legitimacy lies in de-
ploying a par tic u lar doctrinal paradigm. The adversaries’ fear of fun revolves 
ultimately around the fear of exit from the paradigm that frames their mas-
tery; it is about anxiety over loss of their “paradigm power.”
ISLAMISM AND THE STRUGGLE OVER FUN
The history of Islamism has been one of a battle against fun, playfulness, and 
diversion, with the hostility coming from both the Islamist movements and 
the Islamic states. In the late 1980s, Islamist students who dominated univer-
sity campuses in the south and north of Egypt disrupted concerts and plays, 
and harassed male and female students who  were associating freely with one 
another or who  were simply pursuing pleasures of everyday life. The Islamist 
student  unions banned fi lms, dancing, and pop u lar and classical music, be-
cause they  were deemed “alien to Islamic culture.”1 Later, the radical Islamist 
group al- Gama᾽ a al- Islamiyya imposed strict codes of conduct, both on the 
young and on women in a Cairo neighborhood under its control; it forbade 
beauty salons and video shops and put an end to joyous music at weddings. 
Even the moderate Muslim Brothers held “exemplary Islamic weddings” that 
eliminated joyful music or allowed only the per for mance of inshad, featuring 
chanting and percussion. Many Islamists in Egypt wished to undo the country’s 
happy culture of Islam, in par tic u lar its highly festive Ramadan observance, 
denouncing the festivals of saints’ birthdays for their cheerful semblance.2 
Morality among the young became a matter of serious concern not only for 
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Islamists, but also for the conservative media. The state- owned weekly Al- 
Ahram al- Arabi lamented that coff ee shops and youth hangouts had become 
“dens of drugs, booze, sexual movies and urfi  [unoffi  cial] marriage” and  were 
frequented by “girls who smoke hookahs and wear clothes that are uncalled- 
for.” The paper called for surveillance to protect “our youth.”3 The mea sures 
advanced by opposition Islamists and conservative media  were quite soft  when 
compared with the puritan policies of self- declared Islamist states such as 
Saudi Arabia, Af ghan i stan, and Iran.
Saudi Arabia’s state control of leisure and diversion in the name of moral-
ity and piety has a longer history. The kingdom has banned dating, cinemas, 
concert halls, discos, clubs, and theaters. Even the innocent joy of fl ying kites 
is not tolerated. Yet nowhere was the dark side of puritanism probably more 
evident than in Taliban Af ghan i stan. During its draconian rule (1996– 2001), 
the Taliban erased all signs of diversion, fun, secular aesthetics, the pursuit of 
individuality, and creativity. Music, tele vi sion, painting, and sculpture, not to 
mention dancing, acting, public jubilance, the expression of beauty, and atten-
tion to the self,  were harshly suppressed. Women  were forced to wear the 
burkha, and men to grow long beards. Thus, when in November 2001 the Af-
ghan capital, Kabul, fell to Northern Alliance forces, many Afghans began their 
human expression of joy in public. They played music in shops and turned on 
tele vi sion sets, while some women shed their burkhas and men shaved their 
beards.
But it was in Iran where the expression of fun turned into a site of the most 
dramatic social polarization, pitting masses of dissenting women and the 
young against the Islamic state. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, conservative 
Islamists battled against those who desired to demonstrate public joy. Fun, 
playfulness, lightness, and laughter  were seen as instances of immorality, lax-
ity, and waste, while entertainment in general was cast as a “counter- value” 
(zedd- e arzesh). “The most dangerous thing that threatens humanity,” declared 
Mohammad Taqui Mesbah Yazdi, an Ira ni an conservative cleric, “is for men 
to forget devotion to God, to establish cultural centers instead of mosques and 
churches, and to be driven by fi lm and art rather than prayer and supplica-
tion.”4 Unsolicited mixing of the sexes was perceived as one of the greatest 
diversions and was therefore “extremely dangerous.” It “represents the hell- 
hole of individuals,” an immoral practice that threatened the spiritual and 
physical health of society.5 Gender segregation, therefore, was to act as yet 
another instrument of social control and discipline. A reader of the Islamist 
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weekly Haft eh- name- ye Sobh echoed the profound anguish of the conserva-
tive establishment over the “dishonorable ways in which teenage girls walk in 
the streets. How will they respond to the blood of our martyrs? I am ashamed 
seeing girls wearing short jackets, of musical bands in Tehran who go as far as 
dancing . . .  !” 6
Although the purists had confi rmed that there was no fun in Islam, this 
did not mean that Islamists rejected any concept of plea sure. In contrast to 
the general hostility of ethical religions toward sexuality, whose temptations 
 were thought to divert man from his mystical quest and whose “essential ir-
rationality” threatened self- control and discipline,7 Ira ni an Islamists recog-
nized (men’s) carnal desires. To fulfi ll them, they proposed the “marriage of 
plea sure” (mot a᾽), which in the Shi῾i Islam tradition is contracted for a speci-
fi ed period of time, ranging from a few hours to years.8 They went as far as 
planning to establish “institutions” where men and women could meet, in-
voking a saying of Imam Sadeq, who had “wished to see every man among 
you practice a mot῾ a at least once in his life.”9 This plan, however, was a con-
trolled, and indeed a rationalized, pursuit of worldly plea sure and was di-
rected essentially toward male passion. Indeed, a 2002 initiative in the Islamic 
republic to channel some three hundred thousand prostitutes into “chastity 
 houses,” where men in pursuit of sex could temporarily “marry” prostitutes, 
follows similar logic of both control and legitimation of morality. Islamists 
 were concerned, not about sex, but about the control of sexuality.
Yet for Islamists true joy lay in spiritual, mystical, and inner pursuits, in a 
sort of pious pleasure— of family, bravery, and sacrifi ce. They revered a meta-
phorical “drunkenness,” but one that was induced “by divine love,” and cher-
ished “amusement,” but only “around prayer.” They trea sured the “joy of 
pious deeds,” “devotion to the path of velayat [clerical rule],” and good 
“health” to carry on with the true path.10 In essence these marked the behav-
ioral disposition of the Islamist “ideal man”: heavy, austere, warriorlike, con-
trolled, resolute, selfl ess, and highly emotional— in short, an extraordinary 
personality who stood against the expression of lightness, carefreeness, and 
spontaneity— in a word, ordinariness.11 To the extent that such a character 
plays down or represses humanistic impulses and desires, the nobility of life 
loses signifi cance and the propensity to celebrate “noble death” or sacrifi ce 
increases. Thus, the annihilation of self and the “other” in the name of a 
“higher cause” assumes grand value. Iran’s puritan zealots, or “mourners of 
joy” as some described them, deplored with great sorrow the secular delight 
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associated with Nowruz, Persian New Year, reminiscing with astonishing 
melancholy about their “unforgettable happy days” on the war fronts.12 This 
admiration of sacrifi ce and death, directed toward both self and other, was 
echoed in myriad slogans that exclusively emphasized “Death to . . .  ,” instead 
of “Long live . . .” 13 The two Islamic months of Muharram and Ramadan, 
highly charged occasions of martyrdom aft er the revolution, became even 
more dreary and sorrowful. Ayatollah Khomeini recognized the signifi cance 
of these rituals by proclaiming, “It is these grievings that have kept Islam 
alive.” The Islamic Republic’s calendar became a testimony to the offi  cial 
sanction of grief over joy. While the authorities commemorated fully the 
deaths, or “death days,” of religious and po liti cal fi gures, their birthdays  were 
widely ignored (the AH 1380/2001 calendar indicated only three offi  cial birth-
days as opposed to ten offi  cial death days). Ira ni an zealots  were astounded to 
see joyful practices of pop u lar Islam in other Muslim societies, describing 
them as jahili (pagan, pre- Islamic) and as a manifestation of “American Is-
lam.” 14 “In many Arab countries, Ramadan eve nings have turned into eve-
nings of fun, joy, parties and jokes,” lamented a commentator in Iran’s weekly 
Jebhe.15 Even the slightest expressions of societal vigor and color disturbed 
puritan sensibilities. “Just take a look at the town,” bemoaned the weekly 
Shalamche, “Western rationalism has dominated our existence. Painlessness 
and plea sure seeking have assumed rational justifi cation. From athletic fi elds 
to classrooms, it is the god of plea sure that is worshipped.” 16 Shalamche lashed 
out at the reformist minister of culture for the production of anthems (so-
roud), which it claimed  were “even more joyful than disco songs.” 17 There was 
even little tolerance for expressions such as clapping, whistling, and joyful 
cheers. The public castigation of teenage boys for hanging around girls’ 
schools in the “backstreets of forbidden love” became a stark reminder of a 
land in which the mighty moral state made it its business to interrogate love, 
to suppress desire, and to place the most innocent expression of youthfulness 
under the po liti cal microscope. “It is horrible to be in love in this country,” 
youngsters oft en lamented. The moral masters made a dangerous venture, a 
sin, of the otherwise mundane exchange of a modest smile for which the ter-
rifi ed teen had made a daylong preparation. “Finding a love letter in a girl’s 
pocket is like walking in the streets without a hijab,” warned a school superin-
tendent.18 Morals police  were dispatched to “cleanse” the public space and 
bring moral order into the private sphere to the extent of invading private 
parties. Sorrow, sadness, a somber mood, and dark, austere colors defi ned the 
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   142 9/1/09   1:59 PM
—-1
—0
—+1
THE POLITICS OF FUN 143
Islamist public space, media, and religious rituals. In such a state of virtue, the 
shape and color of clothing, the movement of the body, the sound of one’s 
voice, the level of laughter, and the intensity of looks all became matters of 
intense control and discipline.19
Throughout the 1980s, the country’s preoccupation with war (with Iraq), 
together with repression and revolutionary fervor, made the overpowering 
surveillance seem invincible. Yet before long, signs of underground and open 
defi ance, primarily among the young, placed the quest for fun at the center of 
the nation’s po liti cal contestation. With the war over and postwar reconstruc-
tion under way during the 1990s, the young began publicly to express their 
selfh ood, both individually and collectively. They pursued music, frequented 
video clubs, and set up underground pop and rock bands. Against the warn-
ings of the authorities, many followed the global tastes, fashion, and dating 
games, expressing them in shopping malls, public parks, underground private 
parties, and pursuits that did not exclude premarital sex.20 The practice of such 
cultural politics subverted the authorities’ portrayal of Muslim youth as a self-
less mass devoid of individuality in the ser vice of stern moral codes; it chal-
lenged the ideological edifi ce of the religious state. Yet the young refused to 
abandon religion as such. Instead, they reinvented their Islam to accommodate 
their youthful claims. Thus, in an ingenious strategy, what I have called “sub-
versive accommodation,” the young utilized the existing legitimate norms 
and institutions to lodge their youthful desires, but in doing so they subverted 
and redefi ned the meanings attached to such norms and institutions. In this 
fashion, the highly charged rituals of mourning could turn into occasions of 
glamour, sociability, and fun.21
These stories are not meant to valorize excess, irresponsibility, or socially 
harmful conducts in the name of fun. The fact is that fun, just like any exer-
cise of freedom, has the potential to become a social problem if individual and 
social responsibilities are not recognized. Excessive individualism, nihilism, 
drug use, unfettered sexuality, AIDS, and violence would impair not only so-
ciety at large, but also and primarily the fun- loving actors themselves. Saudi 
youngsters’ resort to skidding (tahfi t; holding on to a moving car), a dangerous 
pastime against widespread boredom, has taken a large toll on its practitio-
ners.22 And fomenting ethnoreligious violence in the name of fun by the young 
recruits of the Muhajir Quami Movement is causing no less than major dam-
age to Pakistani society.23 My attention, rather, centers chiefl y on harmless fun, 
that which remains more or less within social expectations and generalized 
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standards. Excess in controlling fun may also entail excess in practicing it. 
Reformists in Iran  were concerned precisely about such extreme response 
and disruptions if the conservative puritans continued with their anti- fun 
policies.
Indeed, the battle over fun deepened the confl ict between the reformist 
and conservative wings of the government. Reformists attributed ensuing 
unrest to the suppression of joy and the need for happiness; they unleashed 
a public debate over joy and fun by sponsoring studies, or ga niz ing seminars, 
and publishing articles supporting the idea that “joy was not a sin, but a deeply 
human emotion.” Some called for a “defi nition” and even “management” of 
joy in order to develop a culture of fun and festivity among the people who 
had been denied that experience and  were thus ignorant of the rules.24 Dozens 
of seminars debated the meaning of “leisure” and the modalities of “fun among 
women,” who had been suff ering from depression in larger numbers.25 Psy-
chologists and journalists called for a “love of life,” emphasizing that “living 
with joy is our right . . .  [for] a depressed and austere society cannot have a 
solid civil foundation.”26 Proclaiming that “laughter is not deviance,” some 
reformists lashed out at Islamists who had shunned fun and laughter, human 
pursuits that invigorate society.27
In response, the infuriated Islamists clamored against what they consid-
ered a “cultural invasion,” “hooliganism,” and “anti- Islamic sentiments.”28 
In August 2001 the conservative judiciary, by means of public fl oggings, be-
gan a new crackdown on citizens committing or promoting immorality, de-
pravity, and indecency in the public space. The police closed boutiques, cafés, 
and restaurants that exhibited signs of depravity.29 Neckties  were outlawed, 
girls wearing loose veils  were photographed for police fi les, and men  were 
stripped to the waist and fl ogged for drinking alcohol or being seen with non-
familial women.30 A year later Tehran residents watched new groups of uni-
formed men patrol the streets in four- wheel- drive vehicles. Some sixty special 
units included several hundred men wearing green uniforms and toting ma-
chine guns and hand grenades as they drove up and down the streets chasing 
young drivers listening to loud music, women wearing makeup or loose veils, 
partygoers, and alcohol drinkers.31 The crackdowns did little to change the 
behavior and instead caused a public uproar in which the fundamentals of 
the Islamic penal code came under further attack, as scores of reform- minded 
clerics questioned its application in this modern age.32
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FUN BEFORE FUNDAMENTALISM AND AFTER
Has anti- fun- damentalism been an invariable feature of Islamic history? If 
not, at what point did fun become a prominent po liti cal concern in Muslim 
societies? What kind of attitudes toward fun existed before the rise of Is-
lamism? Certainly, anti- fun ethics are not just a recent occurrence. Muslim 
societies have been witness to both a desire for and a battle against fun. How-
ever, the dynamics of its politics have been diff erent. Historically, anti- fun 
sentiments and rulings focused overwhelmingly on “wine, women, and song.” 
They  were framed essentially in terms of “forbidding wrong,” an Islamic in-
junction rooted in a number of Qur᾽ anic verses that call on Muslims to “com-
mand right and forbid wrong.”33 However, the questions of what is wrong, 
who forbids, and how to forbid remain contested.34 It is also not certain 
whether the Qur a᾽nic phrases meant what the ulema (Muslim clerics) later 
took them to mean.35 In principle, wrongs included morally reprehensible 
practices such as dishonest commercial activity and usury, but especially 
singing, wine drinking, immodesty, and prostitution. The enforcers of moral-
ity  were overwhelmingly puritanical and assertive ulema who led bands of 
devotees acting as their foot soldiers.36 Surveillance, then, came largely from 
those individual zealots confronting wrongdoers, who in their daily lives re-
mained overwhelmingly indiff erent to such puritanical ethics and who contin-
ued pursuing their mundane pleasures. “In the fi rst four centuries of Islam,” 
reports Franz Rosenthal, “the representatives of ascetic piety  were compara-
tively few, and their voices  were not heeded. On the contrary, there existed a 
pronounced predilection for humor and gaiety which knew few restrictions.”37 
Scholar Michael Cook cites evidence suggesting that in the medieval Muslim 
world drinking as a social practice was a “normality”— a tradition from which 
even women  were not excluded.38 Humor, poetry, and music seem to have 
been even more widespread. The legends of Ash a᾽b, the singer, dancer, and 
comedian of Medina and Mecca in the ninth century, and the more recent 
fi gure of the famous Nasreddin Hoca represent historical prototypes of hu-
mor in Muslim societies. Indeed, the genre of adab literature in the Middle 
East is replete with jokes and anecdotes (muzah) relating to politics, religion, 
and everyday life.39 In Sufi  Islam the ecstasy of divine experience was and still 
is tightly intertwined with poetry, dance, and music. Joyful religious practice 
to a large extent remains a character of folk Islam. To the dismay of religious 
purists, every year millions of Muslim men, women, and children join the 
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mulid festivals to celebrate the birth of revered saints with food, fun, and a 
fair, oft en for several days and nights.40 On such occasions, a fusion of piety, 
prayer, and rapture is embedded in religious songs (aghani diniyya) in the 
spirit similar to that of the joyous culture of the Afro- American group of the 
Episcopal Church in the United States. In these religious songs, the line sepa-
rating secular and sacred is not easy to draw.41
While in premodern times confl ict over everyday pleasures derived from 
and was restricted to sporadic intrusions by individual religious purists into 
people’s public behavior (exceptions include the twelft h- century al- Mohad 
dynasty in Morocco and the eleventh- century Fatimid caliph Hakim in 
Egypt), with the advent of modern states, social movements, and the Western-
ization of Muslim societies, especially the development of new modes, means, 
and spaces of sociability, such as radios, tele vi sions, cafés, concert halls, bars, 
restaurants, and holiday resorts, the dynamics of anti- fun politics shift ed.42 
First, instead of merely individual ulema, powerful movements raised the 
banner of the battle against mundane pleasures. Second, the target of anti- 
fun- damentalism was no longer just fun- loving individuals, but also those 
secular states that allowed and accommodated ordinary joys of everyday 
life— music, cinema, entertainment, dating, or any sort of pastime that could 
be seen as morally reprehensible. Thus, Abul- Ala Mawdudi of India’s Jama῾ at- i 
Islami and Sayed Qutb of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood spearheaded later 
militant movements that branded modern Muslim states and societies, such 
as that of Egypt of the 1950s, as corrupt and jahili. These states, according to 
the militants, needed to be transformed (through revolution) into Islamic 
moral entities so as to guide their “corrupt societies” onto the right path. In 
other words, it was incumbent on the states (and not simply individuals or 
movements) to take on the duty of righting moral wrongs. With the establish-
ment of full- fl edged monolithic Islamic states, as in Saudi Arabia, Af ghan i-
stan, and Iran, curbing fun became a prominent po liti cal concern in society. 
Ironically, modernity displaced the individual zealots and gave rise to over-
powering states that confronted people’s private desires, interests, and expres-
sions. In Saudi Arabia the concerted anti- fun campaign began with the 
emergence of the purist Wahhabi movement (led by Muhammad ibn Abd al- 
Wahhab [d. 1792]) in Nejd in the eigh teenth century. The movement gave rise 
to three episodes of the Saudi state in Arabia. During the fi rst Saudi reign 
(1745– 1818), rulers in the Hijaz banned tobacco, scrapped musical instruments, 
and obliged people to attend mosques and to pray more regularly.43 Through 
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the years, they expanded the scope, types, and geo graph i cal coverage of anti- 
fun rulings and by the late 1920s established the Committee for Commanding 
the Right and Forbidding the Wrong. Although during the reign of Ibn Saud 
(1902– 52) puritan ethics  were undermined and people  were allowed to have 
their fun, in the late 1950s as the tide of Nasserist republicanism swept through 
the Arab world, Saudi rulers revived a new and far more severe strategy of 
moral discipline.44 Likewise, Af ghan i stan’s strict anti- fun policies came to 
fruition with the Taliban puritan regime (1996– 2001), which established a 
ministry to determine and enforce a pervasive moral surveillance.45
Unlike the Saudi and Taliban rulers, the Islamic regime in Iran faced a 
formidable challenge in launching its moral crusade, for it confronted a popu-
lace that had a longer and more widespread experience with secular diver-
sions than had the populations of Saudi Arabia and Af ghan i stan. In Iran the 
secular trend had reached its peak in the same de cade, the 1970s, as the Is-
lamic revolution. In the years just prior to the 1979 Islamic revolution, there 
was a tremendous boost in the dissemination and consumption of both do-
mestic and imported cultural goods. Western cinema and tele vi sion pro-
grams, pop u lar music, youth centers, bars, casinos, and Caspian Sea holidays 
had become signifi cant components of Iran’s urban culture. The number of 
movie viewers had increased by 50 percent between 1969 and 1975, nearly 
twice the rate of population growth in the same period. Every year during the 
1970s, Ira ni an cinemas showed over fi ve hundred foreign fi lms, one- quarter 
of which  were American. By 1975 half the urban population owned a tele vi sion 
set, compared with less than 4 percent in 1960, and 65 percent of total  house holds 
owned radios.46 During the 1970s hundreds of thousands of middle- class Ira-
ni ans regularly vacationed at Caspian Sea resorts to take plea sure in the glo-
balized experience of sea, sun, sand, and sex. Ira ni an Muslims did not aban-
don commemorating the somber occasions of Muharram and Ramadan, yet 
both the rich and the poor, Muslim and non- Muslim, found great joy in cele-
brating the pre- Islamic Nowruz for thirteen days, by wearing new clothes, 
visiting relatives and friends, taking trips, partying, and picnicking— a highly 
secular tradition the Islamic regime has been struggling to undermine. By the 
late 1970s the media had molded a highly festive pop u lar culture, embodied in 
the songs and per for mances of dozens of vastly pop u lar singers, actors, and 
comedians such as Gugoush, Haydeh, Aghasi, Sousan, Arham Sadr, Vahdat, 
Parviz Sayyad, Fardin, and the sultry Foruzan. Comedy, humor, and jokes, 
even though at times cynical, had become an integral part of both artistic life 
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and pop u lar idiom at large. This growing culture of fun and festivity, espe-
cially the western imports, dismayed and disappointed many puritan clerics. 
They condemned cinema, radio, and tele vi sion, since in Ayatollah Khomei-
ni’s view they  were used to “corrupt our youth.” 47 They deplored the urban 
“bright light” culture and holiday resorts and bemoaned the sins of summer 
vacations at the Caspian Sea. The offi  ce of Inhaft eh, the Ira ni an equivalent of 
Playboy magazine, was bombed. These mea sures, however, did little to im-
pede the expression of everyday diversion and enjoyment. It was only by the 
ascendancy of the Islamic state that fun became the site of a major po liti cal 
struggle in society.
ISLAM AND FUN
Why did Islamists insist on preserving puritan values despite the po liti cal 
cost? What lay behind their fear of fun? The prevailing western view is that 
animosity toward fun and joy had roots in the rigid ethics of Islam. According 
to this vision, Islam embodies a “world in which human life  doesn’t have the 
same value as it does in the West, in which freedom, democracy, openness 
and creativity are alien.” 48 Indeed the Islamic doctrine appears to contain 
rulings that disdain fun and festivity. For instance, a number of hadith, pro-
phetic sayings and practices, seem to emphasize haya᾽  (modesty in character), 
scorning crass and trivial manners.49 The exegeses indicate how the Prophet 
disliked those who used undignifi ed language to make people laugh.50 Re-
portedly, A῾᾽ ishah, his wife, “never saw [the Prophet] laughing to an extent 
that one could see his palate; he always used to smile only.” 51 In the spirit of 
minimizing distractions from devotion to God, the Prophet deplored indul-
gence in activities such as poetry when they diverted people from God’s re-
membrance, religious knowledge, and the recitation of the Qur a᾽n.52 Thus 
some Muslim jurists prohibited the performing arts, drawing, and sculpture, 
for fear that they would lead to idolatry (shirk), since only God was the creator, 
even though the performing arts  were present during eids and other festive 
occasions. Some jurists disallowed any play, amusement, or diversion, as vain 
and wasteful in conditions of prolonged war and strife that demanded a total 
focus on jihad.53 Indeed, the literature on bid῾a (innovation in religion), nota-
bly those attributed to Ibn Taymiya, carried decrees against (among others) 
joy, laughter, and hedonistic ethics.54 Shi῾i sources include similar pronounce-
ments that interpret excessive amusement, laughter, and fun as “satanic” acts, 
which cause scandals (aberurizi) and diversion from the faith.55 They revere 
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modesty, shyness, and asceticism (zohd) and disdain the love of material 
wealth.56
But there is more to this. Doctrine, indeed the very same sources, simulta-
neously endorses ethics of joy and jollity. In contrast to the severe conduct of 
today’s Islamists, the Prophet is also championed as a messenger of tolerance 
and tenderness. He despises those like ‘Umar whose “harsh” and “stern” char-
acter frightened fellow Muslims. “By Him in Whose Hands my life is,” the 
Prophet addressed a forbidding ‘Umar, “whenever Satan sees you taking a 
way, he follows a way other than yours.” 57 These words come from a man who 
smiled at those who  were rude to him. Numerous sources mention his gentle 
and merciful nature and his pleasant and mild manner in his daily interac-
tions.58 Some rulings in Shi῾i sources clearly reject violence and coercion, 
calling instead for soft ness, jollity, fun, and amusement.59 Imam Sajjad is 
cited as saying that for the Prophet, “the noblest deed before God is to bring 
joy to other people.” 60 According to Imam Sadeq, cheerful (khoshrou) persons 
are so revered that God reserves the heaven for them.61 By comparison, re-
ports on the Prophet’s sayings on dancing and singing remain vague, but in 
them the Prophet does not appear to forbid these acts.62 Moreover, and con-
trary to self- righteous puritans who in the name of morality easily charge 
fellow Muslims with sin and kufr (nonbelief in God), Prophet Mohammad is 
emphatic that “all the sins of my fellows will be forgiven, except those of the 
Mujahirin [who decidedly repeat their evil doings].”63 So, you should not be 
extremists.” 64 “Do not take upon yourselves except deeds which are within 
your ability.” 65 Indeed, charging a believer with kufr is equal to murdering him 
or her.66
It appears that Islam, similar to other religions, does not off er a defi nite 
theory of fun. As scholar Khaled Masoud suggests, the confl icting narratives in 
the doctrine, including the hadith, refl ect uncertainty and plurality of views over 
such issues in early Islam, thus leaving behind a tradition that remains open to 
contesting readings.67 Islam’s position on the issue of fun, consequently, de-
pends largely on who interprets it. Thus, in contrast to the conservative puri-
tans, Iran’s reformists of the 1990s proclaimed that Islam had never forced 
asceticism on Muslims. Instead, it had asked them to recognize their limits in 
order to promote and harmonize human instincts and life’s pleasures with 
reason and responsibility. The reformists reminded the puritan Islamists not 
to force people to do “more than what God has asked” because “they will de-
liver less.” 68 In the view of the young cleric Hojjat al- Islam Gholami, “Islam 
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has, in fact, called for practices that induce happiness, like traveling, festivi-
ties, marriage, diversion, games and fun.” 69 If “Imam Ali was both playful 
(shoukh tab῾) and very jolly (khande- rou),” the sheikh objected, then why 
should the “clerics appear so heavy and sour- faced”?70 Many ordinary Mus-
lims wondered why the Islamic authorities harassed men wearing short sleeves 
or women in colored outfi ts, when there was no religious or legal basis for 
such prohibitions.71 Why did Islamists insist on the suppression of delight, 
joy, self- expression, and love of life— human qualities that most people in the 
world take for granted? What ever their motives, Islamists in the end drew on 
certain teachings of their religion, on exegeses and opinions of some early 
Muslim jurists. But is this tendency peculiar to Islam and Islamists?
ANTI- FUN- DAMENTALISM BEYOND ISLAM, 
BEYOND RELIGION
In truth, traces of rigid piety and ascetic tendencies can be seen in most reli-
gions. Most religions, and not just Islam, have raised, in their par tic u lar read-
ings, the banner of martyrdom or admiration for dignifi ed death. Socrates, 
the “secular saint,” is said to represent the genesis of martyrdom in the West, 
while Christianity, with its story of crucifi xion, developed a distinct theology 
of martyrdom.72 In addition, most religions, in their distinct interpretations, 
have expressed hostility toward sexuality, holding that it binds humans to the 
animal world and diverts them from their mystical quest by threatening self- 
control and discipline.73 Arts and music have not been spared from pietistic 
wrath. Protestant puritans replaced the Church as the medium of salvation, 
resorting to pietistic practices such as hard work and “avoiding cards, danc-
ing, theatre- going, and essentially every action which could be seen as a con-
cession to ‘the world’ ” in order to assure their eternal redemption.74 Drawing 
on Protestant ethics, Max Weber suggests that while “orgiastic” or “ritualistic” 
religions  were inclined toward song, music, pictorial arts, and poetry, “ratio-
nal religions” (such as Judaism, ancient Christianity, and Protestantism) showed 
animosity toward the arts. According to this logic, art, sexuality, and by ex-
tension fun had the potential to disrupt the infl uence of reason on human 
conduct or divert humans from full attention to the transcendental.75
There is surely some truth about diversion from the transcendental as a 
major cause of religious aversion to fun, levity, art, or sexuality, even though 
in reality not all followers of a faith have similar puritan values, as seen so 
far— some oppose them, others ignore them, and still others, in par tic u lar those 
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in authority, oft en uphold and enforce them. However, anti- fun sensibilities 
are not restricted to religious doctrines. The most irreligious movements— 
French Jacobins and Rus sian Bolsheviks— have expressed similar sentiments. 
In pre- revolution Eu rope authorities had campaigned in the name of morality 
to suppress all forms of lower- class public entertainment. Football, public 
drunkenness, wearing masks, and dancing  were prohibited, and the tradi-
tional carnivals came under strict surveillance.76 With the French Revolu-
tion “bourgeoisie asceticism” seemed to reach its high point. During 1793– 94, 
France witnessed the Jacobins attempting to cleanse Paris by shutting down 
brothels and gambling  houses and eliminating drunkenness. In what Crane 
Brinton described as the “republic of virtue,” even dancing and festivals  were 
outlawed.77 Citizen Jacobins’ imposing such moral restrictions on people in 
public diff ered little from that of the morals police in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran in the 1980s. Within days aft er Robespierre went under the guillotine, 
ordinary Pa ri sians took over the public space with their simple but subversive 
pleasures. They engaged in jubilation,  horse racing, bear baiting, and Christ-
mas festivities, fi lling dance salons while oft en dressed in revealing attire. 
Games, jokes, street dancing, and singing dominated public squares at times 
in a rowdy and tactless manner.78 This subaltern culture of fun and festivity, 
or what E. P. Thompson called “arts of living,” disturbed bourgeois sensibili-
ties and capitalist work ethics— ethics that revered discipline, self- control, 
hard work, and “rationality.”79
Not just the French bourgeois Jacobins but also Rus sian communists ex-
pressed revulsion against “wine, women, and song.” The Bolsheviks’ ban on 
jazz as a “de cadent bourgeois art” might perhaps be justifi ed, but their prohi-
bition of vodka in the land of Rus sia is like today’s Islamists’ eliminating mu-
sic from Egyptian weddings. Bolsheviks  were just as “ascetic” in their expres-
sion of contempt for ordinary comfort as  were the Calvinists, both of whom 
considered that it was the everyday sins that needed to be eliminated.80 In 
Brinton’s view, such “religious” puritanism of both Jacobins and Bolsheviks 
originated from the revolutionary “reign of virtue” that emerges during times 
of crisis.81 But his explanation does not make clear why puritanism has to be 
religious in essence. Nor does he justify why it should be exclusively the con-
sequence of revolutions— aft er all, the Eastern Eu ro pe an revolutions of the 
1990s did not suppress mundane pleasures. Indeed, similar puritanism char-
acterized the behavior of some Ira ni an Marxist guerrilla leaders, who in their 
underground lives before the Islamic revolution would have associated fun 
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with nonrevolutionary and bourgeois mind- sets. They imposed celibacy, for-
bidding romance and playfulness among members, and placed restraints on 
ordinary consumption such as eating and sleeping, on reading materials, and 
on what came from joyful individual desires and expressions.82
Thus far, two broad approaches to explain the battle against fun stand 
out. The fi rst, religious reasoning, focuses on diversion from God or faith as 
the principal cause for the suppression of fun. The second revolves around 
modernist sensibilities, including bourgeois rationality (“time is money”), ac-
cording to which modernity discards collective fun because of the latter’s 
counterdiscipline— immoral, irrational, and disorderly dispositions. Accord-
ing to this view, those in pursuit of fun challenge the idea of the modern indi-
vidual as an or ga nized, disciplined, proper, and in- control being. These two 
approaches each off er valuable insights to understanding antagonism toward 
festive behavior. However, they also involve serious analytical limitations. 
Why are fun and amusement and not, say, preoccupation with making a liv-
ing or seeking knowledge largely considered sources of diversion from God? 
More important, as discussed earlier, anti- fun sentiments are not confi ned to 
religion per se; nonreligious and antireligious individuals likewise espouse 
similar attitudes. Brinton’s claim that atheist Bolsheviks and secular Jacobins 
behaved in essentially religious ways neither rescues the religious reasoning 
as such nor sheds light on the source of the revolutionaries’ austere behavior. 
What it does is to reify religion by making puritanism its intrinsic and ex-
clusive attribute. Moreover, the explanation around modernist sensibilities 
not only fails to account for religion- inspired fear of diversion (from God), but 
also fails to explain the position of premodern (e.g., early or medieval Islamic 
and Christian) moral authorities who fought against joy and the pleasures of 
life. The claim that such premodern puritans just like the current austere Is-
lamists in fact exhibited a modernist mind- set conjures up the same kind of 
circular argument that Brinton makes with respect to atheists behaving reli-
giously. In addition, the fact is that fun as such, in the sense of diversion, joy, 
and amusement, poses little threat to the modern authority— one that is char-
acterized by an ideological open market and inclusive social order and is able 
to accommodate, incorporate, commoditize, and even promote public and 
private, hedonistic and consumerist, pleasures. The entertainment industry— 
concerts, music, games, fi lms, comedy, variety shows, and sports— constitutes 
a signifi cant sector in the modern capitalist economy. Consequently, it is not 
merely the revolutionary nature of regimes as such or exclusively religious 
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states or particularly the modernist authority, but rather the doctrinal politics 
(left  or right, old or new, espoused by individuals or groups) and the ideologi-
cally monolithic regimes (e.g., Jacobin, Bolshevik, or Islamic) that feel the haz-
ard of fun ethics. But why?
WHY ANIMOSITY TOWARD FUN?
What then explains, beyond the rhetoric, the underlying reason for similar 
anti- fun passions that a strain of individuals, movements, and regimes from 
diverse worldviews— premodern and modern, religious and secular, bour-
geois and communist— express? Is there a broad explanatory framework to 
integrate the diff erent perspectives that try to show the cause of anti- fun- 
damentalism? Commenting on the Eu ro pe an carnival festivities of the late 
Middle Ages, Mikhail Bakhtin characterizes collective fun in terms of a ritu-
alized rebellion against authority in all forms.83 In their wild delirium, or 
“dancing mania,” the poor created a utopian moment of freedom, community, 
and equality, which defi ed all normal hierarchies— men wore women’s cos-
tumes and ordinary people acted as clerics, kings, or priests. For Bakhtin, the 
plebian laughter represented an “element of victory not only over supernatural 
awe, over the sacred, over death,” but it also meant “the defeat of power . . .  of 
all that suppresses and restricts.”84 Laughter, as depicted in Umberto Eco’s 
novel The Name of the  Rose, protects the lowly from the feelings of fear that 
the nobility, by behaving exceedingly stern and austere, try to impose on the 
poor.85 In Bakhtin, the carnival embodied a folk consciousness, one that acted 
as a medium of class struggle against the power elites. And it was this subver-
sive element in subaltern culture that caused upper- class anxiety over festive 
rituals. While Bakhtin off ers a plausible argument with respect to the politics 
of lower- class pleasures in late medieval Eu rope, there is more to fun than can 
be reduced to a par tic u lar class, or to class politics. Victor Turner’s notion of 
communitas seems to carry more explanatory power, for it extends the politics 
of joy beyond class into the struggle against structures of hierarchy at large. In 
Turner, communitas is the status of ritual participants who break away from 
the everyday norms and structures to operate in an ad hoc state of liminality, 
or in- between- ness, where they form an egalitarian community of equal indi-
viduals in which the authority of the ritual leader is temporarily recognized. 
Communitas embodies a state in human behavior where people act against or 
outside the prevailing structures, that is, the diff erentiated system of social 
positions.86
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What Turner and Bakhtin seem to have in mind when they speak of 
“structure” is primarily the structure of hierarchy. And the festive rituals that 
they describe  were not themselves free from possessing some structural fea-
tures: they  were more or less routinized collective practices performed by 
specifi c actors in fairly specifi c times, places, and formats, which diff ered 
from everyday, free- form, ad hoc, spontaneous, unpredictable, individualis-
tic, or collective fun. In these latter forms, fun has the potential to defy not 
only hierarchy and diff erentiation but any kind of structure. Thus, it is partially 
this antistructure disposition of spontaneous, free- form, and public fun that 
seems to cause anxiety and antagonism among political- moral authorities. For 
it disturbs the sense and security of order, stability, and tranquility that charac-
terize the conservative image of a sensible world.
It would be a mistake, however, to reduce the threat of fun to merely its 
potentially antistructure disposition. Nor should an understanding of the 
subversive element in fun be limited to considering the rowdy, unruly, and 
undisciplined crowd action in pursuit of simple pleasures— those that feature 
the carnival festivities of early modernity.87 The fact is that even the private, 
harmless, and commoditized expressions of plea sure are also strictly regu-
lated and inhibited. What possible injury is done to the ideological state by the 
innocent act of fl ying kites, by the joyous movement of the body in a private 
wedding festivity, or by the exchange of harmless smiles between timid teen-
agers in the tense moments of backstreet love? Why should a mighty state be 
apprehensive of colorful outfi ts, the showing of a few inches of hair, the in-
tense plea sure of joking and play among intimate friends, or the expression of 
impulsive jubilance for the victory of one’s national soccer team? My argu-
ment is that beyond its physicality, fun also presupposes a powerful paradigm, 
a set of presumptions about self, society, and life that might compete with and 
undermine the legitimizing ideology of doctrinal power when these ideolo-
gies happen to be too narrow, rigid, and exclusive to accommodate ethics of 
fun. It is particularly this aspect of fun that causes fury among the Islamist 
moral- political authority.
Anti- fun ethics, whether religious or secular, modern or premodern, bour-
geois or communist— and espoused by individuals, movements, or states— 
are not merely doctrinal concerns; they are primarily historical- political mat-
ters. More immediately, they represent and embody a par tic u lar technique of 
power, a discursive shield that both legitimizes and insulates moral or po liti-
cal authority by binding it to “what is not to be questioned,” to the sacrosanct, 
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the untouchables— God, the Revolution, the Re sis tance, the Proletariat, the 
Nation. Fear of fun, consequently, is not necessarily about diversion from the 
higher powers or noble values as such, but about the fear of exit from the para-
digm that frames and upholds the mastery of certain types of moral and po-
liti cal authorities, be they individuals, po liti cal movements, or states.
Any type of authority, including Weber’s famous ideal types, may be real-
ized only within its own discursive paradigm— a body of consistent concepts, 
meanings, and understandings. Billy Graham may hold authority only among 
a segment of American Christians to whom his message makes sense. For the 
rest of Americans, or Egyptian Muslims for that matter, he holds little power. 
Graham’s authority not only derives from what and how he preaches but also 
is realized specifi cally within the paradigm or discursive frame that allows him 
to operate and communicate with his audience. This is the “paradigm power.” 
It refers to the discursive space that enables those in charge within a par tic u-
lar paradigm to maintain their position by making them meaningful and 
acceptable to their subjects. Thus, any challenge from without or departure 
from within this discursive space amounts to a challenge to those in author-
ity. Because when subjects exit from the shared paradigm, by way of adhering 
to a diff erent value system and way of life, they eff ectively leave the masters’ 
fi eld of infl uence and in eff ect render them powerless. Note how an Ira ni an 
hard- line weekly expresses this apprehension of exit: “When the chants of 
Allah- Akbar [God is Great] are replaced by whistling and clapping hands, 
prayers will come to an end, God will be overlooked, and the doors of lustful-
ness will be wide open. In such conditions, you cannot hear the voice of God; 
you will commit anything in this state of unconsciousness. Even Imam Kho-
meini’s cries will fall on deaf ears.”88 This anxiety is basically about how the 
rival paradigm (fun) may come in between the moral authority and its follow-
ers to divert the latter’s devotion to the former. A powerful conservative aya-
tollah in Iran declares fi lms, arts, and cultural centers “as the most dangerous 
thing[s] that threaten humanity,” because he fears that they would push mosques, 
churches, prayers, supplication, and ultimately devotion to God to the side-
lines.89 His feeling of threat lies not simply in people forgetting God (aft er all, 
people themselves are assumed to be responsible before God), but in under-
mining the “divine- driven” (khoda- mehvar) doctrinal paradigm that ensures 
his moral mastery. In a diff erent, secular setting in July 2005, armed militants 
from the al- Aqsa Martyrs Brigades disrupted a music concert in the Palestin-
ian town of Nablus, because, they argued, the joy of love songs would divert 
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the public’s attention from devotion to the great sacrosanct, the “re sis tance.” 
“These people [the militants] don’t want us to be happy,” protested the em-
battled singer Amar Hasan; “they want us to sit in the ruins and cry.” 90 The 
brigade militias’ apprehension of “happiness” follows the same logic of power— 
fear of a rival frame of mind that could ultimately undercut their authority.
The subversiveness of fun in the conduct of the young, the artists, and the 
musicians and their audiences evokes the notion of the “counterculture”— 
values and norms of behavior that challenge those of the social mainstream.91 
Certainly, these practices of fun can be said to embody some kind of conten-
tious collective sentiments that aff ect the cultural fi eld. Beyond this, however, 
the parallel does not hold, since the ethics and values of fun as espoused by the 
young, the artists, or the poor do not run counter to those of the social main-
stream; rather, for the most part, they are the social mainstream— although 
suppressed— which runs counter to those of the po liti cal elite and moral mi-
nority. Nor can such joyful behaviors easily be labeled and prohibited as west-
ern “cultural imports,” even though many elements and mediums of fun de-
ployed by globalizing youths— such as fi lms, fashion, music groups, and 
dating games— are inescapably informed by the western commodity and me-
dia logic. The Islamists may be opportunistic in denouncing them as part of a 
western “cultural invasion,” but what is to be said when it comes to the inhibi-
tion of the innocent and indigenous manifestation of public joy, dancing or 
singing at one’s wedding, wearing colorful dress, or joking, whistling, and 
clapping? The fact is that fun, whether foreign and commoditized or indige-
nous and innocent, can be subversive. And the threat is not simply a percep-
tion but a reality. Fun disturbs exclusivist doctrinal authority because, as 
a source of instantaneous fulfi llment, it represents a powerful rival archetype, 
one that stands against discipline, rigid structures, single discourse, and mo-
nopoly of truth. It subsists on spontaneity and breaths in the air of fl exibil-
ity, openness, and critique— the very ethics that clash with the rigid one- 
dimensional discourse of doctrinal authority. Jokes bring plea sure and laughter 
because, according to Freud, they break the taboos and speak the unspeak-
able. Fun builds on the joy of immediate and instant pleasures rather than on 
those of distant and abstract referents such as the hereaft er, the sacrosanct, and 
the untouchable— the very referents on which the authority of the doctrinal 
movements and regimes rests.92
In the “fundamentalist” paradigm the ideal individual is an “abstract per-
son,” a selfl ess subject estranged from his or her individuality, particularistic 
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faculties, and features; this individual is massed together with others who 
share a devotion to “divine values” defi ned and prescribed by the moral mas-
ters.93 The experiences of fun and expressions of joy, lightness, and spontane-
ity through the arts, amusements, play, and creativity signify “human” (insan- 
mehvar) resolve for individuality, diff erentiation, and selfh ood— the very ethics 
that the fundamentalist paradigm cannot accommodate. Selfh ood departs 
from and competes with what the Islamists perceive as divine values from 
which all high values are believed to emanate and by which Muslims are to 
abide.94 Surely, there exists an anti- fun individualism of pietistic youths, 
such as those active in the conservative counterculture of evangelical 
churches in the United States, who disdain MTV, drugs, and premarital sex 
and embrace the conservative ethos of marriage, family, and discipline. But 
this represents rather a controlled, structured, and restrictive individualism, 
one that is distinct from the light and carefree selfh ood that informs much of 
subversive fun.
To maintain their authority, masters have to either modify their paradigm 
by enlarging it to embrace fun ethics (in which case they cease to be exclusive) 
or resort to curbing diversion/desertion and combating the alternative ways 
of thinking, being, and doing things. The extent of discipline varies depend-
ing on the forms of fun practiced (traditional or commoditized, erotically 
charged or not charged, private or public), the target populations (young or 
old, men or women, rich or poor), and the type of adversaries (individual puri-
tan zealots or the doctrinal states). Certain forms of fun (e.g., those expressed 
through sexuality, drugs, or alcohol) more than others (e.g., laughter, music, or 
games) are subject to prohibition and regulation. And certain target groups 
(e.g., young women) more than others are subject to severer surveillance. In 
conditions where the moral authority is merged with a state whose legitimiz-
ing ideology is too exclusive to accommodate contending discourses, the bat-
tle against diversion takes the form of systematic discipline and coercion. It is 
no accident that the control of individual deeds and desires in Saudi Arabia, 
Taliban Af ghan i stan, and the Islamic Republic of Iran (all doctrinal regimes) 
has been far more extensive than in Egypt and Algeria and more generally in 
the premodern conditions where, instead of the state, largely individual pur-
ists and groups initiated moral discipline.
The dissenting aspect of fun should not be overstated, however. Fun can be 
pacifi ed, commoditized, institutionalized, and incorporated. The subversive 
eff ect of fun, at any rate, depends ultimately on the capacity of adversaries, the 
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ideological frame of the moral and po liti cal authority, to absorb and contain 
its adverse fallouts. Whereas inclusive politics, as in liberal democracies, have 
succeeded in normalizing and institutionalizing most fun practices, the mono-
lithic doctrinal movements and regimes— for example, the Bolsheviks during 
Rus sia’s revolutionary crisis and current Islamist regimes— are apprehensive 
in allowing and incapable of adapting the ethics of fun and the joy of everyday 
pleasures. The Bolsheviks feared, as did the Jacobins, that the frame of mind 
associated with nonrevolutionary joy and lightness would compete with, and 
instigate exit from, the ideological paradigm that sheltered their mastery. 
Such politicization of the everyday lay at the heart of extending and maintain-
ing their revolutionary power.95 Islamists have had similar anxieties. The sup-
pression of fun and diversion in Saudi Arabia, for instance, is oft en attributed 
to the Wahhabi doctrine of the Saudi ruling family, notably its principle of 
tawhid (unity of God). Since in this doctrine, nothing like saints, convocation 
(do῾ a), or nazri (extending charity to secure God’s favor) are to come between 
the worshipper and God, and no bid῾a, or innovation, is to be allowed; plays, 
fi lms, and harmless joy distract Muslims from God and hence must be sup-
pressed.96 But in fact the revival and spread of this doctrinal order since the 
1960s has, to a great extent, po liti cal roots. It served the Saudi ruling family as 
a discursive shield against the threat of secular nationalism and republican-
ism that the Nasserist revolution had unleashed in the Arab world.97 Reports 
of the Saudi rulers secretly indulging in what their doctrine prohibits suggest 
their imposition of this moral order as a means of social control. In short, the 
issue for Islamists is not simply people diverting from God but the fear of 
people exiting from them.
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Part 2STREET POLITICS AND THE 
PO LITI CAL STREET
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 8 A STREET NAMED “REVOLUTION”
on february 11, 1979, Tehran radio announced the victory of the Ira ni an Rev-
olution with feverish jubilation, thus heralding the end of a 2,500- year- old 
monarchy.1 A tremendous mood of ecstasy overtook the populace, who poured 
into the streets en masse. Young people danced, and women milled through 
the crowd, handing out candies and sweet drinks, sharbat. Vehicles sounded 
their horns in unison, their lights beaming as they drove up and down the 
main streets, which only days before had witnessed bloody battles between 
the revolutionaries and the imperial army. Indeed, some of these very streets 
became the focal point of world photojournalism, the theme of some of the 
most arresting snapshots of the revolution in Iran, ones that convey the com-
mon images of great po liti cal turning points around the globe— the sea of peo-
ple rallying in public squares, the burning streets, comrades carry ing wounded 
revolutionaries, the sober yet ner vous expression of soldiers, and of course 
falling statues and the breaking of prison gates. They all represent the “street 
politics” of exceptional junctures, common features of many monumental 
insurrections that come to fruition in distinct spatial locations, in the “streets 
of discontent.” In Tehran, such space was Enghelab Square, especially Eng-
helab Street; in Cairo, Tahrir Square; and in Istanbul, Taqsim Square.
Why is that par tic u lar spaces act as venues for the expression of conten-
tion and the extension of solidarity? What distinguishes them from other 
Adapted from Asef Bayat, “Streets of Revolution,” in Unsent Dispatches from the Ira-
ni an Revolution, ed. Akbar Nazemi (Vancouver, BC: Pre sen ta tion  House Gallery, 
2005).
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   161 9/1/09   1:59 PM
-1—
0—
+1—
162 STREET POLITICS AND THE PO LITI CAL STREET 
places? Much of the groundbreaking contributions on space and politics as 
espoused by, for instance, Foucault, Lefebvre, and others, focus on how power 
(politics) confi gures space— how, for instance, the modern prison or the spa-
tial division of streets and alleyways was deployed to discipline the bodies (the 
way we move or walk in public, and the like) of modern subjects; how func-
tional specialization in homes (such as separating kitchen, bedrooms, and 
sitting rooms) was aimed at the moral repair of the working class; and how 
modern open boulevards (as transparent spaces) targeted restricting riots by 
exposing insurgents to police surveillance.2 This chapter looks at the other 
side of the coin, at the spatiality of discontents, that is— how par tic u lar spatial 
forms shape, galvanize, and accommodate insurgent sentiments and solidari-
ties. To illustrate, I focus on the revolutionary mobilization during the Ira-
ni an Revolution of 1979 and its spatial dimensions, making references also to 
Cairo’s and Istanbul’s street politics and their sites during the late 1990s.
THE REVOLUTION
In Iran, the victory day was the culmination of more than eigh teen months of 
mass demonstrations, violent confrontations, massive industrial actions, a 
general strike, and many po liti cal maneuverings. Yet the genesis of the revolu-
tion was far back; indeed, it was rooted in the structural changes that had 
been under way since the 1930s, when the country began undergoing a pro cess 
of modernization. It accelerated aft er the CIA- engineered coup in 1953 that 
toppled the nationalist prime minister, Muhammad Mossadegh, and rein-
stated the Shah. These structural changes engendered many confl icts, chief 
among them the tension between socioeconomic development and po liti cal 
autocracy.3 State ineffi  ciency, corruption, and a sense of injustice among many 
sectors of Ira ni an society accelerated po liti cal confl ict in the country.
The modernization policy and economic change, initiated by the state 
under both Reza Shah (1925– 46) and his son, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 
gave rise to the growth of new social forces, to the dismay of the traditional 
social groups. By the late 1970s, a large and well- to- do modern middle class, 
modern youth, public women, an industrial working class, and a new poor 
consisting of slums and squatters, dominated the social scene. With the excep-
tion of the latter, these represented the benefi ciaries of economic development, 
enjoying relatively high status and comparable economic rewards. However, 
the per sis tence of the Shah’s old- age autocracy prevented these thriving social 
layers from participating in the po liti cal pro cess. This angered them. At the 
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same time, the old social groups— a segment of the traditional bazaaris, the 
old urban middle strata, the clergy, and other adherents to Islamic 
institutions— were also frustrated by the modernization strategy, as it under-
mined their economic interests and social status.
With all the conventional institutional channels closed to the expression 
of discontent as a result of repression, the populace was increasingly alienated 
from the state. In the meantime, corruption, ineffi  ciency, a sense of injustice, 
and a feeling of moral outrage characterized the social psychology of many Ira-
ni ans. So, during the tense years of 1970s, at the height of the Shah’s authoritar-
ian rule and remarkable economic development, many people (except perhaps 
the upper class and the landed peasantry) seemed dissatisfi ed, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons. But all  were united in blaming the Shah and his western allies 
for that state of aff airs. It is not surprising, then, that the language of dissent 
and protests was largely antimonarchy, anti- imperialist, Third World- ist, and 
nationalist, turning in the end to religious discourse.
The opportunity for pop u lar mobilization arrived with what we, college 
students, used to call the “Carterite breeze” (Nasseem- e Carteri). President 
Carter’s human rights policy in the late 1970s forced the Shah to off er a po liti cal 
space for a limited degree of expression. This expression, in the pro cess, cumu-
latively built up, and in the course of less than two years it swept aside the 
monarchy. It all began with a limited relaxation on censorship, allowing some 
literary/intellectual activities (in the Goethe Institute and in universities in 
Tehran) and public gatherings by po liti cal Islamists (in Quba Mosque). It con-
tinued with the distribution, by the intellectuals and liberal politicians, of 
critical open letters to high- level offi  cials. In this midst, an insulting article in 
a daily paper, Ettelaat, against Ayatollah Khomeini triggered a demonstration 
in the shrine city of Qum, in which some demonstrators  were killed. To com-
memorate these deaths, a large- scale demonstration took place in the Azeri 
city of Tabriz in the north. This marked the beginning of a chain of events that 
formed a nationwide, revolutionary protest movement in which diverse seg-
ments of the population, modern and traditional, religious and secular, men 
and women, massively participated, and in which the ῾ulama᾽ came to exert 
its leadership. But why did the clergy in par tic u lar lead the revolution?
For over twenty- fi ve years of autocratic rule, since the 1953 coup, all the 
eff ective secular po liti cal parties and nongovernmental organizations had 
been removed or destroyed. The United States– led coup crushed both the na-
tionalist and Communist movements; trade  unions  were infi ltrated by the 
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   163 9/1/09   1:59 PM
-1—
0—
+1—
164 STREET POLITICS AND THE PO LITI CAL STREET 
secret police, SAVAK; publications went through strict censorship, and there 
remained hardly any eff ective NGOs.4 The main or ga nized po liti cal dissent 
came from the underground guerrilla organizations, Marxist Fedaian and 
radical Islamic left  Mujahidin- e Khalq, whose activities  were limited to iso-
lated armed operations.5 Student activism also remained restricted either to 
campus politics inside the country or to those carried out by Ira ni an students 
abroad. In short, the secular groups, while extremely dissatisfi ed,  were or gan-
i za tion ally decapitated.
Unlike the secular forces, however, the clergy had the comparative advan-
tage of possessing invaluable institutional capacity, including its own hierarchi-
cal order, with over ten thousand mosques, Husseiniehs (informal and ad hoc 
religious gatherings), Huwzehs (theological seminaries), and associations that 
acted as vital means of communication among the revolutionary contenders. 
Young Islamists, both girls and boys, along with young clerics, linked the insti-
tution of the u῾lama᾽ to the people. A hierarchical order facilitated unifi ed deci-
sion making, and a systematic fl ow of both order and information ensured 
discipline; higher- level decisions in the mosques  were disseminated to both 
the activists and the general public. In short, the clerics’ institutional capacity, 
in addition to the remarkable generality and ambiguity in their revolutionary 
message ensured their leadership. What maintained that leadership was, be-
yond the lack of a credible alternative, the relatively rapid conclusion of revo-
lutionary events— there was little time for debate and dissent, for a social 
movement to emerge, or for a possible alternative leadership to develop. Thus, 
the nascent Islamic movement of the 1970s rapidly transformed into a new 
state. “Islamization,” then, unfolded largely aft er the victory of the revolution, 
and was enforced primarily from above by the new Islamic state. It was mani-
fested in the establishment of clerical rule, the Islamic legal system, new cul-
tural practices and institutions, and the moral surveillance of the public 
space.
STREETS OF DISCONTENT
Clearly, revolutions are not merely the exceptional junctures of insurrections 
and regime change, of “moments of madness,” as they have been termed. Nor 
are revolutionaries just the visible street actors. Millions work backstage in 
these highly complex dramas: workers in factories, landless peasants on farms, 
students in schools, employees in offi  ces, and leaders, oft en behind closed 
doors. Yet it is ultimately in the streets, public spaces par excellence, that col-
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lective challenge against invincible power holders is galvanized, where the 
destiny of po liti cal movements is oft en decided. In other words, beyond the 
temporal component, revolutions in the sense of insurrections possess an in-
escapable spatial dimension. Thus, in addition to thinking about why revolu-
tions take place, who participates in them, and how events unfold, we should 
also be thinking about where they actually take place. More specifi cally, why 
do certain spaces/places, such as urban streets, more than others become the 
sites of acts and expressions of public discontent?
The Ira ni an Revolution was primarily an urban movement. Massive dem-
onstrations, protests, and clashes took place overwhelmingly in the large cit-
ies, particularly in Tehran.6 It is true that many rural inhabitants, farmers, 
and landless peasants  were also mobilized, yet they would go to the cities to 
communicate their collective discontent. The idea of cities as centers of dis-
content is perhaps as old as the cities themselves. As the seat of concentrated 
wealth, power, people, and needs, cities are also sites of amassed contradic-
tions and social confl icts.7 Thus, by the eve of the 1979 revolution, the Ira ni an 
capital, Tehran, was just such a contradictory site. With a population of some 
fi ve million, Tehran exhibited a remarkable and perhaps unique class (eco-
nomic, social, and cultural) hierarchy. Located on a north- to- south- sloping 
landscape, the geo graph i cal pyramid of the city refl ected its social and eco-
nomic hierarchy. To the far north, the highest district was the site of the most 
affl  uent residents and the most opulent neighborhoods, crowned by the royal 
palace standing at the very summit of the city. The middle areas, from east to 
west,  housed the relatively large middle classes, the state employees, profes-
sionals, and small- business families. The poor (new rural migrants and the 
lower strata of working people)  were pushed away to seek shelters in the lowest 
lands of the city, in slums and squatter settlements with few urban amenities 
and ser vices.8 (See Map 1.) Indeed, the in e qual ity of the capital embodied the 
prevailing social, economic, and po liti cal order of the nation as a  whole. Yet, 
beyond its profound socioeconomic disparity, the spatial dimension of Teh-
ran, its strategic streets, squares and institutions, off ered an additional ele-
ment for the expression of contentious politics.
Among the many “revolutionary thoroughfares” such as Takht- e Jamshid 
Avenue, Khiaban Kargar, and Maidan Zhaleh, a long east– west street— one 
that was appropriately renamed “Revolution Street” (Khiaban- e Enghelab)— 
stood as the most contentious space in the nation. It was  here that the interna-
tional press recorded some of the most remarkable images of the revolutionary 
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struggles. I can recall how, as young intellectuals and activists, my friends and 
I would rush to that par tic u lar street to collect news, demonstrate, attend ral-
lies, obtain literature, participate in discussions, or meet with comrades. It 
was there that most clashes also occurred, both during and aft er the revolu-
tion, so much so that it was imagined as the spatial core of the revolution. 
Why did this par tic u lar street attract so many contenders? What made it a 
distinct space of contention?
By their very nature, streets represent the modern urban theater of con-
tention par excellence. We need only to remember the role “the street” has 
played in such monumental po liti cal turning points as the French Revolution, 
nineteenth- century labor movements, anticolonial struggles, the anti– Vietnam 
War movement in the United States, the “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Eu-
rope, and, perhaps, the current global antiwar movement. The street is the 
chief locus of politics for ordinary people, those who are structurally absent 
from the centers of institutional power. Simultaneously social and spatial, 
constant and current, a place of both the familiar and the stranger, and the 
visible and the vocal, streets represent a complex entity wherein sentiments 
and outlooks are formed, spread, and expressed in a remarkably unique fash-
ion. The street is the physical place where collective dissent may be both ex-
pressed and produced. The spatial element in street politics distinguishes it 
from strikes or sit- ins, because streets are not only where people protest, but 
also where they extend their protest beyond their immediate circle. For this 
reason, in the street one fi nds not only marginalized elements— the poor and 
the unemployed— but also actors with some institutional power, such as 
students, workers, women, state employees, and shop keep ers, whose march in 
streets is intended to extend their contention. For a street march brings to-
gether the “invitees” and also the “strangers” who might espouse similar, real 
or imagined, grievances. It is this epidemic potential, and not simply the dis-
ruption or uncertainty caused by riots, that threatens the authorities who exert 
a pervasive power over public spaces— with police patrols, traffi  c regulation, 
and spatial division— as a result. The police tactic of encircling demonstrators 
in a corner, separating them from the normal fl ow of street life, as frequently 
happened in Cairo’s 2002 spring of discontent, was devised to subvert the 
potential of extension of sentiments to the passers- by.
Beyond this generality, however, “streets of discontent” possess their dis-
tinct sociology, a blend of several socio- spatial features. First, they are spaces 
where a mobile crowd can easily and rapidly assemble before it is forced to 
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disperse. Thus, the vicinities of an urban campus of a university (such as that 
in Tehran), or a large mosque (such as al- Azhar in Cairo), or promenades of 
bookstores and theaters that attract an intellectual crowd are all potential 
sites of contention. Thus, the proximity of Cairo’s Kasr El- Nil and Tal a῾t Harb 
streets, with their bookstores and intellectual cafés, including the historic Café 
Riche, where, the legend goes, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952 was planned, 
provides the same intellectual import to Cairo’s Tahrir Square as does Istiqlal 
Street to Istanbul’s Taqsim Square, and Revolution Street to Tehran’s Revolu-
tion Square. Second, the streets of discontent would usually have a historical or 
symbolic signifi cance, either in some inscribed memories of insurrection and 
triumph, or, just like Cairo’s Tahrir Square in terms of the sites and symbols of 
state power— palaces, parliament, courts, ministries of justice or the interior, 
and the like.
Third, as the locus of mass transportation networks— the bus, taxi, or 
metro terminals— which facilitate access to mobile participants, the streets of 
discontent are distinguished from the suburban slum neighborhoods, where 
the protests of the poor (over de mo li tion of shantytowns, water shortages, or 
electricity cuts) oft en remain localized and contained. Thus, in the late 1970s, 
the intended long march of angry squatters of South Tehran toward the Shah’s 
palace in the far north of the city was aborted by the long distance. In a simi-
lar vein, massive protests of squatters against Tehran municipality’s de mo li-
tion squad in the suburban community of Khak- e Safi d failed to spread fur-
ther, despite their intensity and violence.9 Even the mass protests by workers 
in Helwan, in the outskirts of Cairo in spring 2008, remained by and large 
circumscribed, compared with the city center’s po liti cal rallies of 2006 in-
spired by the Kifaya movement and other prodemocracy groups. Centrality, 
proximity, and accessibility, both in space and in time, are crucial features of 
any street of discontent.
Fourth, equally important is fl exibility. Streets of discontent need to be a 
maneuverable space, where protestors can easily fl ee from the police— a space 
that is open yet surrounded by narrow alleyways, shops, or homes that can 
off er respite or sanctuary to revolutionary fugitives. No wonder Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square, Tehran’s Enghelab, and Istanbul’s Taqsim Square are all encircled by a 
maze of side streets and alleyways, where po liti cal escapees can disappear in 
the event of a police chase. In Eu rope, modern large boulevards  were designed 
partially to counter the po liti cal challenge of just such tangled or dense spaces 
of contention. In the Middle East, insurrectionists are likely to leave the open 
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and exposed boulevards to the offi  cial marches of regime loyalists, who have 
no reason to fear police and prosecution.
Finally, beyond mere physicality, the streets of discontent hold a distinct 
sociality, whereby solidarity is communicated, discontent extended, and the 
news disseminated beyond the immediate surroundings.  Here, I am referring 
to the role of the bus, taxi, or train terminals to transfer people, news, and 
knowledge not only beyond the city limits, but farther, into faraway provinces 
and beyond national borders. A location such as Tahrir Square, which holds 
in its orbit diverse headquarters of the press, tele vi sion stations, foreign ho-
tels, tourists, and journalists, as well as bus terminals, is likely to attract dis-
gruntled insurgents.
“Revolution Street” in Tehran possessed many of these distinct socio- 
spatial qualities. The magnifi cent presence of the Tehran University campus 
(established in 1934) on a stretch of several blocks housing over 20,000 stu-
dents surely contributed to the militancy of the area. Across the university 
compound, on the opposite side of the street,  were hundreds of bookshops 
and publishing  houses that had uniquely turned these few blocks into the 
intellectual epicenter of the nation. This exclusive book bazaar, the hangout 
of Iran’s intellectual window- shoppers, off ered not only academic materials, 
but also underground revolutionary literature. Like the densely packed old 
bazaars, this book market assumed its own distinct identity and had a solid 
internal network— a place where news was spread and rumors  were verifi ed. 
During the revolution, many of these bookshops in Revolution Street shel-
tered the fugitive street protestors. The secular, left ist aura of the place and its 
goods stood in stark contrast to the more religious but far less spectacular 
districts around southern Tehran’s traditional Grand Bazaar, which served as 
the po liti cal hub of earlier, 1950s and 1960s, po liti cal activity. Surely Tehran 
University contributed to the politicization of the area. But perhaps more im-
portant factors  were involved.
In earlier periods, such as the early 1950s, po liti cal crowds would congre-
gate not around Tehran University, but primarily in the grand Baharestan 
Plaza, which embraced the parliament located in South Tehran. By the late 
1970s, the social and spatial transformation of Tehran had pushed the physical 
and “po liti cal center” of the city farther north, to Revolution Street. Thus, lo-
cated halfway between the north and the south, this street carved the city into 
two distinct geo graph i cal and social universes. In a sense, it signifi ed a virtual 
“green line,” demarcating the “affl  uent north” (bala- ye shahr) and “poor south” 
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(pain- e shahr)— a distinction that was unequivocally registered in the pop u-
lar imaginary and language. Not only the intersection of the rich and poor 
zones, this street was also the meeting point of the urban and the rural. In the 
far eastern end of the street, roughly the edge of the city, stood the massive 
Shahyad Square (renamed Azadi [Liberation] Square, aft er the revolution), 
which, together with its neighboring Reza Shah Square (later, Revolution 
Square), gathered the largest insurgent crowds in pre- (and post-) revolution 
Iran. As hubs of intercity bus and taxi terminals, these two squares contained 
the crucial transportation networks linking the capital city to the nearby vil-
lages and provincial towns. A traveler to Tehran would disembark in these 
very grand roundabouts.  Here, the plebeian visitors would rest on the pave-
ments, eat in the cheap street food- stands or tea  houses, stroll around, buy gift s 
from street vendors, get the news of the town, and perhaps see possible dem-
onstrations before leaving the city. In the absence of free press and media, it 
was from places like this that the travelers would spread the news of the revo-
lution. In summary, then, Revolution Street represented a unique juncture of 
the rich and the poor, the elite and the ordinary, the intellectual and the lay-
person, the urban and the rural. It was a remarkable po liti cal grid, intersect-
ing the social, the spatial, and the intellectual, bringing together not only di-
verse social groups, but also institutions of mobilization (the university) and 
the dissemination of knowledge and news (the chain of bookstores).
Thus, the fi rst incidents of collective protest during 1977 emerged from 
Revolution Street. Students’ demonstration for free speech following ten au-
tumn eve nings of literary– political rally at the Goethe Institute catalyzed a 
chain of street mass protests, riots, and military confrontations that eventu-
ally toppled the monarchy. The monumental victory day did not mark the end 
of street action. Aft er the revolution, new episodes of street politics with more 
complex confi gurations unfolded. Yet Revolution Street continues to main-
tain its centrality in Iran’s geography of contention even to this day.
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 9 DOES RADICAL ISLAM HAVE AN 
URBAN ECOL OGY?
in the early morning of January 10, 1993, some fi ft een thousand Egyptian 
military personnel seized the squatter settlement of Munirah Gharbiyya, in 
Cairo’s Imbaba quarter, to “cleanse” this poor community of the militant Is-
lamists, al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya, who had turned it, in the words of one jour-
nalist, into an Islamic “state within the state.” Over the following six weeks, 
police rounded up some six hundred suspects, while an extensive search fol-
lowed for the remaining culprits. This incident, and the scattered reports of 
Islamist mobilization in the slums of Algiers and Istanbul in the late 1990s, 
evoked the older and more spectacular image of Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 
1979, in which the urban dispossessed are believed to have played a crucial part. 
Similarly, the takeover by Turkish Islamists of the reins of power and the victory 
of the Islamist Hamas movement in the dense urban quarters of the Palestinian 
Territories represent more recent instances that seem to resonate the view that 
Islamism appeals to the urban masses, especially to recent rural migrants to 
cities.
These events have triggered a sustained debate and discourse on the urban 
ecol ogy of the poor, oft en reviving century- old assumptions about the social 
consequences of urban transition and the ideological inclination of urban 
marginals in contemporary Muslim societies. They have inspired narratives 
that tend to weave together histories of Islamism and those of the urban 
Adapted from Asef Bayat, “Radical Religion and the Habitus of the Dispossessed: 
Does Islamic Militancy Have an Urban Ecol ogy?” International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research 31, no. 3 (September 2007), pp. 579– 90.
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   171 9/1/09   1:59 PM
-1—
0—
+1—
172 STREET POLITICS AND THE PO LITI CAL STREET 
disenfranchised. Thus, militant Islamism is represented as though it  were the 
movement of the urban downtrodden, a perception that has led some scholars 
to draw parallels between Middle East Islamism and the Latin American lib-
eration theology of the 1960s and 1970s.1 Mike Davis’s infl uential survey Planet 
of Slums, for instance, portrays Islamism (along with the Pentecostalist move-
ment) as the “song of the dispossessed.” Drawing on the slums of the Gaza 
Strip and Baghdad, Davis gives a new radical religious agency to slum dwell-
ers as those with “gods of chaos on their side.”2 Not only does Islamic radical-
ism in some ways represent the poor people’s moral, ethical, and religious 
sensibilities, the very existential character of the urban dispossessed, their 
ecological reality, renders them amenable to embracing the extremist ideas of 
radical Islam.
A key assumption underlying many of these narratives is that there is an 
urban ecological and cultural affi  nity between the habitus of the urban poor 
and militant Islamism. Urban poverty and the concentration of the poor in 
the sprawling slum communities infected by anomie and alienation are 
thought to generate a habitus of violence, lawlessness, and extremism, where 
Islamism emerges out of the rubble of hopelessness and moral decay to give 
a religious expression to that mode of life. At the same time, deep religiosity, 
populist desires, shared language, institutions, and fi nally a propensity for 
“traditionalism” are assumed to bring together the urban poor and militant 
Islamists as strategic allies. This way of thinking resonates most in the main-
stream media, which oft en take for granted the link between urban ecol ogy 
and religious extremism in the Muslim world. As an urbanist in Egypt, I have 
been contacted repeatedly by western media to comment on their storylines 
about the causal relationship between rural migration and Islamism, poverty, 
and violence, or the lack of housing (and its privacy) in an atmosphere of 
moral oppression and sexual frustration that allegedly makes poor young 
men resort to extremism and violence.
Does militant Islamism have an urban ecol ogy? Is there a necessary con-
vergence between the social existence of the urban disenfranchised and radi-
cal religious ideologies? Does the urban subaltern constitute the natural locus 
of Islamist politics? Neither has Islamist radicalism in general shown a genu-
ine po liti cal or moral interest in the urban poor, nor have the urban poor ex-
pressed an ideological commitment to Islamist “distant politics,” the politics 
that largely remain abstract from the daily anguish of plebeian life. Militant 
Islamism, chiefl y a middle- class movement and preoccupied with moral poli-
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   172 9/1/09   1:59 PM
—-1
—0
—+1
DOES RADICAL ISLAM HAVE AN URBAN ECOLOGY? 173
tics and ideological struggles, fails to act as the social movement of the urban 
disenfranchised, who may lend support to Islamists only contingently. The 
urban dispossessed tend to follow their own folk religiosity, relatively autono-
mous informal life, and “intimate politics” of the everyday. Free from strict 
ideological loyalties, they are generally oriented toward strategies and associ-
ations that are direct and immediate, meaningful, and manageable— strategies 
whose outcomes they feel they can control. What characterizes the social life 
of the urban dispossessed in the Muslim Middle East is neither simply ano-
mie, alienation, and a “culture of poverty” nor a par tic u lar penchant for em-
bracing Islamist politics, but primarily the practice of “informal life”— a so-
cial existence characterized by autonomy, fl exibility, and pragmatism, where 
survival and self- development occupy a central place. The urban disenfran-
chised tend pragmatically to lend support to diverse po liti cal trends and move-
ments, both governmental and oppositional, including militant Islamism, so 
long as they contribute to those central objectives.
Islamism refers to the ideologies and movements that, notwithstanding 
their variations, aim in general for the establishment of an “Islamic order”— a 
religious state, Islamic laws, and moral codes. Concerns such as establishing 
social justice and improving the life of the poor would be only secondary to this 
strategic target.3 Historically, Islamism has been the language of self- assertion 
to mobilize the largely middle- class overachievers who have felt marginalized 
by the dominant economic, po liti cal, or cultural pro cesses in their societies, 
those for whom the failure of both capitalist modernity and socialist utopia has 
made the language of morality (religion) a substitute for politics. While the grad-
ualist and reformist Islamists, such as the Muslim Brothers in Arab countries, 
pursue nonviolent methods of mobilizing civil society— through work in pro-
fessional associations, NGOs, local mosques, and charities— the militant trends, 
such as al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya in Egypt, resort to armed struggle to seize state 
power through a strategy akin to Leninist insurrectionism. They oft en operate 
clandestinely in urban areas or neighborhoods where the state has a minimal 
presence. Militant Islamists such as al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya in Egypt follow 
strategies similar to those of the left ist guerrillas in Latin America during the 
1960s and 1970s. But they diff er from the current jihadist trends, such as groups 
associated with al- Qaeda. Whereas militant Islamism represents po liti cal 
movements operating within the given nation- states and targeting the secular 
national- states, the jihadists are transnational in ideas and operations and rep-
resent fundamentally “ethical movements.” 4
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THE MUSLIM POOR: URBAN ECOL OGY 
OF VIOLENCE?
While a classic perception, oft en expounded by the national elites, considers the 
urban dispossessed in the Muslim Middle East as passive plebeians who are 
busy struggling to make ends meet— a disposition in line with the “culture of 
poverty”— the more recent and more powerful view refl ects profound anxiety 
over the active and dangerous role the urban poor seem to play in undermining 
modern urbanity and po liti cal civility, paving the way for Islamist extremism.5 
Thus, Egyptian elites— journalists, planners, and politicians— oft en describe 
Cairo as a giant city choked by overpopulation seemingly resulting from the 
infl ux of fellahin (peasants) who threaten its urban confi guration by turning it 
into a “city of peasants.” Cairo’s ecol ogy, they suggest, is being transformed by 
the spread of massive informal settlements, ashwaiyyat, that are “ruralizing” 
the Egyptian urban landscape.6 The prevalence of poverty, joblessness, and un-
dermined family relations fuels concerns that rural migration is laying the 
groundwork for a major social upheaval. Some see ashwaiyyat as “unnatural” 
communities that trigger “social disease” and “abnormal behavior,” owing to 
lack of privacy, overcrowding, and violence; others are outraged by the erosion 
of respect for parents and the prevalence of immorality. Some academics tend to 
perceive the slums as a Hobbesian locus of crime, lawlessness, and extremism 
that produces a “culture of violence” and an “abnormal” way of life, a breeding 
ground for the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. In short, the slums serve and 
sustain the marriage of the poor and militant Islamism.7 Perhaps nowhere was 
this apparent convergence of radical Islam and urban ecol ogy as alarming as in 
secular demo cratic Turkey during the 1990s, when Islamic- oriented parties 
swept municipal and parliamentary elections. In 1994, the landslide triumph of 
the Islamic Rifah Party in municipal elections, which included metropolitan 
Istanbul, alarmed Turkish elites. Istanbul media warned middle- class citizens 
that the invasion of “black Turks,” or migrants from Anatolia, was “threaten-
ing” the social fabric of modern Turkish urbanity.8 Neighborhoods such as 
Sultanbeyli in east Istanbul and Gazi Mahallesi in the west became the hall-
mark of the marriage between the migrant poor and radical Sunnis and Alev-
ites. This new urban ecol ogy has compelled many elite families, like their Egyp-
tian counterparts, to seek refuge in new gated communities.
In Iran, many Islamist leaders and scholars alike had already presented 
the dislocated migrant poor as the natural social basis of Iran’s Islamic Revo-
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lution. The “revolution of the downtrodden” was crucial to the pro cess. Rural 
migrants in par tic u lar  were seen as the fundamental social basis of Islamist 
movements.9 Some observers considered the miserable living conditions, vio-
lent behavior, and déclassé character of the “lumpenproletariat” as factors 
that made them support Khomeini- type revolution.10 In par tic u lar, the “the 
populist ideology of Islam seems to play a crucial role in mobilizing the 
masses.” 11 In a neo- Durkheimian paradigm, many scholars see Islam— its in-
stitutions and rituals, in general— as off ering a moral community and sense of 
belonging to the dislocated migrants brutalized by anomie and alienation, the 
key eff ects of competitive and atomizing modern urban life.12
Once they are perceived as natural allies, militant Islamism and the poor 
need only po liti cal opportunity to realize their alliance. One such opportu-
nity developed in Iran, owing to its remarkable economic development and 
social change, spearheaded by the authoritarian Shah. The urban poor, the 
by- product of the modernization pro cess, benefi ted little from this economic 
growth. Indeed, they  were its victims. Though relatively few (some 20 percent 
of the urban population), they constituted, by the late 1970s, a fairly distinct 
social group and became a major support base for Islamists during and aft er 
the revolution.13 A similar narrative is applied to Egypt, where, the story goes, 
in spite of Nasserite pop u lism that off ered mea sures to assist the “pop u lar 
classes,” the postpopulist era, notably the period of “open door” (infi tah) and 
“structural adjustment,” coincided with the gradual withdrawal of the state 
from its traditional social contract. The space was gradually fi lled by the mount-
ing activities of the reformist and militant Islamists during the 1980s and 
1990s. Dislocated rural people, disenfranchised migrants, alienated by the 
brutality of modern competitive and individualistic urban life, yearned for a 
moral community and sense of belonging, which Islamic institutions such as 
the mosques could readily supply.14
Thus, in Egypt the fusion between Islamism and the urban poor was fa-
cilitated, on the one hand, by Islamist activists mobilizing the poor through 
opposition mosques and Islamic associations, and, on the other, by the fact 
that activists originated largely from the impoverished quarters of large cities. 
In Gilles Kepel’s view, for instance, “the milieu that is the most fertile source 
of Islamist militants is the 20 to 25 age- group in the sprawling neighbour-
hoods on the outskirts of the big cities.”15 Similar arguments  were made by 
Nazih Ayubi, Hamid Ansari, and others to stress the militants’ impoverished 
disposition. For others, the seemingly proletarian profi le of militant Islamists, 
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their populist rhetoric, and shared urban space (notwithstanding their violent 
methods) render them the movement of the urban dispossessed.16 Islamist ac-
tivists in Cairo, we are oft en told, had infi ltrated thousands of Islamic associa-
tions and mosques located in such slums as Ain Shams, Matariyya, Imbaba, 
Bulaq Addakrour, and Azzawaya al- Hamrah.17 They used mosques to assem-
ble, communicate, or ga nize activities, recruit new members, and preach 
against authorities. Some of the larger and older associations, such as the As-
sociation of Shar῾ iyya,18 Jama῾ iyya el- Shaban el- Muslemin, and Jamai῾yya In-
sar Sunna Muhammadiyya, had already been involved in illegal po liti cal ac-
tivities.19 Such mosques and associations also provided medical care, literacy 
classes, and fund- raising activities to build po liti cal support.
THE MYTH OF THE ISLAMIST POOR
There is certainly some truth in some of these narratives. The urban poor are 
concentrated in the slums where militant Islamists have also sought shelter. 
The poor are inclined to seek assistance from local nonstate agents, including 
mosques and religious donations. Religious associations and NGOs have be-
come centers that, in the absence of the state, provide many types of welfare 
support— material, cultural, and communal— helping the dispossessed to sur-
vive in the harsh urban structure. And fi nally, some degree of crime and vio-
lence does exist in the informal communities, especially when the state agen-
cies, for instance police stations, are largely absent. Yet these pro cesses do not 
necessarily render the urban disenfranchised anomic, alienated, extremist, or 
the strategic ally and the social basis of militant Islamism.
Indeed, the “convergence argument” is grounded for the most part in a 
structural deduction premised on underlying assumptions that are prob-
lematic empirically. To begin with, the poor in Iran remained largely aloof 
from the Islamic Revolution, in which the chief participants included the 
urban middle classes, students, government employees, bazaar merchants, 
shop keep ers, and industrial workers. The poor joined the revolution only at 
its last stage, a month or so before the Shah’s regime collapsed, when opposi-
tion leader Shahpour Bakhtiar formed the last government under the Shah. 
At this time, the urban poor  were mobilized less through mosques and 
hey a᾽ts than through the activities of the Islamic Consumer Cooperatives 
and, especially, Neighborhood Councils, through which middle- class youth 
brought the experience of the revolution to poor neighborhoods by off ering 
them basic goods and fuel at the time of an acute shortage brought on by 
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an ongoing general strike that had crippled production and distribution 
systems.20
Thus, the language of mustaz῾ afi n (the downtrodden), referring primarily 
to the urban disenfranchised, dominated the populist discourse of Islamist 
offi  cials mainly aft er the victory of the revolution, when mobilization of the 
poor became the subject of intense competition between various po liti cal 
groups. The ruling clergy needed to win over the dispossessed as its social ba-
sis in its mounting struggles against liberals, left ists, and remnants of the for-
mer regime. In par tic u lar, Islamic leaders aimed to disarm the left  of its pro- 
working- class campaign. In turn, the left  (various Marxist organizations and 
the radical Islamic Mujahedin- e Khalq) appealed to the poor on ideological 
principles in an attempt to build pop u lar support for themselves. It was in this 
period that the po liti cal orientation of the now- ruling Islamists and the urban 
disenfranchised converged. Pro- poor rhetoric abounded in general exhorta-
tions to improve their living conditions, build housing, and increase commu-
nity development. This honeymoon did not last long, as the new state func-
tionaries did not and could not follow through on their rhetoric to help the 
urban disenfranchised. Consequently, the poor  were polarized. Some seg-
ments (including groups within the newly established revolutionary institu-
tions such as the pasdaran, basij, and the Construction Crusade)  were incor-
porated into the state structure, but others remained outside the system, and 
their struggles for self- development (expressed in the occupation of homes 
and hotels, squatting on land for shelter, illegal construction, and in securing 
collective consumption and jobs) brought them into confl ict with the Islamic 
state. These included hybrid elements whose ideological affi  nity with the Is-
lamic government did not deter them from fi ghting its agents in their daily 
struggles.21
In Egypt, as pointed out earlier, claims of a fusion between Islamism and 
the urban poor are based on two assumptions: fi rst, that Islamist activists mo-
bilized the poor through opposition mosques and Islamic associations, and, 
second, that activists originated largely from the impoverished quarters of 
large cities— those that are instilled with a social ecol ogy that supposedly 
breeds extremist and deviant activities and ideologies. The Imbaba incident 
conferred new credence to this kind of thinking. It reinforced the myth of the 
“Islamist dispossessed” obscuring the dynamics and constituency of po liti cal 
Islam. What particularly added to this mythology was, fi rst, the Egyptian 
state’s sudden apprehension of an emerging “Islamist threat” which in turn 
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caused unpre ce dented publicity around the theme of “urban ecol ogy of Is-
lamist extremism”; and, second, the subsequent “scientifi c” intervention of 
the “expert community” (sociologists, criminologists, and journalists), who 
associated the rise of Islamic militancy and violence with the spread of ash-
waiyyat. These experts, in a sense, gave authoritative backing to the fusion of 
the histories of the urban poor and po liti cal Islam. But the reality was much 
more complex.
Although many militants did reside in the ashwaiyyat, this did not neces-
sarily indicate a strategy devoted to mobilizing the poor. Like many middle- 
class Egyptians, the militants simply did not have much choice when it came 
to where they lived. The lack of aff ordable housing had made a spatially “mar-
ginalized” middle class (educated youth, professionals, and civil ser vice em-
ployees) an Egyptian urban phenomenon— a trend that fi gures into the class 
and spatial dynamics of many other cities in the global South. As the new 
middle classes, especially newlyweds and the young,  were excluded from the 
housing market in more conventional urban quarters, they  were pushed into 
city outskirts, creating heterogeneous informal communities where residents, 
while they shared the perils and possibilities of their common space, diff ered 
considerably in occupations, style, education, and even worldviews. In other 
words, many who live and function in these poor areas do not necessarily 
belong to the so cio log i cal category of the urban poor, defi ned as low- skilled, 
low- income, low- security, and low- status working people.22 On the other hand, 
the informal nature of these neighborhoods (without street names,  house 
numbers, offi  cial registration, or maps) ensured a safe haven for Islamist mili-
tants, chased by the police, who  were on the run from the sugar fi elds of South-
ern Egypt. Some indeed tried to integrate in the well- off  districts of Mohande-
sin, Agouza, and Maadi, but strict police surveillance compelled them to 
move into the opaque neighborhoods of Ain Shams and Imbaba.23
Islamists did infi ltrate charity associations. However, the extent of their 
infl uence is oft en exaggerated. Out of thousands of religious NGOs, only a few 
dozen fell under the infl uence of po liti cal Islamists. The rest  were or ga nized 
either by non- Islamist pious Muslims or expanded owing to market ratio-
nale.24 The sale of religious commodities grew signifi cantly during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Beyond books, recorded sermons, music, and fashion, the market 
for Islamic cultural and educational goods and ser vices expanded because of 
their quality, aff ordability, and religious clout. Many became involved in Is-
lamic associations, not only because they served the needy or provided spiri-
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tual motivation, but also because religious associations provided them with 
jobs and even lucrative business. A few studies of Islamic clinics in Cairo, for 
instance, revealed that the incentive for many of their staff , including doctors, 
was not so much religious obligation as professional opportunity.25 For the 
low- status occupation of nursing, Islamic associations off ered a more respect-
able and reputable place to work. Meanwhile, many schools remained Islamic 
only in name.
More important, like the Ira ni an clergy in prerevolutionary Iran, Egyp-
tian Islamists (both reformist and militant) showed only slight strategic inter-
est in the po liti cal mobilization of the urban subaltern. They never considered 
the urban disenfranchised as a special group in which to invest po liti cally (in the 
way that Marxists considered the industrial proletariat; or Frantz Fanon, the 
“marginal poor” in colonized Africa). In the writings and statements of al- 
Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya and El- Jihad, as in the sermons of Ayatollah Khomeini be-
fore the revolution, references to the poor, let alone views of them as po liti cal 
agents,  were rare.26 Obviously, the secular liberal daily al- Wafd and left ist al- 
Ahaly paid more attention to the plight of the poor than did the Islamist al- 
Sha῾ b or the Muslim Brothers’ publications; the latter focused invariably on 
broader po liti cal and religious matters, such as government corruption, inter-
national Zionism, or world Islamic politics. In my regular Friday visits to a 
number of mosques in Cairo’s poor neighborhoods (Sayyeda Zeinab, Boulaq 
Abul Ela, Darb al- Ahmar, Mar Girgis) during the fall of 1996, Islamic activ-
ism was limited to the sale of tapes by preachers such as Omar Abdul- Kafi , 
Shaykh Kishk, Ahmad Al- Ajami, and Muhammad Hissamah, or of religious 
books and pamphlets covering such topics as life aft er death, marriage, 
women and Islam, jinn, and the dev il.
This po liti cal and ideological distance would set militant Islamism apart 
from Latin American liberation theology, which seemed to establish a more 
organic relation with the poor.27 Whereas the point of departure for liberation 
theology was the “liberation of the poor,” where the gospel was then reread 
and reinterpreted to achieve this fundamental goal,28 Islamist movements 
have in general aimed for the establishment of an Islamic order (a religious 
state with Islamic laws and moral codes); concerns such as establishing social 
justice and improving the life of the poor would follow from this strategic 
target.29 Thus, while for liberation theology concern for the poor was an end 
in itself, indeed, a doctrinal matter, the Islamists’ mobilization of the poor 
had largely the po liti cal purpose of achieving change to clear the way for the 
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establishment of an Islamic order.30 Instead of being an expression of cultural 
identity as in Islamism, liberation theology, partially inspired by humanist 
Marxism, was embedded in the indigenous discourse of development, under-
development, and de pen den cy that Latin America was fi ercely debating at the 
time. Indeed, the idiom “theology of liberation” emerged in the context of 
clerics exploring a “theology of development,” a notion in which the emanci-
pation of the poor was central.31 Islamism, however, has had a diff erent birth 
and birthplace. Broadly speaking, it arose as a language of self- assertion to 
mobilize those (largely middle- class overachievers) who felt marginalized by 
the dominant economic, po liti cal, or cultural pro cesses, those for whom the 
failure of both capitalist modernity and socialist utopia made the language 
of morality (religion) a substitute for politics. In a sense, it was the Muslim 
middle- class way of rejecting those whom they considered their excluders— 
their national elites, secular governments, and these governments’ western 
allies. As an alternative to existing models, they imagined a utopian society 
and state for Muslim humanity. Da῾ wa (an invitation to Islam), not necessar-
ily the liberation of the poor, became a key objective for Islamists, and elitism 
continued to guide their politics.32
Just as the Islamists treated the urban poor in pragmatic terms, the urban 
grass roots in turn approached the Islamists in instrumentalist fashion. In 
postrevolution Iran, the disenfranchised took advantage of the intense compe-
tition between ruling clergy and the po liti cal left  in order to mobilize the poor. 
The poor came to realize their power and used the opportunity to make de-
mands and improve their lot, by squatting on land and in homes, upgrading 
their community, and acquiring consumer goods.33 In Egypt, many among 
the poor had no direct interaction with Islamists and remained confused as to 
their intentions, while others, such as the residents of Imbaba’s ashwaiyyat, 
remained apprehensive and yet appreciative of the ser vices they provided. 
The Imbaba incident placed the urban dispossessed and ashwaiyyat at the 
center of Egypt’s po liti cal and developmental debates. If the ashwaiyyat  were 
regarded as the fundamental locus of extremism and Islamism, then undoing 
them, that is, either upgrading or destroying these entities, was expected to 
ameliorate the situation. Thus on May 1, 1993, a year aft er the Imbaba inci-
dent, President Mubarak authorized that “an immediate implementation of a 
national program in upgrading the most important ser vices and facilities in 
haphazardly built areas in all governorates.”34 USAID had already moved into 
Imbaba with a large- scale project to pave roads and develop sewer systems. 
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Eu ro pe an NGOs followed suit with community development projects in the 
ashwaiyyat. In 1996, 127 zones out of 527 targeted zones “were fully upgraded” 
by the Egyptian government, and by 1998, it had spent EL 3.8 billion 
($700M) on community upgrading. Hasan Sultan (also known as Hasan 
Karate), commander of the military wing of the al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya in 
Imbaba, was turned into a symbol of this “integration.” Having turned 
himself over to police aft er managing to escape the siege, he was now al-
lowed to go free and establish a street kiosk in the heart of Imbaba, Munira 
Gharbiya.35 The government’s policy of urban renewal sought in part a 
common objective of turning opaque communities into transparent entities 
(mapping, naming the streets, and numbering homes) partly in pursuit of 
ensuring surveillance.
What ever the motives behind these developmental programs, the poor 
welcomed both government and Islamic initiatives. Yet they declined to ex-
tend ideological allegiance to either the state or the Islamists. If anything, 
most of them expressed profound indignation about the use of po liti cal vio-
lence by both Islamists and the state. For the most part, the poor relied on 
themselves to survive and improve their lives.
CULTURE OF POVERTY OR INFORMAL LIFE?
If uncertainty and utilitarianism characterized the relationship between the 
poor and Islamism, then why do the predominant narratives continue to in-
sist on the fusion of militant Islamism and the dispossessed? I suggest that 
these narratives refl ect the profound anxieties of the elite and the media con-
cerning the urban ecol ogy of Islamist extremism. They are also general claims 
premised on erroneous presuppositions about urban society and politics in 
the Muslim Middle East.
First, in many Middle Eastern countries, demographic changes since the 
1980s have produced a complex spatial pattern. Many large cities have ceased 
to be centers of rural migrants. Population movement from the countryside to 
large urban centers has leveled off , while rural areas have begun to assume 
some aspects of urban life: consumption patterns, diverse occupations, more 
extensive division of labor, and higher rates of literacy. For instance, in 1996, 
over 80 percent of Cairo’s population and 86 percent of Alexandria’s had been 
born in their city. Of the remaining migrants, over 80 percent, the over-
whelming majority, had come from other cities, not the countryside. Tehran 
followed a remarkably similar demographic pattern, with only 15 percent of 
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residents being migrants, and most of them, too,  were from other urban 
centers.
Second, the politicians and academic community (sociologists and crimi-
nologists) in Egypt viewed the ashwaiyyat through the prism of the concept of 
“slums” formulated in the United States. This model emerged in part from the 
studies of inner- city African American ghettos, where joblessness and de-
cayed family structure are said to be responsible for crime and violence. U.S. 
scholarship on “slums” is heavily informed by the notion of “neighborhood 
eff ects” that are assumed to be responsible for socially isolating the poor from 
conventional life- chances and norms. “Neighborhood eff ects” embrace many 
spatial meta phors, such as “concentration eff ects,” “spatial isolation,” or “ghet-
toized poor,” that overdetermine poor people’s habitus.36 Egyptian researchers 
invoking the American model assumed a priori that Cairo’s ashwaiyyat, for 
instance,  were urban ecologies that fostered isolationism, anomie, lawlessness, 
extremism, and Islamist violence.37 The fact is that local cultures have unde-
niable impact on the subculture of the poor wherever they are. The level of 
crime in the ashwaiyyat was not conspicuously higher than that in other ar-
eas. Serious scholarly works on Cairo’s poor areas invariably confi rmed the 
prevalence of a “cultural capital of tolerance,” resourcefulness, a strong sense 
of community, solid family relations, fi rm social control of children and youth, 
and high hopes for the future, and showed Cairo, a megacity with enormous 
urban problems, to be one of the world’s safest cities, a quality quite distinct 
from its counterparts in Latin America.38
Indeed, the strict offi  cial defi nition of what constitutes an urban unit and 
the invention of the notions of ashwaiyyat, hashieye- nishini, gecekondus, as 
po liti cal categories tend to produce spatial divisions that exclude many citi-
zens from urban participation. The ashwaiyyat, hashieye- nishini, or gecekon-
dus are perceived as “abnormal” places where “nonmodern” people— that is, 
the villagers, traditionalists, nonconformists, or unintegrated— live. But this 
oversimplifi ed picture obscures the fact that populations of informal settle-
ments are involved in the complex urban economy and division of labor. In 
the old so cio log i cal tradition, what in social terms defi nes “urban” is primar-
ily the organic ensemble in a par tic u lar space of a variety of lifestyles and 
economic activities, and those of the informal settlements constitute but one 
signifi cant component of the diversifi ed  whole that is the city.
It is true that many of the inhabitants of informal communities pursue an 
“informal life.” That is, they tend to function as much as possible outside the 
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boundaries of the state and modern bureaucratic institutions. For instance, 
they wish to exert some degree of autonomy in their working and cultural 
lives, basing their relationships on reciprocity, trust, and negotiations, rather 
than on the modern notions of individual self- interest, fi xed rules, and con-
tracts. Thus, they might opt for self- employment or resort to informal dispute- 
resolution rather than report to the police; they might be married by a local 
shaykh rather than at government offi  ces; or they might borrow money from 
informal credit associations rather than from banks. This is the case, to repeat 
from Chapter 3, not because these people are essentially non- or antimodern 
but because the conditions of their existence compel them to seek an informal 
way of life. That is so because modernity is a costly enterprise, in that it requires 
a capacity to conform to the types of behavior (adherence to strict discipline 
of time, space, contracts, and so on) that most poor people simply cannot 
aff ord.
The activities of Islamist militants in Cairo’s Imbaba or Istanbul’s Sultan-
beyli reinforced the image of “informals” as a Hobbesian locus of lawlessness, 
violence, and religious extremism. These may indeed be present in poor squat-
ter areas. However, this type of behavior is not the result of inhabitants’ cul-
tural essentials, since informal communities, despite their appearance, consist 
of heterogeneous occupational and cultural universes. Although stigmatized 
as “rural,” they not only receive migrants from urban core areas but are also 
home to young people and newlyweds— the future of these nations.39 Informal 
settlements in the Middle East are not simply poverty belts but are also home 
to many middle- class urbanites, professionals, and civil servants. What per-
haps breeds lawlessness is not the cultural essentials of residents but rather the 
consequences of their “outsiderness,” the communities’ density and lack of 
spatial clarity. An “outsider” community, even if it is located in the heart of the 
city, by defi nition lacks street names,  house numbers, paved roads, maps, po-
lice presence, and, thus, state control. Islamist violence attributed directly to 
informal cities’ social ecol ogy is more complex than a phenomenon of poverty 
and ignorance. In Cairo, militants (from al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya and al- Jihad) 
 were mostly young, educated individuals, many of whom lived in the ash-
waiyyat because of Cairo’s high housing costs, which exclude and marginalize 
many, including middle- class families. So cio log i cally, these young, educated 
people  were diff erent from the cultural type portrayed by some academics, 
planners, and the media, and there is paltry empirical evidence to suggest that 
they shared the features that characterize Oscar Lewis’s “culture of poverty.” 
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The key sociocultural mode among the Muslim poor in the Middle East is not 
the “culture of poverty” but “informal life.”
The preceding discussions indicate that the relationship between radical 
Islam and the habitus of the dispossessed is more complex than oft en pre-
sented. The claims about organic convergence between the two oft en refl ect 
fear by the national and international elites (politics and media) about the 
social consequences of urban marginality. In reality, however, the dispos-
sessed show no more natural propensity toward extremism or Islamism than 
Islamists (notwithstanding their populist rhetoric) show strategic interest in 
the dispossessed as a po liti cal player or moral target. More oft en than not, a 
utilitarian politics governs the relationship between the urban disenfranchised 
and Islamist activists. As I have discussed elsewhere, the poor cannot aff ord 
to be ideological. Their interests lie in strategies, organizations, and associa-
tions that respond directly to their immediate concerns. To be ideological re-
quires certain capacities (time, risk taking, money) that the disenfranchised 
oft en lack.40 In the Muslim Middle East, the po liti cal class par excellence re-
mains the educated middle class (students, intellectuals, and professionals), 
which both Islamist and secular movements target. “Low- politics,” or local-
ized struggles for concrete concerns, are the stuff  of the urban dispossessed. 
For the dispossessed, it is largely the localized struggles, unlike the abstract 
and distant notions of “revolution” or “reform,” that are both meaningful and 
manageable— meaningful in that they can make sense of the purpose and 
have an idea of the consequences of those actions, and manageable in that 
they, rather than some remote national (Islamist or secular) leaders, set the 
agenda, project the aims, and control the outcome.
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it might sound out of place to invoke the idea of cosmopolitanism in global 
conditions dominated by the language of “clash”— clash of cultures, civiliza-
tions, religions, or ethnicities. The discourse of clash is so overwhelming that 
it is as though it  were the sole feature of today’s cultural, religious, and com-
munal life. It may be plausible for the prevailing scholarship to pay more at-
tention to human confl ict as a subject of inquiry than to cooperation or shar-
ing, because hierarchy and relations of power (in terms of for instance class, 
gender, and race) constitute the key features of human societies. But what 
does justify portraying the relationships between diff erent cultures, religions, 
or national origins (horizontal groups) predominantly in terms of confl ict? 
This tendency is partially rooted in the “primordialist,” outlook which deems 
ethno- religious groupings as natural, permanent, and bounded entities with 
clear and everlasting lines of cultural demarcation, and thus prone to division 
and clash.1 However, this line of thinking has been challenged by those who 
see such communities as dynamic beings, subject to continuous deconstruc-
tion, shift ing boundaries, and reconstruction.2 In other words, “communi-
ties” are not simply introverted and exclusive collectives whose relation with 
others is defi ned merely in terms of mistrust. Rather, communities also at-
tempt to overcome their diff erences and live together.3
This chapter aims to transcend overemphasis on relations of confl ict, by 
highlighting the other, more common but unnoticed and inaudible pro cesses 
Adapted from a contribution that originally appeared in Shail Mayaram, ed. The 
Other Global City (London: Routledge, 2009).
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of human conduct, to show how people belonging to diff erent cultural or reli-
gious groupings can and do reach out of their immediate selves by intensely 
interacting in their lifeworlds with members of other cultural or religious col-
lectives. In short, they experience a cosmopolitan coexistence. Cosmopolitan-
ism refers to both a social condition and an ethical project. In the fi rst place, it 
signifi es certain objective pro cesses, such as globalization, migration, and 
traveling that compel people of diverse communal, national, or racial affi  lia-
tions to associate, work, and live together. These pro cesses lead to diminishing 
cultural homogeneity in favor of diversity, variety, and plurality of cultures, 
religions, and lifestyles. In this sense Dubai, for instance, represents a cosmo-
politan city- state, in that it juxtaposes individuals and families of diverse na-
tional, cultural, and racial ties, who live and work next to one another within 
a small geo graph i cal space.
Cosmopolitanism has also ethical and normative dimensions; it is a proj-
ect with humanistic objectives. In this sense, cosmopolitanism is deployed to 
challenge the language of separation and antagonism, to confront cultural 
superiority and ethnocentrism. It further stands opposed to communalism, 
where the inward- looking and close- knit ethnic or religious collectives es-
pouse narrow, exclusive, and selfi sh interests. Cosmopolitanism of this sort 
also overrides the “multiculturalist” paradigm. Because although multicul-
turalism calls for equal coexistence of diff erent cultures within a national so-
ciety, it is still preoccupied with cultural boundaries— an outlook that departs 
from a cosmopolitan lifeworld where intense interaction, mixing, and sharing 
tend to blur communal boundaries, generating hybrid and “impure” cultural 
practices.
But is this cosmopolitanism not the prerogative of the elites, a bourgeois 
lifestyle? Certainly elites are in a better material position to experience cos-
mopolitan lifestyle; they are the ones who can easily aff ord frequent travel, by 
which they taste diff erent cuisines and experience alternative modes of life 
and cultural products. In addition, unlike the poor, the privileged groups need 
not rely on exclusive communalistic networks as a venue to secure social 
protection— something that tends to reinforce more inward- looking commu-
nalism. However, the objective possibility to experience mixing, mingling, 
and sharing is not the same as the desire and ability to do so. How many of 
those elite expatriates residing in the metropolises of the global South, Dubai 
for instance, share cultural life with those of the poor of the host society? In a 
closer look, the cosmopolitan Dubai turns out to be no more than a “city- state 
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of relatively gated communities” marked by sharp communal and spatial 
boundaries, with labor camps (of south Asian migrants) and the segregated 
milieu of parochial jet- setters, or the “cosmopolitan” ghettos of the western 
elite expatriates who remain bounded within the physical safety and cultural 
purity of their own reclusive collectives.4
What is oft en ignored or downplayed is the cosmopolitanism of the subal-
tern.5 Evidence from early twentieth- century Cairo, Baghdad, Jerusalem, and 
Aleppo suggests how, beyond the elites, the ordinary members of diff erent 
religious communities— Muslims, Jews, Christians, Shi῾is, or Sunnis— were 
engaged in intense intercommunal exchange and shared lives in neighbor-
hoods or at work;6 they  were engaged in “everyday cosmopolitanism.” By ev-
eryday cosmopolitanism I mean the idea and practice of transcending self— 
at the various levels of individual, family, tribe, religion, ethnicity, community, 
and nation— to associate with agonistic others in everyday life. It describes 
the ways in which the ordinary members of diff erent ethno- religious and 
cultural groups mix, mingle, intensely interact, and share in values and 
practices— in the cultures of food, fashion, language, and symbols; in history 
and memory. In everyday life, women in par tic u lar act as protagonists in ini-
tiating cosmopolitan exchange and association. In the mixed neighborhoods, 
women move easily between  houses, chat, exchange gossip, lend or borrow 
things from neighbors. They participate in weddings, funerals, or religious 
festivals. Children of diff erent confessional affi  liations play together in the al-
leyways, teens befriend, and men may make neighborly visits. This notion of 
cosmopolitanism signifi es how such association and sharing aff ect the mean-
ing of “us” and “them” and its dynamics, which in turn blurs and problema-
tizes the meaning of group boundaries. The “everyday cosmopolitanism” may 
not go as far as the oft en abstract and philosophical notions of Stoicist “world 
citizenship” but engages in the modest and down- to- earth, yet highly relevant, 
ways in which ordinary men and women from diff erent communal worlds 
manage to engage, associate, and live together at the level of the everyday.
However, cosmopolitan association of this sort does not grow in a vacuum. 
It takes shape under specifi c structures and possesses par tic u lar geographies. 
Modern urbanity per se potentially contributes to cosmopolitan habitus by 
facilitating geographies of coexistence between the members of diff erent reli-
gious or ethnic groups. But this may be so not just because people of diff erent 
religions and cultures naturally come to live and interact with one another; 
aft er all, neighbors might dislike and distrust one another; rather because 
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proximity and interaction can open opportunities for divergent cultural groups 
to experience trust between them and coexistence in daily life. But the paradox 
of modern urbanity is that not only can it engender cosmopolitan coexistence, 
but it can also facilitate communal identities. A modern city like Cairo tends, 
on the one hand, to diff erentiate, fragment, and break down the traditional 
face- to- face ethnic or religious- based communities by facilitating the experi-
ence of sharing with other cultural- religious groupings. At the same time, 
however, religious- ethnic identities may persist or get reinvented not neces-
sarily through face- to- face interactions, but through the construction of 
imaginary or “distanciated” communities. The modern city has a tendency to 
diff erentiate, individualize, and fragment its inhabitants, to weaken the tradi-
tional ties, break down extended family (among people who can aff ord to be-
come autonomous), and increase geo graph i cal mobility. The logic of land use, 
cost of housing, and jobs oft en determine where families settle. Spatial con-
gregations based upon ethnic or religious affi  liation gives way to class segre-
gation, so that the ethno- religious communities based on intense interper-
sonal interactions are undermined as their members break up into clusters of 
individual families dispersing across the vast expanse of the city, where they 
are compelled to connect to the “larger society,” and where religious members 
may experience real interactions and sharing with city dwellers of diff erent 
religious or ethnic affi  liations. But deep association and sharing between 
members of diff erent communities does not mean the end of religious or eth-
nic identities. On the contrary, the breakdown of faith- based local collectives 
can, in conditions of general uncertainty and threat, give rise to diff erent—
“virtual” or “distanciated”— religious communities.  Here identity is based 
not upon real cooperative experiences, but on imagining ties with distant, 
faceless, and unknown “brothers” or “sisters,” whose general whereabouts 
are shared through modern networks of daily papers, via tele vi sion, or 
through heresy and rumor. This dialectic of both inner- communal identity, 
on the one hand, and the real day- to- day cooperation with people outside, on 
the other, generates a more complex intercommunal dynamics than simply 
harmony or confl ict. For individuals are likely to test their imaginary and 
abstract view of the “other” (resulting from, for instance, prejudice or provo-
cation) against the experience of real association they develop with them. 
This is how I see Muslim– Christian relations in today’s Cairo.
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MAPPING THE COMMUNAL DIVIDE
In 2008, Egypt represents primarily a Muslim majority nation. Yet a substan-
tial proportion of the population, some 8 to 10 percent, or six million, are 
Coptic Christians.7 Christianity came to Egypt with the Roman conquest, but 
it grew largely from the mid- fi rst century AD onwards. It is suggested that the 
oppressive rule of the Roman Empire created a sort of nationalistic Coptic, or 
Egyptian, Christianity that stood in opposition to the Byzantine authorities. 
With the Arab conquest in 639 AD came Islamization and Arabization of 
Egypt, so that by the tenth century the Muslim population had ascended to 
the majority.8 Conversion to Islam was not smooth. Some embraced Islam 
voluntarily for its promise of justice, many did so to avoid special taxation, 
while still others did to acquire equal social and po liti cal status with Mus-
lims.9 In the meantime, Arabic gradually replaced “Coptic language”; since 
the government bureaucracy used Arabic language, it compelled the Coptic 
elite (who continued to work in the administration) to learn Arabic and teach 
it to their children, who would then pursue occupations like their fathers’. 
When in the twelft h century Pope Gabriel decreed that the church use Arabic 
language in its sermons, lay Copts also moved to speak in this language. In the 
end, Arabic became the language of Egyptians, both Muslim converts and the 
remaining Christians, with the Coptic language dying out sometime between 
the fourteenth and eigh teenth centuries.10
Under Muslim rule during Umar (717– 40), Copts became a dhimmi (non- 
Muslim) “minority,” denied of serving in the army, and of high po liti cal posi-
tions, and subject to a special poll tax (in exchange for their protection), 
jizya, for centuries. It was not until the reign of Said Pasha in 1856 that the 
dhimmi status was dropped, the poll tax was lift ed, and Copts became full 
citizens. Mamluk rulers (1250– 1517) had already attempted to create a balance 
between the Copts and the Muslims by recruiting the former into bureau-
cracy and trade, so that Copts became a counterpart to a growing educated 
Muslim “middle class,” which also aspired to positions in government  offi  ces. 
Modern times brought formal equality between the two communities. Mu-
hammad Ali’s Hamayouni Decree in 1856 established Coptic personal status 
laws, allowed them into the military, and promised freedom of religion, 
equality in employment, and removal of all discriminatory terms and sym-
bols, even though the construction of churches remains a contested issue 
even today.
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The “Liberal Age” (1923– 52) was the hallmark of Coptic public presence 
and citizenship. Elite Copts and Muslims developed almost identical liberal 
lifestyles and tastes, informed by French Enlightenment and En glish liberal 
trends. In the early twentieth century two Christians became prime minister 
(Boutros Ghali Pasha, 1908– 10; and Youssef Wahba Pasha, 1919– 20). Wafd, the 
po liti cal party of in de pen dence, was so close to Copts that Islamists and ultra-
nationalist Misr- al- Fitah labeled Wafd the “Party of Copts,” and the king the 
“protector of Islam.” Although the Revolution of 1952 treated Copts and Mus-
lims equally in welfare dispensation and educational attainment, it infl icted 
disproportionate economic losses on the Coptic community. Being exces-
sively richer than Muslims, Christians lost more to Gamal Abdel Nasser’s na-
tionalization policies than did Muslims (some 75 percent of their work and 
property).11 Following the dissolution of po liti cal parties, their presence in 
politics and parliament drastically declined. These developments led to the 
fi rst wave of Coptic emigration, to Canada, the United States, and Australia in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The continuing outfl ow of educated Copts, together with 
the rise of Islamist militancy in Egypt since the 1970s, has cemented a strong 
identity politics among the vocal Coptic community in exile and to a lesser 
degree among Copts living in Egypt.
Since the 1980s, the status of Coptic Christians in relation to Muslims in 
Egyptian history has become the site of a contentious positioning. Both the 
reality of Christian– Muslim relations and its repre sen ta tion have been deeply 
politicized. In this contestation, “history,” as usual, has become the battle-
ground. One view expressed mainly by the militant Copts in exile and at 
home considers Christian Copts as a distinct ethnicity with distinct ancestry, 
religion, and way of life, but one that has been relegated by the Muslim major-
ity and the Egyptian state to the status of an oppressed “minority.”12 The very 
meaning of the term Copt, rooted in the word Aegyptos, or Egypt, suggests 
Christians to be the “true original Egyptians,” a distinct racial group who over 
time have been turned into a “second- class” population.13 Interestingly, mili-
tant Islamists in Egypt likewise attribute a distinct ethnic character to Coptic 
Christians, albeit not as “oppressed” minority, but as the stooge of crusaders 
and western interests. In contrast, most Coptic intellectuals and church lead-
ers, as well as Muslim elites inside Egypt, view Muslim– Coptic relations in a 
unique fashion that does not resemble any other interethnic or interreligious 
dynamics. Such Coptic fi gures as Samir Morcos, Hani Labib, Ghali Shukri, 
Milad Hanna and the like, together with Muslim counterparts such as Tariq 
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el- Bishri, Salim el- Awa, or Jamal Badawi view Egyptian Christian Copts not 
as a so cio log i cal “minority,” but as players and partners in the unique 
Egyptian- Arab- Islamic civilization. The Coptic population is seen as an inte-
gral element in the category of “Egyptian people,” on par with their Muslim 
counterparts, while Egypt is constituted as a “unique entity,” a “land of inher-
ent pluralism and mélange” owing to its pharaonic, Greco- Roman, Coptic, 
and Islamic heritage.14 In Gamal Hamdan’s words, most of today’s Egyptian 
Muslims are yesterday’s Copts [ . . .  ]. In fact Egyptians are made partly of 
Muslim Copts and partly Christian Copts, considering that the word “Copt” 
means “Egyptian.”15 According to Christian Hani Labib, although Islamists 
may consider Copts to be second- class citizens, the Egyptian constitution 
rules for equality, and the modern state renders the concept of dhimmi status 
redundant.16 While the former view insists on “minority” status, “discrimina-
tion,” and confl ict, the latter underlies “citizenship,” “equality,” and accom-
modation. Yet both seem to characterize Coptic reality in terms of certain 
“objective,” historical, and cultural “facts,” a long standing metanarrative. 
There is little reference to everyday life pro cesses, to interpersonal relations 
and agency, to specifi c episodes of confl ict, to the intricate marriage of both 
clash and coexistence, nor especially to the spatial dimension of these 
pro cesses.17
NARRATIVES OF CONFLICTS
Notwithstanding claims about the “unique historic affi  nity” between Egypt’s 
Christians and Muslims, evidence of episodic sectarian confl ict, clash, and 
violence abounds. In modern times, three episodes of sectarian clash stand 
out: British colonial period, the presidency of Anwar Sadat, and the Islamist 
era. During its colonial rule, Britain deployed the usual divide- and- rule strat-
egy to separate Copts from the national movement. It recognized the Copts 
as an “ethnic minority,” stressing their anthropological “distinctiveness.” En-
couraged by the British support, groups of Copts, notably wealthy families, 
pursued a sectarian line, demanding in 1911 a special Coptic repre sen ta tion in 
councils and the legal system, proposing a “Sunday holiday” instead of Fri-
days. Muslims responded with dismay, rejecting the demands. Yet the majority 
of Copts seemed to disapprove of the British emphasis on “Coptic distinctive-
ness,” rejecting the attempt to insert in the 1923 constitution a clause confer-
ring a special status to “foreigners” and “minorities,” including the “Coptic 
community.” Copts in general seemed to desire not a minority status, but 
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citizenship. Indeed, the “liberal era” through the 1960s under Nasser some-
how fulfi lled that desire, as Christians and Muslims exhibited a good mea sure 
of national unity and cooperation at societal and governmental levels up until 
the 1970s.
The presidency of Anwar Sadat in 1971 marked a turning point in Muslim– 
Coptic relations. Sadat wanted to take Egypt out of the Nasserist system as-
sociated with socialism, pop u lism, and nationalism; he wished to open up to 
the West, foreign capital, and market forces. To undermine Nasserists and 
Communists, Sadat gave a free hand to the growing Islamist movement, both 
the reformist Muslim Brothers and the new gama῾ at, Islamist student asso-
ciations, which dominated most universities, and which later turned into the 
violent al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya or ga ni za tion. In addition, Sadat himself as-
sumed a pious posture, speaking the idiom of Islam and passing religious 
laws. He changed the constitution to enshrine shari῾a as the main source of 
law. These mea sures deemed to undermine the status of the Christians. There 
 were even signs of provocation to undercut Coptic authority. In 1972 a report 
was said to be circulated in which the Coptic pope allegedly had called for an 
increase in the Coptic population in order to return Egypt fully to Chris-
tians.18 In addition, mea sures  were taken to restrict new church construction 
by imposing many conditions. Such pressures brought on the fury of the Cop-
tic community, forcing Sadat to back down by passing laws on national unity 
and freedom of belief.
Yet the opportunity for sectarian strife remained. In 1972, Muslim youths 
in Beheira clashed with Copts, burning shops and  houses, on the ground that 
a Christian shop own er had shot at the provocative youths. Then, in 1977, Al- 
Azhar called for passing laws to implement Islamic penal codes (hodoud), and 
to implement the execution of apostates. The mea sures, which would have 
brought Christians under Islamic laws, infuriated the Coptic community and 
the church. The ensuing protests, statements, and hunger strikes, however,  were 
overshadowed by the February 3, 1977 mass urban riots; the laws went ahead, 
and only the exiled Coptic community followed up the campaign. Yet the new 
mea sures  were bound to lead to communal strife. A year later, in the Upper 
Egyptian towns of Menya and Assiut, priests  were attacked and churches set 
on fi re, while offi  cials renewed their threat to implement apostasy laws in an 
attempt to silence the church. With the pope retreating to the desert as a ges-
ture of protest, the Coptic Church and Sadat’s regime had a head- on colli-
sion.19 Although a compromise and relative calm  were established, they failed 
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to end sectarian violence. In June 1981, Egypt witnessed the worst Coptic– 
Muslim incident of violence. Reportedly, a personal dispute between two in-
dividuals in Cairo’s poor community of al- Zawya al- Hamra turned into an 
armed confrontation between groups of Christians and Muslim neighbors. 
The violence ended with the intervention of the state. In 1981, the regime ar-
rested twenty- two priests and bishops and deposed Pope Shenouda, as part of 
a large- scale crackdown on internal dissent arising following Sadat’s peace 
deal with Israel and his new “open door” economic policy.
President Sadat was, ironically, gunned down by an Islamist group to which 
he had given lip ser vice. His successor, President Mubarak, mended relations 
with the Christian community and the church but could not stop sectarian 
confl ict. On the contrary, the 1980s and early 1990s, the height of the Islamist 
movement in the country, witnessed the most frequent and spectacular sec-
tarian violence in Egypt’s history. In March 1987, the Islamist groups insti-
gated a band of youth to burn the Church of the Virgin Mary in the southern 
town of Sohag, on the grounds that some Christians had set a mosque (Qutb) 
on fi re. September saw violent clashes in Assiut between militant Islamists 
and police, in which Coptic shops  were destroyed. In the meantime, Muslim 
militants in Menya attacked a private party given by a wealthy Copt, and 
threw explosives into a church, which was followed by violent clashes between 
Muslims and Christians. In the next two years, churches  were assaulted in 
Rod al- Farag and in Cairo’s Masara, a wedding party was attacked, and more 
skirmishes ensued in Menya and Assiut. In March 1990, Menya’s Abu- Kersas 
became the scene of forty- eight burnt shops belonging to Copts, and bomb 
attacks of more churches. Violence, largely against Coptic Christians, contin-
ued in the early 1990s in Bani Sweif, Menya, and Cairo’s Ain Shams, Zeitoun, 
and Shubra. In 1992 alone, dozens of shops  were destroyed, twenty- two people 
 were killed, homes and places of worship  were attacked. For every Muslim 
killed, two Copts  were murdered.20 The most dramatic sectarian violence took 
place in the southern village of al- Kosheh in January 2000, where at least six-
teen people died. A dispute between two traders spread into the surrounding 
villages, where scores of businesses and homes  were destroyed and residents 
killed in the course of three days of violence. Police regained control only af-
ter the violence had already escalated.21
The confl icts  were not confi ned to these isolated acts of sabotage by some 
professional activists. Undoubtedly, they left  their imprints on communal sen-
timents, reviving a new identity politics in Egypt. The hegemony of Islamism 
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had altered the po liti cal mood in the nation, had generated a more inward- 
looking religious nativism, manifested in a typical defensive selfh ood and 
communalism. As Muslims became more Muslim, Copts likewise became 
more Christian. Muslims grew beards, put on veils, massively attended mosques, 
and chose more and more religious names for their children; similarly, Copts 
showed off  their crosses, displayed Christian icons, paid much greater atten-
tion to church activities, and called their off spring by the names of Christian 
saints. The two communities continued to compete in what Zeidan calls the 
“war of stickers”— bumper stickers on cars. The more they felt threatened, the 
more Coptic Christians withdrew into themselves. College students found 
their own sectarian groupings, with some calling for the establishment of a 
Coptic po liti cal party.22 Meanwhile, occasional sectarian outcries spread from 
the pulpits of mosques, and slanderous books, pamphlets, and cassette tapes 
unleashed sentiments of communal suspicion and mistrust, oft en dispropor-
tionately, against the Copts. These developments became evidence to support 
Copts’ claim as “oppressed minority,” whose dissenting sentiments the church 
leadership tended to appease. An absence of collective action had earned 
them the description of “passive minority.” Thus, when thousands of angry 
middle- class Christian youths took to the streets of Cairo in June 2001 to ex-
press outrage against a slanderous report in a newspaper against the Coptic 
Church (about a defrocked priest allegedly having sex with a woman on the 
premises of a church), it shocked the po liti cal elite. Similar collective outrage 
was expressed only a year later on the screening of the fi lm Bahab al- Sinima (I 
Love Movies), made by a Copt, which had allegedly “misrepresented” the Chris-
tian way of life in Cairo. Signifi cantly, in both cases protesters refused to seek 
state protection but resorted to direct protests from the nucleus of their own 
community, the church.23 These represented communal protests, directed not 
against other religious members, but against a par tic u lar newspaper and a 
fi lmmaker.
What do these forms of incidents tell us about the nature of interreligious 
relations in Egypt? Violent clashes seem to occur in par tic u lar po liti cal con-
ditions, for example, the reign of President Sadat and the rise of Islamism. 
Accordingly, they originate less from the communities’ lay members than 
from elites or militants. Signifi cantly, most of the incidents took place in rural 
areas or provincial towns of southern Egypt, rather than in large cities, such as 
Cairo, where a large concentrated Coptic population lives. Finally, these nar-
ratives of confl ict represent the tales of the vocal, the noise, the shouting, 
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burning, and killing, which are oft en reported, recorded, and which we hear. 
They are real and require serious attention. But the narratives also conceal the 
more intricate dynamics of communal interactions; they tell us little about 
how “separate” communities have nevertheless so profoundly merged into a 
cultural fabric that drawing boundaries between them becomes an empirical 
challenge. The tales of the “mainstream” oft en obscure the ways in which 
Christian and Muslim families live their lives on a daily basis, interact with 
one another, merge and diverge identities, and share long- standing lifeworlds, 
and then experience moments of mistrust and suspicion. To highlight the 
spatial moments of coexistence, I will focus on the Cairo district of Shubra, 
unique for its cosmopolitan history and high concentration of Copts (cur-
rently 30 percent) located in the Muslim megacity in which Christian popula-
tion is dispersed in small pockets or individually in the vast urban landscape.
CAIRO’S SHUBRA: GEOGRAPHY 
OF COEXISTENCE
For centuries aft er Cairo’s construction, Shubra remained the summer resi-
dence of the notables and the elites. In fact, the word Shubra is a Coptic term 
referring to Djebro or Sapro, meaning “countryside.” 24 From the nineteenth 
century, the area expanded, developing especially aft er World War I. In 1947 
Shubra had 282,000 residents, increasing to 541,000 by 1960. The natural popu-
lation growth and migration turned the surrounding areas into Coptic neigh-
borhoods. So in the current administrative division, Shubra constitutes only a 
segment of the adjacent districts of Rod El- Farag, Ezbekiya, and Sahel, which 
accommodates the highest concentration of Christians in the city. In its mod-
ern expansion, Shubra developed new European- style streets and buildings, in-
cluding churches, clinics, missionary schools, and cinemas. Mohammad Ali 
Pasha’s summer palace, built in the image of Versailles, crowned Shubra Ave-
nue, the fashionable carriage promenade, which had become known as Egypt’s 
Champs Elysées. With the settlement of elite families originating from the Le-
vant, Ottoman, Syria, and Lebanon, as well as Jews, Greeks, and Italians, and 
most famously the singer/actress Dalida, Shubra assumed an exceptionally cos-
mopolitan character, attracting a host of artists, singers, writers, and poets.25
The twentieth- century Shubra, an extension of Ezbekiya, has been the 
residential area of middle- class urbanites, with a 40 percent Coptic concen-
tration. However, in its current form, Shubra looks in many ways like hun-
dreds of other lower- class areas in the city. The district has lost its past glory, 
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style, elitist distinction, and cosmopolitan posture. From being Egypt’s Champs 
Elysées, Shubra Avenue has declined into a congested, crowded road, dark-
ened and depleted by the city’s traffi  c fumes. The run- down remains of its 
old- style homes, two- or three- story villas, are now surrounded by scores of 
tasteless, boxy, and fl imsy buildings, struggling to emerge out of layers of dust 
and pollution. Its urban form, shops, people, and rhythms are not radically 
diff erent from other neighborhoods. Yet Shubra represents a distinct urban-
ity, refl ected in its history and memory, in its urban “footprints,” in social 
space, in echoes and manners.26 It is perhaps the only baladi, or pop u lar area 
in the city, where one can see a larger number of unveiled women shopping, 
walking, or working in the public space. Some of them stand behind store 
counters as salespersons, while older ones may sit in front- door chairs on the 
sidewalks. More striking perhaps is Subra’s skyline. Minarets of cross and 
crescent conjoin sometimes in juxtaposed proximity, staring at each other in 
resolve and rectitude. From these structures emanate the echoes of eve ning 
prayers, fi lling the sky of the neighborhoods.
Indeed, for Muslim passersby, Shubra’s small churches are not estranged 
places; they look remarkably like Muslim zaways— small, single- room spaces 
and simple structures, with the male worshippers usually sitting on the fl oor, 
reciting from the holy book, simultaneously broadcast on rooft op loudspeak-
ers. The large churches, such as Mar Girgis in Khalafawi, where worshippers 
are seated on chairs, are more complex. They oft en act as community centers, 
places of prayers, recreation, education, interpersonal relations, and spaces of 
communal identity and association. Both male and female Copts attend large 
churches, but, just as in mosques, they pray or attend religious classes in seg-
regated halls. Similarly, the informality that characterizes Coptic churches 
(the apparent disorder, screaming children, men and women chatting, sipping 
tea, and nibbling sandwiches) resembles that of mosques. Both institutions of 
faith share in their regard for each other. During Muslim festivals and Rama-
dan, for instance, Shubra churches illuminate with colorful green lights, to 
express solidarity with mosques.
The experience of sharing in the public space encompasses the common 
use of many diff erent institutions. Coptic and Muslim children attend the 
same government schools, where they play, fi ght, form peer groups, and expe-
rience almost identical childhoods. There are plenty of stories about Muslims 
who attended Christian schools, or Copts who joined Islamic (owqaf ) schools. 
Educated Copts from the older generations took courses in Al- Azhar; the poet 
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Wahbi Tadross studied Qur᾽ an; and Francis al- Eter attended classes by Mu-
hammad Abdu, who decried the sectarian divide and saw nationalism as the 
cooperation of all citizens irrespective of religion.27 In the localities, Muslims 
and Christians build deliberately nonsectarian organizations such as com-
munity associations to improve the neighborhood. Coptic and Muslim busi-
nesses and shops are invariably found next to each other, with almost no way 
for an outsider to know which belongs to whom, except by religious names of 
their own ers. This integration structures daily personal interactions, for in-
stance, in cleaning up the front shop sidewalk, watching each other’s business, 
lending and borrowing, and neighborly chatting and discussing. I did not see 
any indication that Christians refer only to Christian, and Muslims to Mus-
lim, businesses.
Business personnel of Shubra are likely to live in the vicinity, in the typical 
three- or four- story boxy apartment buildings, where each fl oor is usually tai-
lored to enclose two or three fl ats, within each residing a Muslim or Christian 
family. The proximity of buildings across the narrow streets and alleyways is 
such that neighbors cannot avoid overhearing or seeing one another. In such 
interfaith spatial arrangement, few things remain private. For residents who 
have shared common life, apartment doors do not remain closed. Umm Ya-
hya may enter into Abla Mary’s fl at just across the hall without knocking on 
her door, and engage in hour- long smalltalk, a practice not to the liking of the 
more autonomous younger generations. If a neighbor does not hear the usual 
buzz in the next- door apartment, she might wonder what has gone wrong. 
“Where is your mother?” recalled Safa, a Christian resident of Shubra, about 
her neighbor, Umm Yahya from the front balcony. Umm Yahya had not heard 
Safa’s mother’s usual “good mornings,” for she had fallen ill. Upon hearing the 
news, “she came back, before lunch, with two big chickens and lots of maca-
roni,” a visit that was followed by frequent calls to make sure that the children 
 were fi ne.28 “It is not clear in your story if Umm Yahya was a Christian or 
Muslim,” I commented. “She was Muslim, God bless her; she was a neighbor,” 
she replied. “You see at the time,” Safa went on, “we did not know [notice] re-
ligion. We  were not just aware if this person was Christian or that one Muslim. 
Actually, my father kept both the Qur a᾽n and Bible at home. We had both; we 
didn’t know the separation.” In fact, there is little that distinguishes a Chris-
tian home from a Muslim one in middle- class Shubra. Except for the religious 
icons, home decorations and internal designs are almost identical— small 
rooms packed with heavy furniture, big and bright chandeliers, and walls 
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fi lled with religious calligraphies. So, a Christian entering a Muslim home 
would fi nd not a strange but a familiar habitat.
Neighborly relations widely involve the customary practice of borrowing 
things from each other— money, tools, or more frequently a cup of oil, sugar, 
rice, or beans. For those who fi nd cash in scarcity, it is essential, as part of 
survival strategy, to secure access to foodstuff  by lending and borrowing. The 
practice follows the attendant rationalities in how to keep the account, the fre-
quency of transfers, and the time of returns. The tradition also means that 
food culture in both communities is essentially similar. “Coptic food and Mus-
lims’ diet is exactly the same,” according to Safa, only Muslims avoid pork, and 
Copts camel meat. Otherwise, the main Egyptian dishes, molukhiya, kushari, 
ta᾽ miya, and the like are an integral part of food culture in both communities. 
Even such Muslim delicacies as ashura (a special sweet made of milk, rice, and 
sugar) are widely consumed by the Christians, oft en on special occasions by 
“important” members of the family, men. Muslim and Christian male neigh-
bors may get together in eve ning pastimes to socialize, play backgammon, 
and talk, while women serve them tea and delicacies, which refl ects how gen-
der relations in the two communities are remarkably similar.
The Orthodox Church stipulates that it is the man’s duty to  house, feed, 
clothe, and shelter his wife, who, in return, is obliged to obey her husband and 
not to leave home without his permission. Women are not allowed to make 
major decisions in the church, or to become deacons or priests, even though 
they may involve themselves in charity and ser vice work. Just as in mosques, 
in churches too men and women sit separately during the prayer. Early mar-
riage is condoned and female circumcision is practiced in both communities. 
Christians share more or less similar piety and moral codes as Muslims in 
terms of family relations, respect for elders, sexuality, and marriage. “Conser-
vatism is not just a Muslim thing,” Coptic Maged commented. “Church is also 
saying TV or fi lms are not allowed.”29 However, while the conservative piety of 
Muslim women is oft en judged by their public appearance in the veil (as op-
posed to “modern” unveiled ones), lack of veiling among Christian women of-
ten veils their conservative ethos. What in principle determines the cultural 
and behavioral patterns in Egypt is not religion, but class. Muslim and Coptic 
middle classes share by far more than what poor and middle- class Copts do. 
No distinct dress codes separate members of the two faiths. Gone are the 
nineteenth- century days when the Copts  were compelled to wear colored tur-
bans, belts, or heavy crosses around their necks, as reported by Edward Lane, 
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even though the use of some religious symbols (such as the cross and tattoos 
that in the past largely peasants displayed as protection from evil spirits) 
seems to be back.30 The growth of veiling among Muslim women is a very re-
cent phenomenon, largely since the 1980s. It is mainly the use of religious 
names (such as Mohammad or George) that distinguishes a Christian from a 
Muslim. Yet with the growing use of nonreligious names (such as Shirin or 
Mona), this identity marker has drastically diminished.
Followers of both faiths invariably stressed deep interfaith friendships, in 
par tic u lar among youths of the same sex. Beyond the schools where peer 
groups are formed, neighborhoods and apartment buildings are places where 
youngsters establish deep affi  nity. Male youngsters spend a great deal of time 
on the street corners, strolling, chatting, seeing movies, sitting in coff ee shops, 
or playing soccer, sometimes very late at night. But young females, both Mus-
lim and Christian, are likely to join together in the privacy of homes to build 
close associations. Even when Fatma, a Muslim friend of her Christian neigh-
bor Lilian, went through a new religiosity by putting on the veil, their deep af-
fi nity was not aff ected.31 Muslims in Shubra attend churches for marriage and 
religious festivities, while Christians may partake in Muslim weddings and 
such festive occasions as Eid al- Fitr, or Eid al- Adha, and Ramadan ift ars. Na-
tional ancient holidays, such as Sham Nassim, are shared by both religious 
members.
It is true that intermarriage is rare, but cross- religious love is not. Novels 
and fi lms on Shubra oft en contain stories about love aff airs between the Chris-
tian and Muslim youths, highlighting secret romances between the neighbor-
ing teens. The proximity of homes, windows, and balconies makes eye con-
tact, personal interactions, and emotional exchanges between neighbors— in 
their ordinary or “natural” states, their T-shirts or pajamas— a way of life. Yet 
such tales of interfaith love oft en end in sorrow, in the sad realization that 
legal  union will not be in their future.
Venturing into Shubra neighborhoods on Friday midday, one cannot es-
cape the reverberating sound of Qur᾽ an recitation and the adan (call for prayers) 
from the bustling mosques, large or small. The mosques soon are packed with 
young and old men, with the prayers lined up, soon extending into the sur-
rounding allies and streets. In the western mainstream media, the group of 
bending praying men represents the most eye- catching marker of Islam ( just 
note the images in books on Islam or in daily papers), representing a clear re-
ligious pointer that separates “us” from “them.” For the Christians of Shubra, 
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however, the scene is neither novel nor an issue, except perhaps for the traffi  c 
congestion they might cause; otherwise, they are just how things are in the 
neighborhood. People simply “do not see them.” Indeed, the lack of awareness 
about many identity markers that readily stand out for an outsider is remark-
able. For the month or so that I lived in Shubra’s neighborhood of Khalafawi, 
I would be wakened, oft en abruptly, by the thundering noise of morning 
adans, which blast from the loudspeakers hooked onto the front doors of 
neighborhood mosques. Almost every night I would wonder how the Chris-
tian neighbors felt about such piercing sounds in the middle of the night. “We 
don’t hear them,” they usually responded. This discourse of “not seeing, not 
hearing, or not noticing,” in a sense, points to a state of unconsciousness 
about “diff erence” in the daily life of Shubra, indicating the dissipation of 
boundaries in some domains of social and cultural life among Muslims and 
Christians.
DIALECTIC OF CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE
It is naive to present a romantic picture of harmonious sectarian relations in 
Cairo. What good does such sharing do if it suddenly turns into episodes of 
violent confrontations, of killing, burning, and destroying in the name of re-
ligious diff erence? What if these members do not invoke their shared lives 
when the overarching image of communal divide haunts them? We have al-
ready seen how Egypt experienced three de cades of frequent violent confl icts 
between members of Muslim and Christian communities, with dozens of 
people killed, mosques and even more churches attacked, and scores of prop-
erties destroyed. But as indicated earlier, the violent clashes occurred in par-
tic u lar po liti cal episodes,  were instigated primarily by militant members, 
took place in specifi c geographies, and escalated not simply out of sectarian 
diff erence, but also due to the Upper Egyptian “culture of vendetta,” of re-
venge killing” (tha῾ r), which in essence serves to strengthen the patriarchy of 
lineage or tribe.32 More importantly, incidents of confl icts take place not 
within the large modern cities, but overwhelmingly in villages or provincial 
towns.
Yet, interreligious clash does arise in everyday interactions. Confl icts may 
occur between the Christians and Muslims for the same reasons as within 
each religious group. Tensions with secular roots can be given religious color-
ings as a way of cultivating support or opposition in an urban locality. Radical 
activists on both sides attempt to highlight religious diff erences in their quest 
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to build pop u lar backing. Militant Islamists oft en “otherized” Copts as non-
religious people in order to plant a more exclusive religious identity among 
their potential constituencies. National politicians at times exalt one faith over 
the other to nurture support. Thus, Christians oft en feel a profound insensitiv-
ity when po liti cal leaders or soap operas project “Egypt as an Islamic nation,” a 
posture that subtracts the Coptic population from the national membership.33 
Yet other tensions arise directly out of diff erences in religious traditions; for 
instance, churches ringing their bells simultaneously with the mosques’ calls 
for prayers can cause disruption and tensions.
Laypeople of the faith, as in Shubra, time and again try to fi nd solutions to 
their diff erences. Many Shubra residents remain indiff erent to the divisive tactics 
of national politicians. Thus, during the parliamentary elections in 2000, in the 
mostly Muslim district of Al- Weili in Shubra, the Muslim candidate of the rul-
ing National Demo cratic Party, Ahmad Fouad Abdel- Aziz, played the sectarian 
card against his Christian opponent, Mounir Fakhri Abdel- Nour, from the 
Wafd Party. He propagated the idea that a Christian member of parliament 
could not represent Muslims. Yet Muslims went ahead electing the Christian 
candidate as their deputy.34 In general, Cairo has seen the prevalence of sectar-
ian coexistence more than confl ict. The reason cannot be attributed simply to 
some natural tendency of humans to cooperate, for we have also seen periods of 
confl icts, even though humans do possess the capacity to coexist, largely when 
“right conditions” are at their disposal. Nor can the general interreligious calm 
be reduced to Copts’ minority position, their “passivity,” atypical tolerance of 
discrimination, or their subordination to the hegemony and cultural power of 
the majority. For we have seen also episodes of disquiet, protests, and the expres-
sion of collective identity. Despite that Copts constitute a distinct group in terms 
of shared historical memory, religion, a “proper name,” or a “myth of common 
ancestry,” undoubtedly their shared traits, homeland, history, and culture with 
the “larger Muslim society” play a major role in Muslim– Christian coexis-
tence.35 Yet there is a need to transcend generalities and abstract images of 
commonality, by exploring the concrete ways in which people of diff erent 
ethno- religious groupings experience interconnectedness in daily life. In other 
words, we need to highlight the geographies within which sharing is experi-
enced (or confl ict is fostered). The modern city severely undermines the tradi-
tional pattern of immediate, local, interpersonal, and territorial ethno- religious 
communities. It mixes people with various primordial imaginings, facilitating 
experiences of interpersonal interactions and sharing; it destabilizes the total 
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and indiscriminate image of sectarian community and solidarity. Muslim– 
Coptic relations in Shubra are a function of the transformation of urban space 
in Cairo in the twentieth century.
Social change and the modernization of Cairo in the past one hundred 
years have led to the breakdown of the traditional Coptic community— that 
is, a relatively bounded religiously based group localized in par tic u lar urban 
territory with regular day- to- day interpersonal relations— into a mostly frag-
mented population loosely tied together through a “virtual” or “distanciated 
community.” These Copts with broad Christian identity simultaneously share 
and experience life with diff erent and diverse non- Coptic individuals and 
groups. Janet Abu- Lughod has shown how the ecological or ga ni za tion of the 
preindustrial city in medieval times has in many ways shaped the ethnic and 
religious distribution of the population in today’s Cairo. Built in the tenth 
century by the Fatimids, the walled city of Cairo did not expand consider-
ably until the French Expedition in the early nineteenth century and the en-
suing modernization pro cess; at this time its population did not exceed some 
200,000 inhabitants. Until the nineteenth century, the Muslim majority largely 
lived inside the walls, while some 20,000 religious minorities— Greek sects, 
Jews, Armenians, and some 10,000 Copts— resided outside, in the northwest 
corner of Cairo, and  were “excluded by and in turn excluded the majority.”36 
Not only the religious minorities, but also the Muslim majority,  were ethni-
cally divided into distinct groupings, including Egyptian Arabs, foreign Mus-
lims, Mamluks, Black Nubians, and Ethiopians.37 The ethnic and religious 
groups irrespective of class and status lived in distinctive shared quarters, 
wherein workplaces stood traditionally in close proximity to homes. Only Jews 
typically lived in the walled city, since their major occupation, money- 
changing and goldsmithing,  were located inside the walls, and because they 
lived close to and under the protection of the ruler who crowned the walled 
city. The Coptic quarter was located just north of the modern Azbakiya, a site 
for the port town of al- Maqs, and within the Qas al- Sham῾a portion of old 
Cairo. What determined their spatial location had to do with Copts’ main-
stream occupations, as scribes, account keepers, and customs offi  cials, who 
resided in the proximity of their work site, the port.38 These  were the urban 
occupations in which the early Arab conquerors (warriors)  were not inter-
ested and lacked the skill to perform.39
The rapid modernization pro cess transformed occupational structure and 
changed many spatial features of Cairo, including the walled quarters; it cre-
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ated new architectural styles and institutions, a class- based spatial division, 
distinction of workplace and living areas, land use separation, and ethnic and 
religious mixing. The modern industry, education, and administration gener-
ated a new class of professionals and businesses among Muslims (eff endys) 
and Copts alike. Yet Copts remained disproportionately more urban, more 
professional, and better- off . The Coptic tradition of secular education empha-
sizing professionalism seems to have contributed to the higher percentage 
of  teachers, doctors, and engineers among them. One estimate in the 1970s 
found that 80 percent of all pharmacists and 30– 40 percent of all doctors in 
Egypt  were Copts.40 They have also been involved in businesses such as money- 
lending or wine and pork production, in which Muslims express lesser inter-
ests. As modernization swept the nation, such wealthy and professional Copts 
did not hesitate to move out of the traditionally Coptic neighborhoods to dis-
perse and merge into the newly established middle- class areas across the city. 
What added to a further fragmentation of ethnos and dilution of ethnic com-
munities was that many ethnic and religious minorities, especially Jews, some 
middle- class Copts, and foreigners (Greek and Italian entrepreneurs, British 
civil servants, troops, and businessmen) left  Egypt aft er the 1952 Revolution. 
By the late 1960s, close to 300,000 Egyptians  were living abroad.41 Although 
the walled section of today’s Cairo has maintained some aspects of its 
traditional spatial or ga ni za tion, it has been strangled by the encroaching 
modern neighborhoods and their feeble buildings devoid of any memorable 
character.
Thus, the Coptic population (some 10 percent of the total inhabitants42) 
dispersed individually or in pockets of families across the vast terrain of this 
megacity. It was largely Shubra, an extension of the Coptic quarter in Azba-
kiya that maintained its historic legacy of relatively higher (40 and 30 percent 
respectively) Christian density. Yet even  here the infl ux of Muslim rural mi-
grants (partly due to the location of Khazindar bus terminal in Shubra) since 
the Second World War expanded Shubra while diluting its Christian density. 
Indeed as more rural Muslim migrants have moved in, residing in such lower- 
class neighborhoods as al- Wayli, Zaytoun, Shubra al- Khaymah, or al- Azawa 
al- Hamra, the affl  uent and middle- class Christians (along with their Muslim 
counterparts) chose to move out to settle in the more desirable districts of 
Muhandessin, Heliopolis, and Nozha, where they created ethnically heteroge-
neous and more cosmopolitan urban localities. The appeal of modern autono-
mous individuality, mobility, and the in de pen dent nuclear family free from 
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traditional ties and restrictions continue to push new generations of middle- 
class professional Copts to seek, once they can aff ord it, to reside outside of 
their historic Coptic quarters. Consequently, Shubra over the years has been 
left  with more variation in terms of housing styles, socioeconomic status, and 
ethnic composition than other districts.43 While, relative to other areas in 
Cairo, Shubra still accommodates more concentrated Christian Copts, the 
area has nonetheless lost its more cohesive ethnic grouping or closeness in a 
bounded spatial location. Ethno- religious dilution in a neighborhood means 
diminishing the real experience of intimate and durable interaction and shar-
ing with members from one’s own ethnic grouping, simultaneously increas-
ing the possibility of more physical proximity to, social interaction, cultural 
sharing, and, in short, coexistence with members of other ethno- religious 
clusters. So, the old Coptic quarter of Azbakiya and its Shubra extension, 
where Christians lived together, did business, interacted, and shared in every-
day life, has given way to a more heterogeneous mélange of diverse people, 
interests, and interactions. It is perhaps no surprise that a Coptic intellectual 
would argue: “Community? What community? There is not such a Coptic 
community in Egypt.” 44
“DISTANCIATED” COMMUNITY
I tend to think, however, that some sort of “Coptic community” does exist in 
Egypt. The diminishing of localized, immediate, and territorially based reli-
gious “community” has not meant the end of collective identity, communal 
sentiment, and imagining. A feeling of general threat, discrimination, and 
distinction or a desire for what Stanley Tambiah calls “leveling” can generate 
collective affi  nity among religious members who may not even have met each 
other. Leveling refers to eff orts to equalize entitlements, eliminating the real 
or perceived advantages enjoyed by the opponents and the disadvantages suf-
fered by the self.45 While the modern city, as in Cairo, tends to erode close- 
knit face- to- face and localized collectives, thus bringing out modes of cosmo-
politan experience and interaction, it at the same time facilitates broader, 
even though distanciated and imagined, communities. For the modern city is 
not just physical space (neighborhood relations, immediate proximities, and 
the everyday) but also consists of the public sphere— the sphere of virtual 
communities, po liti cal pro cess, media activities, and citizenship. The urban 
concentration of literacy, electoral campaigns, and mass media (news, novels, 
daily papers, images, TV, satellite channels, and now the Internet) provide 
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anonymous religious members the means to associate, develop collective af-
fi nity, and form a virtual community. In modern conditions, rumors, the source 
of so many sectarian tensions, spread faster and farther than ever before, thus 
potentially rendering communal relations even more volatile and precarious. 
Unlike in premodern times, when confl icts would remain mostly enclosed, 
extinguishable, and endemic, the modern media have the capacity to broaden 
a small and insignifi cant incident into epidemics of generalized violence 
among overstretched imagined and distanciated communities. Only in late 
modernity could a few cartoons of Prophet Muhammad or Pope Benedict’s 
statement galvanize Muslim collective outrage in such a global scale and 
velocity.
In Egypt, the dominance of Islamic discourse in the past three de cades has 
made the Christians more self- conscious as a “minority.” Their internal affi  n-
ity has been reinforced by both real and imagined acts of discrimination. 
Copts in general speak of how they are under- represented in academia and 
professional  unions; are deprived of state support for Coptic studies; have no 
Coptic mayors, governors, college deans, school head teachers; and are absent 
from high- ranking military positions, the judiciary, intelligence, and presi-
dential offi  ces. When the Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mustafa Mashhur, 
stated in the 1990s that Copts as the people of dhimmi  were not to be allowed 
to serve in the Egyptian army, it implied a lack of trust in Christians. Mass 
media have in par tic u lar been instrumental in alienating Copts as a collective 
by spreading anti- Christian smears and rumors or by projecting them as 
second- class citizens. Pop u lar tele vi sion serials oft en depict Egypt as an Is-
lamic nation, thus excluding Christians from its membership.46 Many ordinary 
Christians may not experience or not be aware of these facts, but these are 
usually communicated through publications, via websites, and, more fi ercely, 
by Coptic activists in exile. On the other hand, the retreat of the state from 
social welfare provisions tends to reinforce the sectarian divide, in that people 
are compelled to rely on their own communal support instead of the state, 
upon which all citizens equally rest. Thus, following President Sadat’s open 
door policy, the Coptic Church took on the task of establishing a network 
of community development centers in rural and urban areas to provide reli-
gious education, literary classes, women’s empowerment, and income genera-
tion schemes of various kinds— ones that cater largely to Christian clientele. 
The 1980s and 1990s saw an even more expansive “welfare pluralism,” one that 
was deemed to buttress a new “communal identity” and loyalty.47 Thus, Maged’s 
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uncle in Shubra established a welfare association that supports forty poor 
Coptic families, who are introduced by the local church or the related associa-
tions, serving only the Christian families.48 Thus, while Shubra stands as a 
distinctive Christian– Muslim cosmopolitan locale in the city’s imagination, 
the discourse of exclusivist identities does contribute to lines of tension within 
Shubra.
What we have, then, is a coincidence of both a daily experience of inter-
religious coexistence and a sense of inner- communal belonging among Copts 
and Muslims. This simultaneity of exclusive communal identity and inclusive 
inter- communal connectedness gives rise to a diff erent kind of ethno- religious 
reality, one quite distinct from those projected by both primordialist and in-
strumentalist schools. One might call this “critical communalism” or “post- 
communalism,” referring to a critical identity that unites a collective sense of 
ethno- religious self with cosmopolitan experience of lifeworld, and in which 
the sense of the “other” is complicated by the live experience of interpersonal 
association, sharing, and trust. In day- to- day life, judgment about “us” and 
“them” tends to be concrete, selective, and diff erential, rather than general-
ized and sweeping. Selective rational judgments moderate generalized praise 
of self and prejudice against others, diminishing the ground for inward- 
looking sectarianism and collective confl ict in everyday life.
Does this mean that the modern city is free from communal strife? Not 
quite. The extraordinary tales of sectarian violence in Beirut, Sarajevo, Mum-
bai, and Delhi attest to the fact that “critical communalism” does not elimi-
nate the possibility of episodic sectarian violence in cosmopolitan conditions. 
Civil war, destruction of property, killing, and rape are common features of 
what Horowitz calls the “deadly ethnic riot” in urban places. It is not uncom-
mon to hear astonishing tales of carnage between long- standing neighbors 
and associates.49 Of course, the experience of the sectarian divide in Egypt, 
even in its villages, is in no way comparable to the kind of “routinization,” 
“ritualization,” and seemingly disproportionate scale of collective violence 
that seem to characterize South Asian or African ethnic relations.50 Neverthe-
less, Egypt’s urban landscape has not remained immune to occasional com-
munal confrontations. October 2005 saw ten- day sectarian tension and vio-
lence between Muslims and Christians in the historically cosmopolitan port 
city of Alexandria. The incident began with the media reporting news of a 
video recording, a DVD, of a play called I Was Blind, but Now I Can See. The 
play told the story of a young Copt who was persuaded by fundamentalist 
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Muslims to convert to Islam, only to return to Christianity soon aft er realiz-
ing the moral shortcomings of Muslims. The tabloid press seemed to exploit 
the DVD to undermine a Christian candidate for the parliamentary elections 
in favor of his Muslim rivals. The newspapers pressed the Coptic Church to 
issue an apology for the DVD. Upon its refusal, some fi ve thousand Muslim 
protesters assembled at the gate of the church of Mar Girgis, which had been 
accused of distributing the DVD. The ensuing fi ghts left  three people dead, 
150 injured and over 100 arrested. The incident became a prelude to yet an-
other episode of violence some six months later, when on April 14, 2006, a 
Muslim man stabbed Coptic worshippers in three separate Alexandria 
churches, causing further sectarian dissension.51
How, then, can one explain the episodic feuds between individuals and 
families of diff erent denominations who have been living together through 
communal divide? This is an extremely challenging task, and a satisfactory 
response is yet to emerge. Suffi  ce  here to suggest that the very coincidence of 
cosmopolitan interaction, on the one hand, and communal belonging, on the 
other, carries within itself the seeds of an exaggerated emphasis on demarca-
tion, which can potentially grow into mass violence of extraordinary scale. 
Georg Simmel observed that “the degeneration of diff erence in convictions 
into hatred and fi ght occurs only when there are essential similarities between 
the parties.” 52 In other words, when confl ict erupts between ethno- religious 
groups that had a history of similarity and coexistence, rival parties make an 
exaggerated attempt to highlight the diff erences and wipe out blurring and 
confusion. Thus, in the words of Tambiah, speaking on South Asia, “the 
greater the blessings of and ambiguities between the socially- constructed cat-
egories of diff erence, the greater the venom of the imposed boundaries, when 
confl ict erupts between the self and the other, ‘us’ and ‘them.’ ” 53 Notwith-
standing their signifi cance, these observations refl ect only an aspect of the 
complex  whole, in that they relate to the indiscriminate intercommunal atroci-
ties in which assailants construct an abstract and generalized picture of the 
target groups, lumping everyone together as the object of hatred. The fact, 
however, is that the times of acute tension are also times when individual op-
ponents selectively spare, protect, and rescue neighboring “enemies” from the 
wrath of indiscriminate assault. They invoke their life experience of sharing 
and trust with people who happen to belong to a rival sect. In other words, the 
experience of cosmopolitan exchange renders a Muslim to project a more 
concrete and diff erentiated “Christian people,” rather than massing them 
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together as an abstract and totalized other, and vice versa. Thus, a Coptic resi-
dent referring to the sectarian confrontation in Alexandria in October 2006 
would say, “This [the clash] is not going to keep me from associating with my 
Muslim friends.” And a Muslim shop keep er would echo, “In this neighbor-
hood, we Copts and Muslims live together, work together, share the same 
hardships. It is inconceivable that a problem like this should tear us apart.”54 
This pro cess of individual diff erentiation in judging the “other” by lived ex-
perience of interpersonal association, sharing, and trust, that is, everyday 
cosmopolitanism, is likely to contain indiscriminate sectarian divide and 
dissension.55 Aft er all, in Egypt’s worst urban religious “strife” in Alexandria 
in October 2006, only three people  were killed— and they  were killed not by 
rival sect members, but by the rubber bullets of the police.
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in the tense weeks between the September 11 attacks and the fi rst U.S. bomb-
ing raids over Af ghan i stan, and continuing until the fall of the Taliban, com-
mentators raised serious concerns about what the Wall Street Journal later 
called the “irrational Arab street.”1 If the United States attacked a Muslim 
country, the pundits worried, would the “Arab street” rally behind Osama bin 
Laden and other radical Islamists, endangering other U.S. interests in the re-
gion and rendering George W. Bush’s “war on terrorism” a troublesome, if not 
doomed, venture from the outset? As U.S. troops prepared to deploy in Af-
ghan i stan, some offi  cials in Washington implored Israeli prime minister Ariel 
Sharon to exercise restraint in his campaign to crush the Palestinian uprising 
by force. Should Israeli incursions into Palestinian territory continue during 
the U.S. assault on the Taliban, they feared, the simmering rage of the Arab 
masses might “boil over,” leaving the local gendarmes powerless to prevent 
the furious crowds from harming Americans, trashing U.S. property, and 
threatening the stability of friendly Arab regimes. Senator Joseph Biden broached 
the possibility that “every US embassy in the Middle East [would be] burned 
to the ground.”2
Since the war in Af ghan i stan, and continuing through the major Israeli 
off ensives in the West Bank and the buildup to Bush’s war on Iraq, the “Arab 
street” became a minor  house hold phrase in the West, bandied about in the 
media as both a subject of profound anxiety and an object of withering 
Adapted from Asef Bayat, “The ‘Street’ and the Politics of Dissent in the Arab World,” 
Middle East Report, no. 226 (spring 2003), pp. 10– 17.
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   209 9/1/09   1:59 PM
-1—
0—
+1—
210 STREET POLITICS AND THE PO LITI CAL STREET 
condescension. The “Arab street” and, by extension, the “Muslim street” be-
came code words that immediately invoke a reifi ed and essentially “abnormal” 
mind- set, as well as a strange place fi lled with angry people who, whether be-
cause they “hate us” or just “don’t understand us,” must shout imprecations 
“against us.” “Arab or other Muslim actions”  were described almost exclusively 
in terms of “mobs, riots, revolts,”3 leading to the logical conclusion that “West-
ern standards for mea sur ing public opinion simply don’t apply” in the Arab 
world. At any time, American readers  were reminded, protesting Arab masses 
might shed their unassuming appearance and “suddenly turn into a mob, 
powerful enough to sweep away governments—”notably the “moderate” Arab 
governments who remain loyal allies of the United States.4
Worries about the “Arab street” notwithstanding, U.S. forces did move 
into Af ghan i stan, U.S. bombs did kill Afghan civilians in the thousands, the 
Israeli– Palestinian confl ict only briefl y “cooled off ,” and Bush moved full speed 
ahead with plans to attack Iraq. But, though numerous protests in the Muslim 
and Arab worlds did occur, no U.S. embassy was burned to the ground. Nor 
did the Arab and Muslim masses rally behind Bin Laden. Only when Israel 
invaded the West Bank in the spring of 2002 did ordinary people in the Arab 
world collectively explode with outrage. The millions of Arab citizens who 
poured into the streets of Cairo, Amman, Rabat, and many other cities to ex-
press sympathy with the Palestinians evoked memories of how Arab anticolo-
nial movements in the postwar period  were driven from below. But because 
the “Arab street” had not erupted at the possible U.S. bombing in Af ghan i stan 
during Ramadan, this very real example of latent pop u lar anger in the Arab 
world was airily dismissed. Abruptly, the image of the “Arab street” shift ed 
from an unpredictable powder keg to a “myth” and a “bluff ,” somehow kept 
alive despite the fact that Arab countries  were fi lled with “brainwashed” peo-
ple trapped in “apathy.”5 The implication for U.S. policymaking was clear: Ar-
abs do not have the guts to stop an attack on Iraq or any other unpop u lar U.S. 
initiative, and therefore the United States should express “not sensitivity, but 
resolution,” in the face of remonstrations from Arab allies.6 Neither the slogans 
of the actual demonstrators nor the insistence of Arab governments that they 
face unbearable pressure from their populations needed to be taken at face 
value. The Economist declared the “death” of the Arab street, once and for all. 
It was not long before national security adviser Condoleezza Rice concluded 
that because the Arab peoples  were too weak to demand democracy, the 
United States should intervene to liberate the Arab world from its tyrants.7
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STREET POLITICS AND PO LITI CAL STREET
In the narratives of the western media, the “Arab street” is damned if it does 
and damned if it  doesn’t— either it is “irrational” and “aggressive,” or it is 
“apathetic” and “dead.” There is little chance of its salvation as something 
western societies might recognize as familiar. The “Arab street” thus became 
an extension of another infamous concept, the “Arab mind,” which also rei-
fi ed the culture and collective conduct of an entire people in a violent abstrac-
tion.8 It was another subject of Orientalist imagination, reminiscent of colo-
nial repre sen ta tion of the “other,” which sadly was internalized by some Arab 
selves. By no simple oversight the “Arab street” was seldom regarded as an 
expression of public opinion and collective sentiment, like its western coun-
terpart still was, but was perceived primarily as a physical entity, a brute force 
expressed in riots and mob violence. The “Arab street” mattered only in its 
violent imaginary, when it was poised to imperil interests or disrupt grand 
strategies. The street that conveyed the collective sentiment was a nonissue, 
because the United States could and oft en does safely ignore it. Such percep-
tions of the “Arab street” have informed Washington’s approach in the Middle 
East— fl outing Arab public opinion with increasingly unequivocal support for 
Ariel Sharon while he proceeded to dismantle the Palestinian Authority, and 
simultaneously, with determination to wage war on Iraq.
But street politics in general and the Arab street in par tic u lar are more com-
plex. Neither street is a physicality, nor the Arab street a mere brute force or 
simply dead. The “Arab street” is an expression of not simply street politics in 
general, but primarily of what I like to call “po liti cal street”; one whose modes 
and means of articulation have gone through signifi cant changes. “Street poli-
tics” represent the modern urban theater of contention par excellence (see Chap-
ter 8). We need only remember the role the “street” has played in such monumen-
tal po liti cal changes as the French Revolution, nineteenth- century labor 
movements, anticolonial struggles, the anti– Vietnam War movement in the 
United States, the “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Eu rope, and, perhaps, the 
current global antiwar movement. The street, in this sense, is the chief locus of 
politics for ordinary people, those who are structurally absent from the institu-
tional positions of power— the unemployed, casual workers, migrants, people of 
the underworld, and  house wives. It serves as a key medium wherein sentiments 
and outlooks are formed, spread, and expressed in a remarkably unique fash-
ion. But “street politics” enjoys another dimension, that is, it is more than just 
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about confl ict between the authorities and the deinstitutionalized or “informal” 
people over the active use of public space and the control of public order. Streets 
as spaces of fl ow and movement are not only where people protest, but also 
where they extend their protest beyond their immediate circles to include also 
the unknown, the “strangers” who might espouse similar, real or imagined, 
grievances. That is why not only the deinstitutionalized groups such as the un-
employed, but also actors with some institutional power, like workers or stu-
dents, fi nd streets arenas for the extension of collective sentiments. It is this pan-
demic potential that threatens the authorities, who exert a pervasive power over 
public spaces— with police patrols, traffi  c regulation, and spatial division— as a 
result. Students at Cairo University, for example, oft en stage protest marches in-
side the campus. However, the moment they decide to come out into the street, 
riot police are immediately and massively deployed to encircle the demonstrators, 
push them into a corner away from public view, and keep the protest a local 
event. Indeed this heavily guarded actual street points to the fact that the meta-
phorical street is not deserted so much as it is controlled.
Beyond serving as the physical place for “street politics,” urban streets also 
signify a diff erent but crucial symbolic utterance, one that transcends the 
physicality of street, to convey collective sentiments of a nation or community. 
This I call po liti cal street— a notion that is distinct from “street politics.” Po liti-
cal street signifi es the collective sensibilities, shared feelings, and public judg-
ment of ordinary people in their day- to- day utterances and practices, which 
are expressed broadly in the public squares— in taxis, buses, shops, sidewalks, 
or more audibly in mass street demonstrations. The Arab street (and by exten-
sion, the “Muslim street”) should be seen in terms of such expression of collec-
tive sentiments in the Arab public sphere.
THE SHIFTING ARAB STREET
How does the Arab world fare in terms of its “po liti cal street”? Arab anticolo-
nial struggles attest to the active history of the Arab street. Pop u lar move-
ments arose in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon during the late 1950s aft er 
Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. The unsuccessful tripartite aggression by 
Britain, France, and Israel in October 1956 to reclaim control of the canal caused 
an outpouring of pop u lar protests in Arab countries in support of Egypt. Al-
though 1956 was probably the last major Pan- Arab solidarity movement until 
the pro- Palestinian wave of 2002, social protests by workers, artisans, women, 
and students for domestic social development, citizens’ rights, and po liti cal 
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participation have been documented.9 Labor movements in Lebanon, Syria, 
Egypt, Yemen, and Morocco have carried out strikes or street protests over 
both bread- and- butter and po liti cal issues. Since the 1980s, during the era of 
IMF- recommended structural adjustment programs, Arab labor  unions have 
tried to resist cancellations of consumer commodity subsidies, price rises, pay 
cuts, and layoff s. Despite no- strike deals and repression of activists, wildcat 
stoppages have occurred. Fear of pop u lar re sis tance has oft en forced govern-
ments, such as in Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, to delay structural adjustment 
programs or retain certain social policies.10
When traditional social contracts are violated, Arab populations have re-
acted swift ly. The 1980s saw numerous urban protests over the spiraling cost 
of living. In August 1983, the Moroccan government reduced consumer subsi-
dies by 20 percent, triggering urban unrest in the north and elsewhere. Simi-
lar protests took place in Tunis in 1984, and in Khartoum in 1982 and 1985. In 
summer 1987, the rival factions in the Lebanese civil war joined hands to stage 
an extensive street protest against a drop in the value of the Lebanese cur-
rency (see Chapter 4). Algeria was struck by cost- of- living riots in the fall of 
1988, and Jordanians staged nationwide protests in 1989, over the plight of 
Palestinians and economic hardship, forcing King Hussein to introduce cau-
tious mea sures of po liti cal liberalization. Lift ing subsidies in 1996 provoked a 
new wave of street protests, leading the king to restrict freedom of expression 
and assembly.11 In Egypt in 1986, low- ranking army offi  cers took to the streets 
to protest the Mubarak regime’s decision to extend military ser vice. The un-
rest quickly spread to other sectors of society.
While the lower and middle classes formed the core of urban protests, col-
lege students oft en joined in. But student movements have had their own con-
tentious agendas. In Egypt, the 1970s marked the heyday of a student activism 
dominated by left ist trends. Outraged opposition to the Camp David peace 
treaty and economic austerity brought thousands of students out into urban 
streets. Earlier years had seen students or ga niz ing conferences, strikes, sit- ins, 
and street marches and producing newspapers for the walls, the “freest of pub-
lications.”12 In 1991, students in Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Yemen, and 
Sudan demonstrated to express anger against both the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
and the U.S.- led war to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. Since 1986, Palestinian stu-
dents have been among the most frequent participants in actions of the inti-
fada, oft en undeterred by the Israeli army’s policies of shooting and arresting 
students or closing down Palestinian universities.
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Yet many things have changed drastically for the Arab street since the 
1980s. The pace of cost- of- living protests has slowed down, as governments 
enact structural adjustment programs more slowly and cautiously, deploy 
safety nets such as Social Funds (Egypt and Jordan), and allow Islamic NGOs 
and charities to help out the poor. Indeed, the Arab world enjoys the lowest 
incidence of extreme poverty in the world’s developing regions.13 Meanwhile, 
the discontent of the impoverished middle classes was channeled into the Is-
lamist movements in general, and the politicization of professional syndicates 
in par tic u lar.
On the other hand, the more traditional class- based movements— notably, 
peasant organizations, cooperative movements, and trade  unions— have been 
in relative decline. As peasants have moved to the city from the countryside, 
or lost their land to become rural day laborers, the social basis of peasant and 
cooperative movements has eroded. The weakening of economic pop u lism, 
closely linked to structural adjustment, has led to the decline of public- sector 
employment, which constituted the core of trade  unionism. Through reform, 
downsizing, privatization, and relocation, structural adjustment has under-
mined the  unionized public sector, while new private enterprises linked to 
international capital remain largely  union- free. Although the state bureau-
cracy remains weighty, its underpaid employees are unor ga nized, and a large 
proportion of them survive by taking second or third jobs in the informal sec-
tor. Currently, much of the Arab workforce is self- employed. Many wage 
earners work in small, paternalistic businesses. On average, between one- 
third and one- half of the urban workforce are involved in the unregulated, 
unor ga nized informal sector. While relations between employers and em-
ployees are not always happy, workers tend to be more loyal to their bosses 
than to fellow workers.
Although the explosive growth of NGOs since the 1980s heralded autono-
mous civic activism, NGOs are premised on the politics of fragmentation. 
NGOs divide the potential benefi ciaries of their activism into small groups, 
substitute charity for principles of rights and accountability, and foster insider 
lobbying rather than street politics. It is largely the advocacy NGOs, involved 
in human rights, women’s rights, and demo cratization, not wealth and in-
come gaps, that off er diff erent and new spaces for social mobilization.
As people rely more on informal activities and their loyalties become frag-
mented, struggles for wages and conditions tend to lose ground to concerns 
over jobs, informal work conditions, and an aff ordable cost of living; and rapid 
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urbanization increases demands for urban ser vices, shelter, decent housing, 
health, and education. Under such conditions, the Arab grass roots resort not 
to politics of collective protest but to the individualistic strategy of “quiet en-
croachment.” Individuals and families strive to acquire basic necessities (land 
for shelter, urban collective consumption, informal jobs and business oppor-
tunities) in a prolonged and unassuming, though illegal, fashion. Instead of 
or ga niz ing a street march to demand electricity, for example, the disenfran-
chised simply tap into the municipal power grid without authorization (see 
Chapter 4).
Thus, in the Arab world, the po liti cal class par excellence remains the 
educated middle class— state employees, students, professionals, and the 
intelligentsia— who mobilized the “street” in the 1950s and 1960s with over-
arching ideologies of nationalism, Ba῾ athism, socialism, and social justice. Is-
lamism has been the latest of these grand worldviews. With the core support 
coming from the worse- off  middle layers, the Islamist movements succeeded 
for two de cades in activating large numbers of the disenchanted population 
with cheap Islamization— moral and cultural purity, aff ordable charity work, 
and identity politics. However, by the mid- 1990s, it became clear that the Is-
lamists could not go very far with more costly Islamization— establishing an 
Islamic polity and economy and conducting international relations compati-
ble with the modern national and global citizenry. Islamist rule faced crisis 
where it was put into practice (as in Iran and Sudan). Elsewhere, violent strat-
egies failed (as in Egypt and Algeria), and thus new visions about the Islamic 
project developed. The Islamist movements either  were repressed or became 
resigned to revision of their earlier outlooks.
Anti- Islamic sentiments in the West following the September 11 events, 
and the subsequent “war on terrorism,” have undoubtedly reinforced a feeling 
that Islam is under global attack, reinforcing the languages of religiosity and 
nativism. Several Islamist parties that, among other things, expressed opposi-
tion to U.S. policies scored considerable successes in several national elections. 
The Justice and Development Party in Morocco doubled its share to forty- two 
seats in the September 2002 elections. In October 2002, the Islamist move-
ment came in third in Algerian local elections, and the alliance of religious 
parties in Pakistan won 53 out of 150 parliamentary seats. In November, Is-
lamists won nineteen out of the total forty parliamentary seats in Bahrain, 
and the Turkish Justice and Development Party captured 66 percent of the leg-
islature. However, these electoral victories point less to a “revival of Islamism”14 
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than to a shift  of Islamism from a po liti cal project with national concerns into 
more fragmented languages concerned with personal piety and global, anti- 
Islamic menace. If anything, we are on the threshold of a post- Islamist turn.15 
(See Chapter 13.)
What ever its merit, a major legacy of Islamism has been to change the 
Arab states. It rendered the Arab states more religious (as states moved to rob 
Islamism of its moral authority), more nativist or nationalist (as states moved 
to assert their Arab authenticity and to disown democracy as a western con-
struct), and more repressive, since the liquidation of radical Islamists off ered 
states the opportunity to control other forms of dissent. This legacy of the Is-
lamist movements has further complicated the politics of dissent in today’s 
Arab world.
A RENEWAL
The revival of the “Arab street” in 2002 in solidarity with the Palestinians was 
truly spectacular. For a short while, states lost their tight control, and publicly 
vocal opposition groups proliferated, even among the “westernized” and “apo-
liti cal” students of the American University in Cairo. The Palestinian solidar-
ity movement showed that there is more to Arab street politics than Islamism 
and spurred the renewal of a po liti cal tradition. In January, as the United 
States moved closer to attacking Iraq, one million Yemenis marched in Sanaa, 
chanting, “Declaration of War Is Terrorism.” Over ten thousand protested in 
Khartoum, thousands in Damascus and Rabat, and hundreds in the Bahraini 
capital of Manama.16 Twenty thousand Christians in Jordan staged a prayer 
for the people of Iraq, condemning Bush’s war.17 One thousand Yemeni 
women demonstrated in the streets to protest the arrest of a Yemeni citizen 
mistaken for an al- Qaeda member in Germany.18 Large and small protest ac-
tions against the war on Iraq continued in Egypt and other Arab countries 
amid massive deployments of police. And with the U.S. and U.K. invasion of 
Iraq, street protests throughout the Arab world assumed a new momentum.
At least with regard to Palestine, however, the tremendous rise of the Arab 
street occurred with the tacit approval of the Arab states. The extremity of 
Israel’s violence during the 2002 invasions, and later invasion of U.S. forces 
into Iraq, brought the politicians and people together in a common national-
ist sentiment. In addition, street dissent was directed largely against an outside 
adversary, and protesters’ slogans against their own governments  were voiced 
primarily by the ideological leaders rather than the ordinary participants.19 
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Only in the later Cairo rallies of 2005 and 2006 did crowds demand the re-
moval of the twenty- year- old emergency laws, which continue to hamper free 
public assembly, and an end to the Mubarak presidency. These rallies then 
evolved into an explicitly prodemocracy movement.
Why did the Arab street fail to rise against its own suppression, to demand 
democracy and justice? While the disenfranchised have resorted to “quiet 
encroachment,” the Arab states have considerably neutralized the po liti cal 
class by promulgating a common discourse based on nationalism, religiosity, 
and anti- Zionism. Entrenched in the “old- fashioned Pan- Arab nationalism,” 
and seduced by the language of religiosity and moral politics, the Arab intel-
ligentsia failed to seize the moment to win po liti cal concessions from their 
own authoritarian states. Israel’s occupation of Palestinian lands, with mate-
rial and diplomatic U.S. support, has trapped generations of Arab intelligen-
tsia in a narrow- minded nativism and cultural nationalism from which the 
authoritarian Arab states largely benefi t. The nativist oft en dismisses ideas and 
practices, however noble, that can be described as rooted in alien, usually 
“western,” cultures and romanticizes ideas and practices of the “self” even if 
they are oppressive. Human rights, for example, may simply be discarded as a 
western import or a manipulative U.S. ploy.
On the other hand, the Arab governments allow little room for in de pen-
dent dissent. Since 2000, demands for collective protests against the United 
States and Israel  were ignored by the authorities, while unoffi  cial street ac-
tions faced intimidation and assault, with activists being harassed or de-
tained.20 On February 15, 2003, the day that over ten million people through-
out the world demonstrated against the U.S. war on Iraq, thousands of Egyptian 
riot police squeezed some fi ve hundred demonstrators into a corner, separat-
ing them from the public.
Faced with formidable challenges to expression in the street, Arab activ-
ists developed new means of articulating dissent, mostly in the form of civic 
campaign— boycott campaigns, cyberactivism, and protest art among them. As 
the Arab states exercised surveillance over the streets, activism was pushed in-
side the confi nes of civil institutions— college campuses, schools, mosques, pro-
fessional associations, and NGOs. Given the lack of a free po liti cal climate, 
professional associations off ered venues for po liti cal campaigns, to the extent 
that they oft en assumed the role of po liti cal parties, where intense competi-
tion for leadership prevailed. Their headquarters served as sites for po liti cal 
rallies, meetings, charity work, and international solidarity campaigns. Other 
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civil associations, chiefl y the new advocacy NGOs, began to promote public 
debates on human rights, demo cratization, women, children, and labor rights. 
In early 2000, some ninety to one hundred human rights organizations oper-
ated in the Arab world, along with hundreds of social ser vice centers, and 
many more social ser vice organizations that began to employ the language of 
rights in their work.21
Innovations in mobilization, styles of communication, and or gan i za tion al 
fl exibility are bringing a breath of fresh air to stagnant nationalist politics. 
The Egyptian Pop u lar Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada 
represented one such trend. Set up in October 2000, the committee brought 
together representatives from Egypt’s various po liti cal trends— left ists, na-
tionalists, Islamists, and womens’ rights groups. It set up a website, developed 
a mailing list, initiated charity collections, or ga nized boycotts of American 
and Israeli products, revived street actions, and collected two hundred thou-
sand signatures on petitions to close down the Israeli embassy in Cairo. The 
Egyptian Anti- Globalization Group and the National Campaign Against the 
War on Iraq, as well as the Committee for the Defense of Workers’ Rights and 
some human rights NGOs, adopted similar styles of activism.22 It was these 
organizations and styles that served as the precursor for the emergence of a 
new kind of politics in Egyptian po liti cal tradition. It was galvanized in Ki-
faya and other prodemocracy movements.23
Grassroots charity and boycotts, or product campaigns, became new me-
diums of po liti cal mobilization. Collecting food and medicine for Palestin-
ians has involved thousands of young volunteers and hundreds of companies 
and organizations. In April 2002, students at the American University in 
Cairo gathered thirty 250- ton truckloads of charitable products from facto-
ries, companies, and homes in the space of four days and nights, bringing 
them to Palestinians in Gaza. Millions of Arabs and Muslims joined in boycot-
ting American and Israeli products, including McDonald’s, KFC, Starbucks, 
Nike, and Coca- Cola. The remarkable success of local products caused Coca- 
Cola to lose some 20 to 40 percent of its market share in some countries, while 
fast- food companies also lost sales.24 The Ira ni an ZamZam Cola captured a 
sizable Middle Eastern market, extending to Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and several African countries. Within four months, the company exported 
ten million cans to Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf states. Some Eu ro pe an 
countries, Denmark and Belgium, began to import ZamZam. Alongside 
ZamZam, Mecca Cola appeared in Paris to cater to Eu ro pe an Arabs and 
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Muslims who boycotted the U.S. beverages. It sold 2.2 million bottles in 
France within two months. Mecca Cola allocated 10 percent of the revenue to 
Palestinian children.
Information technology was also increasingly employed to direct po liti cal 
campaigns. “Small media” have a longer history in the Middle East. The ser-
mons of Islamic preachers like Shaykh Kishk, Yusuf al- Qaradawi, Shaykh 
Fadlallah, and the pop u lar Egyptian televangelist Amr Khaled have been dis-
seminated on a massive scale through audio and videocassettes. Followers of 
Amr Khaled, who was banned from preaching in late 2002, could gather over 
ten thousand signatures in his support via websites. Later, activists began to 
use e-mails to publicize claims or mobilize for rallies and demonstrations. 
These media proved instrumental in disseminating news, calling for rallies, 
and street mobilization. In February 2003, Egyptian Co ali tions in Solidarity 
with Palestine and Iraq planned to send one million petitions to the UN and 
to the U.S. and British embassies via the Internet. Alternative news websites 
have become probably the most important sites through which networks of 
critical and informed constituencies are formed. The increasing use of Face-
book, the social networking site, allowed Egyptian youth in 2008 to build 
what came to be known as the April 6 Youth Movement. The “movement” 
mobilized some seventy thousand, mostly educated, youths who called for 
free speech and economic welfare and decried corruption. Activists succeeded 
in or ga niz ing street protests and rallies and, more spectacularly, in initiating 
a general strike on April 6, 2008, in support of the striking textile workers. 
The venue for networking has gained a considerable ground in most Arab 
countries, where Facebook is among the ten most- visited sites on the web.25 In 
addition, satellite TV has been rapidly spreading in the Arab world, bringing 
alternative information to break the hold of the barren domestic news channels. 
The skyline of Damascus, bristling with satellite dishes, helps to explain the 
soullessness of the street newsstands where the ruling party’s dailies are dis-
played. While cybercampaigns remain limited to the elite (despite increased 
Internet use), the politics of the arts reaches a mass audience. The Israeli reoc-
cupation of the West Bank in 2002 revived the po liti cal legacy of Umm Kul-
thoum, Fairuz, and Morocco’s Ahmed Snoussi. Arab artists, movie stars, paint-
ers, and especially singers became oracles of public outrage. In Egypt, major 
pop stars such as Amr Diab, Muhammad Munir, and Mustafa Qamar produced 
best- selling albums that featured exclusively religious and nationalist lyrics. 
Munir’s high- priced Land and Peace, O Prophet of God sold 100,000 copies in a 
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short period. Other singers, including Ali al- Hajjar, Muhammad Tharwat, 
and Hani Shakir, joined together to produce the religio- nationalistic album 
Al- Aqsa, O God, which cornered Arab marketplaces.
Of course, the extent and effi  cacy of these new spaces of contention re-
main modest. Yet the growing tendency of most Arab governments to try to 
control them— closing NGOs, banning publications or songs, and arresting 
Web designers, and the protagonists of “Facebook Revolution”— off ers a hint 
of their potential to compensate for the impediments facing the Arab street. 
The street remains the most vital locus for the audible expression of collective 
sentiments, so long as the local regimes or the global powers ignore popularly 
held views. The Arab street has been neither “irrational” nor “dead,” but it is 
undergoing a major transformation caused by both old constraints and new 
opportunities brought about by global restructuring. As a means and mode of 
expression, the Arab street may be shift ing, but the collective grievance that 
it conveys remains. Will Islamism occupy the center stage as the ideological 
articulation of these grievances?
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the forward march of Muslim militancy— from Iran to Lebanon, from Alge-
ria to Palestine, from North Africa to South Asia, extending to the immigrant 
communities in Eu rope, not to mention the transnational al- Qaeda—seems 
to confi rm the view that the world is on the verge of Islamist revolutions. It is 
as though the late twentieth century has impregnated history to give birth to 
Islamic revolutions with the same intensity and vigor that the early twentieth 
century produced socialist rebellions. Is globalization pushing religion, Islam, 
onto the center stage of world radical politics?
This chapter attempts to show that ours may be an age of widespread so-
cioreligious movements and of remarkable social changes, but these may not 
necessarily translate into the classical (rapid, violent, class- based, and over-
arching) revolutions. What most accounts of Islamism refer to do not signify 
Islamic revolutions; rather, they point to heightened but diff used sentiments 
and movements associated, in one way or another, with the language of religi-
osity. Perhaps we need to rethink our understanding of “revolutions” in gen-
eral and the Islamic version in par tic u lar. In the Muslim Middle East, the fu-
ture is likely to belong to a kind of sociopo liti cal change that might be termed 
“post- Islamist refolution.”
Adapted from Asef Bayat, “Is There a Future for Islamic Revolutions? Religion, Re-
volt, and Middle Eastern Modernity,” in Revolution in the Making of the Modern 
World, ed. John Foran, David Lane, and Andreja Zivkovic (London: Routledge, 
2008), pp. 96– 111.
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MODERNITY AND REVOLUTIONS
Revolutions and revolutionary movements are integral features of modernity, 
and the Middle Eastern experience is no exception. In this context, modernity 
implies the solidifi cation of the nation- states that forge material infrastruc-
ture, such as a modern army and conscription, education and media, through 
which people can “imagine” and develop a sense of nationhood.1 Nationalist 
movements are the likely outcome if the nation is under colonial domination.2 
Second, modernity is also characterized by the formation of modern central-
ized states, with the sole power of constituting laws and the monopoly of coer-
cive powers over people whose rights (as citizens) within the framework of the 
nation- state are recognized. In short, it involves rule over people who hold 
rights. Modern states, in turn, not only enact laws to regulate dissent (estab-
lishing organizations,  unions, procedures, and protection) but also tend to be-
come targets of contention by po liti cal forces. Third, it is indeed under modern 
conditions that broader modular contentions become possible, when the local-
ized struggles for parochial concerns of premodern times give way to general-
ized and epidemic movements.3 Finally, (capitalist) modernity involves an 
overarching contradictory tendency, which is followed by deep- rooted con-
tentions fostered by both the remaining old social classes and groups as well 
as the historically novel ones (such as the new middle class, women, youth, 
 etc.).  Here I am not referring to the Marxian labor– capital contradiction, even 
though it remains a fundamental one. I am, rather, pointing to a more general 
anomaly. Simply put, modernity off ers unparalleled opportunities for many 
people to thrive, forge identities, and get ahead in life, and yet it excludes and 
ravages the fortunes of many others. Modern capitalist economy and science, 
urbanization, education, and the idea of citizenship are closely tied to the 
fl ourishing of new social groups such as the bourgeois, professional classes, 
youth, and public women who foster new social existence and habitus, and 
engender par tic u lar demands. At the same time, on the margins of the mod-
ern po liti cal economy, ways of life, and institutions, lies a great humanity that 
is excluded from the modern off erings, in terms of life- chances, respect, 
equality, and meaningful po liti cal participation. Revolutions are the outcome 
of the collective contention of such social beings whose oft en “partial inter-
ests,” moral and material, converge and become the basis of collective identity 
and action. Revolutionary struggles target the state and are waged only within 
the confi nes of a par tic u lar nation- state.
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As such, none of the above on its own may explain the actual making of revo-
lutions. Revolutions are more intricate phenomena than mere structural contra-
dictions and agency. The making of revolutions involves, in addition, a complex 
set of material, moral, and cognitive conditions as well as po liti cal (internal or 
international) opportunities. One needs to determine how the potential revolu-
tionaries perceive and interpret their real or imagined misfortunes and margin-
alization. And, if they do so at all, whom do they blame as being responsible: 
themselves, God, the state, their immediate superior at work, or fate? Do they 
fi nd possible ways to get out of their hardship, such as reliance on family, kin, or 
traditional institutions of support? But if they opt for change, what kinds of re-
sources have they to deploy, as Tilly and others have wondered? 4 Finally, to what 
extent does a “structure of opportunity” allow for action, how far are states able 
to withstand the demand of their citizens for change, and what (coercive or re-
formist) strategies do they deploy to undermine revolutionary movements?5
MIDDLE EASTERN MODERNITY 
AND REVOLUTIONS
These propositions fi nd resonance also with respect to the modern Middle 
East, notably those countries with oil and other kinds of rentier economies. 
Despite claims to be otherwise,6 Middle Eastern modernity has had its own 
particularities, even though it is by no means “peculiar or exceptional,” as the 
Orientalists would suggest. In the Middle East, the modernization pro cess 
(characterized by capitalist relations, national markets, human mobility, ur-
banization, and new education systems, and of modern national states) has by 
and large been a synthesis of both internal dynamics and colonial encoun-
ters.7 For Hisham Sharabi, this “hybrid” formation refl ects “neo- Patriarchy,” 
defi ned as a mixture of “pseudo- modernism” and “Patriarchy.” And patriar-
chy is seen as a sociocultural reality characterized by myth (rather than rea-
son), religious (rather than scientifi c) truth, rhetorical (as opposed to analyti-
cal) language, authoritarian (instead of demo cratic) polity, communal (rather 
than citizenry) social relations, and kin- based rather than class- centered so-
cial relations.8 Although Sharabi’s neopatriarchy focuses on the cultural di-
mension of modernity (ideas, behavior, and relations) in the Arab world, its 
structural dimension in terms of the emergence of new social structures, so-
cial forces, economic classes, and social relations has also been far- reaching.
Thus, the gradual pro cess of modernization inaugurated in the late nine-
teenth century and earlier has involved two contradictory pro cesses. On the 
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one hand, it has fostered opportunities for city dwelling, modern education, 
social mobility, and new classes and groups (such as new working and middle 
classes, women, and youths, who together came to coexist with the already 
existing merchants, artisans, and religious elite, or the ῾ulama᾽ ). On the other 
hand, modernization has also triggered formidable challenges for the popula-
tion. Restricted po liti cal participation (by both colonial regimes and postco-
lonial populist states), in e qual ity, and exclusion from economic development 
(the poor and marginalized groups), po liti cal structures, and conditions of 
reproduction (of power of the “traditional” groups, the Islamic institutions, 
the ῾ulama᾽  and their legitimacy) account for the major challenges. At the same 
time, modernity fostered strong centralized states that commanded power 
over the populace and major economic resources. An overarching feature of 
Middle Eastern modernity has been a contradiction between social and eco-
nomic development and po liti cal underdevelopment,9 a condition ripe for 
demo cratic revolutions. Modern economy, institutions, bureaucracy, work re-
lations, education, social classes, city dwelling, and generally the modern pub-
lic sphere have been accompanied by the states that have remained, by and 
large, authoritarian, autocratic, and even despotic (embodied in kings, mon-
archs, shaykhs, or lifelong presidents). Thus, the modern middle classes oft en 
have played the leading role in all major social movements and revolutions in 
the region. The authoritarian character of the regimes has partly to do with 
the ruling elites’ forging of a “traditional solidarity” (asabiyya), notably in the 
Arab states of the Persian Gulf;10 but for most part it has to do with their con-
trol over oil revenue, an asset that has given them not only monopoly over 
economic resources, but also po liti cal support of foreign powers who look for 
a share in oil. The overwhelming power of these rentier states has been such 
that it has generated dissent from almost all segments of the population, in-
cluding the affl  uent groups. No wonder Homa Katouzian views the people– 
state (mellat– dawlat) divide as the principal line of demarcation in societies 
like Iran, even though social confl icts within the category of “people” cannot 
be denied.11 Such centralized states oft en evoke analogies with Marx’s “Asiatic 
mode of production” or Wittfogel’s “oriental despotism.”
No doubt, many of these authoritarian regimes are the products as well as 
promoters of modernization, even though not in the domain of the polity. 
Many of these states  were either installed by the colonial powers (as in Jordan, 
Saudi Arabia, and other sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf, as well as both 
Pahlavi Shahs of Iran) or pushed to power by the rising classes. In their quest 
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for modernization of their countries, the postcolonial regimes oft en encoun-
tered formidable confl icts with the power of land- owning classes, who re-
sisted to transform themselves into the new bourgeoisie. In such circum-
stances, the modernizing regimes began a signifi cant pro cess of “revolutionary 
reform,” oft en from above, on behalf of the middle classes as well as the peas-
antry, who then  were to turn into smallholders or farm workers. In Egypt, 
Syria, Iraq, and Iran, the earlier po liti cal confl icts assumed the form of mili-
tary coups representing the ascending classes, followed by massive social and 
economic transformation, nationalization, land reform, and populist dispen-
sation in employment, education, and health.12 Yet none of these revolution-
ary reforms entailed an inclusive polity and demo cratic governance. What 
they did was produce and empower social forces that in later years  were to 
target the very same states, this time in the name of Islam.
WHAT SORTS OF MUSLIMS REBEL?
So what kinds of Muslims rebel in the age of modernity? Many accounts of Is-
lamist movements see the basis of Muslim rebellion as reaction against moder-
nity.13 Beyond the perspectives of the Islamist ideologues, in general, two types 
of interpretations have attempted to explain the spread of religious politics in 
modern times. The “modernist” interpretations portray Islamism as reactive 
movements carried out by “traditional people,” whether intellectuals or the ur-
ban poor, against western- type modernization. The movements are said to be 
antidemo cratic and regressive in character. On the right, the “clash of civiliza-
tions,” proposed by Bernard Lewis and shared by Samuel Huntington, manifests 
the framework within which the “antimodern” character of such movements in 
their encounter with western modernity is assessed.14 On the left , one can point 
to Alberto Melucci and Alain Touraine, among others, who express concerns 
about religious revivalism. “Regressive utopianism” and “anti- movement” are 
how they refer to religious movements, including Islamism.15 The second type 
of interpretation views Islamism as the manifestation of, and a reaction to, 
postmodernity. In this framework, the movements represent a quest for diff er-
ence, cultural autonomy, alternative polity, and morality versus the universal-
izing secular modernity. Foucault described the Ira ni an Revolution as the 
“fi rst post- modern revolution of our time,” as the “spirit of a world without 
spirit.” For Giddens it signals “the crisis of modernity.”16
There seems to be some plausibility in such observations. The global condi-
tions in which most of these movements emerged, and the discourses of such 
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Islamist leaders as Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi, Ayatollah Khomeini, Ali Shari-
ati, Musa Sadr, Sayed Qutb, Rachid Ghannoushi, and others, attest to this ten-
dency. Mawdudi’s concept of jahiliya, a society characterized by the worship of 
man by man and the sovereignty of man over man, had been taken up by Sayed 
Qutb in Egypt, Abdul Salaam Yassin in Morocco, and Ali Shariati in Iran, 
among others, to lash out on western liberalism, secular nationalism, and 
imperialism, which come, in Yassin’s views, in the name of enlightenment, re-
form, nationalism, and rationality.17 Shariati’s notion of “return to self” re-
fl ected Islamists’ choice of Islam as an indigenous and all- embracing human 
alternative. While Maududi proposed some kind of “Islamic cosmopolitan-
ism” to be governed by a “theo- democracy” or a “divine demo cratic govern-
ment,” Shariati off ered a “divine classless society”; and Sayed Qutb, an Islamic 
state and economy. Ayatollah Khomeini called for “Islamic government” but 
went along with an Islamic republic.18
What is not entirely clear about these observations is how their authors 
have come to their conclusions. It seems that many of the assumptions rest 
on texts, on the discourses of the articulated leaders of the Islamist move-
ments. If we understand movements not in a Bourdieuian sense of solid groups 
to be represented by leaders, but as heterogeneous entities with diverse layers 
of activism, interests, and perspectives, then we will have to consider the va-
riety of discourses embedded in a social movement, digging into what the 
constituencies really aspire to. Living in and observing the Middle East dur-
ing the past twenty years, I would argue that most of the Islamist rebels 
would probably be in favor of modern conditions, would wish to be part of 
them, and would desire to enjoy their off erings only if they could aff ord their 
multifaceted costs. But they simply cannot. The central problem, therefore, is 
not primordial animosity against what is modern; neither is it related to op-
ponents’ historical origin, in that premodern classes, for instance, may op-
pose the modern order; aft er all, the working class is a product of modern 
capitalist economy and yet has major confl icts with this economic and social 
formation. The question, rather, pertains to whether and to what extent indi-
viduals and groups have the capacity to handle modernity, so to speak, to 
function within and benefi t from it. The truth is that, as we have already dis-
cussed in this book, not everyone can aff ord to be modern, because it is a 
costly arrangement. It requires the capacity to conform to the kind of mate-
rial, institutional- cultural, and intellectual imperatives that many simply 
cannot aff ord. In other words, things would likely be less volatile had the 
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majority of the population been enabled to cope with the various costs of 
modern life. Let me elaborate.
In many Middle Eastern countries, a large segment of the educated middle 
class (college graduates, professionals, state employees, or unemployed intel-
ligentsia) lack the material abilities to enjoy what modernity would otherwise 
off er them, such as decent shelter and a possibility of forming a nuclear family 
with a good degree of autonomy from elders.19 So, many are compelled to stay 
under the protection of extended family, fathers and elders, with all its con-
straining implications limiting their autonomy and the individuality that 
they oft en aspire to. Many of them wish to possess, but cannot aff ord, the 
usual consumer commodities or travel to the places about which they oft en 
have great knowledge. Consequently, they are oft en pushed into the ranks of 
the poor, marginalized in life- chances and consumption realms, while strug-
gling hard to maintain a lifestyle and taste that match their education and 
status.20 Their acute awareness of what is available and of their inability to 
acquire it gives them a constant feeling of exclusion and what Barrington 
Moore called “moral outrage.”21 They are likely to be revolutionaries.22
The urban poor oft en experience the same or an even higher degree of ma-
terial deprivation as the educated but marginalized middle classes. Yet this 
state of deprivation does not engender in them the same kind of po liti cal and 
moral outrage as occurs among the middle classes. For unlike the middle class, 
the poor oft en live on the margin of modern off erings, be they rights at their 
jobs, goods, entertainment, power, opportunities, or, above all, information. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, the poor are immediately aff ected and frustrated by 
the complex modalities of modern working, living, and being. They oft en lack 
the capacities and the skills, both materially and culturally- behaviorally, to 
function within the prevailing modern regimented institutions. This does not 
mean that the poor are antimodern traditionalists; rather, it tells us how the 
conditions of their lives compel them to resort to informal ways of doing 
things.
Nor are the Muslim poor necessarily antimodern revolutionaries. In-
deed, instead of confronting the states, the poor oft en seek recourse in “quiet 
encroachment.” Yet when the opportunity arises, they tend to make tactical 
alliances with revolutionaries, until their expected benefi ts dwindle, in 
which case they return to the strategy of “quiet encroachment.”23 At any 
rate, the poor have remained largely divorced from Islamism as a po liti cal 
project. They surely generate their own oft en kin- based ties and collectives, 
544-41003_ch01_4P.indd   227 9/1/09   1:59 PM
-1—
0—
+1—
228 STREET POLITICS AND THE PO LITI CAL STREET 
but these do not necessarily induce revolutionary communities, as some 
tend to suggest.24
Then, there are the rich— segments from the well- off  classes, mostly the 
new rich (notably women)— who do enjoy material well- being and economic 
status; they oft en adhere to globalized consumer behavior, in terms of con-
sumer goods, education, and entertainment. Yet they lack the intellectual 
abilities to tackle the epistemological premises of late modernity, its multiple 
truths, to which they are widely exposed precisely because of their privileged 
positions (traveling, global communication, access to global cultural and in-
tellectual products, and living in global cities). They are disturbed by moder-
nity’s philosophical and existential uncertainties, its risks. They are troubled, 
for instance, by the normalization of the idea that there may not be a God, 
that homosexual marriage may be legitimate. They are distressed by being 
bombarded by many “truths” from the satellite TV channels, by new “discov-
eries” that overturn established ethical paradigms— all these in conditions 
where the “gender division of sin” renders well- off  women more than men or 
poor women susceptible to religious moral “wrongdoings” (such as appearing 
half- naked on beaches, showing their hair, or mingling with men), and thus 
to feeling remorse and regret. Such groups are likely to form their own moral 
communities, as spaces for existential security and certainty. Religion, Islam, 
can off er a core institutional and conceptual setting for such communities. 
In Egypt, for instance, thousands of halaqat, or weekly informal gatherings 
of women to discuss religious rituals and injunctions, serve as moral commu-
nities where participants feel empowered to face the challenges of modern 
ethics. These groups may not be revolutionaries but are likely to support some 
kind of religious transformation of society.25
To these modern critical classes may join the traditional merchants, arti-
sans, and religious elites, members of the traditional religious establishments, 
the guardians of mosques and seminaries, who together may form a loose co-
ali tion of contentious classes in the modern Muslim Middle East. They tend 
to wage their collective struggle against secularist, oft en repressive and inef-
fi cient, postcolonial regimes that have tended to rest on the support of the 
secular western powers.
In the postwar period, pop u lar classes in the Muslim Middle East  were 
mobilized overwhelmingly around the secular ideologies of nationalism, so-
cialism, and Ba᾽ thism, which by the 1970s  were superseded by illiberal capital-
ism. The Nasserist revolution of 1952 in Egypt mobilized the lower and middle 
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classes to fi ght the remnants of colonial rule and to ensure social justice; it 
spearheaded a model of “Arab socialism” that swept the Arab world in sub-
sequent de cades. In 1961, a military coup overthrew a medieval system led by 
an imam that had ruled Yemen for centuries. Two years later, a revolt in Iraq 
brought the Ba᾽ th Party to power. A secular nationalist movement ensured 
Algerian in de pen dence from the French rule in 1962; and the Libyan modern 
elites dismantled the Senussi monarchical dynasty, establishing a revolution-
ary regime in 1969.26 A precursor to these events was the nationalist movement 
led by the secular prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh, who nationalized 
the Ira ni an oil industry and inaugurated a secular democracy in Iran, before 
he was overthrown by a CIA- engineered coup in 1953.27 But by the 1970s, these 
secular ideologies seemed to fail to deliver. Arab socialism (despite some im-
portant social outcomes) soon encountered insurmountable economic pres-
sure, as in Egypt and Algeria. Secular nationalism fell with Nasser’s defeat by 
Israel in the 1967 war. Ba᾽ thism lost to the despotism of Saddam Hussein and 
Hafez al- Assad. And the capitalist experiment led to growing social in e qual ity 
and exclusion and was identifi ed with Sadat’s perceived “sell- out” in foreign 
policy and his heavy- handed internal polity. Then emerged po liti cal Islam 
with an enormous boost from the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran.
THE PLACE OF ISLAM
Why po liti cal Islam? What is the place of Islam in these contentious condi-
tions? Is Islam an inherently revolutionary religion, a religion of politics? 
Certainly, the religious outcome of the Ira ni an Revolution reinforced among 
many observers the image of a highly politicist Islam in the age of modernity. 
Projecting the outcome of the revolution to the pro cess, even such careful 
scholars as Nazih Ayubi would not hesitate to state that “Islam is a po liti cal 
religion for it promises to control public morality.”28
Initially, much of the attention focused on the Shi῾i branch of Islam (the 
Ira ni an version) as more prone to revolution and protest than Sunni Islam. 
This was so supposedly because Shi῾i Islam represented a minority group, a 
“creed of the oppressed,” and thus a “religion of protest.” The story of Imam 
Hussein’s (the Prophet’s grandson’s) struggles against the powerful and “op-
pressive” Mu῾ awiyah was to provide the doctrinal and historical basis for the 
imagined radicalism of Shi῾i. The writings of the Sorbonne graduate Ira ni an 
Ali Shariati gave a particularly “scientifi c” legitimacy to the conceptualization 
of what he termed as “red” or revolutionary Shi῾i.29 In fact, he brought the 
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modern concepts of “class,” “class struggle,” and “revolution” into the Shi῾i 
Islamic discourse, popularizing the battle of Karbala (where Imam Hussein 
fought against Mu῾ awiyah) as the historical stage of a premodern revolution. 
He was instrumental in turning Islam into a po liti cal ideology. Following 
Shariati, Iran’s Mujahedin- e Khalq or ga ni za tion, with an ideological blend of 
Islam and Marxism- Leninism, put revolutionism into practice by establish-
ing a Latin American– type guerrilla or ga ni za tion in the 1960s.30 Hamid Da-
bashi’s massive volume Theology of Dissent represents an exploration of this 
revolutionary character of Shi῾i Islam in retrospect. Beyond Iran, the rise of 
Hizbullah in Lebanon in the late 1980s onto the center stage of world radical 
politics, and its relentless struggle to oust Israeli occupation forces from Leba-
non, further reinforced the revolutionary image of Shi῾i Islam in the world, 
until September 11, 2001, when attention was shift ed to Sunni Islam as the re-
ligion of violence and revolution.
In truth, Sunni Islam has also had some revolutionary elements. The Egyp-
tian Hasan al- Banna, a leader of the oldest and largest Islamist movement in 
the Arab world, brought the concept of jahili state and society from the Indian 
Abul Ala Maududi, who himself was infl uenced by Lenin’s perspective on or-
ga ni za tion and the state. Maududi’s notion of Islamic “theo- democracy” was 
not very dissimilar to a model of the communist state. Al- Banna, however, was 
remarkably Gramscian in strategy (in “war of maneuver” and hegemony), even 
though there is no evidence that he actually read Gramsci. More recently, in 
the 1980s, many Sunni Marxists (such as Tariq al- Bishri, Mohammad Emarah, 
Mustafa Mahmoud, Adel Hussein, Abdulwahab el- Massiri, and others)  were 
turning to Islamism, thus bringing many Marxian visions and vocabularies 
into po liti cal Islam, projecting the latter as an endogenous Third World- ist 
ideology to fi ght imperialism, Zionism, and secularism.31 However, it was the 
events post- 9/11 that mostly exonerated the revolutionism of Shi῾i Islam, shift -
ing attention to Sunni radicalism, notably its Wahhabi version. Not only  were 
all culprits in the 9/11 attacks Sunni Islamists, the rise of post- Islamist reform-
ists in Iran in the late 1990s had already undermined essentializing assump-
tions about Shi῾i revolutionism. And then the violent insurgency of the “Sunni 
triangle” in Iraq against the U.S. occupation was oft en contrasted with the 
“reasonable” and “moderate” Shi῾i clerical leader, Ayatollah Al- Sistani.
I have argued elsewhere that the revolutionary/reactionary, demo cratic/
undemo cratic character of religions, say Islam, should be seen not by refer-
ence to some “intrinsic” dispositions of the faith, but by the historically condi-
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tioned faculties of the faithful. In other words, we should focus not on Islam 
as such, but on the historical Muslims, who come to defi ne and redefi ne their 
religion, both in ideas and practice, in diverse fashions. In short, it is the 
Muslim humanity with diverse moral and material interests, loyalties, and 
orientations that come to construct diff erent types of Islams— revolutionary, 
conservative, demo cratic, or repressive.32
Through this prism, the role of Islam in radical politics is important in at 
least two main respects. First, Islam can act, and has done so, as the ideologi-
cal and moral structure within which contentious politics and revolutions 
are given meaning. Any act of contention fi rst goes through the fi lter of the 
prevailing moral and communal values through which “injustice” is per-
ceived, defi ned, and resisted, and where struggle assumes its meaning. Islam 
can provide that structure. Islamic codes and concepts can also be deployed, 
deliberately, to frame a revolutionary movement, that is, to justify, legitimize, 
dignify, and extend the appeal of movements. Muslim revolutionaries attempt 
to present Islam as an alternative social, po liti cal, moral, and even economic 
order. Having an alternative on the horizon constitutes a leap for contenders 
to further their struggles. The ideologues’ repre sen ta tion of Islam as an alter-
native social order oft en remains at the level of generality. This might sound 
like a drawback, but it is in fact projecting a broad and ambiguous prospect 
that may cover diff erences in opinions and expectations and thus ensure 
unity. In the chaos of revolutionary hope, the generality of objectives ensures 
uniformity and guides action, leaving the potentially divisive details to the 
free imagination of each contender to construct their own ideal outcome.33
Islam may intervene in revolutionary struggles not merely as an ideology, 
frame, and model, but also as a harbinger of vested interests. In the Middle 
East, the “Islamic sector” (consisting of religious institutions, mosques, shrines, 
madrasa, rules, rituals, tastes, and the associated personnel, property, and 
power) has historically been pervasive. Within it, the ῾ulama᾽  (the clerical 
class), as the articulated gatekeepers, have served as the main legitimizing fac-
tor for Middle East rulers.34 The sector continues to reinvent itself in the face 
of modernity’s challenges. Yet the advent of the modern state, citizenship, 
education, fi nance, and taxation has seriously undermined the legitimacy and 
power as well as the material gains and control of many functionaries, notably 
the “spiritual elites” involved in the religious sector. The ῾ulama᾽ , as a status 
group controlling the “spiritual property,” could see their status, legitimacy, 
material gains, and especially their “paradigm power” (that is, the discursive 
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frame that allows them to communicate and exert their hegemony) being 
eroded. The new education system deprived them of being the sole transmit-
ter of knowledge and literacy; the modern justice system pushed them aside 
from the helm of religious arbitration; the new taxation and fi nancial institu-
tions undercut their ability to raise religious tax (zakat, khoms, and sadaqat), 
while the modern states brought many of the religious endowments (awqaf ) 
under the control of the bureaucrats, consequently seriously undercutting the 
fi nancial in de pen dence of the religious authorities. Associated with these 
changes, religious sensibilities and the power that they bring to the religious 
elites are challenged. In short, Islam, in this sense, may move into the center 
of a revolutionary struggle because of religious elites’ vested interests. In the 
experience of Iran, the Shi῾i clerics who had managed to maintain their au-
tonomy (fi nancially and po liti cally) succeeded in retaining a good part of the 
religious sector in de pen dent from the diktat of the Shah’s regime by relying 
on various religious taxes and donations (zakat, khoms) from the faithful and 
the revenue from the remaining endowments. But Egyptian ῾ulama᾽  and with 
them much of the Islamic sector  were incorporated into the state structure, 
fi rst by Muhammad Ali in the nineteenth century, and later and more fi ercely 
by Nasser in the 1960s. In Iran, the ῾ulama᾽  became a major revolutionary 
force, while in Egypt, it was not the ῾ulama᾽ , but the lay Muslim activists, who 
in the form of the Muslim Brothers raised the banner of re- Islamization of 
Egyptian society and polity.
This is not to fi xate on Islam and the Islamic ῾ulama᾽  as essential subjects 
of revolutionary transformation. Indeed, “modernizing” ῾ulama᾽  may well 
cohabit and cooperate with Middle Eastern secular states. The top segment of 
Egypt’s religious establishment and its elites have for de cades pursued a policy 
of coexistence and cooperation with the government. Indeed, today most re-
gimes in the region enjoy the general blessing of “establishment Islam,” for 
example, Al- Azhar’s top clerics. In Iran, the clerical class is deeply divided, 
along po liti cal as well as doctrinal lines. The “traditional” and “fundamental-
ist” ῾ulama᾽  (as they are labeled in Iran) support a religious state, while the 
younger generation, and those adherents of “critical rationality,” who place 
“reason” at the center of the management of public life, oppose the very idea of 
an “Islamic state.” While the unity of po liti cal and religious authorities tends 
to alienate at least a segment of the clerical class, lay Muslims have expressed 
far greater distrust of an Islam that is enticed by mundane po liti cal power. As 
the outcome of several elections in the late 1990s showed, many women and 
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the young in Iran feel more than any other group the debilitating eff ect of the 
religious state, in their daily lives, at work, before the law, and in the public 
space. They have been in the forefront of the opposition against an Islam that 
they see as having degenerated into an offi  ce of power. Thus, Islam may be 
both a factor of revolution and its target. It can be not only the subject of revo-
lution, but also its object.
THE FUTURE OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONS
What is the future of Islamist revolutions in the age of globalization? Is glo-
balization conducive to the making of revolutions in general, and Islamist 
revolutions in par tic u lar? I think that globalization may induce dissent, social 
movements, and even revolts but is antithetical to classical revolutions, in-
cluding the Islamic versions. Perhaps we need to revisit our understanding of 
“revolutions,” looking at them in terms of more diff use and nonviolent mobi-
lization with gradual pro cess and long- term change. Their ultimate aim may 
not be to challenge the global system, but to negotiate with it.
Critiques of globalization seem to generally agree that it leads to consider-
able instability and insurgency, in par tic u lar in the periphery of the world 
capitalist system.35 National states become undermined by the normalized 
involvement of supranational economic and po liti cal entities and structures 
in the national aff airs of the sovereign states. The neoliberal economic policies, 
oft en directed by the creditor nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the World Bank, oblige the postcolonial populist states to retreat from 
their traditional social contract in off ering subsistence provisions to their 
needy citizens. Not only do such retreats generate pop u lar resentment against 
these regimes, they also open new space (left  by the withdrawal of the state 
from the social sector) that then is fi lled by oppositional forces, such as the Is-
lamist militants in the Middle East.36 Many view the growth of “social Islam” 
as a front for po liti cal Islam resulting from such an absence by the states. In the 
meantime, the globalization of means of communication facilitates the inter-
nationalization of national confl icts, the easy fl ow of information, and forging 
solidarities that extend beyond national boundaries. In addition, international 
po liti cal pressure, by the governments, civil society, and suprastate institutions 
(e.g., the international criminal court, the UN Charter and Security Council, 
human rights organizations, and the like) are likely to reinvigorate movements 
for po liti cal change within the individual countries of the global South. Thus, 
with the decline of “legitimating identities,” such as nationalism and socialism, 
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according to Castells, contenders express their re sis tance against the global 
“network society” by forming autonomous “communities” around ethnic, cul-
tural, and religious identities (“re sis tance identities”). These formations may 
not even remain defensive but may develop into a new identity “that defi nes 
their position in society and by so doing seeks the transformation of over- all 
social structure,” what Castells calls “project identities.”37
The 1989 chain of revolutions in Eastern Eu rope, the Zapatista revolution-
ary movement connecting a local peasant rebellion to the international anti-
globalization movement (Castells), and, most recently, the “color revolution” in 
the former Soviet  Union between 2003 and 2005 (which, unlike the Zapatista 
movement, was supported by western established classes and elites) all point to 
the power of the transnational linkage of dissent and solidarities, of models 
and lifestyles that seem to penetrate the national iron curtains.38 It is as though 
such momentous events of the turn of the twentieth century stand as testi-
mony to yet another “age of revolution,” reinforcing the high hopes of such 
postwar social theorists and activists as Hanna Arendt, who saw “almost as 
a matter of course that the end of the war is revolution, and that the only cause 
of which possibly could justify it is the revolutionary cause of freedom.” Eric 
Hobsbawm retained such a high hope until the “halt” of the “forward march of 
labour” in 1978. And as late as 2000, David Harvey suggested, against the pre-
vailing mood, that Marxism and notably the Communist Manifesto had never 
been as relevant to the global conditions as they are today. At the outset of the 
twenty- fi rst century, Harvey implied, the world is ripe to free itself from the 
shackles of capital.39
However, it seemed that these theorists’ “optimism of will” overshadowed 
their “pessimism of intellect.” Arendt did not survive to observe the wave of the 
late- 1990s revolutions against communism. Hobsbawm, in reviewing his own 
history, was to acknowledge, though “without apology,” the “over- optimism” of 
those early years. And Harvey became dismayed by the absence of interest in 
Marxism and the politics of revolution.40 If the idea of revolution for these ob-
servers was to free humanity from the diktat of capitalism, then the age of 
globalization seems to have made such a freedom ever more formidable. With 
the hegemony of capital and neoliberal logic in every society and major sector, 
space for alternative social order becomes restricted primarily and ironically to 
the margins, those on the exclusion zones of global capital and po liti cal order: 
the informal sectors, the barrios, cityscapes, and  house hold economies, and in 
terms of the reviving cultural identities and ethnicities, within which some 
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degree of autonomy is still maintained.41 Indeed some (postdevelopment advo-
cates) consider these “premodern communes” as the major alternative to the 
western- imposed development model.42
The point, then, is that a world needing a revolution is not necessarily the 
one that has the requisite forces to carry it out if the agents are fi gured by frag-
mentation, despair, individualism, and alienation. Even in 2009, in the midst 
of the worst fi nancial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, no serious 
movement to challenge capitalism has emerged. Harvey’s merit lies not so 
much in spelling out revolutionary conditions as it does in his attempt to off er 
“spaces of hope,” the possibility of alternative ways of or ga niz ing society, econ-
omy, work, and ecol ogy, to undercut the debilitating pessimism of will, or the 
prevailing idea that “there is no alternative.” What Harvey and Castells explore 
are not, nor do they aim for, agency and conditions for Marxian revolutions, 
but the constitution of dissent, social movements, and alternative ways of ar-
ranging work and life.
I am inclined to think that the logic of globalization (because it tends to 
fragment the pop u lar classes through informalization, NGOization, and indi-
vidualization, and because it transnationalizes both the objectives and actors 
of revolutionary movements) may be antithetical to the making of classical 
revolutions. It is true that globalization does engender radical changes, but not 
in the form of the rapid, violent, and nationally based revolts to transform the 
state and society, that is, classical revolutions. For classical revolutions are ac-
tualized only within the confi nes of the nation- state; they come to fruition by 
mass revolts in which the national states become the ultimate target. Because it 
is only within the limits of a nation- state that “rights” assume their concrete 
meaning, and around which dissent, mobilization, and action make sense. In 
addition, it is only within the confi nes of the nation- states that dissent fi nds a 
concrete focus, a recognizable target, and a manageable course of action. In other 
words, the question of revolution is ultimately tied to the question of the state— 
the way in which the states change (or do not change) determines whether a 
revolution has occurred, and what kind. If nation- based revolts lie at the core 
of classical revolutions, then the transnationalization of revolts, both in their 
agents and aims (e.g., struggles against the “West” or “global injustice”), would 
deprive them of broad mobilization against a concrete national objective. In 
short, the idea of world revolution is ironically nonrevolutionary.
Now, what of the future of “Islamic revolutions”? I think that the possibility 
of Islamic revolutions in the current age follows a more or less similar logic. 
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Iran’s earlier idea of “global Islamic revolution,” beginning with Iraq, clearly 
failed during the war with Saddam Hussein, because opposition against the 
Ba῾ thist regime did not come from within the country but had a foreign ele-
ment (Iran), which in turn instigated Iraqi nationalism. Since then, the revi-
sionist idea of “Islamism in one country” has become the accepted strategy of 
the Islamic republic. But there is more to the story of revolutions. Revolutions 
signify extraordinary change par excellence, rare moments of utopian visions 
and extreme mea sures, followed by compromise and confl icts to merge utopia 
and hard realities, thus leading to a surging dissent both from within the revo-
lutionary ranks and from without. The Islamic Revolution involves par tic u lar 
incongruities by its distinctly religious ideology and moralist regime, which 
paradoxically rules over a modern citizenry through a modern state. Al-
though, the Islamic Revolution in Iran caused dissent at home, it inspired and 
found friends among the Islamic movements in the Muslim world. But Is-
lamic revolutions do not only inspire movements to emulate but also subvert 
similar happenings, because they make incumbent secular regimes (e.g., in 
Egypt or Algeria) more vigilant in suppressing potential revolts, and because 
their subsequent anomalies and retreat demonstrate that revolutions may not, 
aft er all, be desirable options. This pushes the nation- based Islamist move-
ments into a state of perplexity and confusion, where they vacillate between 
revolutionary utopia and realpolitik, between aspirations and limitations.
Yet more signifi cant trends seem to be under way in the dispositions of 
Islamism that lead it to deviate from a revolutionary path. These trends are 
infl uenced by both the internal workings of the Islamist movements and 
global politics, in par tic u lar the post- 9/11 events. One trend is what I have 
called “post- Islamization.” It refers to the project and movements that want to 
transcend Islamism as an exclusivist and totalizing ideology, seeking instead 
inclusion, pluralism, and ambiguity. It is nationalist in scope (as opposed to be-
ing Pan- Islamist), and consciously postrevolutionary—post- idea- of- revolution, 
that is. It represents primarily a po liti cal project. In Iran, it took the form of the 
“reform movement” of the late 1990s, which partly evolved into the “reform 
government” (1997– 2004). A number of Islamic movements also exhibit some 
aspects of “post- Islamism”: the new pluralist strategy of the Lebanese Hizbullah 
in the early 1990s, leading to a split in the movement; the emergence in the mid- 
1990s of the Al- Wasat Party in Egypt as an alternative to both militant Is-
lamists and the Muslim Brothers; the Justice and Development Parties in both 
Turkey and Morocco; the discursive shift  in the Indian Jamaat- i Islami toward 
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more inclusive, pluralistic, and ambiguous ideological dispositions; and fi -
nally, the emergence in Saudi Arabia of an “Islamo- liberal” trend in the late 
1990s, seeking a compromise between Islam and democracy— each displaying 
some diverse versions of post- Islamist trends in Muslim societies today. Most 
of these movements seek a secular state but wish to promote religious societies 
(see Chapter 13).
Many movements in the Muslim world still aspire to establish an Islamic 
state but wish to do so within the existing constitutional frameworks; they 
reject violent strategies and hope to operate within the prevailing po liti cal 
norms, invoking many demo cratic principles. Their Islamic state and econ-
omy fi nd an overall complementarity to capitalism. The Muslim Brothers in 
Egypt and its off shoots in Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Kuwait, Palestine, and Jor-
dan represent this trend. So did Necmettin Erbakan’s locally based Rifah 
Party in Turkey. Even though in classical terms they are reformist, not revo-
lutionary, movements, they tend to engender signifi cant social and po liti cal 
change in the long run.
Global events since the late 1990s (the Balkan ethnic war, Rus sian domina-
tion of Chechnya, the Israeli incursions into the West Bank and Gaza, not to 
mention the post- 9/11 anti- Islamic sentiments in the West) created among 
Muslims an acute sense of insecurity and a feeling of siege. This in turn has 
heightened religious identity and communal bonds, generating a new trend of 
“active piety,” a sort of missionary tendency quite distinct from the highly or-
ga nized and powerful “apo liti cal Islam” of the transnational Tablighi move-
ment. Inclined toward individualism, diff usion, and Wahhabi- type conserva-
tism, the adherents aim not to establish an Islamic state, but to reclaim and 
enhance their own individual ethical selves, even though they strive to im-
plant such an undertaking among others. Even though the mobilization of 
millions of Muslims against the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad 
in 2006 demonstrated forging a new type of ethical- political practice and 
protest, it also pointed to the globally disparate, reformist, and nonrevolu-
tionary character of the dissent.
It is largely the so- called jihadi trend that pursues armed struggle and ter-
rorism. But even  here, only a segment follows the project of overthrowing the 
Muslim regimes within a par tic u lar nation- state, and in this sense it is revolu-
tionary. For the most part, these groups are consumed by the idea of jihad as 
an end, perceiving the very pro cess of struggle as an ethical journey, off ering 
little in the way of projecting a future state, society, and economy. Many jihadi 
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groups are involved in “civilizational” struggles, with the aim of combating 
an abstract “west,” “infi del” and “corrupt’.” A reading of Bin Laden’s messages 
reveals how his priority goes little beyond “uniting opinions under the word 
of mono the ism and defending Islam.”43 Transnational and notoriously male 
in aim and or ga ni za tion (defending the global umma against an “unholy 
West”), al- Qaeda intrinsically lacks any sort of social and po liti cal program, 
and thus is unlikely to succeed in mobilizing a concerted national dissent 
against a concrete national state.
In the current status of widespread religious sentiments and movements 
in the Muslim world, the growth of demo cratic sensibilities and movements 
(secular or religiously oriented) is likely to push Islamism into the post- Islamist 
course, paving the way, through “reformist” struggles, for a demo cratic 
change in which an inclusive Islam may play a signifi cant role. The outcome 
might be termed “post- Islamist refolutions.” In the end, the Ira ni an experi-
ence of 1979 may well remain the fi rst and the last Islamic revolution of our 
time. The fi nal chapter describes the details of this trend in the Muslim Mid-
dle East, highlighting the part that “nonmovements” and the “art of presence” 
may play in such a transformation.
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 13 NO SILENCE, NO VIOLENCE
Post- Islamist Trajectory
debate about a “demo cratic defi cit” in the Middle East is not new. What is 
novel is the excessive attention given to Islam as a factor said to hinder demo-
cratic reform. With its emphasis on God’s sovereignty and patriarchal dispo-
sition, Islam is argued to be essentially incompatible with democracy. Lacking 
concepts of citizenship, freedom, and tolerance, it encourages believers to 
embrace coercion, violence, and the path of jihad.1 Thus, Islam is viewed as a 
“world in which human life  doesn’t have the same value as it does in the West, 
in which freedom, democracy, openness and creativity are alien.”2 Such views 
have been energized by many home- grown Islamists who, in the name of 
their religion, suspect democracy as a “foreign construct,” suspend pop u lar 
will in favor of God’s sovereignty, and commit violence in the name of jihad. 
Even though many Muslims refute these charges by suggesting that God has 
granted sovereignty to humans to govern themselves, and that Islamic justice 
values life (“killing one person equals killing the  whole of humanity”) and 
disallows discrimination based on class, race, or gender,3 the debate has in 
general been bogged down in entirely textual and philosophical terrains, with 
little eff ort to understand the politics of religious affi  liation, and how in prac-
tice Muslims perceive their religion in relation to demo cratic ideals.
Adapted from Asef Bayat, Making Islam Demo cratic: Social Movements and the Post- 
Islamist Turn (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007). For a full elaboration 
of the arguments raised  here, and for extensive historical/empirical narratives, please 
refer to the book.
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I would like to suggest that the question, raised so per sis tent ly, is not 
whether Islam is or is not compatible with democracy (itself a convoluted con-
cept), but rather how and under what conditions Muslims can make Islam 
embrace demo cratic ethos. Nothing intrinsic to Islam— or any other religion— 
makes it inherently demo cratic or undemo cratic, peaceful or violent. It de-
pends on the intricate ways in which the living faithful perceive, articulate, 
and live through their faiths: some deploy their religions in exclusive, authori-
tarian, and violent terms, while others read in them justice, peace, equality, 
repre sen ta tion, and pluralism. Irrespective of whether religious beliefs and 
experiences relate to supernatural reality, in the end, “religion is expressed by 
means of human ideas, symbols, feelings, practices, and organizations.” 4 In a 
sense, religious injunctions are nothing but our understanding of them; they 
are what we make them to be. Some fi ft y years ago many social scientists be-
lieved that Christianity and democracy  were incompatible.5 But today the 
most deep- rooted democracies are in the Christian heartland, even though 
fascism also emerged, and was associated with the church, in the heartland of 
Christianity. Clearly then, there are no such things as religions out there. 
Rather, a religion is understood, imagined, and constructed by diff erent groups 
of the faithful in diverse forms. As to why individuals and groups perceive 
and present the same scriptures diff erently is a most intriguing so cio log i cal 
question and cannot be elaborated  here. Suffi  ce to state  here that it depends 
largely on individual believers’ diff erent biographies, social positions, and 
interests.
While so much is currently discussed about the “fundamentalist Islamist” 
and jihadi trends that draw oft en on puritanical, exclusivist, and hostile inter-
pretations of the doctrine, little is known about the ethics and experiences of 
those nonviolent social movements— what I have called “post- Islamism”—that 
aim to bridge the gap between Islam and democracy in Muslim societies today. 
This chapter elaborates on the workings of these movements and discusses the 
obstacles as well as opportunities to envisage a post- Islamist democracy in the 
Middle East through peaceful means.
POST- ISLAMISM
What is post- Islamism? Is it a discursive break from Islamism— the ideologies 
and movements that aim to establish an Islamic order (i.e., religious state, Is-
lamic laws and moral codes), emphasizing disproportionately people’s obliga-
tions over their rights? Or does it rather represent only a par tic u lar version of 
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Islamist politics? Does the term indicate we have reached the historical end 
of Islamism altogether? In 1995, I happened to write an essay entitled the 
“Coming of a Post- Islamist Society” 6 in which I discussed the articulation of 
the remarkable social trends, po liti cal perspectives, and religious thought 
which post- Khomeini Iran had begun to witness— a trend which eventually 
came to embody the reform movement of the late 1990s. Since then, a number 
of observers and students of Islam have deployed the term, even though de-
scriptively, to refer primarily to what they consider a general shift  in attitudes 
and strategies of Islamist militants in the Muslim world. In fact, partly due to 
its poor conceptualization and party for its misperception, the term has in-
vited critical appraisal.7
In my formulation, post- Islamism represents both a condition and a proj-
ect. In the fi rst instance, post- Islamism refers to a po liti cal and social condi-
tion, in which aft er a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, and 
sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted even among its once- ardent 
supporters. Islamists become aware of their system’s anomalies and inade-
quacies as they attempt to normalize and institutionalize their rule. The con-
tinuous trial and error makes the system susceptible to questions; and the 
pragmatic attempts to maintain the system reinforce abandoning certain of 
its underlying principles. Islamism becomes compelled to reinvent itself, but 
does so at the cost of a qualitative shift . Not only a condition, post- Islamism is 
also a project, a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the ratio-
nale and modalities of transcending Islamism in social, po liti cal, and intel-
lectual domains. Yet, it is neither anti- Islamic nor un- Islamic or secular. Grow-
ing out of the anomalies of Islamist politics since the early 1990s, post- Islamism 
represents an endeavor to fuse religiosity and rights, faith and freedom, Islam 
and liberty. It wants to turn the underlying principles of Islamism on their 
heads by emphasizing rights instead of duties, plurality in place of a singular 
authoritative voice, historicity rather than fi xed scripture, and the future in-
stead of the past. It strives to marry Islam with individual choice and freedom, 
with democracy and modernity (something post- Islamists stress), to achieve 
what some have termed an “alternative modernity.” It wishes to undo the dis-
course of violence that is so much ingrained in the ideologies and practices of 
some, but not all, Islamist trends today, to discard the current association of 
Islam with violence. Post- Islamism is expressed in acknowledging secular exi-
gencies, in freedom from rigidity, in breaking down the monopoly of religious 
truth. In short, whereas Islamism is marked by the fusion of religion and re-
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sponsibility, post- Islamism emphasizes religiosity and rights, even though the 
latter’s relationship with liberalism remains tense. I should stress that, fi rst, 
Islamism and post- Islamism serve primarily as conceptual categories to sig-
nify change, diff erence, and the root of change. In the real world, however, 
many Muslims may adhere eclectically and simultaneously to aspects of both 
discourses. On the other hand, the advent of post- Islamism as a real trend, 
should not be seen necessarily as the historical end of Islamism. What it 
should be seen as is the birth, out of Islamist experience, of a quantitatively 
diff erent discourse and politics. In reality we may witness simultaneous pro-
cesses of both Islamization and post- Islamization.
Whether or not Islam corresponds to demo cratic ideas depends primarily 
on whether advocates of these perspectives— Islamism and post- Islamism—
are able to establish their hegemony in society and the state. The history of 
socioreligious movements in Iran and Egypt since the 1970s off ers a fertile 
ground to examine the logic, conditions, and forces behind rendering Islam 
demo cratic or undemo cratic. In Iran, the 1979 revolution and establishment 
of an Islamic state set conditions for the rise of post- Islamist ideas and move-
ments that aimed to transcend Islamism in society and governance. The end 
of the war with Iraq (1988), the death of Ayatollah Khomeini (1989), and the 
program of postwar reconstruction under President Rafsanjani marked a 
turning point toward post- Islamism. It expressed itself in various social prac-
tices and ideas, including urban management, feminist practice, theological 
perspective, and social and intellectual trends and movements. Youths, stu-
dents, women, religious intellectuals, and many state employees, among oth-
ers, called for democracy, individual rights, tolerance, and gender equality, 
but they refused to throw away religious sensibilities altogether. Thus, daily 
re sis tance and struggle by ordinary people compelled religious thinkers, spir-
itual elites, and po liti cal actors to undertake a crucial paradigmatic shift . 
Scores of old Islamist revolutionaries renounced their earlier ideas of exclu-
sivism, revolutionary violence, and religion as ideology and politics, and la-
mented the danger of religious state to both religion and the state. Numerous 
opponents from both without and within the Islamic state called for its secu-
larization but stressed maintaining religious ethics in society. In fact, the re-
formist government of President Muhammad Khatami (1997– 2004) repre-
sented only one, the po liti cal, aspect of this pervasive societal trend.
In Egypt, on the other hand, instead of an Islamic revolution, there devel-
oped a pervasive Islamist movement that held a conservative moral vision, 
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populist language, a patriarchal disposition, and adherence to scripture. By 
the early 1990s, through da῾ wa (invitation to faith) and associational work, the 
movement had captured some large tracts within the civil society, moving on 
to claim space in state institutions. Although it failed to dislocate Egypt’s 
secular regime, the movement left  an enduring mark on both society and state. 
It succeeded in hegemonizing an “Islamic mode” in society. Engulfed by the 
pervasive “Islamic mode,” major actors in Egyptian society, including the in-
telligentsia, the new rich, Al- Azhar (the institution of establishment Islam), 
and ruling elites, all converged around the language of nativism and conserva-
tive moral ethos, thus severely marginalizing critical voices, innovative reli-
gious thought, and demands for genuine demo cratic reform. In the end, 
threatened by expanding Islamism, the authoritarian state appropriated as-
pects of conservative religiosity and nationalist sentiments (which had been 
cultivated by the continuing Arab– Israeli confl ict) to confi gure Egypt’s “pas-
sive revolution.” This Gramscian passive revolution represented a managed 
Islamic restoration in which the state, in reality the original target of change, 
succeeded in remaining fully in charge. Even though a nascent democracy 
movement in 2005 (Kifaya) pointed to some hopeful change in the po liti cal 
climate, the power structure remained authoritarian, religious thought stag-
nant and exclusive, and the po liti cal class nativist. Little in Egypt resembled 
Iran’s post- Islamist trajectory.
Since the 1990s, both of these trends, Islamism and post- Islamism, have 
been unfolding simultaneously in other parts of the Muslim world. On the one 
hand, the global and domestic social and po liti cal conditions have continued 
to generate appeals for religious and moral politics, especially in those nations 
that had not experienced Islamism. Anti- Islamic sentiment in the West follow-
ing the September 11 terrorist attacks, and the subsequent “war on terrorism,” 
reinforced a profound feeling of insecurity and outrage among Muslims who 
sense that Islam and Muslims are under an intense onslaught. This increased 
the appeal of religiosity and nativism, so that Islamic parties (such as those in 
Morocco, Algeria, Pakistan, Bahrain, and Turkey) that among other issues ex-
pressed opposition to U.S. policy in Af ghan i stan have scored considerable suc-
cesses in several national elections since 2002.
At the very same time, however, and against the backdrop of intensifying 
religious sentiments in the Muslim world, a new post- Islamist trend has begun 
to emerge, attempting to accommodate aspects of demo cratization, pluralism, 
women’s rights, youth concerns, and social development with adherence to 
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religion. In Lebanon, Hizbullah transcended its exclusivist Islamist platform 
(i.e., calling for an Islamic state in Lebanon) by adapting to the pluralistic po-
liti cal reality of Lebanese society, acting more or less like a confessional po liti-
cal party as its Lebanese counterparts. In Egypt, Hizb al- Wasat, a breakaway 
faction of the Muslim Brothers, disassociated itself from both the violent strat-
egy of the al- Gama῾ a al- Islamiyya (which later, in 1997, renounced violence 
unilaterally and opted for peaceful activities) and the authoritarian disposition 
of its Muslim Brothers pre de ces sors. Hizb al- Wasat privileged modern democ-
racy over Islamic shura (the principle of consultation), embraced pluralism in 
religion, and welcomed gender mixing and ideological tendencies. In fact, the 
main ideologue of the party has been a Coptic Christian. In Central Asia, 
while the Islamist Hizb al- Tahrir has held its ground in Tajikistan, the Islamic 
Re nais sance Party has integrated into that country’s secular po liti cal pro cess, 
attempting to contest po liti cal power through peaceful electoral fashion.8 The 
Jamaat- e-Islami of India has experienced a qualitative shift  from a movement 
resting on an organic, complete, and exclusivist Islam— one that rejected de-
mocracy and was intolerant of other faith lines— into a movement that em-
braces ambiguity and interpretation in its foundational thoughts, values de-
mocracy and pluralism, and cooperates with its ideological “others.” 9 Leaders 
of the current Moroccan religious movement al- Adl wal- Ihsan (Justice and 
Benevolence) discard an exclusive understanding of Islam, rely on interpreta-
tion and historicizing, and acknowledge fl exibility and ambiguity; they reject 
imposing shari a῾ laws and hijab on Muslims, and endorse human rights, plu-
ralism, democracy, and separation of powers.10 But more than al- Adl wal- Ihsan, 
it is Morocco’s Justice and Development Party that has spearheaded a post- 
Islamist disposition by practically participating in the current multiparty elec-
toral competition. And fi nally, notwithstanding an initial unease in the West 
about growing religious revivalism, Turkey has smoothly and rapidly tran-
scended the Islamism of Virtue and Welfare Parties by embracing a self- 
conscious post- Islamist trend expressed in the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP)— one that advocates a pious society in a secular demo cratic state. Even 
in the highly conservative Saudi Arabia, a post- Wahhabi trend has been at-
tempting to incorporate notions of “liberal Islam,” seeking a compromise with 
democracy.11 Yet, except for Turkey, which already had a multiparty democ-
racy, none of these movements has assumed governmental power to consider 
how and to what extent they would be willing or able to forge demo cratic gov-
ernance. If there is a lesson in the Ira ni an experience, it is that its post- Islamism 
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was pushed back by the conservative Islamists, who control major domains of 
the state power.
Thus, neither did Egypt’s Islamist movement succeed in fully “Islamizing” 
the Egyptian state, nor did Iran’s post- Islamism succeed in demo cratizing the 
Islamic Republic. Both movements encountered stiff  opposition from their re-
spective power elites. In other words, the po liti cal impasse in these countries 
has been less a function of religion per se than of structural impediments and 
the longtime vested interests of ruling elites. To what extent can social move-
ment mobilization enforce intended po liti cal and structural change? How far 
can states accommodate the radical projects of their social movement adver-
saries? And how far can social movements alter, without resorting to violent 
revolutions, the po liti cal status quo in the Middle East— a region entrapped by 
the authoritarian regimes of both secular and religious dispositions, exclusiv-
ist Islamist opposition, and blatant (threat of) foreign domination?
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND PO LITI CAL CHANGE
Multifaceted social movements are not single- episode expressions that melt 
away under an act of repression. Rather, they are prolonged, many- sided pro-
cesses of agency and change, with ebbs and fl ows, whose enduring “forward 
linkages” can revitalize pop u lar mobilization when the opportunity arises. 
Clearly, the most common work of social movements is to pressure opponents 
or authorities to fulfi ll social demands. This is carried out through mobilization 
and threatening disruption or uncertainty against adversaries.12 For instance, 
the Islamist campaign in Egypt compelled the government to restrict many 
liberal publications, persecute authors, or prohibit fi lms. Second, even if social 
movements are not engaged in a po liti cal campaign, they may still be involved 
in what Melucci calls “cultural production.” 13 The very operation of a social 
movement is in itself a change, since it involves creating new social formations, 
groups, networks, and relationships. Its “animating eff ects,” by enforcing and 
unfolding such alternative relations and institutions, enhances cultural produc-
tion of diff erent value systems, norms, behavior, symbols, and discourse. This 
pro cess of building “hegemony” is expressed by producing alternative ways of 
being and doing things. Post- Islamist movements display a vivid example of such 
a moral and intellectual infl uence in civil society, through the press, publica-
tions, associations, discourse, education, and lifestyles.
Third, social movements may also induce change by discreetly operating 
on the fault line between the state and civil society— in educational, judiciary, 
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media, and other institutions. In the early 1990s, Egyptian Islamists suc-
ceeded in penetrating the state education system, infl uencing policymakers, 
teachers, and, above all, a generation of students through their activities at 
teacher training colleges. Islamist judges enforced Islamic law, punishing sec-
ulars while supporting Islamic- oriented legal suits. Even police and the mili-
tary  were not immune. Finally, social movements, if they are tolerated by the 
incumbent regimes, may be able to capture segments of governmental power 
through routine electoral means. The cases of Turkey’s ruling AKP and Iran’s 
reform government under President Khatami represent only two recent ex-
amples. Both movements managed to form legitimate governments.
A great challenge of a social movement is how to retain its movement char-
acter and at the same time exert governmental power. While sharing state 
power may enable social movements to turn some of their ideas into public 
policy, failure to do so, even though due to opponents’ sabotage, would under-
mine their support base in society, thus rendering them powerless. Clearly, 
then, social movements need to go beyond discursive struggles for demo cratic 
polity by consolidating their institutional foundations within the fabric of 
society, to link up intimately with the subaltern constituencies. For not only 
can a solid institutional social base compel the opponents/states to undertake 
po liti cal reform, as in the Mexican experience, and may even enforce a “po liti-
cal pact” between democracy movements and the states (as in Chile and 
Spain), it can also protect movements from repression and annihilation and 
ensure continuity and revival even aft er a period of downturn. Egypt’s Mus-
lim Brothers exemplify a pertinent case, where the movement has managed to 
survive since its inception in the late 1920s by enduring de cades of ebbs and 
fl ows, thanks primarily to its deep- seated associational work in civil society 
and to its kinship networks.
THE ART OF PRESENCE
No doubt, reform of authoritarian states would require distinctly laborious 
struggles, the signifi cance and diffi  culties of which one cannot discount. 
However, demo cratic societal change remains indispensable to meaningful 
and sustained demo cratic reform of the state. Change in society’s sensibilities 
is a precondition for far- reaching demo cratic transformation. Social change 
might occur partly as the unintended outcome of structural pro cesses, such 
as migration, urbanization, demographic shift s, or a rise in literacy; it may 
also result from global factors and the exchange of ideas, information, and 
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models. But the most crucial element for demo cratic reform is an active citi-
zenry: a sustained presence of individuals, groups, and movements in every 
available social space, whether institutional or informal, collective or indi-
vidual, where they assert their rights and fulfi ll their responsibilities. For it is 
precisely in such spaces that alternative ideas, norms, practices, and politics are 
produced. The aptitude and audacity associated with active citizenry is what I 
have phrased the “art of presence.” Muslim citizens cannot spearhead a demo-
cratic shift  unless they master the art of presence— the skill and stamina to 
assert collective will in spite of all odds by circumventing constraints, utilizing 
what is possible, and discovering new spaces within which to make themselves 
heard, seen, felt, and realized. Authoritarian regimes may be able to suppress 
or ga nized movements or silence collective re sis tance. But they are limited 
when it comes to stifl ing an entire society, the mass of ordinary citizens in 
their daily lives.
Beyond acting as a precondition to sustain a demo cratic reform, the 
change in society’s sensibilities through the active citizenry can also induce 
and impel change onto (authoritarian) states. In this respect, I envision a strat-
egy whereby every social group generates change in society through active 
citizenship in their immediate domains: children at home and at schools, stu-
dents in colleges, teachers in classrooms, workers in factories, the poor in 
their neighborhoods, athletes in stadiums, artists through their art, intellec-
tuals through media, women at home and as public actors. Not only are they 
to voice their claims, broadcast violations done unto them, and make them-
selves heard, but also to take responsibility for excelling at what they do. An 
authoritarian regime should not be a reason for not producing excellent nov-
els, brilliant handicraft s, math champions, world- class athletes, dedicated 
teachers, or a global fi lm industry. Excellence is power; it is identity. By “art of 
presence,” I imagine a way in which a society, through the practices of daily 
life, may regenerate itself by affi  rming the values that deject the authoritarian 
personality, get ahead of its elites, and become capable of enforcing its collec-
tive sensibilities on the state and its henchmen. Citizens equipped with the art 
of presence would subvert authoritarian rule, because the state usually rules 
not as an externality to society; rather, it does so by weaving its logic of power— 
through norms, rules, and institutions— into the fabric of society. Challenging 
those norms, institutions, and logics of power is likely to subvert a state’s 
“governmentality,” its ability to govern.14 And in this, women’s struggle to 
challenge patriarchy in their day- to- day interactions becomes enormously 
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critical, precisely because patriarchy is deeply embedded in the perception 
and practice of religious authoritarian polity. Even though patriarchy may 
evade or incorporate women’s public presence, the latter still leads to undeni-
able eff ect. When girls overtake boys in colleges, women are likely (though 
not necessarily) to be future directors and managers whose authority men are 
compelled to accept, if not internalize. This alone would point to a notable 
shift  in society’s norms and balance of power.
Under authoritarian rule, such eff orts to challenge patriarchy are likely to be 
the expression of women’s nonmovements. Indeed, nonmovements, or the col-
lective endeavors of noncollective actors, would in general constitute the key 
vehicle through which active citizenry may be realized. This is so because of the 
actors’ constant mobilization against, and negotiation or engagement with, the 
dominant powers— the state, property holders, patriarchy, or moral authorities. 
Not only would the nonmovements, on their own, cause signifi cant change in 
the actors’ life- chances; they may in the meantime evolve into sustained social 
movements and contentious politics when the opportunity arises.
My focus on the “art of presence,” or active citizenry, is not intended to 
downplay the signifi cance of or ga ni za tion and concerted collective endeavors 
for change. Nor do I mean to substitute contentious movements with indi-
vidual active citizenry; in fact, such a citizenry, as noted just above, is likely to 
embrace and facilitate or ga nized collective action. Aft er all, Iran’s spectacular 
Green Movement (to protest electoral fraud and demand democratic reform) 
did not emerge out of the blue, but had roots in the various nonmovements, 
which then burst collectively into the open once they found a political oppor-
tunity in July 2009. Yet it is crucial to recognize that not only does authoritar-
ian rule routinely impede contentious collective actions and or ga nized move-
ments, it is also unrealistic to expect a civil society to be in a constant state of 
vigor, vitality, and collective struggle. Society, aft er all, is made up of ordinary 
people, who get tired, demoralized, and disheartened. Activism, the extraor-
dinary practices to produce social change, is the stuff  of activists, who may en-
ergize collective sentiments when the opportunity allows. The point is not to 
reiterate the po liti cal signifi cance of contentious movements to cause po liti cal 
change, or to ignore the necessity of undercutting the coercive power of the 
states. The point, rather, is to discover and recognize societal spaces in which 
lay citizens, with their ordinary practices of everyday life, through the art of 
presence, may recondition the established po liti cal elites and refashion state 
institutions into their sensibilities.
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Such refashioning of the state may result not only from active citizenry, 
individuals’ own initiative and education, but more pervasively from the long- 
term impact of nonmovements or, especially, social movement activism. 
Through their cultural production— establishing new social facts on the ground, 
new lifestyles, modes of thinking, behaving, being, and doing— movements 
can acclimatize states to new societal trends, compelling the authorities to 
take account of society’s prevailing sensibilities. For instance, the Islamic re-
gime in Iran was compelled to recognize and minimally act upon the pop u lar 
desire for secularization, demo cratic polity, and civil liberties, which Iran’s 
social movements had since the late 1990s helped to articulate. Similarly, the 
fact that the Islamic AKP has bowed to Turkey’s secular democracy is neither 
simply a sign of deception nor merely the fear of backlash from the Turkish 
army. Rather, it is a position that has been nurtured and shaped by the secular 
demo cratic sensibilities of Turkish citizens, both religious and secular. I have 
called this laborious pro cess of society infl uencing the state— through estab-
lishing new lifestyles and new modes of thinking, being, and doing things—
socialization of the state. It means conditioning the state and its henchmen to 
societal sensibilities, ideals, and expectations. Socialization of the state is, in 
eff ect, “governmentality” in reverse. It can serve as a crucial venue through 
which citizens may cultivate and compel demo cratic reform onto the authori-
tarian states.
It would be naive to read too much into society at the expense of demon-
izing the state. Just as states may be oppressive and authoritarian, societies can 
be divided, individualized, conservative, and exploitative. Clearly, then, social-
izing the polity, the state, into demo cratic sensibilities may not succeed with-
out politicizing society into a demo cratic direction. Otherwise, active citizenry 
can easily recede into co- optation, communalism, authoritarian ethos, or self-
ish individualism that can turn it into a citizenry devoid of collective sensibil-
ity, inclusive responsibility, and aspiration. It is thus crucial for an active citi-
zenry to think and act po liti cally, even within its own immediate sphere, even 
though its aim might not be revolution or regime change; it must be con-
cerned with solidarity, social justice, and an inclusive social order.
In the Muslim Middle East, initiatives for a sustained demo cratic reform 
need to come from the region’s indigenous movements, who would then deter-
mine if and how international assistance should be deployed. The painstaking 
reform eff orts in the region will yield little if democracy is preached and pushed 
by foreign forces, and even far less through coercion and conquest.
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shevik Rus sia, see Fitzpatrick, Cultural Front; see also Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander 
Rabinowitch, and Richard Stites, eds., Rus sia in the Era of NEP: Explorations in Soviet 
Society and Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).
96.  See Algar, Wahhabism.
97.  Ibid, pp. 48– 49.
Chapter 8
1.  These sections draw heavily on my “Revolution Without Movement, Move-
ment Without Revolution: Comparing Islamic Activism in Iran and Egypt,” Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 42, no. 1 (January 1998), pp. 136– 69.
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